Price, Product Quality, and Exporter Dynamics: Evidence from China

By Joel Rodrigue (Vanderbilt University) and Yong Tan (Nanjing University of Finance and Economics)

For the typical Chinese exporter, foreign sales grew exponentially after China’s entry to the WTO.  How was this so-called ‘economic miracle’ achieved in such a short span of time? Answering this question has been the focus of policymakers, government officials, and academic researchers across the globe.

Our recent paper adds to a rich literature studying the determinants of Chinese export growth.[1] In particular, we examine the impact that consumer loyalty has on the market strategies adopted by Chinese firms to successfully grow into high-value export markets.  Even if they were aided by falling trade costs, convincing foreign consumers to purchase Chinese goods for the first time is no small feat.  To clear this hurdle we argue that Chinese firms systematically chose to enter markets producing low quality products and setting low prices.

This doesn’t mean the stereotype that Chinese exports are broadly low price or low quality is accurate.  Rather, as foreign consumers adopted new Chinese goods, producers adjusted production to produce higher quality, higher price, higher-value varieties.  In this sense, the rapid Chinese export-driven economic growth has occurred alongside an observable rise in the nation’s firm-level climb up the value-chain.

Our approach builds on the static O-ring models of endogenous quality choice under monopolistic competition.[2]  We extend this setting to consider the dynamic pricing and product quality decisions by bridging this framework with models of habit persistence and demand accumulation.[3]  A key outcome from this marriage of ideas is that exporting firms will alter markups and product quality over time in order to grow sales rapidly during the initial years after entry and develop a large customer base.

The degree to which firms care about the future, however, depends on the firm’s long-run outlook in competitive export markets.  Small, unproductive firms are more likely to produce low quality products and yield little discount initially because they don’t expect to serve the same consumers more than once.  In contrast, the most efficient firms optimally aim to reach consumers by offering good value for their dollar: high quality products at a relatively low price.

To fix ideas we focus on the production of electric kettles, a small electronic appliance, typical of much of China’s export growth.  In Figure 1 we depict the evolution of export prices, product quality and export sales for a representative firm in a typical export market.  New Chinese exporters, despite producing low quality varieties, sell these goods one percent cheaper than established firms selling the same quality of electric kettle.  While this difference might sound small, it is worth at least 4 percent higher export sales in the firm’s first year – often the difference between breaking even or losing money when a firm enters new markets.

Over time the impacts are even larger.  While the export sales of a typical kettle producer grew by nearly 80 percent between 2001 and 2006, Chinese producers systematically added new features to their products: stainless steel casings, rapid heating systems, larger capacity, etc.  Adding these desirable product characteristics, however, is not free.  Rather, we document that over a five-year period typical input costs rose by twelve percent to incorporate higher quality attributes.

Not surprisingly product quality upgrading is likewise found to drive a large part of Chinese export growth; observed product improvements account for at least 17 percent of the aggregate growth in kettle exports over the same time period. As Chinese firms further entrenched themselves in foreign export markets, their profits rose accordingly: markups increased by nearly 2 percent over the same time period as Chinese firms exported kettles at higher and higher profit margins.

The consequences for trade policy are manifold.  In particular, price effects are likely to be muted in response to changes in trade policy.  While tariff declines are found to directly reduce the price consumers pay, product quality upgrading has an opposing effect.  Quality upgrading offsets price declines because high quality products are more expensive to produce, but also because it induces higher producer markups.

In contrast to the long march towards free and unfettered trade after WWII, recent tariff policy can broadly be characterized by unprecedented tariff increases in many countries.  Nowhere is this more evident than US trade policy vis-à-vis China where tariffs have increased sharply, but – surprisingly – prices have remained remarkably stable despite the rise in trade costs.[4]  Could this reflect changes in product characteristics and markups?  That remains unclear.  What is clear is that Chinese producers will react to tariff change on multiple fronts to maintain and grow their foothold in US export markets.  Ignoring the multi-dimensional responses of producers can potentially misrepresent the nature and impact that tariff policy has on firm behavior.

References

Amiti, Mary, Stephen J. Redding, and David Weinstein, (2018); “The Impact of the 2018 Trade War on U.S. Prices and Welfare.’’ NBER Working Paper No. 25672.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Pinelopi Goldberg, Patrick Kennedy, and Amit Khandelwal, (2019); “The Return to Protectionism.” NBER Working Paper No. 25638.

Gilchrist, Simon, Raphael Schoenle, Jae. W. Sim, and Egon Zakrajsek, (2017); “Inflation Dynamics During the Financial Crisis.” American Economic Review, 107(3): 785-823.

Kugler, Maurice and Eric Verhoogen, (2012); “Prices, Plant Size, and Product Quality.” Review of Economic Studies, 79(1): 307-339.

Piveteau, Paul, (2018); “An Empirical Dynamic Model of Trade with Consumer Accumulation.” Working Paper, Columbia University.

Rodrigue, Joel and Yong Tan, (2019); “Price, Product Quality, and Exporter Dynamics: Evidence from China.” International Economic Review, forthcoming.

Endnotes

[1] Rodrigue and Tan (2019).

[2] See Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).

[3] In our model, habit persistence is based on Gilchrist et al (2017), while demand accumulation is based on Piveteau (2018).

[4] See Amiti et al (2018) and Fajgelbaum et al (2019).

Research Analyst

The Peterson Institute for International Economics, a leading think tank located at Dupont Circle, Washington, DC, seeks a full-time research analyst to work with Dr Chad P. Bown on projects on international trade policy and trade agreements.

Responsibilities include collecting and analyzing economic data, producing charts and graphs for publication and presentations, doing econometric analysis, reviewing policy texts, writing literature reviews, and summarizing results.

Applicants should have a solid understanding of international economics and policy, strong knowledge of econometrics, proficiency with Stata, good writing skills, and attention to detail. Applicants should also be self-driven and demonstrate professional maturity.

In addition to a resume and three references, applicants should also submit a recent writing sample.

The Institute offers a professional work environment, a competitive salary, and excellent benefits. Please email applications to  with the subject line “RA-International Trade Policy.” No phone calls please.

For more: https://www.piie.com/about/employment/full-time-research-analyst

Call for Papers: Workshop EP@B, Economics & Politics at Bruxelles

December, 16-17, 2019, Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium)

Following the 2018 Economics and Politics at Lille (EP@L), the 2019 Economics and Politics Workshop will take place at Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and become EP@B, jointly organized by Centre Emile Bernheim (ULB), Dulbéa (ULB), CEE  (Sciences Po Paris), and LEM (University of Lille). The workshop aims to bring together scholars from economics and political science interested in interdisciplinary work on political economy. We welcome theoretical as well as empirical papers by both economists and political scientists. Papers covering issues in all usual areas of political economy are welcome. The workshop is intended for presentation of papers-in-progress that can benefit from discussion. Selection of papers will be based on their quality with the aim to offer a coherent program. Submissions by graduate students and recent graduates of thesis chapters are welcome.

Workshop Organization
There are no parallel sessions. Participation in the workshop implies participation in all sessions. To facilitate and improve discussions, the time devoted to presentation and discussion will be equivalent. For each paper, at least one discussant will be designated. There is no conference fee. Young scholars (up to two years after PhD) can apply for a scholarship.

Deadlines and submissions
Extended abstract or a copy of the paper in pdf format should be sent to epal.lille@gmail.com by October 18, 2019. Authors will be notified by November 1st and agree to send at least a draft version of their paper by December 1st, 2019. Those interested in discussing a paper or willing to take part in the event could contact the organizers. To support young researchers (up to two years after PhD), the organizers can cover travel expenditures and accommodation for up to four researchers (max 500 euros each). Please, indicate whether you apply for those scholarships in your submission and where you would travel from.

Program committee: Quentin David (LEM, Lille University), Abel François (LEM, Lille University), Emiliano Grossman (CEE, Sciences Po Paris), Pierre-Guillaume Méon (Centre Emile Bernheim) and Ilan Tojerow (Dulbéa)

Local committee: Pierre-Guillaume Méon (Centre Emile Bernheim) and Ilan Tojerow (Dulbéa) Contact: Pierre-Guillaume Méon (pgmeon@ulb.ac.be), Ilan Tojerow (itojerow@ulb.ac.be)

Do Macro Production Functions Differ Across Countries?

Markus Eberhardt (University of Nottingham) and Francis Teal (Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford)

“We compare this [input] index with our output index and call any discrepancy ‘productivity’… It is a measure of our ignorance, of the unknown, and of the magnitude of the task that is still ahead of us.” Zvi Griliches (1961)

It is an unfortunate misconception that the canonical Solow-Swan growth model necessarily implies that all economies in the world, rich or poor, industrialised or agrarian, possess the same production technology.[1]  As the above quote shows there are prominent critics of this assumption while Solow himself suggested that “whether simple parameterizations do justice to real differences in the way the economic mechanism functions in one place or another” was certainly worth ‘grumbling’ about.[2] Nevertheless, the notion that cross-country empirical analysis should, in case of accounting exercises, adopt or, in case of regression analysis, aim to arrive at a common capital coefficient of around 0.3 for all countries is deeply ingrained in the minds of growth economists.

In a forthcoming paper, we take an alternative approach to revisit the issue of whether technology is common across countries.[3] But before we discuss the approach and findings of that paper, we want to briefly illustrate why the assumption of a common capital coefficient is questionable. If the commonly adopted value for the capital coefficient of 1/3 were of great significance then we would expect total factor productivity (TFP) estimates from standard growth accounting exercises to differ substantially once we chose different values for the capital coefficient, in particular for values close to zero. Our data exercises proceed as follows: we first draw a random capital coefficient between zero and one, which we employ to compute annual TFP growth via standard growth accounting. The accounted country-specific TFP growth is then averaged over time and countries are ranked by TFP growth magnitude. This process is then repeated 1,000 times.

An important feature of this analysis and also our study is the focus on manufacturing. The central importance of this industrial sector for successful development is (still) a widely recognised ‘stylised fact’ in development economics. Yet in contrast to the literature on cross-country growth regressions using aggregate economy or agriculture data there is comparatively little empirical work dedicated to the analysis of the manufacturing sector in a large cross-section of countries. If manufacturing matters for development it seems self-evidently important to learn about the production process and its drivers in this industrial sector.

A visual illustration of the results from the 1,000 growth accounting exercises is provided in Figure 1: the ‘Baobab trees of growth accounting’. We split the 48 countries in the sample into 8 groups, based on the rankings implied by their average TFP growth rate when the capital coefficient is 1/3. On the y-axis of each plot we indicate the capital coefficient applied in the growth accounting exercise, while the x-axis indicates the resulting rank of each country from 1 to 48 in terms of average TFP growth. All of the plots show the same pattern, resembling a Baobab tree, with a narrow ‘trunk’ and a spreading out of the upper ‘crown’. We conclude that provided the capital coefficient is assumed common across countries it is entirely unimportant what value is chosen for this parameter, since the productivity rankings based on TFP growth rates are essentially unchanged for ‘reasonable’ values of the capital coefficient. We only see considerable change if the capital coefficient is greater than 0.6, which we know is an unreasonable parameter value. This finding raises serious doubts over the validity of the common technology assumption maintained in these computations.

Figure 1

 

In our paper, we compare and contrast regression results from different estimators which make different assumptions about production technology and TFP: whether technology differs or is common across countries, whether TFP levels and growth rates differ or are common across countries. While the theoretical literatures on growth and econometrics provide solid foundations for technology heterogeneity as well as the time-series and cross-section properties of macro panel data we highlight in our paper, these have in practice not been considered in great detail in the empirical growth literature. Since most growth economists are not familiar with our preferred set of empirical estimators, we motivate and discuss them in the paper at great length. These methods enable us to model country-specific production technology and time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across countries (differential TFP levels), but also time-variant unobserved heterogeneity to capture differential TFP evolution over time in a very flexible manner.

Our analysis establishes that assuming a common technology parameter for all countries yields very serious bias in the capital coefficient, with parameter values ranging from 0.6 to 0.8, far in excess of the macro evidence of 0.3. The heterogeneous parameter estimators yield uniformly lower capital coefficients, much more in line with the aggregate economy factor income share data. Based on formal diagnostic testing, our empirical results favour models with heterogeneous technology which account for a combination of heterogeneous and common TFP and reject the notion of common technology. We also carried out a significant number of formal parameter heterogeneity tests which confirmed this result.

Our general production function framework provides a number of alternative insights into macro TFP estimation. Firstly, it seems prudent to allow for maximum flexibility in the structure of the empirical TFP terms: if TFP represents a ‘measure of our ignorance’ then it makes sense to allow for differential TFP across countries and time. Secondly, it further makes sense to keep an open mind about the commonality of TFP: while early empirical models assumed common TFP growth for all countries, later studies preferred to specify differential TFP evolution across countries. We believe the arguments for commonality (non-rival nature of knowledge, spillovers, global shocks) and idiosyncracy (patents, tacit knowledge, learning-by-doing) call for an empirical specification which does not rule out either by construction. Thirdly, an empirical specification that allows for parameter heterogeneity across countries and for a shift away from the widespread focus on TFP analysis and toward an integrated treatment of the production function in its entirety appears to fit the data best. The Baobab Tree accounting exercises illustrate the very limited insights to be gained from the assumption of a common technology framework.

Our analysis represents a step toward making cross-country empirics relevant to individual countries by moving away from empirical results that characterise the average country and toward a deeper understanding of the differences across countries. Further, the key to understanding cross-country differences in income is not exclusively linked to understanding TFP differences, but requires careful consideration of differences in production technology. Since modelling production technology as heterogeneous across countries requires an entirely different set of empirical methods we have focused on developing this aspect in the present paper and have left empirical testing of rival hypotheses about the patterns and sources of technological differences for future research.

References

Eberhardt, Markus, and Francis Teal (2019); “The Magnitude of the Task Ahead: Macro Implications of Heterogeneous Technology.” Forthcoming in the Review of Income and Wealth.

Griliches, Zvi, (1961); “Comment on An Appraisal of Long-Term Capital Estimates: Some Reference Notes by Daniel Creamer.” Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement (NBER), pp. 446–9.

Solow, Robert M., (1986); “Unemployment: Getting the Questions Right.” Economica, 53(210): S23–34.

Endnotes

[1] We refer to ‘technology heterogeneity’ to indicate differential production function parameters on observable inputs across countries, with unobservables captured as TFP.

[2] See Solow (1986 S23)

[3] See Eberhardt and Teal (2019)

RIDGE Workshop on International Trade / Growth and Development in Macroeconomics

The Research Institute for Development, Growth and Economics (RIDGE) is pleased to announce a call for papers for the Workshop on International Trade / Growth and  Development in Macroeconomics to be held in Montevideo, Uruguay, on 17-19 December 2019.

The deadline for submission is September 27, 2019 (12 AM ET).

Invited Keynote Speakers:

Gene M. Grossman (Jacob Viner Professor of International Economics at Princeton University
Jonathan Eaton (Distinguished Professor of Economics at The Pennsylvania State University)
Ufuk Akcigit (Associate Professor at University of Chicago)

The RIDGE December Forum aims to favor the spread of high quality research in economics by bringing together prestigious researchers working on the frontier of knowledge to local and regional researchers and policymakers.

Participants to this workshop are welcome to attend the other workshops.

Full papers, written in English, must be submitted for consideration for the workshop. The cover page should include: the title of the paper, institutional affiliation, including address, phone and email of each author and an abstract with the appropriate JEL classification.

Papers should be submitted as pdf and the file should be saved as follows: “Surname of author, name of author, title of paper.pdf”.

Each author can submit and present at most one paper per workshop. Submission of papers to other workshops is possible, however the same paper can only be presented in one workshop within the same forum.

Full papers should be submitted via the website:
http://www.ridge.uy/paper-submission/

Important dates
Deadline for paper submission: September 27, 2019 (12 AM ET)
Notification of organizers decision: October 11, 2019

 

Funded PhD position in macroeconomics / international economic development

The University of Lucerne is the youngest university in Switzerland. Founded in 2000, it has four faculties and around 3,000 students. The Faculty of Economics and Management opened its doors to students in the autumn semester of 2016. Personal supervision of students, interactive forms of teaching, close links between academia and practice, and a young, motivated team all give this new faculty a unique profile.

The Chair of International Economics (Prof. Manuel Oechslin) at the Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Lucerne invites applications for a

Funded PhD position in macroeconomics / international economic development,

starting October 1, 2019 (negotiable)

The successful applicant will complete a tailored graduate course program and write a doctoral thesis. The position comes with comparatively light teaching (assistance) obligations. The terms of employment are subject to university regulations.

Applicants should hold (or soon earn) an excellent master’s degree in economics and have a specific interest in one of the above-mentioned subject areas. An affinity for economic modeling would be highly welcomed.

For further information, please contact Prof. Manuel Oechslin ().

Please submit the usual documents (cover letter, CV, transcript of grades) via our job portal on www.unilu.ch/jobs. In addition, please ask two academic referees to send their reference letters by email to . Applications will be considered until the position is filled.

Apply via our job portal: www.unilu.ch/jobs

PhD in Economics – Melbourne, Australia

Application for PhD in Economics at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.

The Department of Economics at Deakin University, Australia <http://www.deakin.edu.au/business/economics> is pleased to announce a call for applications for the 2020 PhD programme in Economics (starting March 2020), where a number of scholarships will be available to cover fees and living expenses. Key areas of research expertise of the Economics Department include Development Economics, Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Theory, Applied Economics and International Trade. It is ranked among the top nine in Australia and third in Victoria according to the Australian government rankings (ERA 2018). It is one of the top departments in the Deakin Business School, which recently received the prestigious AACSB accreditation. Deakin University is ranked in the top 2% of universities worldwide across the three major international university rankings (ARWU, Times Higher Ed, QS), and is one of the top 50 universities under 50 (QS). Deakin has a 5-star QS rating, highlighting the quality of our research and teaching.

The Department is seeking applicants of the highest academic standards to participate in our PhD programme and will provide them with the training (through rigorous course work during the first year of studies), experience and mentorship necessary for their professional development. Students specializing in development economics also have the option to visit Yale University for a period of 9 to 12 months, where they will be part of Professor Mushfiq Mobarak’s working group of PhD students (please contact us for further details).

A completed honours or master’s degree in economics, mathematics, statistics, or cognate fields with an excellent academic record and experience in research is required. Refer to our website for full eligibility requirements:

https://blogs.deakin.edu.au/business-and-law-phd/disciplines/economics/

Further enquiries should be sent to the PhD Director in Economics, Dr. Aaron Nicholas at economics-phd@deakin.edu.au

Applications must be made online by 15th September, 2019 though we advise applying by 8th September for pre-evaluation.

Should the WTO Require Free Trade Agreements to Eliminate Internal Tariffs?

By Kamal Saggi (Vanderbilt University), Woan Foong Wong (University of Oregon), and Halis M. Yildiz (Ryerson University)

At a time when multilateral trade liberalization at the World Trade Organization (WTO) seems to have come to a grinding halt, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) appear to be the only game in town for countries interested in undertaking international trade liberalization. Under the current rules of the WTO, countries entering into a PTA are required to eliminate tariffs on “substantially all trade” with each other and refrain from raising trade restrictions on non-member countries. In the existing literature, Article XXIV has often been invoked as a justification for the assumption that PTA members impose zero tariffs on each other. Though reasonable, this approach masks the incentives underlying the tariff-setting behavior of PTA members and, by design, fails to shed light on the consequences of requiring them to fully liberalize internal trade. In reality, PTA members do not always abide by this restriction.[1] In a recent article, we employ a model of endogenous trade agreements to shed light on the consequences of such non-compliance on the part of PTA members regarding the free internal trade requirement of GATT Article XXIV.[2]

Our conceptual approach follows the recent literature on endogenous formation of trade agreements.[3] In a modified version of the three-country competing exporters framework, in order to draw out the implications of requiring PTA members to eliminate tariffs on one another, we derive and contrast optimal tariffs and equilibrium trade agreements under two scenarios.[4] While members are required to engage in free internal trade in the WTO-consistent scenario, PTA members have the freedom to implement jointly optimal internal tariffs under the unconstrained preferential liberalization scenario. A comparison of these two scenarios delivers several interesting results.

First, we show that if FTA members choose internal tariffs to maximize their joint welfare, they indeed have an incentive to impose positive tariffs on one another. The intuition for this surprising result rests on the interplay between the lack of external tariff coordination between FTA members and the complementarity of imports tariffs. Since FTA members set their external tariffs independently, each member fails to take into account the benefits that its external tariff confers on its partner and thus the individually optimal external tariffs of FTA members are too low from the perspective of maximizing their joint welfare. While coordinating their internal tariffs, FTA members deliberately choose to set positive internal tariffs on each other: doing so commits each of them to a higher external tariff on the non-member country thereby bringing their individually optimal external tariffs closer to jointly optimal ones. To confirm the role that external tariff coordination plays in generating positive internal tariffs within an FTA, we consider a CU formation game where members can coordinate their external as well as internal tariffs. Under such a case, members indeed find it optimal to engage in free internal trade. This result suggests that the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV is likely to be more binding for FTAs relative to CUs.

The second major insight delivered by our analysis is that requiring PTA members to eliminate internal tariffs benefits the non-member since it leads to lower external tariffs on the part of PTA members. This result is noteworthy since part of the original intent behind the design of Article XXIV may have been to minimize any potential negative effects of PTAs on non-member countries. Ostensibly, this objective was met by prohibiting PTA members from raising their external tariffs on outsiders. However, in our model, PTA members have no incentive to increase their external tariffs on the non-member country anyway. Thus, the Article XXIV stipulation that PTA members cannot raise tariffs on outsiders may actually do little to protect the interests of outsiders. Our analysis demonstrates that, somewhat surprisingly, it is the Article XXIV requirement of free internal trade within a PTA that ends up protecting the non-member as opposed to the restriction imposed on the external tariffs of PTAs.

Our third major result pertaining to the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV is that having such a requirement makes it harder to achieve global free trade. By lowering the external tariffs of FTA members, the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV makes it less attractive for the non-member to enter into trade agreements with them. Thus, the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV might facilitate some degree of free-riding in the WTO system by allowing non-member countries to benefit from reductions in external tariffs of FTA members (that result from their internal trade liberalization) without having to offer any tariff cuts of their own. Thus, our overall message is somewhat nuanced: when circumstances are such that achieving global free trade is not possible, the free internal trade requirement of Article XXIV increases world welfare by lowering tariffs worldwide but, at the same time, it also reduces the likelihood of reaching global free trade.

We also show that our results are robust to two alternative tariff setting scenarios. First, we relax the assumption that countries seeking to form FTAs set their MFN tariffs non-cooperatively. To this end, we allow countries to engage in a limited degree of cooperation and show that our main results regarding the impact of the free internal trade requirement continue to hold even when countries do not set their tariffs in a fully non-cooperative manner. Second, to address the issue of the extent of enforceability of the free internal trade provision of Article XXIV, we examine a scenario where Article XXIV imposes a ceiling on the internal tariffs of an FTA. Under such a scenario, we show that the free-riding incentive continues to be the pivotal force and tighter ceiling lowers the external tariffs of FTA members, making it less attractive for the non-member to enter into trade agreements with FTA members which in turn undermines global free trade.

References

Bagwell, K. and R.W. Staiger, (1999); “Regionalism and multilateral tariff cooperation.” In John Piggott and Allan Woodland, eds, International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim, London: MacMillan.

Bagwell, K., C.P. Bown, and R.W. Staiger, (2016); “Is the WTO passé?Journal of Economic Literature 54(4): 1125-1231.

Saggi, K. and H.M. Yildiz, (2010); “Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade.” Journal of International Economics 81: 26-37.

Saggi, K., W.-F. Wong and H.M. Yildiz, (2019); “Should the WTO require free trade agreements to eliminate internal tariffs? “, Journal of International Economics, 118, 316-30, 2019.

Saggi, K., A. Woodland, and H.M. Yildiz, (2013); “On the relationship between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization: the case of customs unions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5(1): 63-99.

Endnotes

[1] See Bagwell et. al, 2016.

[2] See Saggi et al. (2019).

[3] See Saggi and Yildiz (2010) for FTAs and Saggi et. al (2013) for CUs.

[4] See Bagwell and Staiger (1999).

Welcome New Members May 2019

We would like to welcome the following new members to the InsTED Network

Prof Kathy Baylis (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Her research interests lie in the design of agricultural, conservation, and trade policy to promote ecosystem preservation and international food security.

Ms Casey Petroff (Harvard University).  Her research interests are in economic development and public policy, focusing on the development of public good provision relating to health care.