RAF Officer Graduates from Chief of the Defence Staff’s Scholarship

Posted on April 23, 2015 by Danny Steed

An RAF Officer selected as the first Chief of the Defence Staff’s Scholar has graduated with distinction from the University of Exeter. Wing Commander Mal Craghill was selected as the CDS Scholar from a group of MOD personnel undertaking the inaugural MA Applied Security and Strategy (MStrat) at Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, where he had been awarded a place through the Chief of the Air Staff’s Fellowship scheme. Besides the MOD students the MStrat cohort of 28 included recent Bachelor’s graduates as well as mid-career professionals from diverse backgrounds, nationalities and career streams.

Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, led last year by Professor Paul Cornish and Lt Gen (Ret’d) Sir Paul Newton, offers the MStrat as a unique and innovative approach to the study of strategy in the contemporary security environment. Alongside a core programme of lectures and seminars, students undertake crisis management simulations, field trips and conferences as well as presenting their own policy frameworks for the UK’s engagement with real world challenges. In the latter case Wg Cdr Craghill led a group investigating the UK’s approach towards Iran, culminating in a presentation to Whitehall policy-makers at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

The MStrat, taught by dedicated faculty as well as a wide array of internationally renowned academics and practitioners, pushes students well beyond traditional academic boundaries and sees them producing blog posts, op-ed articles and think pieces, policy briefs, options papers and evidence submissions to Parliamentary Select Committees as well as more traditional essays and literature reviews. Topics range widely, covering areas such as the role of the private sector in delivering national strategy, scrutiny of intelligence and security agencies, and drawing lessons from historical case studies. The final MStrat deliverable is a dissertation on a strategy or security related topic; Wg Cdr Craghill’s research took an inter-disciplinary approach to remodelling conflict prevention in fragile states, applying lessons from crime prevention to suggest a revised approach to the UK’s strategy for intervening in the developing world. He is now putting the MStrat into action in the MOD’s strategic headquarters, formulating policy and plans in the Defence Engagement Strategy team.

Photo: Wg Cdr Craghill graduating from the University of Exeter’s inaugural MA Applied Security and Strategy.

Abstract Terrorising Terrorists – The jus ad bellum of drone operations in Pakistan by Tobias Ruettershoff

Posted on January 27, 2015 by Danny Steed

Over the last decade, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or ‘drones’, have become the United States’ (U.S.) preferred military tool for fighting al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, used in all major military conflicts and crisis regions of the world, such as Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Yemen, yet mostly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Although their use as a military tool is only part of a wider, highly emotional debate about the use of force against non-state actors across national borders, global attention has focused on such operations. After denying for many years that these attacks do take place, the U.S. administration has recently admitted to conduct such operations, defending them as a legal and legitimate response to terrorist threats. The chapter finds that amidst the heated discussion about the use of drones, it is often forgotten or misunderstood in which ways the state can react to transnational terrorism.

In the first step of the analysis, it is discussed whether the laws of war can be applied to the transnational fight against terrorism or if it has to be seen under human rights law, which would put much stronger restraints on the use of force. It is argued that the law-enforcement paradigm is very difficult in dealing with terrorist threats originating from areas which are no longer under government control. On the one hand, law-enforcement agencies of the victim state are often unable to operate in foreign countries. On the other hand, if the host government attempts to use law-enforcement measures, the backlash from the militants is more likely to create more of a quagmire than if a concerted and limited military action, such as a drone attack, were taken. Therefore, it is the most sensible option to assess the drone strikes is under the laws of armed conflict and not human rights law, as it is too domestic in nature to apply to the fight against international terrorism and does not allow appropriate means.

This raises important questions about the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, as Article 2 (4) of the UN Charta prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. An exception to this prohibition is Article 51, which allows self-defence against an armed attack, yet it is not clear whether any action of self-defence has to be in response to an armed attack imputable by another state. In the traditional interpretation of the ICJ and customary international law, Article 51 does not warrant a right to self-defence against non-state actors, unless they are imputable to another state. Yet, as it is argued in the chapter, in recent years there has been change. Article 51 is now more and more interpreted in the way that states must be able to defend themselves against terrorist threats, hence allowing transnational use of force against terrorists. However, to limit risk of abuse against Article 2 (4), the strict rules of customary law need to be applied. These are the principles of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality.

Applied to the cross-border use of drones by the U.S. military against terrorists based in Pakistan, the chapter maintains that the overwhelming majority of U.S. incursions into Pakistani territory are illegal under international law because they do not meet these strict constraints of customary international law. However, targeted killings are not per se illegal, if the United States can prove – in each individual case – that an operation meets the requirements.

Drivers for Radicalisation by Simon Gray

Posted on November 22, 2014 by Danny Steed

The term radicalisation is one that conjures an image of jihad and extreme Islam. It is a term that has lost its way, in the same way as the term terrorism has. It is a term that is now connected to politics and as such means many things to different people. Wikipedia states “Radicalization (or radicalisation) is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or undermine the status quo or (2) reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice.”[1] I think this definition is pretty good; it is broad and encapsulates ideas which are wider than Islam, such as far right, white supremacist extremism or far right Christian beliefs which motivated Anders Behring Breivik to kill over 90 people in Norway because “he wished to attack society and the structure of society”[2].

The problem with the term radicalisation is that it seems to be primarily used in conjunction with radical Islam. I think politicians and the media are largely to blame for this. Radicalisation is a political concept and is therefore ”essentially contestable”[3]. That is, a word’s meaning can change depending upon on how it is used. The word radicalisation is used by politicians to emphasise a point and to unsettle rival politicians. As the media present political opinions, they as a consequence, also use the word radicalisation to mean various different things. For example, using the word radicalisation, in terms of radical Islam, to gain support for further funding for their initiatives, or defending their track record on tackling radicalisation and appealing to the electorate. As a consequence the term radicalisation has lost it’s meaning, from what Wikipedia states above. Despite this and only looking at a narrow aspect of radicalisation, in this think piece I am going to look at the most common current meaning of radicalisation, its connection with extreme Islam. The common misconception is that radicalisation is purely targeting the naive and poorly educated individuals. This piece is going to show how much broader than this it is.

In Ed Hussain’s book, The Islamist, he talks about his journey into, what he calls Islamism, an extreme version of Islam. He talks about how these views garnered gently over time, through attendance at mosques and reading texts, where his inquisitive mind was fed evermore extreme views until he was converted, after which he set about pushing these extreme views onto others through school, college and his local community. The task of gaining further followers was coordinated, well run and very successful. One of the key motivational factors in indoctrinating new recruits, other that what was written in the texts, was the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, where Muslims were being killed. Although his experience was prior to 9/11, the institutions’ ability, be it college, local authorities etc, to respond was slow, cumbersome and ineffective. His work was all done within the law, and his, and his fellow members’, passion, drive, enthusiasm and charisma made it difficult for the moderate proponents of Islam to combat. They were more reserved in their approach and therefore less effective in reaching the youth. Much legislation and work has been put in place since this period, but the same concepts will apply. When he changed his belief back to moderate Islam, it was through further reading and gaining more knowledge than his peers: that he was able to look beyond the opinions that had been presented to him by his peers on a daily basis. This would suggest that the UK domestic radicalisation problem is one that needs to be fought in the classroom.

In an article for the BBC, Tony Blair states “in order to fight a warped and worsening ideology in the long term we need to recognise that education is a security issue”[4]. Social media and the Internet make it ever easier for the extremist views, such as Salafi Wahhabism, to get to their recruits. We cannot shut down the Internet, we cannot completely monitor social media, we cannot prevent radical conversations happening in schools, gymnasiums and mosques. It must be accepted that vulnerable youths are likely to come into contact with extremist views. These extremist views will penetrate down from various sources to the UK’s youth. Therefore, to protect the youth from these extremist ideas, the younger generation need to be armed with a wider knowledge and understanding, of not just Islam but other religions as well, so they have the necessary information to prevent indoctrination. In an interview to the International Business Times[5], Mubin Shaikh, a former Taliban recruiter, states how he actively looked for recent converts to Islam, because they would likely have issues at home, and individuals who were ignorant of their religion were easier to indoctrinate.

Tony Blair’s “Faith Foundation” has representation in 30 countries and “seeks to increase understanding of the faiths and beliefs of others, the facets of identity and the requirements of global citizenship” and is seeking a future in “which people are respected as equals”[6]. This principal of education, as a way of combating extreme Islam, is being used in the Midlands, with the popular comedian Humza Arshad fronting an online video called “Think for Yourself”[7]. Humza Arshad is reported to have over 4 million followers and this video should therefore hit a wide audience. However, when looking at the source video on Youtube[8] it had received under 5000 views. The video is over a month old and this can be seen as a failure to get to the target audience.

Sharon Morris talks about the problems with the Pakistan’s youth where “upwardly mobile”[9] individuals seek fulfilment and not meaningless employment. “They want to change the world to fight injustice, to earn respect, and maybe, most of all, to challenge the status quo”. The Scottish Nationalist Party recently exploited the same youth passion, during the Scottish referendum. They challenged the youth to “reject the status quo”[10]. The campaign, although ultimately unsuccessful, was successful in that it galvanised the youth behind a cause, with political poll turnouts in excess of what would normally have been seen. The response from the three main political parties was seen as stifled and sluggish. Although not extreme in its views, it demonstrated how powerful the concept of challenging the status quo can be. The debate is certainly not finished, with the support for the Scottish Nationalist Party ever increasing, as described during the morning news on BBC Radio 4 – it is a matter of time before Scotland calls for another referendum[11]. If a referendum were not to be granted, I can see the conditions for radicalisation ideas to be common in Scotland.

Both of the motivating factors outlined above can be proven to be wrong as well. Take for example Bilal Abdulla, who was convicted, in 2008, of plotting terrorist attacks, against London and Glasgow. The case was in connection with Kafeel Ahmed, who died after the attack in Glasgow[12]. Abdulla was a junior doctor within the NHS and Ahmed was an engineer who had previously studied for a PhD[13]. Neither of these individuals fill the ill educated or want to change the status quo description. Instead Abdulla’s QC in court stated “This is not a case where his intention was driven by religious faith but by his frustration with what he saw as an unjust war”[14], that war being Iraq.

So there are a wide variety of backgrounds that are susceptible to radicalisation and with a number of motivational factors. I think the backgrounds of the 7/7 bombers best articulates this. From the four bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan was a respected teaching assistant, Shehzad Tanweer was a sports science graduate, Germaine Lindsay was a convert and temporally unemployed, and Hasib Mir Hussain had just finished an advanced business course after receiving 7 GCSEs. They were from both Pakistani and Jamaican backgrounds[15]. The motives of the four individuals is not known exactly: some are thought to have been motivated by martyrdom, but the best evidence is described in Khan’s video will and testament in which he states “Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation….”[16]. The only things in common among the four bombers are that they all came from a densely Muslim populated area and are young.

The backgrounds, motives and education of individuals who have been radicalised are diverse. The only true single thing they have in common is that they are young when they gain these radical ideas. The plan to tackle this problem needs to include education, such as Tony Blair is championing, but it also needs to be much wider, with foreign policy being aware of unintended consequences.

[1]Wikipedia, ‘Radicalisation’.

[2] Black, ‘Norway terror suspect’s motive revealed: he wanted a revolution’.

[3]University of London, ‘What does radicalisation mean?’

[4] Blair, ‘Tony Blair: Fight wars of ideas against extremism’.

[5] Masi,, ‘ISIS Recruiting Westerners: How The ‘Islamic State’ Goes After Non-Muslims And Recent Converts In The West’.

[6]Blair, ‘Tony Blair: Fight wars of ideas against extremism’.

[7] Ashrad, ‘Comedian Humza Arshad fronts anti-extremism school campaign’.

[8]Viewed on the 12 November 2014.

[9] Morris, ‘Teenage Wasteland: Why do so many efforts to stop young people from joining extremist groups fail?’.

[10]Wikipedia, ‘Radicalisation’.

[11]BBC Radio 4, ‘Today’, 0630hrs.

[12]BBC News Channel, ‘Doctor guilty of car bomb attacks’.

[13]Taylor, ‘Profile: Kafeel Ahmed – the mastermind’.

[14]BBC News Channel, ‘Doctor guilty of car bomb attacks’.

[15] BBC News Channel, ‘7 July bombings: The bombers’.

[16]House of Commons, ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’, pg 19.

From Great Leap Forward to Confident Stride, But can China Prevent Itself from Stumbling? By David Bond

Posted on November 19, 2014 by Danny Steed

Exeter, November 2014. There are signs that China is struggling with the reforms required to realise its potential during a millennia prematurely labeled ‘Asia’s Century’. In three decades China has undergone a transformation of staggering proportions witnessing unprecedented economic growth. The question that remains is whether President Xi Jinpeng can create the conditions within China that will deliver the growth necessary for ‘China’s Dream’. This question will as well be heavily influenced by China’s demographics, which will probably be a seismic game changer. It is possible that China may stumble on its 21st Century journey in attempting to deliver this ‘dream’ as President Xi now wrestles with the dilemma of implementing the policy changes necessary to continue China’s economic growth whilst limiting the change to the workforce’s age structure and insatiable economic aspirations. China’s economy is not without its own problems as William Wilson recently outlined, “China surpassed the United States in outstanding corporate debt last year, amounting to $14.2 trillion. Moreover, the credit quality of Asian corporate debt is much lower than in the West.” The amount of household debt now held in China is approaching the levels the UK experienced between 2001-2007. Such levels of personal debt were assessed as being toxic in the West and contributed, in part, to the slow economic growth post-crash. Radical social and economic reforms are necessary; what is required from the Central Committee, therefore, is action and not inertia.

China has experienced tremendous social change in the past, but the results have not always been terribly impressive. Mao’s Great Leap Forward in 1958-61 was intended to deliver a rapid transformation from an agrarian economy into a communist society through industrialisation and collectivisation. It delivered, however, The Great Famine resulting in 30 million deaths with Mao introducing systematic terror, coercion and forced labour in striving for transformation. A return to such practices in the 21st Century is highly unlikely however, and especially with Xi Jinpeng. The Chinese President is evidently, and intentionally, stepping out of the shadows of the Central Committee. He has solidified his power base, adopted greater executive powers and appears to be forging an identity as Statesman rather than pantomime ‘princeling’. President Xi’s personal experience whilst working in Liangjiahe, on a farm for seven years, should have engendered some empathy with the majority of Chinese people – his abhorrence towards the endemic corruption that exists within government is surely evidence of that. This empathy should serve him well; it is often forgotten that China remains an extraordinarily poor country with around one billion Chinese living in abject poverty on less than $4 a day. Policy reforms therefore, need to address the inequality that exists in China and make society more equitable; he of all of the ‘princelings’ will know that.

The more sophisticated reforms of the late 1970s delivered two basic aims: developing the Chinese economy and controlling the population. Thereafter, China opened its doors to foreign trade and created a manufacturing based market economy and introduced the ‘One Child Policy’. Implemented in 1979, this population control measure has significantly slowed Chinese fertility rates (presently between 1.5 and 1.6 births per woman) and was partly responsible for the demographic dividend that assisted China whilst realising year-on-year gains of 10% gross domestic product (GDP). However, some analysts now assert that such economic growth is unlikely to continue; the signs are that it is already slowing with GDP for 2012 (7.7%) and 2013 (7.6%) falling short of projections. And, to compound the problem China’s population is ageing, and it is doing so very quickly. The ‘demographic dividend’ that has boosted China’s industries will in a few years become a ‘demographic deficit’. In dealing with this problem, more emphasis on society providing care for the elderly will be necessary. What should be a concern for the Communist Party is that even when unpopular policies like this are relaxed, as was the case last year, cultural changes within society and affordability issues have resulted in a surprising apathy towards larger families. Xinhua, a Chinese paper, recently outlined that whilst “11 million couples have been granted a permit to have a second child since the country relaxed its family planning policy at the end of last year, statistics from the National Health and Family Planning Commission shows that only 700,000 had filed birth applications.” It is possible the cost of sending additional children through an expensive education system, with limited capacity, is preventing parents from extending their families. The government therefore, should add the issue of affordable and available education to its ‘to do list’.

China is not unique in facing this problem, and by 2050 in excess of 60 countries will have populations where over 30% are 60 years or older. Significantly, only a third of those countries affected possess adequate social welfare schemes to address this problem. Significantly, China is not one of those countries and they currently possess a ridiculously low average retirement age (50 years for women and 60 for men). This is accompanied by an archaic pension system that is higher for those in urban areas and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) than it is in the countryside (the 56% living in the countryside can expect a quarter of what those residing in the SEZs receive); such disparity is an obvious source of irritation for those Chinese below the poverty line. Such economic disparity, exacerbated by the ethnic tension that exists in such a vast and diverse country is creating frictions that if not addressed could threaten President Xi’s vision. The problem for China is stark and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) have acknowledged its existence, stating that they will provide policy solutions by 2020. Many observers contend that this is not quick enough.

Current predictions are that by 2050 there will be almost 420 million pensioners in China. In 2000, there were 6 workers for every retiree, but by 2030 this ratio will have fallen to just 2:1. This development will unquestionably undermine the ‘4-2-1 model’ of familial support that has been lauded as a means of contemporary Chinese workers sustaining their immediate family. Whilst it is likely that a small proportion of Chinese workers could sustain such responsibilities, Stratfor’s George Friedman stated “The China we think of, the China where people are earning more than $20,000 a year, well, that China is maybe 60 million people.” If Friedman’s figures are accurate then pension reform and other welfare policies will be necessary to provide for the majority in their dotage. Presently, the average retirement age in China is 53 years and better nutrition and greater access to modern medicine has resulted in an average life expectancy of 75 years of age. Whilst increasing the retirement age is a suggestion there is a deep and broad objection to this proposal – 70% of those polled in eleven Chinese cities recently objected to raising of the pension age. The MHRSS have indicated that they will legislate on such issues by 2020, but they need to address this quickly as China’s work force, that has so long delivered the demographic dividend the country needed, is now shrinking. For example, there were 3.4 million less workers in China in 2012 than in 2011. China’s workforce is dwindling and whilst it has traditionally been structured on high-volume, low to medium-skilled manufacturing it is now increasingly finding this a highly competitive environment, as William Wilson stated “China’s decade of double-digit wage growth is causing it to lose lower-end manufacturing to less costly countries like Vietnam and the Philippines.”

President Xi is clear on his vision: ‘China’s Dream’ of increasing economic power and asserting greater influence across Asia and possibly, globally too. However, presently one billion Chinese remain in poverty, its workforce is ageing rapidly and the welfare provision for these future pensioners is both inequitable and likely inadequate. Moreover, the impending ‘demographic deficit’, low birth rate, on-going corruption and poorly structured economy could result in China stumbling just at the point when everyone expected it to stride purposefully through the 21st Century and emerging as the sole hegemonic power. What is required now in is innovation. Numerous social and economic reforms, briefly outlined, are required to truly unlock the enormous potential whilst addressing the obvious problems. These observations are not criticisms. Over the past 30 years China has done the hard work remarkably well by developing its economy and utilising its mass, but what is now required is the leadership and innovation to do the ‘harder’ work. President Xi must deliver greater governance, re-structure the economy and raise living standards for all and not just the few. Whilst the Central Committee has acknowledged these problems exist there appears more inertia than action in the 18th Plenum and waiting until 2020 might not be soon enough. There is a perception of inertia and a stumble is beckoning….

Syria: “Boots on the Ground” After All? By Tobias Borck

Posted on June 20, 2014 by Danny Steed

We will have “no boots on the ground” in Syria – that is the great mantra governments in Washington and London are repeating at almost every possible occasion. Even when American and British military action against Syria was imminent in September 2013 so as to punish Bashar al-Assad’s regime for the use of chemical weapons, Barack Obama and David Cameron made clear that putting “boots on the ground” was not up for discussion.

Just last week, in his speech at West Point, Obama felt compelled to tell the world again that he had “made a decision that we should not put American troops” into Syria and that he believed “that is the right decision.” Nobody disagrees, not even the Syrian opposition. They may be demanding more anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, they may even welcome Western air support, but they certainly don’t want American or British soldiers to take on the Assad regime on their behalf.

But there may come a time when all this insistence of “no boots on the ground” no longer matters. There may come a time when Obama and Cameron (or their successors) send their uniformed men and women into Syria after all – or at least vote in the UN Security Council that other nations should send theirs. When these “boots”, wherever they may come from, are placed “on the ground” in Syria, it will not be to fight Assad. That remains – and will most likely remain – out of the question. Instead, it will be to keep the peace, to stabilise Syria and to make sure that a political settlement can be implemented.

The war in Syria will end with a political solution, no side can win a military victory. Obama and Cameron repeat that fact almost more frequently than their “no boots” mantra. In fact, there is wide-spread agreement within the international community that a political settlement is the only way to end the nightmare of the Syrian people.

Let us cast our minds forward and imagine a scenario where such a political settlement has actually been reached. The regime and the opposition sign a document, the newspapers print pictures of handshakes. But what next? Syria is in ruins. Aleppo, Homs, Damascus’ suburbs – everything has been reduced to rubble after years of barrel bombs, shelling and gunfire. Millions of Syrians are displaced, everyone has experienced monumental loss and is irrevocably scarred for life, physically or mentally. And there are inevitably some groups, probably the radical Islamists, that are not done yet, that want to keep killing and destroying.

This future Syria will need serious state-building and some kind of peacekeeping force to provide the necessary security. America and Britain will not have to shoulder this task alone; that is the responsibility of the UN – Russia, the EU, the Arab League, perhaps even Iran will need to help. But it may not be enough to deploy a few thousand Blue Helmet troops from India, Nepal, Indonesia or Spain as in the UN’s ongoing peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. This is not to disparage the quality of these troops or their achievements. But if groups like al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra, or the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) linger on, American and British soldiers may have to step up.

American and British militaries are the only ones with the necessary training, equipment and experience to battle an opponent like ISIS. They did it successfully during the surge in Iraq in 2007-08 when they fought al-Qaeda, ISIS’s predecessor, into a corner. The Iraqi case should also be a warning. Since American and British troops have left Iraq, radical Islamists have experienced their own little surge. ISIS currently controls parts of Fallujah and Ramadi and suicide bombers terrorise the people of Baghdad. The Iraqi military, although trained by America and Britain and outfitted with Apache helicopters, drones and hellfire missiles, has made little progress against the extremists.

There will be “no boots on the ground” – this mantra will hold true as long as the war rages in Syria. But when the agony of the Syrian people finally ends and a political solution to the conflict is reached, it may become untenable. A UN peacekeeping mission may be needed to help rebuild the country and American and British soldiers may have to do the heavy lifting, to once again take up the battle with radical Islamists. We should be ready.

Weapons for peace? The West needs to convince Assad that he cannot win, by Tobias Borck

Posted on June 1, 2014 by Danny Steed

The war in Syria has to end in a political solution. This is one of the very few things that most members of the international community agree on. In his recent speech at West Point, US President Barack Obama made clear that that “no military solution that can eliminate the terrible suffering any time soon.”^{^[i]} The Russian Foreign Ministry agrees the lack of any progress on a political settlement of the war only “results in more deaths and suffering in Syria every day.”^{^[ii]} The Speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Lrijani, emphasises the need for “negotiations and dialogue,”^{^[iii]} and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague thinks that all sides need to “reach an inclusive political settlement that takes into account the needs and aspirations of all Syria’s communities.”^{^[iv]}

A political solution to the war in Syria is of course not a new idea. Neither is the apparent consensus within the international community that it is the only viable option to end the bloodshed. Peace initiatives, talks, and talks of talks are a constant by-product of the war. Nevertheless, it took almost three years just to get representatives from the regime and the opposition to sit down together in the same room at the UN in Geneva. For a few days in January and February 2014 there was a small glimmer of hope. It was quickly extinguished, though, and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s chairman of the negotiations, apologised to the Syrian people that the talks hadn’t “helped them very much.”^{^[v]}

In the months since the Geneva conference virtually no progress has been made to find a political settlement. Instead around 200 Syrians die every day, adding to the war’s death toll that has already exceeded 150,000.^{^[vi]}

There are of course several reasons for why a political solution to the conflict remains elusive. The opposition is famously fragmented and al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamists act as powerful spoilers. Perhaps the most crucial reason, however, is that Bashar al-Assad still thinks that he can win the war. This year, his forces have made some territorial gains, and although a total military victory is nigh on impossible, so is a total defeat. This is why the Geneva talks failed and why no new negotiations have happened. A political solution requires compromises and the Assad regime simply doesn’t see the need to make any at the moment.

If the USA, Russia, the UK, Iran or the rest of the international community are serious about their commitment to a political solution, they will have to convince Assad that there is no alternative to negotiations, that he cannot win the war. There are two options of how this can be done: through diplomatic or military pressure.

Russia and Iran hold the key to the diplomatic option. They have the greatest sway over the Assad regime. Without their financial, military and political support, Assad would be in serious trouble. However, this support in the absence of any concessions by the regime in the political process suggests that Russia and Iran are ultimately unwilling to use their leverage over Assad.

The only meaningful concession the regime has made since the beginning of the conflict was the deal to give up its chemical weapons, and Russia played a decisive role in this. But it is also important to remember that the deal was only reached after Obama’s infamous ‘red line’ had been crossed with the chemical weapons attack in August 2013. Russian pressure on Assad may have been important, but American missiles pointing at Syria surely helped as well.

“When you fear for your life, then you are going to trade,”^{^[vii]} says Alistair Burt, a former UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. To make Assad fear for his life and to bring him to the negotiating table, it may therefore be necessary to renew the military pressure on his regime by stepping up support for the opposition forces.

It is a sad reality that political solutions to end wars often only become possible through temporary escalation. The example of the war in Bosnia Herzegovina demonstrates this. Here, a brutal war raged for three years. All initiatives for a political settlement failed. Then, in 1995, NATO support enabled a Croat-Bosnian alliance to make significant advances against the Bosnian Serbs. However, NATO did not allow a total Croat-Bosnian victory. This would only have resulted in more ethnic cleansing, this time with the Bosnian Serbs as the main victims. Instead all sides were brought together to negotiate and the Dayton Agreement was reached.

The objective of empowering opposition forces in Syria should therefore not be to defeat the Assad regime, but merely to convince him that he cannot win the war. A western military involvement of the same scale as NATO’s Bosnia operation is currently unthinkable in Syria. There is no political will to launch missile strikes, an air campaign, much less a full-scale invasion. However, the USA and its European allies can certainly provide the armed opposition with the military equipment and training it needs to tackle the regime’s tanks and airplanes. In his West Point speech Obama suggested that operations in this direction are already underway.

So far, the Obama administration has been extremely cautious in its military support for the opposition, mainly out of fear that American weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists. This risk is of course difficult to eliminate, but it should also not be overstated. One of the main reasons why groups such as al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have become so influential in Syria is their military effectiveness, not their extremist ideologies. Increasing the military capability of more moderate groups could therefore also limit the influence of the radical Islamist.

The war in Syria has to end in a political solution. Ultimately it of course appears counter-intuitive to feed additional weapons into a war that has already killed so many people. American weapons in the hands of opposition forces will inevitably be used to kill more. But as long as Russian and Iranian influence, for whatever reasons, is not enough to convince Assad to make concessions, it may be the only way to create the conditions for meaningful negotiations.

^{^[i]} BBC (2014) “Obama West Point Speech in Full with Analysis.” BBC Online, 29 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-27606537 [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[ii]} Voice of Russia (2014) “Russia Urges Setting of Date for New Round of Syria Talks in Geneva.” Voice of Russia, 15 May. http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_15/Russia-urges-to-set-date-for-new-round-of-Syria-talks-in-Geneva-0341/ [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[iii]} Press TV (2014) “Iran Backs Political Solution to Syria: Larijani.” Press TV, 5 May. http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/05/05/361455/iran-backs-political-solution-to-syria/ [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[iv]} Hague, W. (2014) “Foreign Secretary William Hague to the Montreux Peace Talks on Syria.” Gov.com, 22 January. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-geneva-conference-on-syria [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[v]} Maigua, P. (2014) “Syrian Peace Talks Adjourned Indefinitely.” United Nations Radio, 15 February. http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/02/syrian-peace-talks-adjourned-indefinitely/#.U2J5dl6CTwI [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[vi]} Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe?fref=ts [Accessed 31 May 2014].

^{^[vii]} Burt, A. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

What Will Shock the World? Waiting for Syria’s Srebrenica by Tobias Borck

Posted on May 12, 2014 by Danny Steed

The bombing of the Ain Jalout school in Aleppo, on 30 April 2014, encapsulates the horror of the war in Syria. The air strike, carried out by the Syrian military, killed more than 20 people, half of them children. That day, the school was hosting an exhibition of drawings and paintings, in which the students had depicted their dreams – most of them featured the war, death and destruction.^{^[1]}

James Bays, reporting for Al-Jazeera, said that the attack on the Ain Jalout school “should shock the world.”^{^[2]} But will the shock be big enough to change the attitude of the international community, or rather, the strategies of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council? Valerie Amos, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, expressed her outrage calling the bombing of the school, and other attacks targeting civilians, “a flagrant violation of the basic tenants of war.”^{^[3]} Ultimately, however, the attack is unlikely to change anything.

Syria’s war has entered its fourth year. The killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians have become a daily occurrence, causing unspeakable human suffering. James Clapper, United States Director of National Intelligence, has recently called the humanitarian situation in Syria “an apocalyptic disaster.” Since the beginning of the war in March 2011, more than 150,000 people have been killed,^{^[4]} among them more than 11,000 children.^{^[5]} 2.7 million Syrians have fled the country;^{^[6]} a further 6.5 million were forced to leave their homes but remain in Syria.^{^[7]}

We Are Waiting

The strategy of the western P5 members towards Syria, led by the USA, appears to be based on waiting and monitoring the situation. But what is it that Barack Obama’s government is waiting for?

Despite recent territorial gains for Bashar al-Assad’s forces, a military victory for any side in the conflict is unlikely. The Geneva peace talks, chaired by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, ended without significant results in February 2014. Back then, Brahimi called on all parties involved to decide whether “they want this process to take place or not.”^{^[8]} In the absence of any tangible further developments since, the answer seems to be: no. Brahimi himself is expected to resign in the coming months, particularly if presidential elections in Syria planned for June are going ahead. President Bashar al-Assad has recently confirmed his stand for reelection and it is widely believed he will win.^{^[9]}

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council Resolution 2139^{^[10]} from February 2014, continues to be violated with impunity by all sides in the conflict. The resolution demanded an end to all attacks against civilians, and unrestricted access for humanitarian agencies within the countries. While the resolution is legally binding under International Law, it does not stipulate any consequences for noncompliance or measures for its enforcement. Any advances towards a more robust resolution continue to be blocked by Russia.^{^[11]}

To improve their own position and to convince Assad that there can be no military solution to the conflict, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the opposition’s leadership in exile, continues to lobby western governments to provide opposition forces with much needed military equipment. In an interview with Exeter students, Walid Saffour, the SNC’s UK ambassador, expressed his belief that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) could make significant progress on the ground “if we have got adequate arms to stop two things: the tanks and the aircraft.”^{^[12]}

Next week, Ahmad Jarba, the SNC’s president will visit Washington, not least in an attempt to convince the US government to arm the FSA with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Whether he will succeed, however, is uncertain. Apart from some limited shipments of weapons, the Obama administration has thus far been extremely cautious in providing military equipment to opposition forces. The main reason for this reluctance is the fear that American weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists.^{^[13]}

What Are We Waiting For?

What, then could change US policy towards Syria? A review of some of the US-led military interventions and wars in past decades, suggests that changes in US strategy are often influenced by specific events. With regard to the US interventions in Lebanon (1982), Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011), it is possible to identify crucial turning points for US strategy. With the exception of the war in Afghanistan, which was a direct response to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, these events were not in themselves the sufficient or sole reason for respective US governments to launch interventions. They did not occur in a vacuum, but rather in a continuum of conflicts within the individual countries or – in the case of 9/11 – within the context of global developments. They were the last straws that broke the proverbial camel’s back and convinced the US presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama that military action, or at least military support for one side in the conflict, was unavoidable.

In 1982, Ronald Reagan’s decision to send almost 2,000 US Marines to Lebanon came days after the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September. At this point, Lebanon’s civil war had already devastated the country for seven years. In August, a contingent of US marines had briefly deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from the country. They left on 10 September. A week later, between 16-18 September, a Christian militia – with, at the very least, the quiet acceptance of the occupying Israeli army – killed between 700 and 3,000 Palestinian refugees. The images of the massacre’s aftermath went around the world and promoted Reagan’s formation of a new multinational force tasked with supporting the Lebanese government. The intervention was ultimately unsuccessful and ended in the horrific terror attack on the US Marines’ barracks in October 1983. The war continued until 1990.^{^[14]}

In Bosnia Herzegovina, the US-led NATO interventions only occurred after the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. The war had begun in 1992 and had already cost tens of thousands of deaths. A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), with limited US participation, was deployed in 1992, but only had a mandate to protect certain areas, not to use force to stop the fighting. UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness was exposed when Bosnian Serb forces overran the Muslim town of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and killed more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims. Days after the massacre, NATO agreed to take a tougher stand to defend other safe areas and in August launched a decisive campaign to end the war.^{^[15]}

In Kosovo, two widely publicised massacres by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanians in Prekaz and Racak played a critical role in the prelude to NATO’s US-led military intervention. After the Prekaz massacre, in which 53 Albanians were killed on 5 March 1998, the USA intensified its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Two days after the attack, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright announced that “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.’’^{^[16]} Nine months later, after 45 Albanians were killed in the Racak massacre on 15 January 1999, the USA and its European allies decided that diplomacy alone was no longer enough. In March, NATO’s military intervention began.^{^[17]}

The US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not preceded by massacres in those countries, but by the terror attacks in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. These attacks were decidedly more instrumental in the US government’s decision to launch military operations than any of the events outlined above, especially in the case of Afghanistan. However, both Afghanistan and Iraq were on the USA’s foreign policy agenda long before 2001. In 1998, the Clinton administration authorised missile strikes against suspected bases of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.^{^[18]} In Iraq, the USA played the leading role in maintaining no-fly zones over both the north and the south of the country throughout the 1990s. Regime change in Iraq was certainly identified as a US objective before 9/11, especially among the neoconservative establishment. Yet, it took 9/11 to create the momentum to launch a military campaign.^{^[19]}

Finally, NATO’s intervention in Libya is a rare example of where the threat of a massacre was sufficient for the USA and its allies to launch military intervention. In March 2011, Gaddafi’s forces were advancing on Benghazi, the origin of popular protests against the regime and the stronghold for the armed rebellion. Obama later explained his decision to support NATO’s intervention: “I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”^{^[20]}

These six events – the atrocities in Sabra and Shatila, Srebrenica, and Prekaz and Recak, the attacks of 9/11, and the potential massacre in Benghazi – were unique in themselves and specific to their respective contexts. There is no particular threshold, no definitive number of casualties that forces US presidents to opt for military intervention. However, these events are united in the fact that they represented significant turning points for US strategy. It is important to note that these events did not necessarily lead to international consensus in favour of military intervention – the Kosovo intervention happened despite vehement Russian opposition.^{^[21]} Although Russia may have more of an invested interest in Syria than it did in Kosovo, this suggests that deadlock in the UN Security Council is not an insurmountable obstacle to military intervention.

The Waiting Continues

In Syria a turning point was almost reached in August 2013, when between 300-1,400 civilians were killed in a chemical weapons attack. For a few days US missile strikes against Syria seemed likely. However, diplomacy prevailed and the Assad regime agreed to the US-Russia brokered deal to give up its chemical weapons stockpiles.^{^[22]} Six months later, the international Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has removed the bulk of Syria’s declared chemical weapons arsenal.^{^[23]} The killing, however, continues unabated and with horrific consistency. In the week culminating in the Ain Jalout school bombing on 30 April 2014, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) had counted daily death tolls of 206, 270, 210, 265, 288, 223 and 284.^{^[24]} These figures are far from unusual for the war in Syria. The data published on the SOHR’s Facebook page shows very similar numbers for the past months, even years.

Alistair Burt, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, suggests that this consistency is no accident. “We think Assad has learned perfectly well from his father that killing 20,000 people in Hama as in 1982 would not now be the right thing to do,” he said in an interview with Exeter students.^{^[25]} However, the death of 200-300 people a day appears to be a level that governments in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London are prepared to sustain. The decisive turning point, Syria’s Sabra and Shatila or Srebrenica has not yet occurred. For the moment, “four, five thousand, six thousand people a month appears to be a figure that the world is prepared to stand,” says Burt.

In the absence of a turning point event in Syria, a terror attack originating in the country but carried out in one of Syria’s neighbours or even in Europe or the USA could potentially lead to a policy change by western governments. The proliferation of radical Islamist forces and groups linked to Al-Qaeda in Syria is well documented.^{^[26]} Thus far, these groups have concentrated on terrorising Syrian civilians. A day before the Ain Jalout school bombing, two car bombs by Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra killed more than 50 civilians and injured hundreds in an area of Homs controlled by the Assad regime.^{^[27]}

However, it is far from certain that Al-Nusra, and other radical organisations active in Syria will continue to limit their operations to the battlefield within Syria. Matthew Olson, Director of the US National Counterterrorism Center told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2014 that “Syria has become the preeminent location for independent or Al-Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom we assess may seek to conduct external attacks.”^{^[28]}

It is clear that the current policy of the Obama administration and its allies in Europe is not leading to any meaningful changes in Syria. Chemical weapons may have been largely removed from the conflict, but the killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians continues at a horrifically consistent level. US and European strategy appears to be reduced to waiting, either for one side of the conflict to achieve an unlikely military victory, or for an atrocity that will make further inaction simply impossible.

^{^[1]} BBC (2014) “Syria Crisis: ‘Children Killed in Aleppo School Strike.” BBC Online, 30 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27227791 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[2]} Al-Jazeera (2014) “Aleppo School Bombing Condemned by UN.” Al-Jazeera Online, 1 May. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/aleppo-school-bombing-condemned-un-2014516372113604.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[3]} Ibid.

^{^[4]} Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) “More than 150,000 Martyred and Killed Since the Start of the Revolution.” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Arabic website, 1 April. http://www.syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=17296&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.U2J3A16CTwJ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[5]} Salama, H., and Daragan, H. (2013) “Stolen Futures: The Hidden Toll of Child Casualties in Syria.” Oxford Research Group, 24 November. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/stolen_futures [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[6]} UNHRC (2014) “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” UNHRC, last updated 14 April. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[7]} USAID (2014) Syria – Complex Emergency: Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2014, April 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/syria_ce_fs12_04-10-2014.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[8]} Maigua, P. (2014) “Syrian Peace Talks Adjourned Indefinitely.” United Nations Radio, 15 February. http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/02/syrian-peace-talks-adjourned-indefinitely/#.U2J5dl6CTwI [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[9]} Charbonneau, L. (2014) “Search is on for Successor to Syria Peace Mediator Brahimi.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-brahimi-idUSBREA3T10A20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[10]} United Nations Security Council (2014) “Full Text: UN Security Council Resolution 2139.” UN Watch, 22 February. http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2014/02/22/full-text-un-security-council-resolution-2139/ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[11]} Nichols, M. (2014) “UN Aid Chief Suggests Stronger Action Needed on Syria.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-aid-un-idUSBREA3T10B20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[12]} Saffour, W. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

^{^[13]} Pecquet, J. (2014) “Syrian Opposition Looks to Congress for Military Boost.” Al-Monitor, 25 April. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/syria-opposition-congress-military-boost.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[14]} Azrael, J. R., and Payin, E. A. (1996) US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force. Santa Monica: RAND. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/CF129.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[15]} Daalder, I. H. (1998) “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Brookings, December. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[16]} Erlanger, S. (1998) “Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence.” The New York Times, 8 March. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/08/world/albright-warns-serbs-on-kosovo-violence.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[17]} BBC (2000) “Behind the Kosovo Crisis.” BBC Online, 12 March. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/674056.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[18]} BBC (2014) “Afghanistan Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 8 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[19]} BBC (2014) “Iraq Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 1 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[20]} Cooper, H. (2011) “Obama Cites Limits of US Role in Libya.” The New York Times, 28 March. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html?pagewanted=1&hp [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[21]} BBC (1998) “Why Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo.” BBC Online, 13 October. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/111585.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[22]} BBC (2014) “Q&A: Syria Chemical Weapons Disarmament Deal.” BBC Online, last updated 30 January. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23876085 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[23]} BBC (2014) “Bulk of Syria’s Chemical Weapons ‘Removed’, Says Sigrid Kaag.” BBC Online, 27 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27179365 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[24]} Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe?fref=ts [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[25]} Burt, A. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

^{^[26]} Jones, S. G. (2013) “Syria’s Growing Jihad.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (4), pp. 53-72. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival–global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2013-0b78/55-4-07-jones–seth-abcd [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[27]} Human Rights Watch (2014) “Syria: Car Bombs, Mortars Hit Residential Areas.” Human Rights Watch, 1 May. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/01/syria-car-bombs-mortars-hit-residential-areas [Accessed 4 May 2014].

^{^[28]} Olson, M. G. (2014) “Extremism and Sectarianism in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.” Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 6 March. Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030614AM_Testimony%20-%20Matthew%20Olsen.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

Wanted – Your views on how Strategic Foresight should be integrated into the academic field of International Relations – for #futureday

Posted on March 10, 2014 by Danny Steed

Posted on behalf of our Honorary Fellow, Cat Tully

Is the academic field of International Relations losing out because it doesn’t embrace foresight thinking? What can we do about it? If you have 5 minutes to share your views and thoughts, read on and fill out the survey: HERE.

This year, at the International Studies Association 2014 Conference, we are hosting a Roundtable on the practice and pedagogy of strategic foresight in International Relations, entitled: ‘Bridging the Gap : The Art and Practice of Strategic Foresight in International Relations‘. The purpose of this Roundtable is to bring together International Relations scholars and practitioners to discuss the role of strategic foresight in international relations and to strengthen the community of interest to take this endeavour forward. To prepare for this Roundtable we are conducting a survey on the practice of strategic foresight in international relations – and seeking your views on this issue.

Strategic foresight approaches, when incorporated into long-term planning processes, can have significant impact on international policy-making. Looking beyond present challenges and opportunities to those on the horizon is arguably an indispensable and necessary role of government especially in the foreign policy realm. At this time of geopolitical uncertainty, there is growing interest in this approach to understand developments in the spatial dimensions of foreign policy. Yet foresight has a strangely marginal position in the International Relations academic sphere and is largely absent from most International Relations faculties and courses. However, it is arguably a discipline worth being taught and studied in universities. The strategic foresight toolkit is growing in use by foreign policy practitioners, including diplomats. And research would help clarify and focus on debates about good practice and the effectiveness of strategic foresight in influencing decision-making.

By hosting a Roundtable on this issue, we will be exploring the importance of strategic foresight and the challenges it faces in the school of international relations. We will be discussing the contribution of scholars to foresight in international affairs, debate the value of the endeavour, and share examples of effective approaches and projects. This survey will collect views from a wider group of people prior to the roundtable – and is being launched on World Futures Day on the 1 March, a day to celebrate the possibilities for transforming the future and an opportunity to open dialogue on these issues. You can get involved now by filling out this survey and contributing your views to the debate. The results of the survey will be discussed at the Roundtable and incorporated into an associated report.

The Survey will open on World Futures Day on Saturday 1st March, and will be live for 10 days, closing on Monday 10 March. It should take between 5-10 minutes to complete. Follow this link to fill out the survey: COMPLETE SURVEY

Thank you very much. And have a great #Futureday

– See more at: http://fromoverhere.net/2014/02/wanted-your-views-on-how-strategic-foresight-should-be-integrated-into-the-academic-field-of-international-relations-for-futuresday/#sthash.A7eSog1o.dpuf

Danny Steed to speak at “Spy Chiefs” conference in Venice

Posted on March 3, 2014 by Danny Steed

Dr Danny Steed will be presenting a paper at the University of Warwick’s “Spy Chiefs” conference in May 2014, in Warwick’s Venice conference venue. Full details of the conference can be found below:

The Politics and International Studies Department at Warwick is delighted to announce an upcoming conference entitled ‘Spy Chiefs: Intelligence Leaders in History, Culture and International Relations‘.

The conference will be held on May 6th and 7th in Warwick’s Venice-based conference facility, and will feature keynote speeches from Tony Mendez, the CIA agent who the film Argo is based upon, and Professor Christopher Andrew, Intelligence historian at Oxford and former Official historian for MI5.

The papers and panel discussions held within the conference will focus around the following set of issues.

In many countries today spy chiefs are the public face of intelligence. They speak to the media, appear before public inquiries and committees, and even write books. This has not always been the case. In the United Kingdom, for example, heads of agencies were historically appointed in secret, their names and roles not officially disclosed to the public.

This international conference brings together leading academics and practitioners from across the world to broaden and deepen our understanding of what makes an intelligence leader.

Conference website including registration information is here:http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/paisseminars/spychiefsconference/

Mstrat student submit evidence to Parliament on Iran

Posted on March 3, 2014 by Danny Steed

The UK Parliament Commons Select Committee launched on 2 December 2013 its inquiry on “UK Policy Towards Iran”. Falling in line with the focus of one of the Mstrat student inquiry groups as part of the Crisis Watch module, two of our students submitted evidence to this inquiry in January.

The evidence submitted by Mal Craghill and Nicholas Wood can be found at the following url: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2010/iran-2014/?type=Written#pnlPublicationFilter

Evidence was also submitted by an Exeter PhD candidate, Morgane Colleau, who is supervised by SSI’s Director of Research, Professor Gareth Stansfield. Her evidence can also be found in the link above.

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