Dan Sowik on the ARRC Staff Ride to Berlin

At first glance, the city of Berlin bears few scars of the brutal Soviet assault it suffered in 1945. However, at certain moments during NATO’s Exercise ARRCADE BUGLE 14, a chronological journey through the siege which ended the Second World War in Europe, and through the city’s Cold War experience, the history seemed to seep out of the surroundings. Standing on Kustrin Fort and looking westward across the River Oder towards Berlin, as so many thousands of Red Army soldiers must have done with anticipation and apprehension in April 1945. Looking out from the Seelow Heights over the Oder flood plain, across which nearly a million Soviet troops advanced in the last big push of the European war. Standing on the remains of the Humboldthain flak tower in central Berlin, where crew after crew of Hitler Youth manned the guns in defence of what remained of Hitler’s Germany, in the face of certain annihilation by a ferocious Soviet artillery bombardment.

Though certainly of immense historical importance, the Battle for Berlin does not stand as a shining example of strategic brilliance from which modern leaders can learn. It is, at its simplest level, a case of the final death throes of a fanatical regime being violently suppressed by the brute force of an equally tyrannical opponent. Leadership was weak on both sides, with Hitler giving contradictory orders and awaiting salvation in the form of outmanned and outgunned armies, and Stalin playing Russian generals against one another, letting them throw tens of thousands of men into the fray as they competed to enter Berlin and capture the Reichstag building. Effectiveness at the tactical level varied wildly, but this was ultimately of little consequence when both sides were willing to accept such heavy losses.

Having grown up in the bubble of relative peace and security that is post-Cold War Europe, perhaps the most striking thing about the Berlin staff ride was how the historical conflict simultaneously felt so foreign, and yet so familiar. While the idea of total war in Europe now seems like a bad nightmare for many of us, some collective memories are longer than others, and the history of the 1940s now acts as an ideological catalyst for a war in Eastern Europe. While the presentations and discussions with NATO personnel which punctuated the tour highlighted the ways in which warfare at the tactical, operational, and even strategic levels has evolved in the last 70 years, the trip served as a poignant reminder of what can happen when grand strategies collide. Moreover, hearing the news while in Berlin that a civilian airliner had been shot down over Ukraine drove home the point that the Second World War was no more a ‘war to end all wars’ than the First.

Ultimately, the Berlin staff ride was an incredible experience, and an opportunity to study perhaps one of the most comprehensive victories ever achieved in a war of ideology and conquest. While there are few modern parallels, there are still lessons which can and should be learned from the Battle for Berlin, not the least of which is the ultimate, terrible cost of total war between industrialised, fanatical nations.

MStrat and ARRCADE FUSION

‘Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps’ is an imposing title that is entirely suitable for NATO’s premier rapid deployment headquarters. This means ‘HQ ARRC’ is the headquarters that NATO may turn to in its hour of need. If it is believed that a region needs stabilising, this will probably be the organisation that does it.

However maintaining the capability and expertise that ensures this is not an easy task. This is where exercises like ARRCADE Fusion become important. At several points throughout the year the staff at HQ ARRC are tested to breaking point through simulations designed to mirror what could happen if they were deployed. The Exercise Control, or ‘EXCON’, spends three weeks causing chaos within the simulation and the staff of HQ ARRC has no choice but to respond with all the energy they can muster.

Within this maelstrom of activity and acronyms, two former MStrat students found themselves arriving with sleeping bags and, in my case, wholly inadequate waterproof clothing in hand. Daniel Sowik and I had volunteered for this mission determined to understand what the ‘Applied’ in ‘MA Applied Security Strategy’ actually means.

As part of an experiment for HQ ARRC and SSI, we were attached to the G2 Branch’s All Source Cell. The G2 is responsible for the HQ’s intelligence activities and our cell analysed the intelligence gathered. The All-Source Cell’s team of analysts makes assessments that help guide senior level decision-making.

Thrust into this frenetic environment Daniel and I were given our roles. He was working with the G2’s Political Advisor as Political Analyst and I, with a counter extremism role in Whitehall, as the Counter Extremism Subject Matter Expert.

However before we dove into the workings of G2 there was the simple matter of the simulation itself. We read hundreds of pages about it, covering mineral deposit locations to relationships between key individuals. After wading through this information, we began to develop our contributions.

Learning how the HQ worked and improving our situational awareness, we eventually became integrated into the processes driving the ARRC’s activities rather than being just ‘attached’. Daniel and I developed white papers that helped to inform the HQ’s commanders, as well as operating as sounding boards for intelligence assessments. Mostly importantly we gave different perspectives on the situation that were appreciated and taken onboard by senior staff, giving us excellent feedback that helped drive the creation of our products. For Daniel and me, hearing that experienced and respected military personnel were finding value in our output was extremely gratifying.

However this is not the whole story of the ARRC.

My personal reflection often returns to being genuinely impressed by HQ ARRC and its personnel. Seeing people work 15 hours a day, keep their spirits up, and find time for the gym is mind-blowing to my former student self. This was whilst sleeping in tents situated in a cold and constantly wet Cornwall far from home.

But what has really surprised me is my reaction to leaving HQ ARRC. After integrating into and experiencing the simulation I remember the feeling of immediacy and the adrenaline rush from operating in that environment. Suffice it to say, I hope to be back soon.

Al Cole was a student on the Innovation Cohort who now works in the Department of Education on Counter Extremism

Bosnia Herzegovina Through Fresh Eyes by Al Bowman, MStrat Student

My last experience of the Balkans was as a young infantry officer deployed as part of the United Nations Protection Force in 1995.  Although we were told the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was part of the European land mass and was a conflict on our doorstep, it didn’t much feel like it; it felt a long way away and very different from my own experience of Europe.

What struck me returning for the first time was just how European it now feels.  For all the talk of basket case countries and corrupt bloated political systems the people of Sarajevo and it’s surrounding cantons did not reflect this assessment.  The conflict of 1992-1995 was horribly divisive and unimaginably brutal, yet somehow the human desire for revenge and justice has been parked in order to move on.

Admittedly the underlying nationalist and ethnic tensions that caused the last conflict remain and there is a sense of unfinished business but the hope is that the more that Bosnia Herzegovina can be drawn into the European expansion experiment the less chance there is that the unfinished business will be violent.

What struck me most travelling between Sarajevo and Gorazde was the distance, geography and physical reach between places that look very close on the map.  The Dutch commander at Srebrenica in 1995 was only a short helicopter ride from Sarajevo but it must have felt like he was isolated on a different planet as the genocide took place.  Britain has been lulled into believing over the last 20 years that globalisation has reduced the likelihood of conflict and the physical distance between places is less important.  However, I suspect that geography is very much alive and well as a critical factor in global politics and economics as Russia is demonstrating now.  Soft power and influence is great but it needs hard power that can be projected to make it meaningful.

We ought to remember this when crafting our next salami-slicing National Security Strategy that suggests we can do more with less (again).

MStrat Student, Dom Valitis, reflects on a field trip to Bosnia

One of the first things you notice about Sarajevo is the surrounding landscape. The lush steep hills that tower above the city and the picturesque houses scattered among them paint an idyllic picture that would stand out in any travel brochure or guidebook on the Balkans. At the same time though, they also make you feel rather vulnerable. After all, it was these very same ‘fairy tale’ like hills that enabled Serb Forces to besiege the city and mercilessly attack its residents for nearly 4 years. Although impossible to fully comprehend what that must have been like, standing in the city centre looking up at those hills, you at least get ‘a sense’ of the vulnerability Sarajevo’s residents must have felt during those dark and violent days.  Indeed, the war is never far from mind in Bosnia. From the shrapnel scarred and bullet-riddled buildings to the painful memories etched in the very faces of the Bosnians we met, reminders of the conflict are everywhere.  The trip offered a number of experiences and insights like these that cannot be conveyed in a textbook or learned in a lecture.

Of course, that’s not to say there wasn’t a place for academic pursuits during our visit. The conference room of our hotel in central Sarajevo was the perfect location for a series of lectures on the conflict, how it shaped Bosnia and what the international community is doing  (both right and wrong) to help the country move forward. We were privileged to hear from some of the key people driving that effort forward. Representatives from the UK, EU, UN and OSCE all took time to honestly and openly share their views and opinions with us. It was an invaluable insight into how strategies are applied in the ‘real world’ and the challenges that are encountered in the process.

For me though, the highlight was hearing from ‘ordinary’ Bosnians who were willing to share their deeply personal experiences about the conflict, what life is like in Bosnia today and their hopes and fears for the country. Although harrowing, the trip to Srebrenica and meeting survivors of the massacre was a valuable experience.  So too was our visit to the Sarajevo tunnel and the personal briefing we received from representatives of the International Commission on Missing Persons about their work identifying the hundreds buried in Bosnia’s mass graves. A visit to Goradze underlined the sacrifices made by Britain’s armed forces during the conflict and a discussion with students from Sarajevo University highlighted the challenges facing the country today.

The MStrat trip to Bosnia was an invaluable experience and one that brought to life a cruel conflict that – sadly – is yet to be fully resolved.

 

SSI Field Trip to the Somme

SSI Somme Field Trip

Three MStrat Students recall the SSI Somme Trip:

“On a drab and grey Friday afternoon in March we found ourselves standing in a hedgerow next to a farm looking at a large-ish copse at the far end of a field.  Except it wasn’t a hedgerow, it was the forward-most trench of the German Strongpoint defending Serre village on the morning of 1 July 1916.  And the copse wasn’t one large copse but four smaller ones – known as Matthew, Mark, Luke and John.  This was the left hand flank (the German right) of the British attack on the infamous first day of the Battle of the Somme where the British Army, largely made up of Kitchener’s volunteers formed into Pal’s Battalions, sustained nearly 60,000 casualties in a single day.  Over the course of the weekend we worked our way south, visiting the battlefields around Serre, Beaumont-Hamel and, finally, Thiepval where we laid a wreath from the students and staff of the Strategy and Security Institute at the imposing memorial.

A dozen of intrepid MStrat students took the opportunity of being in France to tour the battlefields.  Whilst many of us had been before, Professor Newton situated the battle in its wider strategic context and gave us a different view of the Great War.  Even if he did have a particular interest in resurrecting the reputation of the Generals… It was interesting to see the extent to which our understanding of what happened in the trenches is coloured by myth.  The portrayals of ‘lions lead by donkeys’ in films and TV shows like Blackadder and Oh What a Lovely War have had a lasting impact and overwritten what may be a more accurate portrayal of strategic leadership in 1916.

Kevin Myers, an Irish historian and journalist, took up this theme of building a myth as he explained how those Irish who fought with the Allies, have been written out of Irish history by successive waves of politicians and academics – despite many of the soldiers being Nationalists themselves.  The power of this narrative is striking, and fascinating how it endures a century on.

For all the understanding we developed of the wider ‘picture’ surrounding The Great War, you cannot escape the pathos of rows of, immaculately kept, white gravestones.  Many of the graves, particularly at ‘Sunken Lane’ the forming up point for the attack on Beaumont-Hamel, stood in clusters – in the beaten zones of the German heavy machine guns.  It does not take much imagination to visualize the ranks of men trudging across No Man’s Land and what they must have gone through.

It was a thoroughly valuable, fascinating and ‘enjoyable’ (if such a word can be used in such a context) trip brought to life and to relevance by our two excellent Tour Guides!”  Gavin Saunders

 

“Having been to the First World War battlefields on a school trip almost a decade ago, as many thousands of children will do so over the coming years to mark the anniversary of the conflict, a few recollections of the Somme stood out – bad weather, the perfectly conserved cemeteries dotted about the countryside, the vast expanses of openness, story after story of seemingly futile attempts to break the German line and, embedded in the psyche, the striking Thiepval Memorial.

This SSI trip now as a (hopefully) more observant MA student and soon-to-be platoon commander, confirmed these memories but also did much, much more.  Perhaps unsurprisingly the ability of General Newton to tie tactical, operational and strategic elements of the Somme together, along with the stories of individuals that really bring a battlefield tour to life, was remarkable – his descriptions of enfilading fire and beaten zones were somewhat more convincing than the valiant efforts of Miss Smith nine years ago. Likewise Kevin Myers powerful inputs on the myths surrounding the Somme were important in helping aid our understanding of the post-war narrative of the battle, and appreciating its place in British history.

As to be expected the sheer scale of the bloodshed is impossible to ignore.  While an overall view of the statistics is shocking enough, it is only when you walk along the headstones reading names, ranks, ages and inscriptions that the emotion tied to understanding that each grave relates to an individual story, of life and of death, really hits home.  Visiting the Thiepval Memorial will once again be an overriding memory of the trip. Laying a wreath from SSI to show our respect was a moving tribute and the image of General Newton and Gavin Saunders bracing up having placed a cross at the gravestones of two unknown soldiers of the Hampshire Regiment, a lineage I hope one day to join, is one that will undoubtedly remain vivid for some time.”  Daniel Hunt

“As a journalist, I’m well aware of the sacrifices the brave men and women of our Armed Forces have made over recent years.  I can vividly remember every single repatriation, inquest and funeral I’ve ever been assigned.  All were deeply sad occasions.  I can’t even begin to imagine what it must have been like for the families and friends of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.  Perhaps the main thing I took away from the SSI trip to the Somme was the industrial scale of the killing that occurred during World War One. Of course, I had read about the horrors of the war at school but nothing prepared me for the sheer number of graves.  Each one marking a life cut short, a family bereaved and a community shattered.  Nowhere was this more evident than at the Thiepval Memorial; a huge dedication to the 72,000 missing British and South African men who died in the battles of the Somme.  It was an utterly overwhelming experience and a poignant reminder of what can happen when strategies fail.” Dominic Valitis

Why Russia is Invading Ukraine by SSI Honorary Fellow, Professor Julian Lindley-French

Alphen, Netherlands. 3 March.  Article 30 of the May 2009 Russian National Security Strategy states, “Negative influences on the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies are aggravated by the departure from international agreements pertaining to arms limitation and reduction, and likewise by actions intended to disrupt the stability of systems of government and military administration…”  The Russian invasion this past weekend is blatant flouting of international law.  It is also a long-planned intervention that has been sitting in the files of the Russian Defence Ministry since at least 1991.  The grand strategic reason for the intervention is the determination of Moscow to reassert control over what it sees as Russia’s “near abroad” with Ukraine as its lynchpin.  However, there are five additional reasons why Moscow has seized the collapse of the Yanukovich regime as the moment to intervene – history, military strategy, military capability, politics and opportunity.

History:  Ukraine has always had a strong pull on the Russian mind as it is the spiritual home of the Russian Orthodox Church.  In 1954 Ukrainian-born Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handed ‘control’ of the Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.  As Ukraine was then firmly under Moscow’s control the transfer mattered little, although it did mean the de facto shift of ethnic Russians and Tartars under the nominal administrative fiat of Kiev.  On Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 the transfer became a matter of both historical and strategic import to Moscow.  ‘Loss’ of Ukraine to the EU (and eventually NATO) would be the final humiliation to the Kremlin following two decades of perceived retreat since the end of the Cold War in 1989.

Military Strategy:  One of Russia’s long held strategic mantras has been the need to maintain a warm water naval base that could enable Russian influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.  Sevastopol has long provided just such a facility for the Black Seas Fleet, which is in fact the Russian Mediterranean Fleet.  The nature of the Russian military operation this weekend and the use of Special Forces to establish a bridgehead at Simferopol and Sevastopol Airports are indicative.  They point to a classic Russian expeditionary operation that creates and exploits local unrest to enable seizure of the seat of government as well as control of land, sea and air space.  The initial aim is to secure the Sevastopol base and its lines of supply and re-supply with Russia.

Military Capability: In 2010 Russia announced it would inject $775 billion into the professionalization and modernization of its armed forces.  This followed the disappointing performance of Russian forces in 2008 during Moscow’s seizure of parts of Georgia. The bulk of those new forces are established in the Central and Western Military Districts which abut the Ukrainian border.  The kit being worn by the deployed force demonstrates a mix of Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and specialised forces and reflects the effort Moscow has made to improve deployability of its elite professional forces.

Ukrainian forces have enjoyed no such modernization.  In any case the upper echelons of the Ukrainian military’s command chain are deeply split, as evinced by the defection this weekend by the Head of the Ukrainian Navy.  Many senior Ukrainian officers owe their appointment to Yanukovich.

Politics:  The Putin regime was established in 2000 and led to the cult of Putinism.  It is a regime that consolidates domestic power by appealing to nostalgic Russian notions of grandeur.  In particular the regime has endeavoured to recreate the sense of a Russia powerful enough to re-capture the influence Moscow enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s at the height of the Soviet Union’s super-power.  The 2014 Sochi Olympics were very much part of the regime’s image-building.  In 2013 US Secretary of State John Kerry gave equal billing to Russia in the handling of the Syria crisis and enhanced the reputation of the regime at home.

Opportunity:  The Kremlin under Putin is first and foremost a strategic opportunist.  The withdrawal of two US Brigade Combat Teams from Europe may seem small in and of itself.  However, taken together with the ‘pivot’ to Asia and President Obama’s uncertain grip of grand strategy the US is no longer the stabilising force in Europe it once was.  The Kremlin also has contempt for ideas of ‘civil power’ built around Germany and the EU.  Moreover, Russia’s military renaissance has taken place in parallel with the West’s failures in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  The Kremlin is also acutely conscious of Europe’s economic travails and de facto disarmament with total defence spending in Europe down by minus 1.8% per annum since 2001.  Moreover, the refusal of all but two NATO European states to meet their obligation to spend 2% of GDP on defence has also led Moscow to conclude that Europeans lack the will and capability to block Moscow’s regional-strategic ambitions.

Implications for Russia and Ukraine:  The seizure of parts of Ukraine will in the short-term strengthen the grip of Putin over Russia.  However, Russia faces deep demographic and economic challenges which unless addressed will see Russia continue to fade as the West, China and others eclipse Moscow.

The east of Ukraine is very vulnerable.  Moscow has a cynical view of the use of power and will almost certainly use the concerns of ethnic Russians to justify an intervention that would straighten Russia’s strategic borders and thus consolidate the new Russian sphere of influence.

Recommendations: There is no quick fix available to Western policymakers.  However, Western allies must use all the non-military tools at their disposal to force the Kremlin to reconsider the costs versus the benefits of such action.  That will include use of international fora to build a countervailing coalition, possibly with China which dislikes sovereignty grabs.  All economic tools must be applied with sanctions imposed on key officials, with Aeroflot flights to Europe and North America suspended and Gazprom slowly removed from the European market.  The accounts of senior Russians outside of the the country must be frozen.  Finally, the US must re-position forces back in Europe, including the Baltic States and Europeans must commit to the re-building of their armed forces.

Conclusions:  Over the medium-to-long term NATO allies must re-establish credible defence as part of a balanced economic, diplomatic and military influence effort in and around Europe.  Former US President Bill Clinton and former US Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns said yesterday that the enlargement of NATO to former members of the Soviet Bloc guaranteed their security.  This is correct to a point. Without the modernisation of Article 5 collective defence the value of NATO membership will over time erode and if Putin remains in power the Kremlin will exploit such weakness.

Julian Lindley-French

Andrew Rathmell’s View – Libya: How to build a stateless state?

Two years after the death of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya’s transition is not going well.  The headlines  tell a depressing story: the Prime Minister (briefly) kidnapped by his own security services; daily assassinations, bombings and robberies; militias and secessionists in the east blockading oil facilities; and the General National Congress (parliament) in disarray.  In the coffee shops and dilapidated government offices where the Tripolitanian middle classes and government officials gather, there is talk of stasis and disappointed expectations.

None of these travails are surprising in the context of a bloody transition from a long-entrenched dictatorship.  For a successful transition, Libya needs to work towards an internal political settlement that balances the interests of its different regions, and to build state structures that are able to enforce the rule of law and administer the economy in a way that serves the wider population rather than, as under Qaddafi, selected elites.

The International Community is responding to this challenge creditably, with the UN, World Bank, EU, US and numerous individual countries rushing to offer assistance.  Keen to see a stable Libya emerge which can get oil production back on track, control its porous borders and crack down on homegrown jihadists, they are providing a range of technical assistance to the Libyan security sector and civil service.  By building up these government institutions in the context of a constitutional process, goes the logic, a duly elected Libyan government will be able to get a grip on the country.  It seems “obvious” that, in a country with a small population, abundant oil wealth, and a lack of deep sectarian or ethnic divisions, this standard statebuilding formula should work.

However, there is a contradiction at the heart of the Libyan state-building project.  Unlike many of its neighbours, modern Libya has deliberately tried not to build a state.  While Libya appears to have the trappings of modern statehood (ministries, flags, airlines, security forces), at the deeper conceptual level, the country has eschewed real state-building.  This was most explicit during Qaddafi’s rule when he put in place a system of “permanent revolution” and deliberately undermined state institutions. But even under the monarchy, the regime only constructed the façade of statehood.  The central administrative and coercive institutions were built purely to protect a narrow elite rather than to support a wider programme of state-building.

Historians have argued that this aversion to statebuilding derives in part from Libya’s disastrous experience with modern statehood under the brutal Italian occupation and in part from the relatively recent and rapid process of urbanisation.  Whatever the cause, the Libyan predeliction for “stateless statebuilding” means that an overly simplistic approach of transferring international skills, equipment and organisational structures is unlikely to succeed.

Libya’s international allies will need to avoid the all too common tendency to import templates from other jurisdictions and Libya’s leaders will need to recognise that they cannot “buy” a modern state overnight.  They will need to focus as much effort on the essentially political tasks of linking state structures to the population as on the technical tasks of bolstering government institutions.  It will be a fascinating, if fraught, journey.

For a recent update, see David Hammond’s blog at: http://9bri.com/human-rights-in-libya-interview-and-comment-on-the-deaths-in-tripoli-from-the-national-council-for-civil-liberties-and-human-rights/

 

Reflections of an Intern: My experience in SSI, by Lara Salzer-Levi

Having spent two months interning at the Strategy and Security Institute (SSI) of the University of Exeter (UoE), saying that I have learnt a lot would be an immense understatement. During my time there, I had the unique opportunity to work alongside Dr Danny Steed, Lecturer in Strategy and Defence, who, having recently arrived to Exeter himself was more than enthusiastic to have me on board and give me the opportunity to get a lot more involved than I originally expected.

But before revealing the inner workings of the department, a quick word about SSI for those who don’t know what it is. The Strategy and Security Institute is a brand new department, set to change the University of Exeter’s student perceptions of strategy and security in today’s world, in effect applying theory to practice. With the ever changing balance in today’s political arena, I would argue that it is a perfect time to have a department which, through simulations and innovative teaching methods available for students of all divisions and age groups, effectively applies the political theory learnt throughout one’s degree to strategy in real life situations.  Come September 2013, the Institute will be fully operational with a Master’s course in Strategy and frequent simulations for those wishing to test their abilities to strategize.

Upon arrival to SSI for my first day as an Intern, I was more than intimidated knowing that the Institute I was about to involve myself with was home to people having experience in unique fields, with CVs that would intimidate even the most well-read PhD and with a profound military presence throughout the Institute. So as a second year student with no real work experience in politics as such, I was determined not to be overwhelmed. To my great surprise the atmosphere in the Institute was relaxed and welcoming, but having talked to Dr Steed before my arrival, I knew that beyond my initial impressions, my time there would involve a lot of challenging work, thinking outside the box, and hair pulling dilemmas.

And so, I was introduced to the ideas behind the simulations I would be helping Dr Steed in bringing to life and with the help of a big map we started brainstorming and plotting. I was trusted enough to be given the opportunity to get heavily involved in planning one such simulation based in Libya. The students participating were split into three teams and spread across three different locations throughout the University (immersing the participants in the way conferences are held during real life crises) and for the first time since starting my degree, I was able to apply what I had spent so much time learning in a classroom to a life-like situation. A situation which, were it to actually occur would be a tough challenge even for senior politicians and civil servants. Despite the simulation only lasting an afternoon, the preparation of it took much longer. Months longer.  What started as a dot on a map became an identification of a reoccurring crisis, which then became the involvement of third parties and finally, the creation of documents, podcasts and media packages to support the simulation before it was presented to the students. Planning the simulation not only challenged the knowledge I had already learnt in my studies but was also very fulfilling in watching our ideas match the development of events on the news, and the stress on the students faces as they argued over the best solution.  Having carried out three simulations already this year, and having hosted a multitude of high ranking officials to talk to the students, SSI has already made a prominent name for itself among the student body at Exeter.

But what an average student does not hear about however, are the perks of the job. I had the unique and incredibly eye opening opportunity of attending closed seminars with people including Jon Day, the Chairman of the JIC; a working lunch with former Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth; and an academic trip to the Royal Marines Commando Training Centre Lympstone. This as well as the treat of meeting individuals such as Dr Stephanie Blair, Andrew Rathmell, Major General Jerry Thomas, Professor Mike Clarke and Robert Fox.

However, it has to be said that without the presence of the SSI’s “driving force” none of the high-tech, lifelike and challenging activities I and other students at the University have participated in, would be as successful as I (as a student at the University) deem them to be.  Firstly, the Director of SSI, General Sir Paul Newton, is a man whose reputation and experience precedes him.  Katherine Felstead and Roo Haywood-Smith are the women who comprise the administrative driving force behind the immaculate executions of SSI appointments. Professor Paul Cornish, a man I did not get to see much yet found his work throughout all key areas of SSI, and Dr Steed, my supervisor and ‘problem solver’ in SSI, have been working towards setting up the new Master’s programme, the MA in Applied Security Strategy.  Along with recently joined Dr Catarina Thomson and Dr Sergio Catignani, the four of them will be leading modules on the Masters course come September.

My final two weeks with SSI consisted of my assisting in the smooth running of the SSI’s Grand Challenges dilemma. The Grand Challenges programme is newly established for first year students, following the completion of the student’s third academic term and exams. The university offers first year students to choose between a range of twelve day long dilemmas including the SSI dilemma  titled ‘Resetting the UK’s National Security Strategy’ which is currently due for re-assessment in 2015. The students were tasked with exploring what the UK currently deems a Tier 1 threat, and discussing whether, with the pending re-assessment of the document, the classification of some of the current Tier 1 threats should be altered. The students proved to be very hard working and fervent on the issue at hand, along with providing full engagement with Sir Paul Newton’s invited guest speakers, asking them very difficult and high quality questions, the answers of which they later considered when addressing issues within the dilemma. As a result, with the help of the supporting members of staff lead by Dr Steed, the students wrote a letter – which has already been sent to the Prime Minister – explaining the student’s desire to alter certain Tier 1 threats and terminology within the document in accordance to, for example, the development of technology i.e. the emergence and awareness of expanded cyber security threats since the document was written.

On a more personal note, my involvement in Grand Challenges was more on the administrative side, making sure the programme ran on time and aiding the Institute in any way I could, however, upon being invited to participate in certain activities throughout the two weeks, I can honestly say that even though I am not a first year student, I was impressed with the level of the discussion on behalf of the students, along with the quality of the talks and level of input the guest speakers provided.

Overall, I feel privileged in saying that I have had a wonderful experience working in SSI and as Dr Steed would rightly say, it is a department that makes the impossible, possible. There was never of moment of lull within the office, and the small pieces of knowledge and tricks I have picked up along the way are both priceless and incomparable. So, I would like to say a big thank you to everyone in SSI for welcoming me and giving me such a fantastic opportunity. I shall definitely be attending all further programmes and simulations the Institute organises; a great experience for those of you who have not yet had the opportunity to attend one.