Bratislava Summit – roadmap for the EU’s future

Miroslav Lajčák,
Slovak Minister of Foreign and European Affairs

Greece takes up the challenge

Albrecht Broemme,
President of the German Technical Relief Agency (THW)

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Europe is the solution, not the problem

Is Europe really in crisis or could it be simply that the EU is currently not equal to the particular challenges it faces? The absence of a common approach to the refugee problem due to national egotism and a lack of common values as well as differing conceptions of the importance of Schengen for combating terrorism; the impossibility of achieving essential progress in the field of the Common Security and Defence Policy because, thanks to the British Government, all efforts to improve European structures and capabilities have up until now been nipped in the bud; the impossibility of finding a satisfactory solution to the financial crisis while the wealth gap between north and south appears to be widening: these are but some of the many challenges confronting the EU all at the same time.

The British application to leave the EU has wreaked less havoc than was feared would be the case, but has been met with less understanding than expected.

The EU’s Bratislava Summit in September was a welcome call for more Europe, less nationalism and more confidence in the EU, for unless it is able to regain citizens’ trust the EU will fail.

The great European goal of peace, freedom and prosperity is something that has to be fought for; it is not guaranteed. Thus Bratislava was an invitation to nations and citizens to join that effort and for the time being to lay aside national self-interest in favour of the higher aim of a common Europe.

Brexit offers some initial opportunities for improving European structures and capabilities. The planning and command capabilities that the EU is lacking could be quickly created in the form of a strategic European mixed civil-military headquarters under the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which would enable the EU to conduct its own missions and at the same time to become an equal and reliable partner for NATO. A structure could be created beneath that headquarters in order to give the EU operational command capabilities by calling upon existing multinational headquarters (operational headquarters) that could command the allocated forces. The 1996 Berlin Plus Agreement guaranteeing NATO support for the EU on request must remain in force.

So far the British Government has refused those plans. The EU needs to set about tackling these aims quickly, before the British have a change of heart and decide to abandon Brexit in the national interest.

The United States: Donald Trump’s populist electoral slogans about retiring from NATO leadership are a reminder to EU Member States that they are completely dependent on NATO, while in recent years there has been a drastic shift of the US political and strategic engagement towards Asia and a growing trend towards isolationism. The development of a European defence is necessary not because of possible power shifts within NATO but because of Europe’s own weakness. I am not afraid that the US will weaken itself by weakening its leading role in NATO. The new American President is going to learn what military power means and also the behaviour that must go hand in hand with it.
Content

3 Editorial
6 NEWS

8–16

In the Spotlight
A new impetus for Europe

8 Miroslav Lajčák, Bratislava
Bratislava Summit – Roadmap for the EU’s future
The European project must continue

12 Arne Lietz MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg
The future of the CSDP
A more capable European defence

14 Hartmut Bühl, Paris
The Trump effect – the carefree days are over
Old and new ideas about European defence

16 Commentary by Jacques Favín Lévêque, Versailles
CETA – lessons learned
Globalisation is a fact

18 Dimitris Avramopoulos, Brussels
Stronger European borders for a more open Europe
Achievements of European integration

20 Documentation
Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security

21 Interview with Klaus Rösler, Warsaw
“A solid legal basis to fully support Member States”
New horizon for European borders

26 Graphics
EU external borders

28 Ska Keller MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg
More power for Frontex – but no boost to human rights
The humanitarian factor is prevailing

30 Gilles de Kerchove, Brussels
The European Union’s external borders
More Europe and more Schengen

32 Marco Feldmann, Berlin
Combat against human traffickers at the Greek-Turkish Border
The migration drama is not over

33 Commentary by Uwe Proll, Bonn/Berlin
Saved from running away
A nightmare

35 Albrecht Broemme, Berlin
Greece takes up the challenge
Implementing the EU-Turkey agreement

39 David Bond, London
Bounding the Leviathan
The NOE security conundrum
“Schengen is one of the greatest achievements of European Integration.“

Dimitris Avramopoulos

NATO
Defence – Dialogue – Détente

42 Petr Pavel, Brussels
Deterrence and Dialogue
The Warsaw Summit – more than rhetoric

43 Alexander Grushko, Brussels
NATO is rethinking the cold war
NATO forces’ withdrawal necessary for a common security

44 Harald Kujat, Berlin
Deterrence and Dialogue or Security and Détente?
Remembering Pierre Harmel

47 Jiří Šedivý, Brussels
Security and Resilience in the context of NATO-EU Cooperation
The basic political barrier is still very high

51–60
Technologies
Solutions should meet the requirements

52 José Mariano López-Urdiales, Barcelona
Responsive on-demand small satellite launchers
Europe’s road to LEO

55 Nicole Kaim-Albers, Berlin
The resilient energy system – a security evolution
A paradigm shift in energy security

58 Thomas Popp, Schwaikheim
CBRN threats are relevant – decontamination concepts and capabilities
A hollistic approach to decontamination

Conference Reports

61 EuroDefense Annual Meeting
by Patrice Mompeyssin, Paris

62 Logistics Capability Workshop
by Jiří Štirba, Prague

owasky (right); page 4: Lukes_photo, CC BY SA 2.0, flickr.com(left), Francesco Malavolta, Frontex (right); page 5: NATO, flickr.com (left); Cassidian (right)
MEPs call for a common EU defence policy

In October, the Members of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee adopted two reports saying that the EU should tackle deteriorating security in and around Europe by helping its armed forces to work together better, as a first step in building a common defence policy. MEPs ask the European Council to lead the creation of “common Union defence policy and to provide additional financial resources ensuring its implementation”. Ideas include establishing an EU operational headquarters to plan, command and manage crisis management operations, setting a defence spending target of 2% of GDP and launching a Common Defence and Security Policy training operation in Iraq.

See also the article by Arne Lietz MEP on the CSDP after Brexit (pages 12–13)

Roadmap for the EU-27

After the British pro-Brexit vote in June 2016, the EU is preparing for the UK’s departure. At the Bratislava summit in September, the 27 EU Heads of State and Government agreed on a roadmap for the Union’s future.

See the article by Slovak Foreign Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák (pages 8–9) in our Chapter In the Spotlight

To leave or not to leave, that is the question

Photo: © The European Union 2016, source: EP
IESMA 2016 event in Vilnius

For the third time, the “Innovative Energy Solutions for Military Applications” (IESMA 2016) event took place from 16-18 November in Vilnius, Lithuania. The conference and exhibition were organised by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC COE) and the Georgian Scientific Research Centre of the Georgian Ministry of Defence (DELTA). Experts from NATO countries and partner nations shared their knowledge and expertise during the conference panels and visited the exhibition where innovative ideas for efficiency in energy usage were presented.

Energy is key for NATO

At the opening ceremony, Juozas Olekas, Minister of Defence of Lithuania, said: “We are living in a very rapidly changing geopolitical situation. Therefore, energy consumption, the protection of critical energy infrastructure and an uninterrupted supply of energy are important not just for NATO itself, but for every independent country. To achieve the best possible result, we must encourage cooperation between the military and private sectors and academia.” Gintaras Bagdonas, Director of the NATO ENSEC COE said: “Energy efficiency and innovations in military is very important for whole NATO. It is the only exhibition of this kind in Europe and the fact, that the interest and numbers of participants is growing, just proves that the energy community exists and it’s growing.”

The Hybrid Power Generation and Management System (HPGS) was part of the IESMA 2016 exhibition. This deployable modular system, developed by the German company Pfisterer, was handed over by the ENSEC COE to the Lithuanian Armed Forces in February 2016. The HPGS utilises both, renewable energy sources and conventional fuel, and includes batteries and a management system.

Mobile communications at AFCEA’s TechNet Europe 2016

This year’s “Jubilee TechNet Europe 2016” on 3–4 October 2016, was held in Rotterdam under the patronage of the Dutch Ministry of Defence and with the support of AFCEA’s The Hague Chapter. AFCEA Europe promotes global security by providing a forum for the exchange of information in all domains relating to C4ISR. Special emphasis was placed on mobile communications.

Secusmart boards security train

The overall theme of the event, “Changing the Game in Security – Key Role for C4ISR”, demonstrated the growing importance of cyber security. The main keynote speaker, Dr Christoph Erdmann, Managing Director of Secusmart, gave a lecture on the topic, “Cyber – What Else?”. He underlined that mobile communications are a major area of cyber security, and that it is more crucial than ever to adopt the right response to cases like the recent spying affairs and wire-tapping scandals. More than 20 governments worldwide, along with enterprises around the globe, have put their faith in the security solutions developed and produced by Secusmart, a subsidiary of BlackBerry Ltd.

Usability and simplicity

The secret of the Secusmart solutions, both for industry and government use, is simple: put the user first, and offer a convenient and easy-to-use solution package. A truly secure smartphone is one that offers both usability and simplicity, combined with an encryption standard that prevents enemies from listening in. Secusmart recently applied the same technology to another class of device. Approved by the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) at the “classified – for official use only” (VSNfD) security level, SecuTABLET offers encrypted data transfer and editing.

See also the article on energy security by Nicole Kaim-Albers from the World Energy Council (pages 55–56)
In today’s interlinked and crisis-ridden world, the European Union is currently being tested more than ever before. It is confronted with unprecedented challenges: migration, radicalisation and terrorism, economic turmoil, social imbalances, bloody conflicts in the European neighbourhood but also a growing gap between the people and political elites. Many citizens doubt whether European politicians are capable of providing effective answers to their concerns and needs. The British voters’ decision to leave the EU is a very tangible – although very regrettable – result of those tendencies. At the same time, it has also served as a wake-up call for Europe and its leaders who needed to realise that we must turn the significant risks facing the existence of the Union into an opportunity for making it better and stronger as well as more understandable for and closer to its citizens.

The Bratislava process

The informal meeting of the EU27 Heads of State and Government hosted by the Slovak Presidency in Bratislava on 16 September was an important step in this direction. European leaders conveyed the message of their determination to continue the European project in unity as EU27. They jointly agreed on the diagnosis of the EU’s shortcomings: the EU, the member states and the European institutions must address concerns of the citizens in a more focused way. They need to make decisions more rapidly and transparently and to implement them more reliably in a manner that makes them understandable for citizens. The leaders also initiated the Bratislava process, which will culminate on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties by March 2017. This process is twofold: On the one hand, there will be a phase of deeper reflection on possible steps to make the EU better, more united, more resilient and more comprehensible. On the other hand, leaders agreed on a set of concrete measures in three priority areas: Migration, Security, and the Economy. What is important is not to limit reflection on the future of the EU to the question of “more Europe” or “less Europe”: Instead of theoretical debates about treaty changes or a transfer of competencies, we need to re-establish respect for our own rules and deliver on what was agreed upon (without attacking or questioning the consensus reached by all).

“Instead of theoretical debates about treaty changes or a transfer of competencies, we need to re-establish respect for our own rules and deliver on what was agreed upon.”

Miroslav Lajčák

Miroslav Lajčák has been the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic since March 2016. Born in 1963, he studied internal relations and law in Moscow, Bratislava and at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany. During his career, Mr Lajčák played an active role in mediating the post-conflict crises in the Western Balkans and in the transformation of his country, as well as in building the EU’s diplomatic service. He has been the Slovak Ambassador to Japan, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 2007 he was appointed High Representative of the International Community and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2010-2012 he served as Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia in the newly created EEAS in Brussels. Mr Lajčák was already appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 and again in 2012. From 2012 to 2016 he also served as Deputy Prime Minister.

The Bratislava Summit – roadmap for the EU’s future

by Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava
Achievements and steps to be taken

Some initial results have been already achieved: The European Border and Coast Guard has been put into service. The ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement by the EU paved the way for it to come into force. And after a dramatic demonstration of European procedures the unprecedented trade agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA) has been signed. But there are further steps to be taken:

A sustainable common migration and asylum policy

The EU is working on crafting a sustainable common migration and asylum policy, on ways to combat youth unemployment and complete the European Single Market. In order to keep up with global technological advancement, the latter needs to be enriched by new pillars: the Digital Single Market and the Energy Union.

Strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy

In Bratislava, the EU leaders also agreed to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In December the European Council shall decide on how to make better use of the options offered by the Treaties. Terrorist attacks, illegal migration, hybrid threats and violations of international law have had a direct impact on security in Europe. The urgency and complexity of these challenges demand that the EU act with unity and solidarity. The EU Global Strategy provides sound political guidance. The key goal is to improve our military and civilian capabilities to make them more responsive to security challenges in our neighbourhood in accordance with our needs, interests and commitments. Slovakia supports a strengthening of the CSDP. It should be ambitious, but at the same time realistic.

The transatlantic link

Of course, the transatlantic link remains vital for European security. For its members, NATO is the indispensable bedrock for their collective defence. A stronger European defence should contribute to strengthening NATO. The Alliance should benefit from increased cooperation and coordination among its European members.

We want the European project to continue

We need to remind ourselves, our elites and citizens of this: for over six decades, the EU has contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, stability, democracy and human rights in Europe and its neighbourhood. If we want the European project to continue to be this unique stabilising force for peace and prosperity, we need to work very hard, with determination and in unity – especially in these tough times with so many internal and external challenges. Slovakia as the current holder of the EU Presidency has the willingness and resolve to do its part.
The Bratislava Declaration

(ed/ak, Berlin) Following Brexit, the Heads of State and Government of the remaining 27 European Union member states got together at the Bratislava Summit on 16 September 2016 to discuss the future of the Union. In the Summit declaration they undertake to make a success of the EU27, to focus on citizens’ expectations and to improve communication within the institutions and with citizens in accordance with the so-called Bratislava Roadmap. Excerpts:

"I. General diagnosis and objective

• [...] Many common challenges ahead of us: people concerned by a perceived lack of control and fears related to migration, terrorism, and economic and social insecurity. Need to tackle these issues as a matter of priority over the coming months.
• Working together, the EU27 have the means to tackle these challenges. We are determined to find common solutions also as regards issues where we are divided: priority here and now to show unity and ensure political control over developments in order to build our common future.
• Need to be clear about what the EU can do, and what is for the Member States to do, to make sure we can deliver on our promises.

II. Migration and external borders

OBJECTIVE
• Never to allow return to uncontrolled flows of last year and further bring down number of irregular migrants.
• Ensure full control of our external borders and get back to Schengen.
• Broaden EU consensus on long term migration policy and apply the principles of responsibility and solidarity.

CONCRETE MEASURES
• Full commitment to implementing the EU-Turkey statement as well as continued support to the countries of the Western Balkans.
• Commitment today by a number of Member States to offer immediate assistance to strengthen the protection of Bulgaria’s border with Turkey, and continue support to other frontline States.
• Before the end of the year, full capacity for rapid reaction of the European Border and Coast Guard, now signed into law.

III. Internal and external security

Internal Security

OBJECTIVE
• Do everything necessary to support Member States in ensuring internal security and fighting terrorism.

CONCRETE MEASURES
• Intensified cooperation and information-exchange among security services of the Member States.
• Adoption of the necessary measures to ensure that all persons, including nationals from EU Member States, crossing the Union’s external borders will be checked against the relevant databases, that must be interconnected.
• Start to set up a Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to allow for advance checks and, if necessary, deny entry of visa-exempt travellers.
• A systematic effort against radicalisation, including through expulsions and entry bans where warranted as well as EU support to Member States’ actions in prevention.

External Security and Defence

OBJECTIVE
• In a challenging geopolitical environment, strengthen EU cooperation on external security and defence.

CONCRETE MEASURES
• December European Council to decide on a concrete implementation plan on security and defence and on how to make better use of the options in the Treaties, especially as regards capabilities.
• Start implementing the joint declaration with NATO immediately.

IV. Economic and social development, youth

OBJECTIVE
• Create a promising economic future for all, safeguard our way of life and provide better opportunities for youth.

CONCRETE MEASURES
• In December: decision on extension of the European Fund for Strategic Investment in light of evaluation.
• October European Council to address how to ensure a robust trade policy that reaps the benefits of open markets while taking into account concerns of citizens.
• In December – decisions on EU support for Member States in fighting youth unemployment and on enhanced EU programmes dedicated to youth."

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Opportunities for reforming the Common Security and Defence Policy

The future of CSDP
by Arne Lietz, Member of the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

Notwithstanding foreseeable challenges in many areas of EU-UK relations, for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Brexit provides a welcome opportunity for long-overdue progress and reform. European decision-makers should finally act upon the fact that Europe’s citizens are largely in favour of a truly European foreign, security and defence policy. According to a Eurobarometer poll in June 2016, half of them would like the EU to intervene more than it currently does. 66% are in favour of a bigger role for the EU in the field of security and defence. We should therefore use Great Britain’s foreseeable exit from the EU to reform and strengthen the Union’s capabilities in this field.

Several strategy and position papers, which I will briefly present below, provide concrete proposals as to how this could be done in practice.

Global Strategy: the EU as a credible security actor
In July 2016, just a few days after the Brexit referendum, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a “Global Strategy” to the EU Heads of State and Government. The document has far-reaching implications for CSDP, which needs to be made fit for purpose in a changed security environment. With the UK preparing to leave the EU, other member states that used to hide behind or emulate the British anti-CSDP integration stance in the European Council now have to adopt a clear position: do they want to prevent the EU from becoming a credible security actor or are they willing to commit to this objective?

What a reformed CSDP could look like
In a joint paper entitled “A strong Europe in an insecure world” the Foreign Ministers of Germany and France, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault, give numerous concrete examples to illustrate what a reformed CSDP might look like. For instance, they propose that the EU develop a common analysis of its strategic environment and a common understanding of its security interests, while highlighting member states’ differing levels of ambition. As a consequence, more ambitious member states should be free to develop a more integrated foreign and security policy that makes use of all available means.

Permanent Structured Cooperation: The Foreign Ministers recommend that groups of member states work together more closely on defence in the framework of “Permanent Structured Cooperation”, a mechanism for which the EU Treaties already make provision. Their proposal to introduce a “European semester for defence capabilities” that would create synergy among national capability development processes and help member states in setting priorities, also aims at further integration in the field of CSDP. These proposals are in line with the aforementioned Global Strategy adopted by the member states on 17 October 2016.

Conflict prevention, crisis response and defence: I agree with Messrs Steinmeier and Ayrault that reforms should not only serve to strengthen defence-related aspects of CSDP, but also enhance the EU’s capacities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis response. This corresponds to the statement in the Global Strategy that in the future, the EU will be active “at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement”. The new strategy further stresses that the EU is the best international player in the field of “soft power”, but that it must also be prepared to defend its member states against external military threats, despite NATO remaining the principal guarantor of security for most of them.

A binding European weapons export regime: I am in favour of integrating national armaments policies and exports, and of

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using them conceptually as instruments of a European foreign policy. To my mind it also makes sense to coordinate investments in security and defence and to provide public financial support for defence research at the EU level, as proposed by Messrs Steinmeier and Ayrault and High Representative Mogherini. However, this needs to be linked to a changed approach to the export of weapons and defence equipment to third countries – one that uses such exports as a political instrument rather than an economic activity.

**EU headquarters for civilian and military CSDP missions:** The discussion on the future of European security and defence is also in full swing in Germany. In the White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the German Armed Forces, “pooling and sharing” of capabilities at the EU level is a central theme. This is positive, as it would increase the interoperability of Europe’s national armed forces and weapons systems without increasing national budgets through parallel defence research. Furthermore, I support the call for an EU headquarters for civilian and military CSDP missions, which was already included in the “Position Paper on Europeanising the Armed Forces” produced by the SPD’s Security and Defence Working Group in November 2014.

**Civil-military planning and conduct capability:** Messrs Steinmeier and Ayrault and HR Mogherini also call for the creation of a civil-military planning and conduct capability – an idea that Great Britain repeatedly prevented from materialising in the past. It is important to stress in this regard that given the CSDP’s focus on conflict prevention and crisis response, an EU headquarters would not mean a replication of NATO structures, as has been claimed by the detractors of this idea. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed this assessment after an informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers in Bratislava in September, stressing that “a strong Europe makes NATO stronger”.

**Institutional consequences**

Interestingly, neither the Global Strategy nor the Steinmeier and Ayrault paper discuss the role of the European Parliament. This is regrettable, as a stronger parliamentary involvement is needed to give legitimacy to the proposed reforms. One way to realise this could be to turn the EP Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) into a full-fledged committee. The aim is not to impinge upon the competences of the national parliaments, for instance when it comes to authorising the sending of military forces to take part in CSDP missions. Rather, the European Parliament should be strengthened so that it can shape and scrutinise common policies on weapons exports, EU-supported defence research or CSDP missions and operations in a democratic way. In addition, we should upgrade such formats as the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, where Members of the European Parliament and their peers from the national parliaments of the member states come together to discuss foreign affairs and security policy. To achieve this upgrade of the European Parliament, a change of the EU Treaties is needed, which in turn requires an agreement among all EU member states. It is not clear that Great Britain’s exit from the EU would clear the way for such a step, but it would at least weaken the group of countries that has opposed any integration in the field of CSDP in the past.
The Trump effect – the carefree days are over
by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief, Brussels

Since Donald Trump’s election as the 45th President of the United States the buzzword has become “unpredictability”, with politicians, think tanks, foundations and others looking for new ways of shaping European defence to make it more efficient and less dependent on NATO.

Trump’s populist declarations about solidarity with the allies, which may even lead to the US stepping down from its leadership role in NATO, certainly testify to an as yet insufficient grasp of the subject, but should nonetheless not be ignored. Trump is not going to revolutionise the world of course, but he is going to generate uncertainty for some time to come, if only because of his changeability. What he said yesterday no longer applies today. This is dangerous, to the extent that during the election campaign the incoming US President gave many people the impression of being opportunist, erratic, and completely self-obsessed. But neither moral outrage or general anxiety will help answer the question of what the change of government in Washington will mean for European security and defence. However, it has energated various reactions, three of which require a brief commentary:

Juncker’s call for a European army

Up until now there were always calls for a European army when European security and defence cooperation was again running into difficulties and it had become impossible to reconcile national with EU interests. Then the idea of a “European army”, or indeed, of a “common European army” would be mooted, but this difficult undertaking has no chance of succeeding without a “United States of Europe”. Still, Jean-Claude Juncker referred to this idea in his speech of 9 November 2016.

The Commission President knows of course that a European army is an illusion, and said as much during the same speech on 9 November 2016 in Berlin when he rejected the vision of a United States of Europe. But what Mr Juncker does say is that there are ways of getting a European defence off the ground through close interaction among member states’ armed forces and with state-of-the-art equipment. This is not a populist, but rather a realistic proposal that makes all the more sense in view of the fact that Britain as a strong military partner will be sorely missed for its capabilities, forcing the EU to develop the relevant capabilities itself. However, Britain will continue in the future to participate in European operations, where this is in its national interest. In such cases the EU must be open-minded and show a readiness to cooperate, but it must hold firmly on to the reins.

Source: European Commission

The ‘Europe Speech’ given by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin 9 November 2016 (excerpt):

“... Irrespective of the outcome of the US election, we should as soon as possible forget the widely held belief that the Americans will always go on ensuring that Europeans are secure. Europe, and this city and this country in particular, owes a great debt of thanks to America, but they will not ensure our security in the long term. We have to do that for ourselves, and that is why we need to take a new approach to the European Defence Union, including the long-term goal of establishing a European army. That is the direction in which we are already heading, even if many Europeans are not yet aware of that fact. There are many aspects to security. Security is multidimensional, necessarily so at a time when Europe is facing a series of crises affecting security and our social and economic position.”

Source: European Commission
Treaty for the Defence and Security

An initiative proposed by the Chairman of the Robert-Schuman Foundation in Paris takes an entirely different approach. Jean-Dominique Giuliani has put forward a new idea: drawing inspiration from the methodology of the Union’s founding fathers he proposes a kind of mutual assistance pact between Germany, France and the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in order once again to ensure the defence of Europe.

Jean-Dominique Giuliani’s proposal is simple and is worthy of interest. He wants Britain as Europe’s second nuclear power to be involved, in spite of Brexit, and also Germany, in view of its recent efforts to improve its capabilities. Whatever one may think of this proposal, it presents an option that may not match the current way of thinking, but it can at least provide a basis for the discussion regarding Britain's role after Brexit.

Treaty for the Defence and Security of Europe between the Federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (excerpt):

“The Parties to this Treaty, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law. Seeking to promote stability and well-being in Europe. Resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. Aware of the threats and dangers for the security of the European continent,

Have therefore agreed to this Treaty:

Art 1 The defence of Europe shall be organised in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4th April 1949.

Art 2 The Parties commit to provide mutual assistance and to cooperate closely if the Armed Forces of one of them are engaged in an operation requiring the use of force.

Art 3 The Parties commit to bring to or to maintain their defence spending at 2% at least of their Gross Domestic Product and their defence expenditure of equipment at least 20% of this figure.

Art 4 Without this the Parties will be free to develop any type of bilateral or multilateral cooperation which they deem useful for the implementation of their commitments under this treaty.

Art 5 The Ministers of Defence of the Parties shall meet at least four times a year as a Defence Conference to share their analyses regarding threats against European security, to assess ongoing operations and to decide on cooperation between their Armed Forces.

Art 6 The Chiefs of Staff of the Parties shall meet at least twice a quarter to organise cooperation between their Armed Forces.

Art 7 Any party which would fail to respect the terms in articles 2 and 3 of this Treaty will automatically exclude itself from this Treaty. Its exclusion shall be acknowledged by the Defence Conference.

Art 8 Without prejudice to this Treaty, the Parties will be free to Regarding the States which do not fulfil the terms in develop any type of bilateral or multilateral cooperation article 3 of this Treaty, the Defence Conference shall set a which they deem useful for the implementation of their timescale enabling it to satisfy those terms. The respect of commitments under this Treaty. this timescale shall be subject to article.

The Mogherini Implementation Plan on Security and Defence

High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini has proposed an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, to “turn into action the vision set out in the EU Global Strategy”. The Plan was discussed by the EU Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 15 November, and will be presented to the EU Heads of State and Government at the next European Council in December 2016. The aim is to give the EU the military capabilities it needs to take autonomous action and strengthen the EU’s strategic role worldwide.

Given the remarks by some ministers during the run-up to the meeting to the effect that following Donald Trump’s comments on NATO it was now time to put out money where our mouths are and to get the European Defence Union off to a start, the result was somewhat disappointing. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the four weeks between now and the Council meeting there may be a breakthrough enabling the Heads of State and Government to task High Representative Mogherini with drawing up a draft treaty during the first six months of 2017.

After intensive negotiations the Ministers adopted Ms Mogherini's Implementation Plan as a compromise. The frontline states, it would seem, continue to look to NATO for their salvation, while the less well-to-do countries see new cost constraints coming their way.

The 31-page Implementation Plan focuses on three main topics:

• More rapid military and civil crisis management;
• Assistance for unstable partner countries;
• Protection of the EU and of its citizens.

A small ray of hope is the creation of a permanent planning and command centre for external operations, but it was not possible to merge the civil and military components: they continue to function in parallel! It was also impossible to agree on the title of “headquarters”, since the German Government, doubtless influenced by the United States, was anxious to avoid giving the impression of duplicating structures.

At least it was possible to settle the question of the costs of operations. However, permanent structured cooperation as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty seemed to meet with greater misgivings and the result falls well below the expectations of the Franco-German initiative of 13 September 2016.
Holy smoke! Wallonia, a little pocket of dissent within a divided Belgium, very nearly managed to scupper a trade agreement between the European Union and Canada which leading economic and political specialists agree will bring major benefits to both Europe and Canada. Of course, anyone can be mistaken, particularly in the field of economics, which is not an exact science and where it is always difficult to predict the future. The most highly reputed economists have often turned out to be wrong. Nonetheless, no-one can dispute the advantages of developing balanced trade relations between trading partners, particularly for the EU states, whose domestic market alone would not be enough to support their economic activities.

Not enough information

The texts of such bilateral trade agreements are very difficult to draft: in particular it is necessary when opening up markets to assess the consequences for all categories of economic players, from the largest multinational company to the smallest domestic firm. Each party will naturally be extremely vigilant about protecting the interests of the community it represents during the negotiations. But this does not mean that the average citizen can claim to have the final opinion on such complex issues or is justified in rejecting such agreements out of hand, whether it be the CETA with Canada or even the TTIP with the United States. What makes such an attitude all the more unacceptable is the fact that in most cases the people concerned have not even made the effort to obtain a modicum of information about the real content of the texts being negotiated.

As regards the agreement with Canada, I, probably like many Europeans, am incapable of making a truly informed judgement about what effects this agreement might be expected to have. The media, the social networks and as a result politicians have not taken the trouble to explain and to make sure that people understand. It is easier for them to harp on the theme of “Gallic village rebels against the Roman Empire”, criticise the “Brussels technocrats” and oppose globalisation, although it is an ineluctable reality that without any doubt can contribute to overcoming poverty in the world.

In fact, if the CETA has been under negotiation for so many years, it is because states, aware of the risks, wanted it that way, and that includes Belgium, whose inability to have a serene and non-politicised vision of the implications of the treaty is illustrated by this Wallonian episode. How could anyone seriously believe that the European market would be flooded with Canadian products when Europe’s economic power is out of all proportion to that of Canada? The Walloons’ arguments about the risks of being submerged by Canadian products are clearly grossly exaggerated; common sense has finally prevailed over timorousness and parochialism and the CETA has been signed by both parties.

Globalisation is a fact

Indeed, judging by what the competent experts say – and without wishing to urge the good people, like the media do, to come out vigorously in favour or against – the agreement appears to be relatively balanced. It is based on the one signed between the EU and Korea, which is proving to be very beneficial to both sides. The geographic origin of products is guaranteed, Canadian public contracts are open, while up until now there was no reciprocity, and the arbitration issue seems to be more a matter of impugning motives than representing any real danger.

Moreover, above and beyond the treaty itself it is the European Union’s whole political philosophy that is at stake. For my part I prefer a Europe that is open to the rest of the world and unafraid to compete on foreign markets to one that is obsessed with defending its own corner and unhealthily fearful of the challenges of the 21st century. Globalisation is a fact: there is no point in cursing it; much better for Europe to take it in its stride; Europe must be part of this combat if it is to achieve what is quite rightly considered as progress.
Border protection is an obligation for each nation and the European Union provides support for Member States at their external borders. Schengen remains essential for the EU’s Security and is at the same time a symbol of identity. With the new Border and Coast Guard Agency, the EU has created the legal basis for protecting borders in a consolidated way and enhanced the possibilities for affording assistance in situations requiring an urgent and effective operational and humanitarian response. Securing borders also means keeping in mind that every act conducted on land or sea borders involves human beings who are entitled to be treated in a fair and reasonable way.
European citizens demand tangible solutions to the challenges of security and migration: solutions which are operational, implemented swiftly and have immediate results on the ground. Both security and migration are transnational and global issues, and as such can only be resolved with approaches that are also transnational and global in reach. This is the only way to restore the trust of citizens and their support for the European project, but also for the political institutions both of their countries and Europe.

**Schengen – the symbol of being European**

Schengen, for example, is at the heart of many of the challenges we face today. No one can doubt that it is one of the greatest achievements of European integration. It is the symbol of being and feeling European: for students, workers, businessmen, travellers, simple citizens that want to move freely, safely and quickly in an area without internal border controls.

The migration crisis of the past two years alongside a series of terrorist attacks on European soil has put the management of both our internal and external borders under pressure. These challenges have demonstrated the need to trust each other more: to show solidarity, to coordinate better, to exchange information and to share responsibility in better managing and protecting our external border. This is an essential prerequisite if we want to keep our internal borders open.

**Sharing our external borders**

This is why the launch of the European Border and Coast Guard on 6 October was a historic moment for the European Union. Not only is it an unprecedented achievement of European political will and union, but also an enormous step forward towards truly jointly managing Europe’s shared external borders. Legally and operationally, the external border of one Member State is now the external border of all Member States. That is the only way forward.

The European Border and Coast Guard will receive the necessary resources to bring our border management to a new level. By 2020, the Agency will work with 1,000 staff members and will manage a budget of more than €320 million. The Agency will also be able to activate a rapid reaction pool of at least 1,500 border guards and other relevant staff, as well as a pool of rapid reaction equipment.

These two pools will be made available to the Agency whenever needed to address urgent situations. The new Agency will closely monitor the management of the external borders by all Member States through the deployment of Liaison Officers and mandatory vulnerability assessments.

**Better exchange of security-critical information**

But the new European Border and Coast Guard is just one piece, albeit an important one, of a much larger border and security puzzle.

**The EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system**

The EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) system, which will collect and process PNR data received from air carriers by each Member State, was recently put in place. Most importantly, the system will ensure a better exchange of security-critical information, in a genuinely joined-up approach across the EU. PNR is now being rapidly operationalised across Europe.

**Proposal for an Entry-Exit system**

We didn’t stop at PNR. We proposed to allow systematic checks on EU citizens crossing our external borders. We also proposed an Entry-Exit system that will register the travel of all third non-EU citizens to the Schengen area, thereby detecting overstayers, identifying undocumented persons and giving a wealth of data enabling law enforcement authorities to do their job.

**The future ETIAS**

In mid-November we proposed a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), to strengthen migration and security checks on visa-free travellers before they enter Europe.

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**Dimitris Avramopoulos**

has been European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship since 2014. He was born in 1953 in Athens and holds a Bachelor of arts degree in public Law and political Science from the University of Athens. After a diplomatic career (1980-1993) he resigned from the Greek diplomatic service in order to enter parliamentary politics as a member of New Democracy. He was mayor of Athens from 1995–2002 and has served in various high-level cabinet posts, including those of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for National Defence.
travel to the Schengen Area. It will scan for irregular migration and security checks, providing the big missing link in our border management – the information gap on the 30 million visa-free travellers we get every year. ETIAS will make their travel easier and safer and will allow us to take the necessary precautions against those that pose a threat to the Schengen area.

Our work to build a genuine and effective Security Union continues swiftly. Soon we will propose a stronger Schengen Information System to enable better access for law enforcement authorities, and an Action Plan on Travel Document Security. There is more action also coming up on the financing of terrorism.

Europe will remain an open continent
While much more remains to be done, approved and implemented, we are better equipping ourselves to manage our external borders in all their aspects.

We know that the migration and security challenges will not disappear overnight. If we want to ensure internal stability and security, if we want to safeguard Schengen, if we want to keep Europe open, the only way is to strengthen our external perimeter.

Europe will remain an open, welcoming and inclusive continent. But this openness must not be at the expense of our security.
On 6 April 2016, the European Commission adopted a Communication on Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Border and Security* presenting a proposal for an improved EU data management architecture. In it the Commission assesses the strengths and weaknesses of existing information systems, such as the Schengen Information System, and sets out options for improving them. In addition, potential new systems to complement the current data management structure are proposed. To ensure interoperability between the systems, an Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability will be set up. The Commission stresses that full respect for fundamental rights and data protection rules is a pre-condition for any of the information systems, while pointing out that well-designed and improved data management technologies can support authorities in complying with those rights. First Vice-President Frans Timmermans underlined that the envisioned system “is about the intelligent, proportionate and carefully regulated access all our information border and security authorities need to do their job – to protect us and the freedoms we defend.”

On this occasion the European Commission presented its revised proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of an Entry-Exit System (EES) aimed at addressing border check delays, better informing travellers from third countries, ensuring the reliable identification of overstayers, and reinforcing internal security by identifying terrorists and (suspected) criminals. According to Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, with this proposal the Commission addresses “an important gap in our information systems and takes concrete action to make our borders stronger, smarter and more efficient for the ever-increasing numbers of travelers coming to the EU.”

As laid out in the Communication* the actions to establish the Entry-Exit System and to develop other additional information systems in order to address information gaps will be:

*Entry-Exit System (EES):
• European Parliament and Council should treat the legislative proposals on the EES as a matter of utmost priority, with the aim of adopting the proposals by the end of 2016.

Passenger Name Records (PNR):
• European Parliament and Council should adopt the PNR Directive by April 2016.
• Member States to implement the PNR Directive, once adopted, as a matter of urgency.
• Commission to support the exchange of data between Passenger Information Units through standardised solutions and procedures.
• Commission to prepare a draft Implementing Decision on common protocols and supported data formats for the transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the PIUs within three months after adoption of the PNR Directive.

Information gap prior to arrivals of visa-exempt third-country nationals:
• Commission to assess in 2016 the necessity, technical feasibility and proportionality of establishing a new EU tool such as an EU Travel Information and Authorisation System.

European Police Records Information System (EPRIS)
• Commission to assess in 2016 the necessity, technical feasibility and proportionality of establishing an EPRIS.*

The interlocking of the information systems for enhanced border management and security, as envisioned by the Commission. The systems marked in yellow are proposed new complementing systems.
New horizon for European borders

“A solid legal basis to fully support Member States”

Interview with Klaus Rösler, Director of Operations, European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Warsaw

The European: Mr Rösler, you are the Director of Operations of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, formerly Frontex; we are grateful that you have found the time for this interview, since with the launch of the new European Border and Coast Guard on 6 October this year, these are busy times for you. There have been many important changes, but what, in your opinion, is the most fundamental change to have resulted from the remodelling of the Agency?

Klaus Rösler: I would like to highlight three major steps forward. First, the new regulation gives the Agency a greater role in law enforcement support, meaning the fight against cross-border crime and security checks at borders. We are now able to fulfill those tasks more effectively thanks to enhanced access to databases and the possibility we now have of processing personal data, pertaining for example to individuals involved in criminal activities, but also to migrants who have witnessed such activities. Second, the newly established vulnerability assessment is very important and forward-looking. It means that we will evaluate external threats to the EU borders and Member States’ ability to counter those threats, with the aim of reacting to them before they become a crisis. And third, our operational response will be more efficient thanks to the creation of the rapid reaction pool.

The European: So, compared with the former Frontex, this means a greater range of functions while being better equipped? How will this affect the daily work of the Agency’s officers deployed on the ground?

Klaus Rösler: Operationally we will continue to work in the same way: the Agency provides support to Member States at their external borders. However, the new regulation will strengthen our cooperation with the Member States because it provides a specific legal basis for what has been successful operational practice, conducting multipurpose operations. Multipurpose means that during border surveillance operations we detect and react to different types of crime, e.g. trafficking in drugs and human beings, but also illegal fishing or environmental crimes. Coast guard functions such as rescue operations are now covered as well. And of course, the new rapid reaction pool means we can better assist in situations requiring an urgent and effective operational response.

The European: What are the implications on the institutional level and why was it necessary to change the name?

Klaus Rösler: The new name does not mean that a new agency is replacing Frontex. The basis for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency is a new regulation and let’s say, the Agency’s mandate has been enhanced with new elements to make it more robust. However, the new name reflects better the broadened tasks, especially the coast guard functions, and the wider scope of border management. We are very proud of the new name because it means that the European policy-makers and legislator have acknowledged the maritime dimension of the Agency and are now giving it a solid legal basis.

The European: Does this also affect your position within the institutional structure of the EU?

Klaus Rösler has been Director of Operations for Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, since 2008. Born in 1955, he has been with the German Federal Police since 1974. Mr Rösler graduated to senior level in 1989 and occupied various managerial posts for almost 25 years, dealing with border control on both the national and European levels. Before joining Frontex, he was, among other things, a senior policy expert within DG Federal Police of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Head of Federal Police office at Munich Airport and of regional authority in Northern Bavaria, and Head of the Border Police Branch of the EUPOL Mission PROXIMA 2003/2004 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Klaus Rösler: By giving the name European Border and Coast Guard Agency the legislator has also made reference to the cooperation with other EU agencies working in this field. We strongly agree that effective border management is not possible without inter-agency cooperation and will therefore strengthen cooperation with other agencies in the field, such as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), but also Europol, the European Asylum Support Office and the Customs authorities.

The European: The remodelling of the Agency took only nine months. Of course, there was a lot of pressure on the Member...
States and the EU to react to the refugee crisis, but do you think that Member States’ attitudes towards a common border management has substantively changed? Is the principle of relying on the Member States slowly being overturned?

Klaus Rösler: We think that the new regulation itself and also the short time it took to set up the Agency demonstrate the high level of commitment on the part not only of the Member States, but also the relevant EU institutions. However, everything that we are doing is in cooperation with and in reliance on the Member States. Indeed, since its operational establishment in 2005, the Agency has proven its effective support for Member States by deploying experts and technical equipment to increase Member States’ capacities in the fields of border control and the fight against cross-border crime.

The European: You mentioned technical equipment: how is the procurement process organised and does the new regulation make provision for the Agency to be able to influence purchasing decisions?

Klaus Rösler: The first step is always a risk analysis and an assessment of operational needs. To give an example: when we need to contribute to a search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean 60 nautical miles north of Libya but 180 nautical miles south of Sicily, coastal patrol boats will not help. What are needed are off-shore patrol vessels, hence the identification of operational needs drives the acquisition of technical equipment, as well as the recruitment of experts with specific skills. The principle stands that the technical equipment is provided to us by the Member States. But we are also starting to procure certain services and products, for example satellite images, mainly from other EU agencies. Or we create joint ventures with Member States for the leasing of equipment. Altogether, this enables us to react swiftly to operational needs and to contribute to an enriched operational capacity.

The European: Let me stay on the topic of cooperation with Member States: how is the decision-making process organised, especially in urgent situations? Is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency able to act autonomously and promptly for the launch of ad hoc missions?

Klaus Rösler: Well, this is a complex issue. As I have already underlined, the Agency supports the Member States and this excludes that we act without having cooperation with them – this applies also to situations requiring an urgent and effective reaction of the Member States to the refugee crisis, but do you think that Member States’ attitudes towards a common border management has substantively changed? Is the principle of relying on the Member States slowly being overturned?

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The European: What are the requirements for such operations? Klaus Rösler: One requirement is for the non-EU country to be the neighbour of an EU Member State. The categorisation here might seem obvious, and for land borders it is, but if we look at air borders, we could consider close and very frequent direct flight connections as a form of neighbourhood. But to give an example, such an operation could mean that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency would coordinate joint controls by Bulgarian, Austrian and Italian officers at the border between Serbia and Bulgaria on the territory of Serbia. Next, it would always require a Member State to have good bilateral cooperation with the neighbouring non-EU country. The Agency would additionally conclude a so-called status agreement with the non-EU country, in order to protect the EU agency-coordinated staff working on the territory of the non-EU country.

The European: What about legal standards? The EU Member States of course have adopted the EU acquis, but how can the EU ensure that the third cooperating country also respects fundamental and refugee rights? Klaus Rösler: Of course, fundamental rights must be respected and we have several instruments to ensure this. The non-EU country needs to comply with our code of conduct, the agency’s Fundamental Rights Officer has to have the right to access information and to give advice on activities to promote respect for human rights. And there is always the concrete operational plan that has to be agreed upon by the states involved. I would like to stress that the issue of upholding fundamental rights...
is not new for the Agency. The last update of the regulation in 2011 established the Fundamental Rights Strategy, the post of full-time Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. What is new is the complaints mechanism, whereby the agency pledges to process complaints from individuals who feel that their fundamental rights are affected during the course of a Frontex-coordinated joint operation.

The European: How do you ensure that the persons affected know about this option and can make use of it?
Klaus Rösler: All the operational plans have been amended accordingly. Complaint forms have been drawn up and are now being translated into the principal languages of the migrants. Frontex has already made efforts to bring the complaint forms into the field and to inform migrants about this possibility. We are also starting to implement the mechanism in-house and determining how to handle such complaints. This is a new aspect and it is an on-going process, but we are not unexperienced in this field.

The European: Looking at the new Agency and the short amount of time it took to remodel it, would you say that anything is still missing, especially as regards the operational and technical aspects?
Klaus Rösler: We are now in the process of implementing priority areas and in one year’s time we will be able to assess whether there is something missing. However, what I would like to see is greater emphasis on access to large-scale European police and law enforcement databases, which would need to be based on an EU-wide law. Access to the Schengen information system or to EURODAC\(^1\), for example, would enrich our capacity for risk analysis and enable us to provide better recommendations for operational responses.

The European: What are the next concrete steps?
Klaus Rösler: We are working hard to make the Agency fully operational as soon as possible. Concrete steps are: developing the vulnerability assessment with an approved methodology and implementation plan; creating the rapid reaction pool; enhancing monitoring and risk analysis of EU external borders; and preparing a European operational strategy on integrated border management. We are moving ahead on schedule here. Of course, we will continue our core business of planning and implementing joint operations of all types at the external borders, as well as enhanced return assistance, which we have substantially increased during the last year while implementing the EU action plan on returns\(^2\), and also training activities.

The European: Do you think that once the Agency is fully operational it will be able to satisfy expectations, i.e. to secure the Schengen area and enable EU asylum policies to be implemented?
Klaus Rösler: We need to remember that the Agency cannot act independently – we support the Member States so that they can effectively carry out their responsibilities. So when it comes to meeting expectations, that hierarchy must be borne in mind. That being said, our objective is to successfully implement policies in the fields of internal and maritime security related to the management of EU external borders, and our overarching goal is to contribute to liberty, security and free movement within an across Europe for all those who are entitled to free movement.

The European: Mr Rösler, let me thank you once again for granting us this interview. We look forward to discussing the Agency’s progress in one year’s time!

The interview was led by Alexa Keinert, Editor, The European - Security and Defence Union.

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1. European Dactyloscopy: the European fingerprint database
MOBILE. MODULAR. MEANINGFUL.

CLEAN WATER FROM ANY SOURCE

- Best in class water purification exceeding WHO standards
- Easy to use and ready to run in minutes
- Logistically optimized
- 2 in 1 product – disaster relief and capacity building
- Optional Solar power

CLEAN WATER FOR EVERYONE
Our focus is on Hospitals, Emergency sectors, Military, Community Water Systems, Schools and Clinics as well as Household Water, Infrastructure Development and Corporate Social Responsibility projects.

VISION
A World where every man, woman and child has access to clean and safe drinking water, at anytime and anywhere.

MISSION
MuchMoreWater will develop and market compact, mobile water purification systems to serve the MuchMoreWater vision – clean water for everyone.

MuchMoreWater.com
EU external borders

Crises in the EU’s neighbourhood have sparked an increase in the number of illegal border crossings on the EU’s external borders – the eastern and southern borders are particularly under pressure. In response to these challenges, the EU aims to strengthen its border management capacities in various ways, as described in the preceding pages.

This map depicts the routes taken by illegal migrants, based on illegal crossings of the EU’s external borders detected in the first quarter of 2016, with numbers for the first quarter of 2015 shown in parentheses for comparison.

The European border management agency, Frontex, is actively working in several countries in order to assist Member States to secure their borders, but also to rescue migrants in distress.

* between 01–08/2016

+ between 07–09/2016

graphik: Beate Dach; source: Frontex, 2016; map: © cunico, Fotolia.com
Eastern borders route

213
(206)

Black Sea route

0
(68)

Western Balkan route

108 649
(32 950)

Western Balkans:

152
Frontex officers deployed

Italy:

532
Frontex officers deployed

38 750
people rescued*

Central Mediterranean route

18 776
(10 252)

Circular route from Albania to Greece

1 350
(1 907)

Bulgaria:

192
Frontex officers deployed

153 967
(14 152)

Eastern Mediterranean route

Greece:

667
Frontex officers deployed

37 479
people rescued*

Spain:

105

Italy:

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Frontex officers deployed

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Border management in Europe must respect human rights

More power for Frontex – but no boost to human rights*

by Ska Keller MEP, Vice-President and migration policy spokesperson, Greens/EFA Group, EP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The new European border and coast guard system sets out to vest Frontex with greater power. In the future, the EU border agency Frontex will be able to force Member States to step up their border control. Member States that refuse can be expelled from the Schengen Area. Frontex’s new powers include operations outside the EU. Even a future operation in Libya cannot be ruled out. This means the EU is further shifting its responsibility for refugees to countries that lie outside of Europe. It is running the risk of human rights being trampled upon.

The Greens advocate border management in Europe that respects human rights and fosters, rather than hinders, the protection of refugees. Border controls must not result in refugees being denied access to protection in Europe. Instead, we need to rescue asylum seekers who are in distress at sea and ensure that they are properly registered and rapidly referred to the relevant asylum authorities. Europe must remain accessible to refugees.

The cornerstones of the new European border and coast guard system:

Operations against a Member State’s will
Frontex, the EU border agency, is being vested with far greater power over Member States. Frontex systematically checks whether Member States are properly controlling their external borders and may demand that Member States step up their border control. Member States that refuse or are not prepared to accept a Frontex operation on their territory risk being expelled from the Schengen Area.
That boils down to the possibility of a Member State being forced to close its borders to refugees. Member States that fail to control their borders against large movements of refugees and migrants will have a Frontex operation imposed on them. There are no comparable repercussions for Member States that erect fences to keep refugees out and decline to fulfill their duties to accept refugees. That imbalance is tantamount to sealing off European external borders.

Reinforcement of Frontex
To boost Frontex’s operational readiness, the agency has now a permanent pool of at least 1,500 border guards and a technical equipment pool. Frontex does not have its own border guards. Instead, it is reliant on Member States providing the relevant personnel for operations.

Operations outside the EU
Frontex can now also assist in the surveillance of borders in countries neighbouring the EU. Such neighbouring countries include North African countries. Hence, even a future operation in Libya cannot be ruled out. An external operation in a third country must be based on an agreement between the EU and that country, including respect for fundamental rights. However, that does not provide genuine protection against violations of human rights. First, Member States can circumvent an agreement – they can also involve Frontex directly in their bilateral cooperation with a third country. Second, Frontex has no recourse if violations of human rights are committed by third country border guards during a Frontex operation, since the EU has no jurisdiction in those states.

Human rights and the protection of refugees are at risk of being trampled upon. Frontex will become complicit with third states that do not necessarily give much weight to the protection of refugees and the rights of migrants. The Greens pushed for Frontex’s external operations to be restricted at least to neighbouring countries of the EU that share a land border with the EU and have fully implemented the European
Convention on Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention (i.e. to the Balkan states). Our efforts, however, were in vain.

Returns
Frontex is morphing into an agency for returns. Now Frontex can take the initiative for returning persons who have no right to stay in the EU to their home country or their country of transit. Previously it could only do so at the request of Member States. EU Member States that are considered to be too lax with respect to deportations, may be required to return more people or allow deportations by Frontex. Frontex is suitably equipped for that task. It now has permanent pools of officers to perform forced returns, return experts and return monitors.

The Commission and the Council also wanted Frontex to be authorised to perform deportations from third countries, such as returns of Pakistani citizens from Serbia or Turkey to Pakistan. The European Parliament – partly in response to pressure from the Greens – prevented that just in the nick of time, in tough negotiations with the Council. Third countries are not bound by European law and the protection guarantees and procedural safeguards enshrined in European law, so Frontex would have been at risk of aiding and abetting the deportation of refugees and people who are at threat of persecution or war in their homeland.

No reinforcement of rescue at sea
The Greens together with the Socialists & Democrats and the Liberals in the European Parliament have pushed for the rescue of refugees and migrants in distress at sea to be one of the core tasks of the European border and coast guard. That was blocked by the Council. Frontex will not be required to conduct rescue operations at sea. Although Frontex is now a border and coast guard, its mandate does not extend to rescue operations. As before, Frontex can only rescue people in distress at sea in the scope of its border surveillance operations. The equipment of the EU border guards still does not include special rescue boats.

Complaints mechanism
It is a genuine success of the Greens that Frontex now has a complaints mechanism. People who believe their rights have been violated by border guards during a Frontex operation can file a complaint with Frontex. Frontex must investigate the complaint and ensure that appropriate disciplinary measures are taken. The complaints mechanism is a result of a parliamentary report drafted jointly by Ska Keller and an MEP of the European People’s Party, Roberta Metsola.

How to rescue the EU-Turkey agreement on Migration

(edi/nc, Paris) In October 2016, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) warned of the consequences if the EU-Turkey agreement on migration that had been signed on 26 March to remedy the refugee crisis, is not properly implemented. The deal is currently hampered by a slow asylum claim process and only few returns of refugees to Turkey even though this point is at the heart of the agreement. Today, 15,000 refugees are still waiting in the Greek islands for their fate to be decided.

In a report entitled “Pangloss in Brussels – How (not) to implement the Aegean Agreement”, published on 7 October 2016, ESI makes concrete proposals on how the agreement could be rescued.

Excerpt:
“So what is to be done? ESI has made three concrete proposals in recent months. The EU should create conditions that allow sending a strong asylum support mission to Greece with at least 200 case workers. The EU, in cooperation with UNHCR, should create a mechanism of verification for everyone returned to Turkey; spell out precisely and publicly what Turkey would need to do to be a safe third country for all non-Syrians to be returned from Greece; and make this the key condition for visa liberalisation before the end of the year. The EU should appoint a senior special representative for the implementation of the EU Turkey agreement — a former prime minister or foreign minister, with the experience and authority to address urgent implementation issues on the ground and to communicate clearly with different audiences, from the citizens on Greek islands to the Turkish public, from human rights organisations and the media to prime ministers across the EU. The most immediate step to take is for the EU to send a clear signal that it has understood both the frustration of Greeks in the Aegean and the worries of Turkey, that it takes the issues that concern the Greek asylum service seriously, while offering credible support to the Greek and Turkish government to treat the few thousand asylum seekers most concerned in line with all applicable law and international norms.”

web: All ESI reports are available here: www.esiweb.org

*Briefing, initially published on 1 July 2016
The challenge of combining security, efficiency and our values

The European Union’s external borders

by Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Brussels

The emergence of foreign terrorist fighters as a major security risk has brought home the importance of comprehensive checks at EU external borders, including of EU citizens. The migration crisis has also put the spotlight on the particular need for the EU to ensure that appropriate security and database checks are carried out with regard to migrants.

Schengen is part of the solution

Recent polls show that a majority of EU citizens think that immigration could increase the risk of terror attacks on their territory, also that they want the EU to play a more important role in the field of security. In order to overcome fears and maintain our openness it is necessary to deliver efficient management of external border controls, to show that Schengen, one of the most important achievements of the EU, is part of the solution, and not the problem. To safeguard Schengen, watertight security at the external borders is necessary today. The Schengen flanking measures, in particular common databases, have to be used to the fullest extent, both in terms of feeding and checking.

Consolidation and progress

A lot of work has been undertaken over the last two years and progress has been made:
The Schengen Borders Code is currently being revised so as to provide for systematic checks against the relevant databases of all travellers, including EU citizens, at the EU’s external borders. It is important to detect foreign terrorist fighters who are leaving or re-entering the EU.

The European Border and Coast Guard is a major advance in the EU’s border management. It will ensure high and uniform standards, with mandatory vulnerability assessments to assess the capacity and readiness of Member States, and ultimately, the agency can be tasked to intervene directly on the territory of a Member State. Members of the teams carrying out a border-management operation will also now be able to consult European law enforcement databases. The new regulation also enables Frontex to process information containing personal data relating to persons suspected to be involved in criminal acts including terrorism and to cooperate with other EU agencies on the prevention of cross-border crime and terrorism.

The Entry-Exit System allows stronger controls by collecting data and registering the date and place of entry and exit. This more modern system of external border management will replace the stamping of passports. It will also contribute to security more broadly, as it will help to detect and combat identity fraud as well as the misuse of travel documents.

The European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS): The Commission plans to present a legislative proposal in November 2016 on an ETIAS to gather information on travellers prior to the start of their travel, to allow for advance processing. It would also be possible to establish a link with the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Records (PNR) databases: The PNR directive, adopted in April 2016 is one of the most important new instruments for the identification, detection and countering of criminals, terrorists.

The challenge of combining security, efficiency and our values

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MAIN TOPIC: Border Security

and their travel movements. An early and effective implementation of the Directive by Member States is crucial. Interoperability initiatives regarding databases are being studied and developed by the High Level Expert Group on Information Systems and Interoperability. The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC): Europol has taken some major steps forward, with the recent setting up of the ECTC. Information sharing on foreign terrorist fighters has increased considerably. The ECTC is working on the link between fraudulent documents and terrorism, whereas for the Europol European Migrant Smuggling Centre the key issue is document security. Europol has deployed officers to carry out second-line security checks of migrants in hot spots.

Further progress is urgent

Whilst Europol has gained credibility, its counter-terrorism capabilities need to be further enhanced if it is to play its full role. It is also urgent to find a practical solution to bridge the gap between the parallel tracks of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. Delivering on better border management, better use of the tools and databases is key to providing effective security for citizens. Many of the issues that need to be tackled are complex and require technical solutions, hence a thorough understanding of the required steps for implementation both at EU and Member States levels is needed to achieve the objectives. Member States and EU institutions now face the challenge of quickly making further progress and allocating the requisite resources.

Gilles de Kerchove

was appointed EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator on 19 September 2007. He coordinates the work of the European Union in the field of counter-terrorism, maintains an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal, closely monitors the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism strategy and fosters better communication between the EU and third countries to ensure that the Union plays an active role in the fight against terrorism. Before that he was Director for Justice and Home Affairs within the Council Secretariat. He is also a European law professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, the Free University of Brussels and the University of Saint Louis-Brussels. He was Deputy Secretary of the convention that drafted the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union from 1999 to 2000. He has published a number of books on European law.

European Counter Terrorism Center

In accordance with the European Agenda on Security 2015-2020, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was launched at the Europol headquarters in The Hague on 25 January 2016.

The step up of Europol’s role, with the ECTC as an operations centre and hub of expertise, reflects the growing need for the EU to strengthen its response to terror, since there is a clear shift in Islamic State’s strategy of carrying out special forces-style attacks in the international environment, with a particular focus on Europe, as well as the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters.

The ECTC focuses on:

- Tackling foreign fighters;
- Sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit);
- Online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit);
- Illegal arms trafficking;
- International cooperation among counter terrorism authorities.

The ECTC is located at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: © European Union, 2016 / Source: EC – Audiovisual Service / Marzia Cosenza
The migration drama is not over

Combat against human traffickers at the Greek-Turkish Border

The Behörden Spiegel team composed of Publisher and Editor-in-Chief R. Uwe Proll and Editorial Journalist for Inner Security Marco Feldmann visited Samos from 25 to 27 September 2016 in order to participate in a German Federal Police maritime patrol around Samos. The patrol took place at night and lasted a number of hours.

Complete darkness. Suddenly, glaring searchlights are switched on and illuminate the deck of a suspicious-looking Turkish sailing boat. Captain Matthias Maier brings the German Federal Police boat “Uckermark” alongside. A Greek coast-guard officer boards the sailing boat and questions the crew, which was travelling from Greece towards Turkish territorial waters. The officer wants to know where the three Turkish citizens started their journey and which harbour will be their final destination. The answers appear to satisfy him: he allows the crew to continue their journey.

Nevertheless, the Greek officer wants to play it safe. He instructs the German police officers to follow the Turkish yacht with their searchlights for a while. After some minutes it is clear: there are no refugees on board and the crewmembers are not human traffickers, because the sailing boat is not sitting unusually low in the water. That is far from always being the case when Maier and the three other members of the German Federal Police patrol the region around the Greek island Samos. They have often had to rescue large numbers of migrants from overloaded and unseaworthy rubber boats, which, moreover, frequently do not have enough fuel to reach the Greek coast. Captain Maier and his crew have already also rescued people from the steep rugged rocks of the Aegean. For missions like these the German Federal Police keep helmets on Samos, in order to protect both officers and refugees from injuries due to falls. Maier remem-
bers one particular operation: “During one of these rescue missions from the steep rugged rocks, I suddenly found myself with a baby in my arms. That was a daunting experience.”

**Different options available**

There are major differences when it comes to the possibilities offered by human traffickers. It is a class system. Migrants can choose between different options depending on their financial resources. Only the poorest refugees board the overloaded rubber boats with their inadequate engines. These boats have at most only a stabilisation plank on board and are not fit to cover the short distance between Turkey and the Greek islands, although at one point on Samos the two countries are only one kilometre apart. The rubber boats are steered by the refugees themselves.

A more comfortable but also more expensive option is a speedboat. Because of their value, these boats are piloted by the smugglers themselves. After dropping off the migrants, they return directly to the Turkish coast.

**Long prison sentences**

An even more comfortable option is a sailing boat. But this is risky too. Just a few months ago, Maier and his team caught three young Ukrainians who were smuggling more than 20 refugees below deck. They probably now face long jail sentences in Greece. According to 44 year-old Maier, “Greek judges sentence smugglers to one year of prison for every migrant they transport.”

So-called guarantee sluicing is definitely the first-class option. For this kind of trafficking the smugglers use jet-skis manned by a maximum of two refugees and one smuggler and which can reach a very high speed. With these jet-skis the smugglers try to reach the Greek islands, where the migrants are either picked up by accomplices from the world of organised crime or have to travel on by themselves. In these cases the smugglers are only paid if the trafficking succeeds.

**Organised crime on the rise**

People smuggling is a lucrative business, which is why criminal organisations are increasingly attracted to the Aegean. In 2015, smuggler gangs working on the Greek islands were mainly Turkish. Now gangs from Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Georgia dominate this business. The trafficking follows a clear pattern: nearly all refugees have a smartphone and to begin with they live illegally on the Turkish coast or camp outdoors. Depending on the criminals’ assessment of the situation, the migrants receive a text message on their smartphones telling them where to wait for their boat. Often this happens only an hour before the boat’s departure. The smugglers evaluate the situation on the basis of the current weather conditions and

**COMMENTARY**

Saved from running away

by R. Uwe Proll, Publisher and Editor in Chief
Behörden Spiegel, Bonn/Berlin

There are scenes that we cannot publish pictures of in order to protect the people concerned but also due to the strict policy of the Greek authorities; but to see them with one’s own eyes brings home the appalling tragedy of the refugee crisis.

Most refugees are fully aware of the risks they are taking when they travel the short distance between Turkey and the Greek islands. And yet mothers are prepared to board unseaworthy boats with their newborn infants. Once in Europe, they are left by the people smugglers on the steep rugged coasts of the islands. But if they are unable to climb the rocks their only hope is to be spotted by Greek, German or Dutch vessels. This is how it is in Samos. The emotion in the eyes of the people who have just been rescued from the sea is overwhelming.

That is one side of the coin. The other is that the interaction with the Frontex Agency, which is designed for a co-operative approach, has never really lived up to expectations on the ground. On the spot, for example, are German officials who are highly motivated to conduct rescue missions, but they have to be accompanied by Greek officials, who do not have that motivation. They are there for reasons of national sovereignty that seem absurd when one considers the plight of the refugees. For example, a Turkish boat is stopped only because it is sailing under a Turkish flag. The Greek official ignores the right to freedom of the seas and orders the sailor to sail back into Turkish waters immediately. This is what happened during our visit and the Greek authorities asked us under no circumstances to report on that experience.

I am convinced that the EU was right to transform Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, to give it competences, staff and equipment and to enable it to take action, including on member states’ territory, that the countries concerned are not able or willing to take.
coastguard activities on the European side. The text messaging system is used above all in the urban regions of Turkey. In other more sparsely populated parts of the country, the migrants are more likely to be picked up by vans and then brought to the embarkation point.

**On patrol without lights**

Back to the “Uckermark”, which has a power of 1,600 HP: immediately following the inspection of the Turkish boat, Maier has to give way to a ferry, also Turkish, that he had identified a few moments before using radar and night-sensing equipment. The German police officers are dependent on these devices because their boat patrols completely unlit. The policemen do not even use position lights because they do not want to be identified. But this can cause problems. Maier reports: “We already have had face-to-face encounters with the Turkish coastguard, with each then illuminating the other.”

To make things worse, the precise delineation of the sea border between Greece and Turkey in the area around Samos is highly controversial. This is a problem for the German Federal Police because their boats often come very close to this line. Sometimes they are only 30 or 40 metres away from Turkish territorial waters, which they are not allowed to enter. The mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), which provides the basis for their action, extends to Greek areas only.

**Reporting only to FRONTEX**

After each patrol the head of the German contingent at Samos, Jan Jung, transmits a report to the FRONTEX headquarters near Athens, which is in charge of the mission. The German authorities are not directly informed, but the chain of command is clearly established. There is also a special relationship with the Greek coastguard, because one of its officers remains on board during all patrols. That officer is responsible for all executive measures, such as the detention of people traffickers. It is also up to that officer to decide whether the German Federal Police boat sails at all.

The German boats are equipped with radar and digital nautical cards photo: Marco Feldmann

The German Federal police still need to rescue migrants from boats that are not consistently seaworthy.

photo: Kripos, NCIS, CC BY 4.0, flickr.com

Although at the moment fewer refugees are arriving on Samos, the German Federal police still need to rescue migrants from boats that are not consistently seaworthy.

The German police officers are responsible mainly for border protection. They are therefore armed and they work on Samos for a month at a time. Each of the two boats has a four-member crew. The crewmembers remain on duty for 24 hours followed by one day off. Duty time is shared between patrol hours, keeping watch on the boat and stand-by duty in the hotel afterwards. There are currently 23 German Federal police officers on Samos dealing exclusively with boat duties. In addition to the crews there is a staff composed of the head of the contingent, one logistician and one employee in charge of servicing the boats and maintenance. In addition to its sea-faring officers, the German Federal Police also has land-based employees on Samos. The mandate that provides the basis for the German Federal Police’s action on Samos was normally due to expire on 31 December 2016, but it was recently extended until 31 December 2017.
Implementing the EU-Turkey agreement demands daily work on the ground

Greece takes up the challenge

Interview with Albrecht Broemme, President of the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), Berlin

The European: Mr Broemme, you are the President of the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). Following the signing of the EU-Turkey Agreement on Migration in March 2016, you were appointed “Special Envoy of the German Federal Government for Implementing the Statement of the European Union with Turkey on Migration”. What exactly does this job entail?

Albrecht Broemme: When I was appointed, I wondered what my job would consist of. Clearly I would be working on the ground, so I went to Greece, observed what was happening there, discussed with the Greek and Turkish authorities, listened to the people on the islands and in the refugee camps to understand what was going on. Every week I had a meeting with the Chancellor’s office, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of the interior in order to report back to them and give them a better idea of what was happening in Greece. Since September, this duty is taken over by a few other people.

The European: What effects has the EU-Turkey agreement had so far?

Albrecht Broemme: The first positive outcome of this agreement was that the number of refugees arriving on the Greek islands from Turkey dropped from one day to the next. The number of people being killed in the Aegean Sea also decreased. Previously there had been about 80 deaths each month; since the start of the agreement until November there have been 12 in all, although this is still too many.

The European: You talk about the people who drowned in the Aegean Sea as having been killed...

Albrecht Broemme: …yes, I used the word “killed” deliberately, because in my view they did not die by accident but were murdered. When you are paid a lot of money for loading people who never learned to swim onto a small overcrowded boat, send it out to sea and then leave them to fend for themselves, it is criminal. When people die as a consequence, this is no accident. For me it is organised murder.

The European: The signing of the agreement has indeed had an immediate and dramatic impact on refugee movements in the Eastern Mediterranean: crossings in the Aegean Sea fell from over 127,000 in the first three months of 2016 to about 18,000 between April and October, with very few daily arrivals during the summer....

Albrecht Broemme: …and I was very happy and proud to be part of a process that was set up in order to put a stop to people risking their lives at sea and to such tragic sights as that of children’s bodies lying on the beach. So, this was a first positive point. But of course, there were a lot of problems to be solved on the ground.

The European: What kind of problems needed to be addressed first?

Albrecht Broemme: When we started working in Athens and on the islands, the new Greek asylum law did not yet exist. To remedy this situation, Greece had to create, in record time, a completely new law. Putting this new law into place was a complicated process and I admire the Greek authorities and Parliament for having succeeded in doing it so quickly.

The European: The media do not always share your positive assessment.

Albrecht Broemme: That’s true, many newspapers, for instance in Germany, are quick to criticise the Greek authorities, accusing them of being disorganised or even lazy, and of not knowing what to do about the refugee crisis. But that is not true at all! My experience is that the Greeks know exactly what to do.

The European: So why is the process so slow? Many refugees in the Greek island camps have not even been able to claim asylum so far.
Albrecht Broemme: The process is slow, because the work on the ground is difficult. That is what I always try to explain: you have to see the situation with your own eyes to understand why it is so hard. The Greek authorities were not prepared for the arrival of so many people in need of help and they lack experience. And they do not have enough specialists for the asylum claims.

The European: But the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is supporting them in this task...
Albrecht Broemme: ...yes, of course, but the EASO staff member supporting the Greek authorities is not allowed to take decisions. EASO workers can only prepare decisions by conducting interviews with the refugees. This is helpful, but then the Greek authorities read the transcript of every single interview from beginning to end in order to be able to draw their own conclusions and take a decision. And they do not want to make group decisions; asylum decisions are taken case by case, which is also time-consuming. The Greeks say, “we appreciate the help of EASO, but it’s our country, and the refugees are in Greece, so it’s our responsibility”. Well, we must respect that. Another problem is that the EU has not thus far sent the full number of experts it promised.

The European: I find it hard to understand why EU member states do not just send more qualified people to Greece to support the Greek asylum authority. Is it also a problem of political will?
Albrecht Broemme: I am disappointed, that Europe is still not jet working together on the refugee question. Things are starting to improve, but for months on end there was no common sense. But there are also practical reasons for the insufficient numbers of EASO staff being deployed. It is not that easy to find enough experienced specialists with at least a basic command of English and willing to work under such difficult conditions: in a Greek island you are sitting in a camp container together with other teams, there is noise, people are desperate, women cry as they tell their story... It is really difficult to conduct interviews under such conditions, which is why it takes more time.

The European: Aren’t the EASO people prepared in their home countries for this situation?
Albrecht Broemme: Not at all! Only when they arrive in Athens, they get information about the situation and some training. In Germany we started giving them more information before they are sent abroad, which makes sense. By the way, for Frontex officers, it works much better. If you need more officers somewhere, they are sent within a few days. And they are trained for this job and it do it very well. But the people working for EASO on the islands also do really a great job. They generally like what they do and some of them stay longer than planned.

The European: Let’s come back to the EU-Turkey agreement. At its core is the idea of discouraging irregular crossings by returning most of those who arrive on the Greek islands to Turkey following a credible assessment of their asylum claims. But to date, about 700 people have been returned to Turkey under the agreement, although there have been 18,000 arrivals. Doesn’t this put the initial plan at risk?
Albrecht Broemme: Unfortunately, we have not yet fulfilled that part of the agreement. As a result the Greek islands are filling up with refugees. However, Turkey really is willing to take refugees back....

The European: ...so the problem lies on the Greek side? In addition to the difficult and time-consuming process you described of deciding what to do with each refugee, does it also have to do with the fact that Greece still has concerns about recognising Turkey as a safe third country for non-Syrian refugees? The European Commission is already considering Turkey as a safe third country.

Albrecht Broemme: I also think that we can consider Turkey as a safe third country because there is really no indication at all that Turkey is not treating the refugees properly. I admire the Turks for what they are doing for the refugees. They have millions of them to take care of and they do it well. Only 20% of the refugees in Turkey are living in camps, the others live in different housing areas. Some refugees have even returned voluntarily from the Greek islands to Turkey, in the hope of finding a better situation there than in Greece. But, as you know, Greece and Turkey have difficult relations for historical reasons.

The European: So the situation is blocked?
Albrecht Broemme: No, things are moving forward, and this “abnormal” situation in a certain way fosters a “normalisation” of
Albrecht Broemme
has been President of the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk, THW) since 2006. Born in 1953, he obtained a master’s degree in electrical engineering from the University of Darmstadt. Between 1970 and 1979 Mr Broemme volunteered at the THW and Fire Department in Darmstadt and became Senior Officer of the Berlin Fire Department in 1980. Prior to his current position, he spent 14 years as Chief Fire Officer of the Berlin Fire Department. In 2016, he was appointed Special Envoy of the Federal Government for Implementing the Statement of the European Union with Turkey on Migration.

Greek-Turkish relations. Today you even see Turkish police officers on the Greek islands. Imagine! This would have been totally impossible before. I am very happy that the middle and lower level relations between Greece and Turkey are much better than they have been in the last 50 years. This is at least one positive side effect of the crisis.

**The European:** But do you really believe Greece will be able to find a solution?

**Albrecht Broemme:** The Greek authorities have started to observe how other EU member states are dealing with migrants and refugees and their asylum claims. In Germany, for instance, we did not expect to receive so many refugees and it was quite chaotic to start with. But today we have quite a good system up and running. I have very good relations with decision-makers on both the Greek and German sides and I help to bring them together; that’s also part of my job. This is why I think that the Greek authorities will find a solution to speed up the process in the near future so that the decision either to send people back to Turkey or transfer them to the mainland and from there possibly to another EU country can be taken swiftly. But I believe that they have to find a solution by themselves.

**The European:** Let us take a closer look at the situation on the islands. Today there are more than 35,000 refugees on the Greek islands located close to the Turkish coast. This also creates tensions in the country, with a growing section of the Greek population participating in demonstrations against the situation on their islands.

**Albrecht Broemme:** It is true that in the islands the local population is becoming increasingly hostile towards the refugees, although the Greek population has given them a lot of support. Today, the willingness to help has not completely disappeared, but the Greeks are worried about the future of their islands, because they see that the situation is not really improving. They are aggressive because they are afraid. For that reason also it is very important to implement the return process under the EU-Turkey agreement faster, because otherwise more camps and hotspots will have to be built on the islands and this is refused by the local mayors.

**The European:** You visited a lot of camps on the islands and talked to many refugees. How are they coping with the situation?

**Albrecht Broemme:** The living conditions are of course poor. But that is not the worst thing for the people in the camps: what makes me really sad is that they wake up each morning with nothing to do. They just wait. In some camps, for example in Chios, children can now attend lessons, or do sports, but the overall situation is really sad for the refugees. They have scant information, they cannot read the Greek newspapers, and only a small percentage have a smartphone. The question I was always asked when I talked to them was: when will we be told what is going to happen to us? And I had to say that I didn’t know. Currently they have to wait months on end and I would really be happy if we could manage to give them an answer within one month of their arrival. Maybe the decision will not be what they hoped for, but at least it will be a decision.

**The European:** Mr Broemme, I would like to put one last question. Your agency, THW, is also engaged in supporting refugees, in collaboration with the UNHCR and other partners. Can you briefly describe THW’s contribution in this field?

**Albrecht Broemme:** THW is indeed involved in the construction of refugee camps. We helped set up the enormous Al Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan, with the capacity for 140,000 people, in only 7 months: incredible! This desert camp currently houses 80,000 refugees. We managed the installation of the water and blackwater system with local workers. We also try to involve refugees in these projects, and we pay them for their participation, and only a small percentage have a smartphone. The living conditions are of course poor. But that is not the worst thing for the people in the camps: what makes me really sad is that they wake up each morning with nothing to do. They just wait. In some camps, for example in Chios, children can now attend lessons, or do sports, but the overall situation is really sad for the refugees. They have scant information, they cannot read the Greek newspapers, and only a small percentage have a smartphone. The question I was always asked when I talked to them was: when will we be told what is going to happen to us? And I had to say that I didn’t know. Currently they have to wait months on end and I would really be happy if we could manage to give them an answer within one month of their arrival. Maybe the decision will not be what they hoped for, but at least it will be a decision.

**The European:** Mr Broemme, thank you very much for this interview. We hope that you will succeed in making possible everything you wish to achieve!

The interview was led by Nannette Cazaubon, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of this magazine.

Albrecht Broemme and Nannette Cazaubon meeting at the THW premises in Berlin, 7 November 2016
photo: © THW
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Politicians should consider the impact of emigration as well as the tragic flood of migrants arriving on the continent. Whilst globalisation has enabled vast numbers to travel and reside overseas, the phenomenon is also causing the conventional state-centric security concept to evolve. For example, citizens’ expectations, across the EU at least, increasingly demand that states provide absolute security and expect it to be proffered upon them regardless of their location.

The impact of globalisation

As a direct corollary to this expectation the political response needs to change, as questions slowly emerge about Western states’ continuing ability to provide an omnipresent security guarantee. NEOs are operations intended to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety, but the scale of the challenge may be beyond many states already and this is significant as they are not infrequent undertakings. The UK has conducted 23 since the Second World War and 11 in the last 20 years.

Whilst NEO characteristics vary they are often limited, rapid, small-scale operations with the critical element being speed; they frequently have political, humanitarian and military implications. When expediency is aligned with aggravating factors like geographic location, scale, security environment and the availability of resources it would be understandable if states placed great emphasis on doctrine, planning and NEO execution. In reality, not all do and greater emphasis may be necessary now, as contemporary migration has presented many states with a prodigious logistical challenge.

An obligation to protect?

In 2011, during Libya’s civil war 800 UK and 1000 EU citizens were rescued from danger in a celebrated UK-led NEO titled Operation DEFERENCE. The Libyan security situation deteriorated so rapidly that the then German Defence Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, had insufficient time to follow ministerial and legal protocol in consulting the German Bundestag before providing the armed forces with authority to conduct Operation PEGASUS (the German NEO). Guttenberg’s unilateral decision to authorise the NEO was a contravention of protocol that received retrospective bi-partisan endorsement because of a consensus that the state was obligated to protect its citizens.

NEOs, therefore, represent a security commitment between citizen and state, frequently reaffirmed by grandiose political statements about the first duty of government being defence of territory and protection of its people. They are an obligation many states have frequently serviced, but critically when the logistics were more favourable.

Maintaining the perception of Leviathan?

There is scant reference to NEOs in many EU security strategies, which reflects that governments are wrestling with servicing a contemporary expectation that they cannot always meet. The UK’s Chair of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee outlined: “There must always be limits of practicality. It is non-discretionary in that you have got to try, but discretionary if having tried to come up with a plan and you can’t, you don’t then proceed.” This implies that policy is sensibly bounded and pragmatic, with discretion retained on whether government should actually conduct NEOs; it would appear that during crises strategy is reverse-engineered with ways and means considered prior to the ends. This is not something that traditional strategists would either recognise or advocate. Such contradictions around security policy are commonplace: “Differing Department of State and Department of Defence perspectives regarding NEOs often lead to a lack of interagency cooperation.” Consequently, some analysts opine that NEO planning should attract greater prominence as Human Security implies a more open society: “(...) citizens must be able to voice out to government their security concerns.” The assertion the state should wrap around all components of modern life, including security, was first articulated by Thomas Hobbes in his description of the modern state as a Leviathan - the mythical sea creature from the Old Testament that grows exponentially. This description resonates and the contemporary NEO security expectation needs to be bounded, as Lewis implies, before the states’ frailties in the current security landscape are laid bare.

Bounding expectations

Politicians should be bold in implementing policies, cognisant of the frictions whilst accepting states’ (individually and collectively) reduced abilities to provide the omnipresence of security: “Our politicians have been in the business of giving
us more of what we want – more education, more healthcare, more prisons, more pensions, more security,” 6 but the scale of the NEO conundrum will only increase, in quantitative terms, as borders become more porous and travel made easier. The military technologies appropriated for NEOs such as strategic air-transport aircraft and troop-carrying warships are exorbitantly expensive, finite in number and oft-committed on operations, and government/military procurement policies may be compounding this conundrum further still: “Paradoxically, the expensive equipment programme the UK’s Ministry of Defence is now invested in is potentially pricing them out of being able to deal with some of the security threats that governments are going to face.” 7 In future, a choice may be looming – operations of necessity versus wars of choice.

Realpolitik

In seeking to mitigate the burgeoning logistical challenge, some states have sought to burden share through multilateralism. The genesis of the NEO Coordination Group (NCG) 8 was the 2006 Lebanon NEO where vessels left Beirut with significant spare capacity not utilised. The NCG meets bi-annually to evaluate potential crisis situations from a consular and military perspective and in 2015 EU states finally agreed on the level of assistance that unrepresented EU citizens could expect from those represented during crises. However, these policies created in the abstract that imagine a collegiate response may apply to permissive crisis situations only. It is highly likely that Realpolitik will ensure that states seek to secure their own interests before considering others in a non-permissive environment. Whilst the multinational effort aspires to burden share, the provenance of this approach, when citizens and the military are taking casualties, remains unproven. A unilateral capability and doctrine therefore remains integral to states’ security strategies and if the security commitment that states can reasonably offer is important, the requirement for greater honesty about the state’s limitations on delivering it should be of significance too. To do otherwise is surely to be an architect in one’s own demise.

3 Julian Lewis MP (House of Commons Defence Select Committee), Personal Interview, Sep 10, 2015.
7 Sir Steve Smith, Personal Interview, Sep 28, 2015.
8 NCG Members include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, New Zealand, Spain, USA and the United Kingdom. The EU’s External Action Service is an observer, and not a member.
NATO: Defence – Dialogue – Détente

NATO-Russia relations have severely deteriorated, but the lines of communication are still open and both sides are careful to ensure that this remains the case. NATO as an alliance must ensure that Russia does not repeat the type of action it took in the Crimea against neighbouring states. From the beginning of the end of the Cold War Russia has perceived itself as being misunderstood in its peaceful intentions and now with the NATO build-up on its borders it needs to save face. If only both could make an effort to meet each other halfway and move forward together.
The Warsaw Summit – more than rhetoric

Deterrence and Dialogue
by Petr Pavel, General, Chairman Military Committee, NATO, Brussels

NATO has absolutely no interest in a new Cold War or a new arms race. Ours is a defensive organisation committed to three core tasks:
1. collective defence,
2. crisis management, and
3. cooperative security.
Deterrence is at the heart of our mission & purpose. To defend against a threat, you must have credible defence and deterrence, underpinned by the will to act. The higher the level or urgency of the threat, the more effective measures need to be. For this reason, NATO has undertaken the biggest reinforcement of its collective defence since the Cold War. NATO must ensure that it has a range of capabilities and options to respond appropriately when required.

New challenges not only at our borders
One of the challenges at our borders is a more aggressive and assertive Russia, with whom we worked to build a partnership for over 20 years since the end of the Cold War. This partnership focused on a range of mutually beneficial areas, from counter terrorism to crisis management. However in 2014, the Russian Government violated international law and undermined European security by illegally annexing Crimea, providing active support and weapons to separatists in Eastern Ukraine. This government has recently engaged in a substantial military build-up, developing new military capabilities and doctrine. Russia also heralds a formidable military posture, which includes large-scale and no-notice exercises, air space violations, the use of propaganda against NATO Allies, and the use of military force to intimidate and subjugate its neighbours.

NATO will respond to any threat against any Ally
The Alliance has a duty to protect its population and territory, so it is responding proportionately, defensively, and fully in concert with international law. To increase our responsiveness, our Alliance has tripled the size of NATO’s Response Force, created a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, established new, small coordinating headquarters to facilitate reinforcements and training, and prepositioned equipment and supplies over the past two years. Other measures are being put in place to ensure our follow-on forces are trained, interoperable and able to deploy rapidly against aggression. At our Warsaw Summit, the Heads of State and Government decided that four rotational multinational battalions would also be deployed in the eastern part of the Alliance. This decision does not aim to escalate or threaten; it is to assure our Eastern allies of our solidarity against any threat while deterring and preventing potential conflict.

Striving for a cooperative relationship with Russia
NATO welcomes a more constructive and cooperative relationship with Russia: dialogue is essential. Meaningful dialogue can increase transparency and predictability and reduce the risks of miscalculation and mishaps. This is why our policy of strong defence and deterrence together with periodic, focused, and constructive dialogue with Russia both at the political and military levels is so important, and why the NATO-Russia Council has already met twice this year.
Our Alliance will maintain transparency in our actions while also identifying and defending our principles. For most, an Alliance of 28 (soon to be 29) sovereign states committed to collective defence and united in their shared values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law would be deterrent enough. For those who might have aggressive intentions, they can have no doubt that NATO can and will respond to any threat against any Ally.
The withdrawal of NATO mobile military forces is a prerequisite for common security

NATO is rethinking the cold war

by Alexander Grushko, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Brussels

NATO decided at its Warsaw Summit to further “strengthen deterrence” vis-à-vis Russia (which in real terms means providing for military power projection on our borders) while keeping channels of political dialogue open. I would not call this a return to the Cold War, but rather a rethinking of the Cold War methodology in a new security environment.

A confrontational model of relations

In fact a confrontational model of relations has been reproduced. NATO countries’ political decisions have been accompanied by a substantial military build-up and the development of military infrastructure on the eastern “flank”, including the deployment of US/NATO missile defence sites close to our borders, an increased level of military activity and “rotations” on a permanent basis.

The Alliance has suspended all practical cooperation with Russia on a wide range of projects conducive to the security of all participating countries. We no longer cooperate in Afghanistan, where the situation is clearly worsening, or in the fight against terrorism or piracy. US nuclear weapons remain in Europe, with non-nuclear states actively involved in so-called “nuclear sharing” in contravention of the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to some estimates, modernisation of these “nukes”, which is under way, could result in a lowered nuclear threshold. These trends are worrying.

The most striking paradox of NATO’s actions is that its military deployments and reinforcements, which are meant to deter Russia and to “reassure” Eastern European states, in fact weaken their and overall European security, fuel distrust and tensions and turn the calmest region in Europe – in terms of conventional military threats – into an area of military competition. What is more, the strengthening of NATO’s collective defence comes at the expense of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, one of the key pillars of European security, if not the only one since NATO countries destroyed the conventional arms control regime.

The mythical “Russian threat”

We are seeing an unprecedented campaign with regard to the mythical “Russian threat”, with the focus now on Syria, contrary to common sense and regardless of the Russian Government’s tremendous efforts to facilitate the resolution of different crises. It is absolutely clear – including to many European politicians and think-tanks – that European security cannot be built against Russia, but only with Russia, which must be considered as an equal and credible partner.

There will be an appropriate response

Let there be no illusions – NATO actions will not go unanswered. The measures taken by NATO countries on the eastern “flank” will be counterbalanced by an appropriate and measured response on our part in all areas where they affect our legitimate security interests. The question is whether NATO members seriously believe that a long-term confrontation with Russia would serve NATO’s interests and help justify its global ambitions and increased defence spending. Hardly anyone wants the state of “permanent emergency” to become our new common reality. Without dialogue we will end up with a long drawn-out stalemate.

Russia is open to dialogue

Our military have made a number of concrete proposals for jointly reviewing the military aspects of the situation in Europe, discussing measures aimed at de-escalation and the prevention of unintended military incidents and considering the possibilities for cooperation in the combat against terrorism. So far there have been no signs that NATO is prepared to engage in such a dialogue. However, it is clear that to achieve practical results normal mil-to-mil contacts are needed. An overall improvement of the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area requires a reduction of NATO military activities and deployments near the Russian borders and the withdrawal of NATO military forces and equipment back to their permanent locations. These steps would mitigate the risk of a new arms race and create the conditions for a constructive dialogue.

Alexander Grushko

There was a certain Pierre Harmel

Deterrence and Dialogue or Security and Détente?
by Harald Kujat, General (ret.), Berlin

Just like at the Wales Summit two years ago, the agenda of the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Warsaw was dominated by the issue of relations with Russia. Deterrence and dialogue are to define the Alliance’s security policy with respect to Russia.

Geostrategic protection
Battalion-size multinational units up to 1000 strong are to be stationed in the three Baltic States and Poland on a rotating basis. Framework nations Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States will command the units and establish their operational readiness by mid-2017. It should be possible, if necessary, for them to be reinforced by the NATO Rapid Response Force within a few days. The commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence and investing more than 20% of the defence budget in modern equipment was reiterated. This is one aspect of NATO’s Russia policy: NATO, supported by a strong collective defence, is to use deterrence to signal that it is prepared to defend the eastern European allies. In a period of tense relations between the West and Russia, this also provides reassurance for the eastern European allies, who given their vulnerable geostrategic position and the conflict in Ukraine feel themselves to be particularly at risk.

Reactivating the dialogue with Russia
However, at the same time, the NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to reactivate the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for dialogue and information. The corresponding political and military contacts should help create greater transparency and calculability, mitigate the risks and allay tensions. These measures involve more than a dialogue. If applied consistently they would make a tangible contribution to reducing the tensions between East and West.

Broadening of NATO activities
NATO also wishes to be more strongly involved in the fight against international terrorism and to contribute to greater stability in the Middle East and Africa, for example by organising military training missions in those regions. The member states that have long been calling for NATO to play a stronger role in the Syrian conflict achieved that objective with the decision to send AWACS to support the western coalition in the fight against so-called Islamic State. Furthermore, in cooperation with the European Union, the maritime presence in the Mediterranean is to be strengthened in order to combat people smuggling and to save refugees from drowning. The extension of NATO’s activities to the Middle East and North Africa counterbalances the stronger Russian engagement in this region. However, this increases the danger of the existing tensions between Russia and NATO in Europe spreading to conflict regions outside Europe, further exacerbating the risk of a military confrontation.

General (ret.) Harald Kujat
was born in 1942 in Mielke. He joined the German Armed Forces on 1 July, 1959 and completed the 20th General Staff Course (Air Force), at the Command and Staff College, Hamburg, 1992–1995 Chief of Staff and Deputy German MiliRep to the NATO Military Committee and Western European Union, Brussels. 1996–1998 Director, IFOR Coordination Centre (iCC), SHAPE, Belgium and later Assistant Director, International Military Staff (Plans & Policy) and Deputy Director, IMS, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 1998–2000 Director of Policy and Advisory Staff to the German MOD, Berlin. 2000–2002, Chief of Defence (CHOD), Federal Armed Forces, Berlin. 2002–2005, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Brussels.

The Harmel Report
The 1967 Harmel Report initiated by the then Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Harmel on moving away from the existing NATO strategy of “massive retaliation” (MC 14/2). NATO’s basic security and defence functions were to be strengthened as a factor for lasting peace. The report refers to two main functions:

► To have sufficient military strength to achieve a deterrent effect, so as to be able where necessary to defend the territory of the member states.
► In the framework of these military measures in favour of security to establish lasting relations in order to be able to resolve fundamental political issues.

Thus military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.
Confidence building and détente

Given the critical state of East-West relations it is a sign of responsible and reasonable behaviour on the part of the Alliance that its military action should be underpinned by a policy of détente, confidence building and dialogue. The best place for that is the NATO-Russia Council in both its political and military format. This is the only way of preventing the counter-measures, misunderstandings, misjudgements and overreactions that could lead to escalation. Particularly as regards the NATO operation in support of the international coalition’s fight against so-called Islamic State, close military coordination at operational planning level is essential in order to avoid confrontations.

50 years on from the Harmel report

More than ever before, “concepts” are a basic component of security policy. Deterrence is not synonymous with security and dialogue is not the same thing as détente. In 1967 the then Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, a bold and farsighted politician, defined security and détente as the cornerstones of NATO’s new security policy. This was at the beginning of the long road that led to the end of the Cold War. Almost 50 years on, we would do well to remember this in connection with the crises of our times. The opposing blocs of the Cold War no longer exist. But a new bloc mentality has developed and we must overcome it if the regions plagued by terror on Europe’s periphery are to be able to look forward to a future in peace and security.

* George Santayana (16 December 1863-26 September 1952) Philosopher, essayist, poet and novelist.
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The question of how to define, assess and enhance resilience turned out to be one of the major topics at NATO’s Warsaw Summit. The Allies undertook (para. 73 of the Summit communiqué) to “continue to enhance (...) resilience,” with civil preparedness seen as a “central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence.”

Implementing that commitment remains a national responsibility, the assumption being that resilient Allies make for a resilient Alliance. However, the resilience of the Alliance is greater than the sum of its parts. In order to achieve a synergetic effect in resilience building, NATO is ready to support Allies in assessing and, upon request enhancing, their civil preparedness. To that end, the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience focus on seven areas: continuity of government, energy supplies, ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people, food and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, communication systems and transport systems.

What lies behind the baseline requirements?

According to NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Jamie Shea, behind these baseline requirements lie two interrelated objectives: first, to ensure that NATO can speedily move all the forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure it needs for that purpose; and second, to be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with a minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s social, political and military cohesion (NATO Review, March 2016). Since resilience is ultimately a cross-cutting theme, the requirements for resilience can now be found in a number of Allied policies and strategies, in domains such as civil preparedness, cyber defence, countering hybrid threats or partnership cooperation.

Against a backdrop of growing global instability and an increasingly unpredictable threat environment combined with a rising wave of attacks against the legitimacy of the liberal international order and its institutions, resilience against a full spectrum of challenges, including hybrid ones, is becoming an indispensable condition or enabler for achieving stable security and a credible defence.

A hybrid security environment

The ever-increasing technological sophistication of our social, economic and military systems generates new vulnerabilities. Threats in the modern era have become an extremely complex, multidimensional continuum (state – non-state, military – non-military, kinetic – non-kinetic) capable of causing disruptions within our national and collective security systems. More broadly, it is the very foundation of our governance – i.e. the institutional continuity of government functions, but also the unity of our society and its cohesion in terms of shared values and norms, that may be targeted.

Under such conditions, resilience must be seen as a multi-layered and dynamic process. It is the ability of a (biological, social or technical) system to respond to emergencies or shocks in at least three ways: (i) absorbing the shock of a crisis while maintaining the continuity of vital functions; (ii) recovery, i.e. the ability to return to a previous state as quickly as possible, to bounce back; (iii) adaptation, i.e. an analysis of the impact of the crisis, identification of lessons learned and corresponding adjustment of the relevant aspect of resilience within the system.

In a hybrid security environment, building resilience requires horizontal interconnectedness and synergies between the civilian and military sectors and the public and private spheres. Vertically then, enhancing or implementing resilience spans from the top level of government down to the local and even individual levels.

Same objective, different emphasis

The joint NATO-EU Declaration signed in the margins of the NATO Warsaw Summit identified amongst its strategic priorities the need to “boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience” (i.e. internal direction) as well as to “foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South” (i.e. external direction).

The basic political barrier between NATO and EU is still very high

Security and Resilience in the context of NATO-EU cooperation

by Jiří Šedivý, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO, Brussels

“Resilient Allies make for a resilient Alliance”

Jiří Šedivý

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The EU – somewhat hesitant about implementation
While in NATO the concept has experienced a boom over the relatively short period of the past two years, the pace seems to be slower in the EU. HR/VP Federica Mogherini presented resilience building (together with an integrated approach to conflicts and crises) as one of the six main building blocks for implementation of the EU Global Strategy. Yet, unlike for NATO, which lays the emphasis on building the Allies’ resilience, the EU’s direction is external, i.e. supporting the resilience of partner countries, be it as one of the instruments for conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation or as an element of capacity building. Nevertheless, already in 2006 the Commission launched the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) that sets the overall framework for activities aimed at improving the protection of critical infrastructure in Europe across all EU States and in all relevant sectors of economic activity. The threats to which the programme aims to respond are not confined to terrorism, but also include criminal activities, natural disasters and other causes of accidents. It seeks to provide an all-hazards, cross-sectoral approach. This is basically resilience building by another name and, indeed it covers the full cycle of the resilience concept, i.e. shock-absorption, recovery, adaptation (see the Commission Communication on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection COM(2006) 786).

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The Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats
The latest important step in the process of developing responses in the context of hybrid security challenges was the launch by the Commission and High Representative F. Mogherini of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2016. The Framework brings together existing policies and proposes 22 operational actions aimed at: (i) raising awareness by establishing dedicated mechanisms for the exchange of information between Member States and by coordinating EU actions to deliver strategic communication; (ii) building resilience by addressing potential strategic and critical sectors such as cyber security, critical infrastructures (energy, transport, space), protection of the financial system from illicit use, protection of public health and supporting efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalisation; (iii) preventing and responding to crises and recovering by defining effective procedures to follow, but also by examining the feasibility of applying the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU) and the mutual defence clause (Art. 42(7) TEU), in the event of a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack; (iv) stepping up cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO as well as other partner organisations.

Towards deepening NATO-EU cooperation
The NATO-EU Declaration certainly gave “new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership”. It embodies the positive momentum generated these past few years between the two organisations and their top leaderships. At the same time, the Declaration demonstrates the limits to closer cooperation: the fact that in the end it was signed by the two organisations’ top bureaucrats and not by Member States – even though 22 EU Nations are also NATO Allies – proves that the fundamental political barrier between the two remains very high.

Another unhelpful element is the asymmetry that exists between the NATO and EU staffs in terms of their enthusiasm for closer collaboration – with the latter usually showing more reluctance, although staff-to-staff consultations and informal coordination have been going on for years now. Against that backdrop, a well-developed and effective consultation mechanism still remains to be developed between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

The institutional fragmentation on the Union side does not help either. NATO’s structure and agenda division are inevitably simpler than those of the more complex Union. The hybrid security and resilience policies spread across several DGs and the External Action Service are a case in point.

By way of conclusion, suffice it to emphasise that while most of the past obstacles and institutional incompatibilities persist, the Declaration has established a substantive level of ambition as well as a platform for cooperation between NATO and the EU, including a way-ahead mechanism (albeit quite a “soft” one). Of the seven areas mentioned in the text, four are directly relevant for countering hybrid challenges and for resilience building. In view of the two organisations’ differing but complementary (and non-competing) priorities within these agendas, it is difficult to imagine better themes for coordination, cooperation and synergy building than these two.

This article will be published simultaneously in the Behördenspiegel Congress-Magazin, 15th Berlin Security Conference 2016, Berlin 11/2016, page 20-21

*HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the Future of EU-NATO Cooperation conference, Brussels, 21 November 2016
NATO-EU Joint declaration
by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

We believe that the time has come to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership. In consultation with the EU Member States and the NATO Allies, working with, and for the benefit of all, this partnership will take place in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members.

Today, the Euro-Atlantic community is facing unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and East. Our citizens demand that we use all ways and means available to address these challenges so as to enhance their security. All Allies and Member States, as well as the EU and NATO per se, are already making significant contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. The substantial cooperation between NATO and the EU, unique and essential partners, established more than 15 years ago, also contributes to this end.

In light of the common challenges we are now confronting, we have to step-up our efforts: we need new ways of working together and a new level of ambition; because our security is interconnected; because together we can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to the challenges we face; and because we have to make the most efficient use of resources. A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond.

We are convinced that enhancing our neighbours’ and partners’ stability in accordance with our values, as enshrined in the UN Charter, contributes to our security and to sustainable peace and prosperity. So that our neighbours and partners are better able to address the numerous challenges they currently face, we will continue to support their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, as well as their reform efforts.

In fulfilling the objectives above, we believe there is an urgent need to:

• Boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response. The development of coordinated procedures through our respective playbooks will substantially contribute to implementing our efforts.
• Expand our coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of our missions and operations, exercises and on education and training.
• Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects.
• Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.
• Step up our coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018.
• Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South in a complementary way through specific projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries, including by strengthening maritime capacity.

Cooperation in these areas is a strategic priority. Speedy implementation is essential. The European External Action Service and the NATO International Staff, together with Commission services as appropriate, will develop concrete options for implementation, including appropriate staff coordination mechanisms, to be presented to us and our respective Councils by December 2016. On the EU side, the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission will steer and coordinate this endeavour.

We will review progress on a regular basis.

We call on both organisations to invest the necessary political capital and resources to make this reinforced partnership a success.

Signed at Warsaw on 8 July 2016 in triplicate.

Donald Tusk, President of the European Council
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission
Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Source: NATO
Technologies

Defence Research is an essential part of the Common Security and Defence Policy. For the first time, the European Union – in her budget provision for 2017 – will allocate a budget for defence research. EU financing of defence research will open the way for future cooperative programmes and enable Member States deploying forces in worldwide cooperation with NATO and the United Nations. Each step forward requested by policymakers to reinforce the armed forces’ capabilities needs industry as a partner and a continuous dialogue to evaluate technological innovations to bringing them together with requirements of armed forces.
Essential to the Union’s security and defence is its capacity to sustain a competitive edge in access to outer space. This market is now experiencing a shift as the trend moves away from lifting very large satellites, sometimes as heavy as a bus, into Geo-Stationary Orbit (altitude of 36,000 km), towards sending small satellites, which range from as small as a tennis ball to up to 500 kilograms in mass. These new-generation satellites are typically deployed much closer to the ground (altitudes of between 100 to 600 km), in so-called Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and take advantage of the miniaturisation of electronics to cost-effectively perform a variety of missions, such as remote sensing, technology development and secure communications.

Tailored launch solutions for small satellites
Traditionally, small satellites were launched into orbit as auxiliary payloads piggybacking alongside larger satellites. This works, but comes with high costs and long delays as small satellites need to adapt to the larger satellites’ schedule and in-orbit placement as the choice of orbits for the small satellite is restricted by that of the larger one. In order to facilitate the trip for these small satellites, entities in spacefaring nations have been developing specialised small satellite launch vehicles that can offer tailored launch solutions to small satellite operators and manufacturers. In order to launch small satellites “on demand”, China has developed the Kuaizhou (“Fast Vessel”) which is a specialised microsatellite launcher that can be launched in a matter of days rather than months. Supported by NASA’s “Venture Class Launch Contracts”, several American start-ups are working towards the same goal; among these is Virgin Galactic with its “Launcher One” design, which features a rocket being launched from a Boeing 747.

European standing
In the world of today, it is not only access to space, but also responsive, quick access, that matters. Since the 1980s Europe has led the world in commercial launches with the Ariane family. Our ingenuity, competitive labour costs, high-tech heritage and benign export control regime have consistently given Europe the edge over other spacefaring nations in commercial space. When it comes to the new market for responsive small satellite launchers, Europe should aim to keep the lead. Over the past 5 years, European venture capital has poured into
Technologies

The five phases from balloon-start into the orbit

various companies that are developing responsive microsatellite launchers:

- “Arion” by PLD is ground launched.
- “SOAR” by Swiss Space Systems is air launched from an Airbus 300.
- “bloostar” by Zero 2 Infinity is launched from a near space balloon.

At Zero 2 Infinity we believe that new missions mean new requirements and new solutions. By decoupling the ascent, done with a balloon, with the acceleration phase, done by a rocket, bloostar can decrease the launch costs by more than 50% as compared to the classical approaches inherited from ballistic missiles and air launched missiles.

Leading the way to the future

It is essential that Europe has its own fleet of small satellite launch vehicles. Even though the Ariane 5 and the Vega do a perfect job during their missions and are very successful, they offer neither responsiveness nor specialised solutions for operators willing to launch small payloads on demand. These small satellites encourage research and experimentation and can be used for a wide range of military and civil purposes.

SpaceWorks estimates that between 2016 and 2022, over three thousand nano and micro satellites will be put into orbit and launch solutions need to be available for these satellites so that they can cheaply and reliably access the orbits where they can be most efficient.

It is evident that the space industry is undergoing a quiet revolution with the advent of small satellites. Many commentators have described this as the “democratisation” of space, in the sense that many countries and other entities which could not own satellites in the past are now able to do so thanks to the lower cost of operating small satellites and, in the coming years, of launching them. This is the perfect opportunity for Europe to capitalise on this surge in the demand for launch vehicles and to provide this service to the entities willing to partake in it. Zero 2 Infinity, with its bloostar solution, offers one such avenue and is working passionately to sustain Europe’s leadership in access to space.
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For a long time the focus in the field of energy security was mainly on oil and gas. On the one hand, both commodities, especially oil, have traditionally been the fuel for economic prosperity. On the other hand, western economies, including those of Europe, have been largely dependent on a few exporting countries in which there is a geographic concentration of those resources. However, while oil and gas remain an important geopolitical factor in foreign policy, as regards energy resilience the perspective has had to evolve.

The political and environmental landscape
The political landscape has changed since the emergence of the European Union in 1992. Geopolitics has become more complicated since the bipolar world ceased to exist, with the emergence of new regional powers. Growing environmental awareness and the search for energy self-sufficiency have increased the political motivation to seek alternative energies and to make efficient use of energy. More and more private companies have appeared on the energy market, especially in Europe, with an ongoing trend towards privatisation and an unbundling of the various components of the energy system.

The exploitation of shale oil and gas reserves has followed a technological evolution combined with favourable market conditions. Peak oil is no longer relevant. Liquefied natural gas has also helped the global gas market to become more independent and reliable for trading. As regards the transformation towards a more sustainable energy system, contrary to what might appear to be the case for some countries, the demand for fossil fuels is still high. In 2015, over 80% of the world’s total consumed energy was derived from coal, oil or natural gas. The world population is growing and so is the hunger for energy and prosperity, especially in Africa and Asia.

New threats to energy infrastructure
The resilience of the energy system has always been crucial to industrialised and developing economies, for which energy represents the fuel for growing welfare. The significance of resilience is increasing as society becomes more digital, urban, interconnected and automated. According to the World Energy Council, emerging physical, financial and virtual risks pose ever-greater threats to the energy sector. Three major new fields of risk for the resilience of the energy infrastructure on the global level have been identified: extreme weather events, the water-energy-food nexus and cyber attacks.

Extreme weather events have increased by a factor of four over the past 30 years. With the rise in average global temperatures the frequency and severity of catastrophic weather events is increasing. The contribution of severe convective storms alone to overall insured losses has increased by more than 40% in the past 20 years. Changes in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, as well as...
unseasonal deviations from average weather, affect current and future energy infrastructure and the energy sector’s profitability. Impacts on energy systems could include blackouts, shutdowns of nuclear and thermal power plants due to long-lasting heat waves, or droughts and changing rainfall patterns that affect hydropower generation.

The interdependencies and competing demands between water usage and the production of energy and food also trigger economic and social challenges. Energy is, after agriculture, the second most water-intensive sector, with 98% of the electricity supply critically dependent on the availability of water. In 2015, hydropower facilities in Brazil sustained economic losses of more than US$4.3 billion due to drought-related energy-rationing and water-rationing measures. Food production requires large volumes of water and energy: energy is used for pumping, moving and treating water; and water is used in the production and supply of energy.

**The energy–water–food nexus** can impact the stability of energy supply and demand for years or decades. It is also likely that the impacts of climate change will increase water stress in many countries, leading to the prospect of greater competition.

The digitisation of the energy sector in industrialised countries has resulted in the rapid development of new methods to enhance the collection, storage and sharing of data, and has provided new opportunities for effective operation and management. While there are benefits to a more interconnected energy value chain, there are also increased vulnerabilities.

**Cyber attacks** on industrial control systems are a major concern. There have been many cases of severe hacker attacks, but only a few were made public. The consequences of a cyber attack range from economic and technical damage, espionage and loss of data to the loss of life. These and other consequences could be local or wide-ranging. The electricity system is not alone in facing increasing cyber security threats: some estimates suggest that by 2018 the oil and gas industries could be spending US$1.87 billion each year on cyber security.

**A broader view of risks and solutions** Developing a resilient energy system will require a paradigm shift in the way security is viewed. In today’s modern energy system – which is complex, privatised, market-oriented, Europeanised and unbundled – there is no single operator or regulator responsible for the resilience of the energy infrastructure. Constant monitoring and exchanges of the latest developments between all key actors within a national, regional and international energy system are required. Moreover, it is important to understand that a diversified energy system enhances flexibility and resilience.

It is important to recognise not only the risk of a disruption in the energy supply, which in the past was reflected in price peaks, but also the risk for energy exporting countries of global peak demand. According to the scenarios drawn up by the World Energy Council, per capita peak energy demand will be reached before 2030. In some state economies, political peace and a high oil price are strongly interlinked. A truly resilient energy system must anticipate and prepare for any challenge that comes its way.
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A holistic approach to CBRN decontamination

CBRN threats are relevant – decontamination concepts and capabilities

Interview with Thomas Popp, General Manager of KärcherFuturetech GmbH, Schwaikheim

The European: Mr Popp, your company is a leader in major areas of CBRN protection. Could you briefly describe your overall portfolio?

Thomas Popp: Our mother company Kärcher is world leader for cleaning machines, but we at KärcherFuturetech are specialised in the field of CBRN decontamination. From our perspective decontamination is the ultimate cleaning function, since an unsatisfactory decontamination result would have dramatic health consequences. We not only use high-pressure systems for CBRN decontamination, but also our patented vacuum chamber technology for sensitive equipment, our shower decontamination systems for the decontamination of persons and our hot gas/steam chambers for heat-resistant material.

The European: And what other systems do you produce?

Thomas Popp: In addition to CBRN decontamination systems, KärcherFuturetech offers mobile catering systems, water supply systems and field camp solutions.

The European: What is your perception of the worldwide threats in the field of CBRN?

Thomas Popp: The crises all over the world in recent years unfortunately show that these threats are very real. Infamous examples are the bird flu outbreak mainly in Asia, the Ebola outbreak in Africa and the use by terrorists of chemical warfare agents in Syria in the 1990s. Thus a functioning CBRN defence system, which of course includes an effective and efficient CBRN decontamination concept, is a vital component of a country’s defence and civil protection policies.

The European: Can you describe the necessary CBRN protective measures?

Thomas Popp: It all starts with individual CBRN protection. For unprotected persons it is necessary to organise collective CBRN protection. In order to be proactive and not just reactive, CBRN detection capabilities are needed if a CBRN contamination event has happened and CBRN decontamination tasks have to be carried out as fast and effectively as possible in order to mitigate the negative effects of such an event. Medical CBRN protection is another vital component of an effective and efficient CBRN defence.

The European: Your approach to CBRN decontamination is a holistic one, but what about training and other services?

Thomas Popp: Indeed, we offer our holistic CBRN decontamination approach to our customers worldwide. In support of all four product groups we provide a wide variety of product-related services for our customers such as training, documentation, spare parts services, OEM shop maintenance and field services.

The European: What does CBRN protection mean for the armed forces in particular?

Thomas Popp: Each armed force should verify if all the above-described requirements for an effective and efficient CBRN defence are fulfilled. It is important to bring all the different pillars up to the same level, especially detection, de-
contamination and medical protection. Ongoing and thorough training is the main factor for success.

The European: What is the priority for avoiding contamination?
Thomas Popp: Good CBRN detection and good modelling capabilities are a necessity in order to avoid contamination.

The European: And if contamination cannot be avoided?
Thomas Popp: Then we need to cover surfaces with special coatings or foils, for example CARC paint systems on vehicles, making the CBRN decontamination processes easier.

The European: I would like to go through the components of CBRN and focus first on the abovementioned risk of chemical attacks. What is your protection strategy and what assets do you have in your portfolio?
Thomas Popp: Depending on the objects that have to be decontaminated, various systems can be used. If a given object allows the use of water and chemicals it is most likely that a wet chemical decontamination process using our GDS 2000 non-aqueous decontaminant will provide the most effective decontamination solution. Heat-resistant objects can be decontaminated in one of our Hot Gas/Steam Chambers and if an object is resistant neither to a wet chemical process nor to heat treatment it can be decontaminated in one of our Vacuum Decontamination Modules.

The European: I presume that such a vacuum process offers additional benefits.
Thomas Popp: Yes indeed; it allows decontamination not only of surfaces, as do powder or wipe technologies, but also of gaps and slots in the given object. This is very important to prevent recontamination due to diffusion processes on the surface or due to off-gassing.

The Decontamination System CDS 2000 – This compact system can decontaminate vehicles, material and persons. photo: Kärcher

Thomas Popp has been Managing Director of KärcherFuture-tech GmbH since 2012. He studied Mechanical Engineering at the University of Stuttgart and joined the Kärcher Group after finishing his studies. Mr Popp has held several positions within the company, among other things managing factories in the US, in Los Angeles. Prior to his current position and from 2007 onwards, he was Managing Director responsible for Sourcing, IT, Logistics, Central Technical Departments, Research & Predevelopment and Facilities within the Kärcher Group.

The European: On the wall I see pictures of road sections being decontaminated. What is your philosophy in this field?
Thomas Popp: We offer systems that can be either mounted on a vehicle or moved by a person in full protective clothing.

The European: And for the decontamination of persons?
Thomas Popp: For this we offer various solutions ranging from simple tent solutions with integrated showers to containerised systems with an automated start-stop system for the showerheads using light barriers and a traffic-light system to control the flow of persons through the system.

The European: You mentioned terrorist attacks using chemical agents. Aren’t terrorists more likely to use radiological substances?
Thomas Popp: Events in the past have shown that all three types of contaminants have been and could unfortunately be used in the future. And when we talk about chemical attacks by terrorists we mustn’t think only about “conventional” chemical warfare agents but also relatively easily available Toxic Industrial Materials and Chemicals (TIMs and TICs), which could also be used for such attacks. As discussed above I strongly believe that a proper CBRN defence entails being well prepared for decontaminating all three types of CBRN contaminants.

The European: What decontamination agents are in your production line?
Thomas Popp: Due to the different physical and chemical properties of the possible CBRN contaminants, for KärcherFuture-tech a range of different types of decontaminants is a must. Thus we offer to our military and civilian clients worldwide:

- GDS 2000 for chemical warfare agents,
- BDS 2000 for biological contaminants,
- RDS 2000 for radiological contaminants,
- RM 21 for washing off contaminants from human skin in shower systems.
The European: I skipped Biological, but let me come back to it now. You mentioned BDS 2000. Could you comment on the effects of the paracetic acid (PAA) that this agent contains?
Thomas Popp: The PAA is in a concentration that enables the fast (efficient) and thorough (effective) inactivation of bacteria and viruses. Weaponised encapsulated bacteria can also be effectively inactivated, since the PAA is transported inside the cell of the given bacterium where it inactivates the cell by oxidising reactions. Other decontaminants often cannot penetrate the cell wall of the pathogen.

The European: And what is the chemical structure of BDS 2000?
Thomas Popp: Our active component in BDS 2000 has a special chemical structure that makes it stable including during high temperature applications. This enables our customers to also use the active component of BDS 2000 in our vacuum decontamination modules at elevated temperatures and in hot gas aerosol generators for interior decontamination, for example our SN 50 Decon.

The European: Let me ask now about your decontamination technologies.
Thomas Popp: These entail a combination of decontaminants and application modules or systems. Only this combination enables our customers worldwide to achieve a thorough decontamination result with the least effort and in as short a time as possible. The latter point is very important in order to achieve the highest possible throughput at the decontamination site. At KärcherFuturetech we look very closely at the obstacles our customers have to overcome in a given decontamination scenario, and on that basis we develop broad decontamination technology solutions.

The European: A broad spectrum: ok, but what are the core technologies?
Thomas Popp: The full range of decontamination technologies is important for a holistic approach to CBRN defence. In a nutshell one could say that the core products are the decontaminants, the high-pressure application modules, the vacuum decontamination modules, the decontamination shower systems for persons and the application modules for interior decontamination. It is important to start with a strategic and organisational approach in order to define the capabilities. We actively support our customers during this process.

The European: One last question on water: you are a leader in the field of water purification. Are you going to develop smaller and more mobile systems using technologies other than osmosis?
Thomas Popp: Since we see a demand among our customers for water purification systems for groups of 20 to 200 persons we have already developed a demonstrator system contained in a suitcase and based on ultra filtration. The main benefits of such a system are its size and weight and the extremely low power demand, which can be covered by small solar panels.

The European: Mr Popp, many thanks for this interview!
EuroDefense Annual International Meeting

by Brigadier General (ret.) Patrice Mompeyssin, Secretary General, EuroDefense-France, Paris

EuroDefense's traditional International Annual Meeting took place this year from 3 to 5 November in Paris, organised by EuroDéfense-France.

EuroDefense is a network of 14 national associations from all over the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Romania, United Kingdom) linked by a charter. Its objectives are to propose solutions for improving European security and defence and to develop citizens’ awareness of these issues.

Security Challenges

“New security challenges: which defence for the future of Europe?” was the main topic for the first day. An introduction by Hubert Védrine, former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was followed by two round tables with contributions from such eminent speakers as Dr Werner Fasslabend (Vienna) and Mr Antonio Figueiredo Lopes (Lisbon) former Defence Ministers of their respective countries, and now the Presidents of EuroDéfense Austria and Portugal. Military know-how was supplied by General Jean-Paul Perruche, former Director General of the EU Military Staff in Brussels.

The Round Tables came to the conclusion that there are indeed major security challenges (terrorism, crime, hybrid and cyber warfare, massive population movements, etc.) but that European societies must realise that major common and personal efforts are required in order to preserve their lifestyles and that the population must be involved, “or else the result will be blood and tears”.

The EDA at the mercy of the Member States

The assessment of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was pessimistic. Many solutions have been proposed in recent years, but a stronger political will and public support of the Member States are required in order to deliver. Brexit may contribute to advances in sectors in which Britain has thus far blocked any progress. A common Headquaters – a request of EuroDefense since 2010 – EU funding of missions and the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation are the most important issues to tackle.

On the morning of the second day the delegations visited SAFRAN’S VILLAROCHE plant, where the jet engines for civil and military aircraft (inter alia Airbus, Boeing, Dassault) are produced for the main aircraft makers. It is the world’s largest and most modern production plant for these types of engine. During the afternoon there were meetings of the five European multinational working groups (Cyber Warfare, European Industrial and Technological Base, EU-Russia Relations, Reinforcing the CSDP, Migrant Crisis), and the Permanent Observatory for the Mediterranean area.

The Presidents visit the Quai d’Orsay

All heads of delegation met with Mr Nicolas de Rivière, Director General for Political Affairs and Security in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and discussed with him the future challenges to security and defence. The Director recognised EuroDefense as an efficient and useful network for enhancing security and defence in Europe.

5th EuroDefence Council

The morning of the third day was devoted to the 5th Council of EuroDefense Presidents and to their final discussions and conclusions. One key question was that of how the United Kingdom’s capabilities could be made available to the European Union. The UK EuroDefense association expressed its will to remain in the network, even following the implementation of Brexit, and all the other associations concurred that it must indeed remain. The Presidents decided to submit a proposal to the EU Commission on the ways and means of complementing and strengthening the EU Council’s actions in order to support the objective of European strategic autonomy.
FUTURE FORCES FORUM (FFF), the most important defence and security event in the Czech Republic, was held at the PVA EXPO PRAHA Exhibition Centre between 19–21 October 2016.

The programme included a traditional international exhibition, conferences and workshops with the topics oriented mainly to modern technologies and approaches in ensuring defence and security at both national and international levels, future needs of armed and security forces, and protection of population and critical infrastructure. Representatives of the government, state administration authorities, international organizations, industry, science and research were actively participated in the event.

Logistics Capability Workshop 2016 (LCWS16) as part of the Future Forces Forum 2016 conducted upon the tremendous success of CAPABLE LOGISTICIANT (CL) series of exercises conducted in 2013 in Slovakia, in 2015 in Hungary presented another Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre’s (MLCC’s) contribution to common effort in the area of Logistics Capabilities Development.

LCWS16 assembled together leading specialists of the international logistic community for discussions focused on specific logistic functional areas. The Military Capabilities that Alliance and EU will need for the coming decade and beyond must be modern and interoperable. Current global financial and security situation shows necessity to cooperate even more than ever in the field of logistics - cooperate on solid basis of understanding with respect to all aspects and rational acceptance of risks. This workshop tried to highlight the need for interoperability, the need for deeper cooperation with science and research to eliminate current and future threats.

I’m sure it also served as a great platform to show current and future military technologies in logistic area, an important meeting platform for the experts from all around the world and allowed exchange of experience and visions.

The first day oriented on the interoperability and cooperation under the umbrella of the alliance and EU was followed by the day reserved for the recent development in the Smart Energy area.

Following the presentations on NATO’s and Nation’s activities to reduce the energy consumption in deployable field camps, Dr Susanne Michaelis, facilitator of the second day of the LCWS, concluded that though the technology is available, the technology transfer from the civilian to the military sector has not yet taken place. However, a number of nations have installed or have plans to install demonstrator projects for testing and data collection.

The following points should be emphasized:
- The briefers stressed that definitions and standards for materiel and processes are needed. NATO has already launched the process, but it will be lengthy and it has to be ensured that standards will not kill innovation.
- Companies have already invested a considerable amount in developing components for hybrid micro grids and even whole systems. They urgently need a market to get a return of their investment. Especially small enterprises are not able to further develop their products and to participate in a future exercise.
- Data on energy consumption and energy use are urgently needed to enable the expert community to make informative decisions and to convince leadership to invest in innovative technologies. National projects like SMARTEN that the Czech Army is planning and the Hybrid Power Generation System (HPGS) (Pfisterer) that the Lithuanian Army is testing are expected to deliver such convincing data.
- The exercise Capable Logistician 2015 (CL15) has been found extremely helpful for testing components and processes, assessing interoperability and identifying gaps in NATO standards. NATO is currently developing a Smart Defence project that will include standardization and integration of micro grid components in CL19.
- Last but not least, modular smart hybrid micro grids need protection against cyber-attacks.
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SECURITY and DEFENCE

POLICE
20th EUROPEAN POLICE CONGRESS
Berlin, 21/22 Feb 2017
www.european-police.eu

Main Speakers of the next Congress
Dr Thomas de Maizière, Federal Minister of the Interior, Federal Republic of Germany
Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director, Frontex
Nicoletta della Valle, Director, Swiss Office of Police Receivpol, Swiss Confederation

DISASTER MANAGEMENT
13th EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Berlin, 19/20 Sept 2017
www.civil-protection.com

Main Speakers of the last Congress
Râzvan Arafat, State Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Romania
Christoph Fiery, Deputy Director, Federal Office for Civil Protection, Swiss Confederation
Christoph Unger, President, Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)

DEFENCE AND SECURITY
BERLIN SECURITY CONFERENCE 2017 – 16th CONGRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Berlin, 28/29 Nov 2017
www.euro-defence.eu

Main Speakers of the last Congress
General Petr Pavel, Chairman NATO Military Committee
Elisa Stolkin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, USA
General Denis Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO

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