Category Archives: Terrorism

Abstract Terrorising Terrorists – The jus ad bellum of drone operations in Pakistan by Tobias Ruettershoff

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Over the last decade, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or ‘drones’, have become the United States’ (U.S.) preferred military tool for fighting al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, used in all major military conflicts and crisis regions of the world, such as Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Yemen, yet mostly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Although their use as a military tool is only part of a wider, highly emotional debate about the use of force against non-state actors across national borders, global attention has focused on such operations. After denying for many years that these attacks do take place, the U.S. administration has recently admitted to conduct such operations, defending them as a legal and legitimate response to terrorist threats. The chapter finds that amidst the heated discussion about the use of drones, it is often forgotten or misunderstood in which ways the state can react to transnational terrorism.

In the first step of the analysis, it is discussed whether the laws of war can be applied to the transnational fight against terrorism or if it has to be seen under human rights law, which would put much stronger restraints on the use of force. It is argued that the law-enforcement paradigm is very difficult in dealing with terrorist threats originating from areas which are no longer under government control. On the one hand, law-enforcement agencies of the victim state are often unable to operate in foreign countries. On the other hand, if the host government attempts to use law-enforcement measures, the backlash from the militants is more likely to create more of a quagmire than if a concerted and limited military action, such as a drone attack, were taken. Therefore, it is the most sensible option to assess the drone strikes is under the laws of armed conflict and not human rights law, as it is too domestic in nature to apply to the fight against international terrorism and does not allow appropriate means.

This raises important questions about the violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, as Article 2 (4) of the UN Charta prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”. An exception to this prohibition is Article 51, which allows self-defence against an armed attack, yet it is not clear whether any action of self-defence has to be in response to an armed attack imputable by another state. In the traditional interpretation of the ICJ and customary international law, Article 51 does not warrant a right to self-defence against non-state actors, unless they are imputable to another state. Yet, as it is argued in the chapter, in recent years there has been change. Article 51 is now more and more interpreted in the way that states must be able to defend themselves against terrorist threats, hence allowing transnational use of force against terrorists. However, to limit risk of abuse against Article 2 (4), the strict rules of customary law need to be applied. These are the principles of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality.

Applied to the cross-border use of drones by the U.S. military against terrorists based in Pakistan, the chapter maintains that the overwhelming majority of U.S. incursions into Pakistani territory are illegal under international law because they do not meet these strict constraints of customary international law. However, targeted killings are not per se illegal, if the United States can prove – in each individual case – that an operation meets the requirements.

What Will Shock the World? Waiting for Syria’s Srebrenica by Tobias Borck

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The bombing of the Ain Jalout school in Aleppo, on 30 April 2014, encapsulates the horror of the war in Syria. The air strike, carried out by the Syrian military, killed more than 20 people, half of them children. That day, the school was hosting an exhibition of drawings and paintings, in which the students had depicted their dreams – most of them featured the war, death and destruction.[1]

James Bays, reporting for Al-Jazeera, said that the attack on the Ain Jalout school “should shock the world.”[2] But will the shock be big enough to change the attitude of the international community, or rather, the strategies of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council? Valerie Amos, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, expressed her outrage calling the bombing of the school, and other attacks targeting civilians, “a flagrant violation of the basic tenants of war.”[3] Ultimately, however, the attack is unlikely to change anything.

Syria’s war has entered its fourth year. The killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians have become a daily occurrence, causing unspeakable human suffering. James Clapper, United States Director of National Intelligence, has recently called the humanitarian situation in Syria “an apocalyptic disaster.” Since the beginning of the war in March 2011, more than 150,000 people have been killed,[4] among them more than 11,000 children.[5] 2.7 million Syrians have fled the country;[6] a further 6.5 million were forced to leave their homes but remain in Syria.[7]

We Are Waiting

The strategy of the western P5 members towards Syria, led by the USA, appears to be based on waiting and monitoring the situation. But what is it that Barack Obama’s government is waiting for?

Despite recent territorial gains for Bashar al-Assad’s forces, a military victory for any side in the conflict is unlikely. The Geneva peace talks, chaired by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, ended without significant results in February 2014. Back then, Brahimi called on all parties involved to decide whether “they want this process to take place or not.”[8] In the absence of any tangible further developments since, the answer seems to be: no. Brahimi himself is expected to resign in the coming months, particularly if presidential elections in Syria planned for June are going ahead. President Bashar al-Assad has recently confirmed his stand for reelection and it is widely believed he will win.[9]

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council Resolution 2139[10] from February 2014, continues to be violated with impunity by all sides in the conflict. The resolution demanded an end to all attacks against civilians, and unrestricted access for humanitarian agencies within the countries. While the resolution is legally binding under International Law, it does not stipulate any consequences for noncompliance or measures for its enforcement. Any advances towards a more robust resolution continue to be blocked by Russia.[11]

To improve their own position and to convince Assad that there can be no military solution to the conflict, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the opposition’s leadership in exile, continues to lobby western governments to provide opposition forces with much needed military equipment. In an interview with Exeter students, Walid Saffour, the SNC’s UK ambassador, expressed his belief that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) could make significant progress on the ground “if we have got adequate arms to stop two things: the tanks and the aircraft.”[12]

Next week, Ahmad Jarba, the SNC’s president will visit Washington, not least in an attempt to convince the US government to arm the FSA with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Whether he will succeed, however, is uncertain. Apart from some limited shipments of weapons, the Obama administration has thus far been extremely cautious in providing military equipment to opposition forces. The main reason for this reluctance is the fear that American weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists.[13]

What Are We Waiting For?

What, then could change US policy towards Syria? A review of some of the US-led military interventions and wars in past decades, suggests that changes in US strategy are often influenced by specific events. With regard to the US interventions in Lebanon (1982), Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011), it is possible to identify crucial turning points for US strategy. With the exception of the war in Afghanistan, which was a direct response to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, these events were not in themselves the sufficient or sole reason for respective US governments to launch interventions. They did not occur in a vacuum, but rather in a continuum of conflicts within the individual countries or – in the case of 9/11 – within the context of global developments. They were the last straws that broke the proverbial camel’s back and convinced the US presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama that military action, or at least military support for one side in the conflict, was unavoidable.

In 1982, Ronald Reagan’s decision to send almost 2,000 US Marines to Lebanon came days after the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September. At this point, Lebanon’s civil war had already devastated the country for seven years. In August, a contingent of US marines had briefly deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from the country. They left on 10 September. A week later, between 16-18 September, a Christian militia – with, at the very least, the quiet acceptance of the occupying Israeli army – killed between 700 and 3,000 Palestinian refugees. The images of the massacre’s aftermath went around the world and promoted Reagan’s formation of a new multinational force tasked with supporting the Lebanese government. The intervention was ultimately unsuccessful and ended in the horrific terror attack on the US Marines’ barracks in October 1983. The war continued until 1990.[14]

In Bosnia Herzegovina, the US-led NATO interventions only occurred after the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. The war had begun in 1992 and had already cost tens of thousands of deaths. A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), with limited US participation, was deployed in 1992, but only had a mandate to protect certain areas, not to use force to stop the fighting. UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness was exposed when Bosnian Serb forces overran the Muslim town of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and killed more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims. Days after the massacre, NATO agreed to take a tougher stand to defend other safe areas and in August launched a decisive campaign to end the war.[15]

In Kosovo, two widely publicised massacres by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanians in Prekaz and Racak played a critical role in the prelude to NATO’s US-led military intervention. After the Prekaz massacre, in which 53 Albanians were killed on 5 March 1998, the USA intensified its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Two days after the attack, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright announced that “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.’’[16] Nine months later, after 45 Albanians were killed in the Racak massacre on 15 January 1999, the USA and its European allies decided that diplomacy alone was no longer enough. In March, NATO’s military intervention began.[17]

The US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not preceded by massacres in those countries, but by the terror attacks in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. These attacks were decidedly more instrumental in the US government’s decision to launch military operations than any of the events outlined above, especially in the case of Afghanistan. However, both Afghanistan and Iraq were on the USA’s foreign policy agenda long before 2001. In 1998, the Clinton administration authorised missile strikes against suspected bases of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.[18] In Iraq, the USA played the leading role in maintaining no-fly zones over both the north and the south of the country throughout the 1990s. Regime change in Iraq was certainly identified as a US objective before 9/11, especially among the neoconservative establishment. Yet, it took 9/11 to create the momentum to launch a military campaign.[19]

Finally, NATO’s intervention in Libya is a rare example of where the threat of a massacre was sufficient for the USA and its allies to launch military intervention. In March 2011, Gaddafi’s forces were advancing on Benghazi, the origin of popular protests against the regime and the stronghold for the armed rebellion. Obama later explained his decision to support NATO’s intervention: “I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”[20]

These six events – the atrocities in Sabra and Shatila, Srebrenica, and Prekaz and Recak, the attacks of 9/11, and the potential massacre in Benghazi – were unique in themselves and specific to their respective contexts. There is no particular threshold, no definitive number of casualties that forces US presidents to opt for military intervention. However, these events are united in the fact that they represented significant turning points for US strategy. It is important to note that these events did not necessarily lead to international consensus in favour of military intervention – the Kosovo intervention happened despite vehement Russian opposition.[21] Although Russia may have more of an invested interest in Syria than it did in Kosovo, this suggests that deadlock in the UN Security Council is not an insurmountable obstacle to military intervention.

The Waiting Continues

In Syria a turning point was almost reached in August 2013, when between 300-1,400 civilians were killed in a chemical weapons attack. For a few days US missile strikes against Syria seemed likely. However, diplomacy prevailed and the Assad regime agreed to the US-Russia brokered deal to give up its chemical weapons stockpiles.[22] Six months later, the international Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has removed the bulk of Syria’s declared chemical weapons arsenal.[23] The killing, however, continues unabated and with horrific consistency. In the week culminating in the Ain Jalout school bombing on 30 April 2014, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) had counted daily death tolls of 206, 270, 210, 265, 288, 223 and 284.[24] These figures are far from unusual for the war in Syria. The data published on the SOHR’s Facebook page shows very similar numbers for the past months, even years.

Alistair Burt, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, suggests that this consistency is no accident. “We think Assad has learned perfectly well from his father that killing 20,000 people in Hama as in 1982 would not now be the right thing to do,” he said in an interview with Exeter students.[25] However, the death of 200-300 people a day appears to be a level that governments in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London are prepared to sustain. The decisive turning point, Syria’s Sabra and Shatila or Srebrenica has not yet occurred. For the moment, “four, five thousand, six thousand people a month appears to be a figure that the world is prepared to stand,” says Burt.

In the absence of a turning point event in Syria, a terror attack originating in the country but carried out in one of Syria’s neighbours or even in Europe or the USA could potentially lead to a policy change by western governments. The proliferation of radical Islamist forces and groups linked to Al-Qaeda in Syria is well documented.[26] Thus far, these groups have concentrated on terrorising Syrian civilians. A day before the Ain Jalout school bombing, two car bombs by Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra killed more than 50 civilians and injured hundreds in an area of Homs controlled by the Assad regime.[27]

However, it is far from certain that Al-Nusra, and other radical organisations active in Syria will continue to limit their operations to the battlefield within Syria. Matthew Olson, Director of the US National Counterterrorism Center told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2014 that “Syria has become the preeminent location for independent or Al-Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom we assess may seek to conduct external attacks.”[28]

It is clear that the current policy of the Obama administration and its allies in Europe is not leading to any meaningful changes in Syria. Chemical weapons may have been largely removed from the conflict, but the killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians continues at a horrifically consistent level. US and European strategy appears to be reduced to waiting, either for one side of the conflict to achieve an unlikely military victory, or for an atrocity that will make further inaction simply impossible.


[1] BBC (2014) “Syria Crisis: ‘Children Killed in Aleppo School Strike.” BBC Online, 30 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27227791 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[2] Al-Jazeera (2014) “Aleppo School Bombing Condemned by UN.” Al-Jazeera Online, 1 May. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/aleppo-school-bombing-condemned-un-2014516372113604.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[3] Ibid.

[4] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) “More than 150,000 Martyred and Killed Since the Start of the Revolution.” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Arabic website, 1 April. http://www.syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=17296&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.U2J3A16CTwJ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[5] Salama, H., and Daragan, H. (2013) “Stolen Futures: The Hidden Toll of Child Casualties in Syria.” Oxford Research Group, 24 November. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/stolen_futures [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[6] UNHRC (2014) “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” UNHRC, last updated 14 April. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[7] USAID (2014) Syria – Complex Emergency: Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2014, April 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/syria_ce_fs12_04-10-2014.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[8] Maigua, P. (2014) “Syrian Peace Talks Adjourned Indefinitely.” United Nations Radio, 15 February. http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/02/syrian-peace-talks-adjourned-indefinitely/#.U2J5dl6CTwI [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[9] Charbonneau, L. (2014) “Search is on for Successor to Syria Peace Mediator Brahimi.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-brahimi-idUSBREA3T10A20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[10] United Nations Security Council (2014) “Full Text: UN Security Council Resolution 2139.” UN Watch, 22 February. http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2014/02/22/full-text-un-security-council-resolution-2139/ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[11] Nichols, M. (2014) “UN Aid Chief Suggests Stronger Action Needed on Syria.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-aid-un-idUSBREA3T10B20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[12] Saffour, W. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

[13] Pecquet, J. (2014) “Syrian Opposition Looks to Congress for Military Boost.” Al-Monitor, 25 April. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/syria-opposition-congress-military-boost.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[14] Azrael, J. R., and Payin, E. A. (1996) US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force. Santa Monica: RAND. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/CF129.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[15] Daalder, I. H. (1998) “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Brookings, December. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[16] Erlanger, S. (1998) “Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence.” The New York Times, 8 March. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/08/world/albright-warns-serbs-on-kosovo-violence.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[17] BBC (2000) “Behind the Kosovo Crisis.” BBC Online, 12 March. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/674056.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[18] BBC (2014) “Afghanistan Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 8 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[19] BBC (2014) “Iraq Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 1 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[20] Cooper, H. (2011) “Obama Cites Limits of US Role in Libya.” The New York Times, 28 March. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html?pagewanted=1&hp [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[21] BBC (1998) “Why Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo.” BBC Online, 13 October. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/111585.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[22] BBC (2014) “Q&A: Syria Chemical Weapons Disarmament Deal.” BBC Online, last updated 30 January. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23876085 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[23] BBC (2014) “Bulk of Syria’s Chemical Weapons ‘Removed’, Says Sigrid Kaag.” BBC Online, 27 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27179365 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[24] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe?fref=ts [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[25] Burt, A. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

[26] Jones, S. G. (2013) “Syria’s Growing Jihad.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (4), pp. 53-72. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival–global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2013-0b78/55-4-07-jones–seth-abcd [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[27] Human Rights Watch (2014) “Syria: Car Bombs, Mortars Hit Residential Areas.” Human Rights Watch, 1 May. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/01/syria-car-bombs-mortars-hit-residential-areas [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[28] Olson, M. G. (2014) “Extremism and Sectarianism in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.” Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 6 March. Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030614AM_Testimony%20-%20Matthew%20Olsen.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

Grand Challenges, ‘Resetting the UK National Security Agenda’ Government response to open letter

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From the National Security Adviser

 

15 July 2013

Lieutenant General (Retd) Sir Paul Newton KBE

Professor of Security and Strategy

Director, Strategy and Security Institute

Dr Danny Steed

Lecturer in Strategy and Defence

Strategy and Security Institute

Dear Sir Paul and Dr Steed

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 17 June, and the interesting analysis it contained of the UK’s National Security Strategy.  The Prime Minister has asked me to reply.

We are preparing for a review of the National Security Strategy in 2014-15.  In the light of this, and without agreeing with every word, it was timely and valuable to have this input from your students on the current text.  They made some useful points about the handling of cyber threats, terrorism, and inter-state military crises, and about Britain’s future role in the world.  I’ve passed the letter to the team who will be responsible for preparing the next version of the Strategy.

With my best wishes.

 

KIM DARROCH

Grand Challenges, ‘Resetting the UK National Security Agenda’ open letter to Prime Minister David Cameron

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Monday, 17 June 2013

Dear Prime Minister,

We are students participating in the University of Exeter’s Grand Challenges programme. Our inquiry group, titled ‘Resetting the UK National Security Agenda’, is charged with assessing Britain’s National Security Strategy and considering how those aspects labelled “Tier One” might better serve the nation’s security agenda.

Cyber attacks

We believe that this is the area of the NSS with the most expansive potential. Malicious activity in cyberspace is a transnational issue and, indeed, we contend that it should also be considered a human security issue.

We therefore agree that cyber threats do qualify for Tier 1 status. As it currently exists, however, the cyber section of the NSS also demonstrates significant misunderstanding of the issue. We believe that a clearer definition of what constitutes a cyber threat is needed; currently there is not enough technical articulation of the threat with which to educate the British public.

Cyberspace is an arena of both state-perpetrated attacks and of widespread criminal activity. While GCHQ focuses primarily on the former, it is in fact the latter which has the greatest effect on British nationals and companies. We must also remember that cyber attacks are perpetrated by real world actors; where legislation can impact the problem we must ensure that such provisions are in place, both internationally and domestically.

We fundamentally dispute the idea that Britain’s primary objective should be to secure the country for business purposes, as is stipulated in the Cyber Security Strategy. We believe instead that the importance of educating citizens and developing computer talent should be the primary objective in Britain’s cyber efforts. The objective should be for the British population to become the most secure, educated, and aware users of cyberspace in the world, which would in turn enhance online business security. Education forms part of our proactive defence, as does the recruiting of the most skilled British individuals to work toward solutions.

Terrorism

We unanimously agree that terrorism represents a Tier 1 threat. We believe, however, that it overly dominates our foreign security policy. While our relationships with international partners are important, the NSS is, in the end, a national security document. Terrorism should thus hold priority only to the extent that it poses a threat to Britain and its interests. Foreign policy should react to terrorism, not be dictated by it.

To present an effective strategy, the NSS should reflect the ways in which our international political and military actions can not only catalyse, but also precipitate, domestic tensions. It should thus put more focus on non-militaristic, soft-power approaches and encourage more holistic policies. Prior to military solutions, we must use all of our available assets such as NGOs, foreign aid bodies, and avenues of economic integration to address the underlying causes of terrorism.

The almost exclusive focus on Al-Qaeda, while politically expedient, contributes to a public misunderstanding of the nature of this complex threat. Rhetoric such as that within the PREVENT strategy has the unintended effect of marking huge societal groups as outsiders and actively contributes to factionalism within our society. The terminology used to describe terrorist actions must be consistently applied, whatever the identities or affiliations of the perpetrators. Using the lessons learned from Northern Ireland, we should differentiate between terrorist actors and the populations that they claim to represent in order to diminish the societal divides exemplified and exploited by the terrorist groups.

Conversely, the term ‘Lone Terrorists’ also implies a misinterpretation of the threat. The NSS should differentiate between true independent actors, whose motives lie in the psychology of the individual, and members of connected groups. We bestow upon terror groups undue power when we label lone criminals with the same moniker as internationally linked domestic terrorists. We should tackle such incidents for what they are – acts of criminality.

Interstate military crisis

This was the most divisive issue in our inquiry because we believe there is a tension in the ambiguous wording of the NSS document. It is not clear what ‘drawing in the UK’ actually means; there is a clear divide in our inquiry for the need to either specify this phrase or retain its inherent ambiguity. Many of us see the existing ambiguity as a potential problem, while others also view it as potentially advantageous in the event of an unforeseen crisis.

For our NSS to more accurately reflect the nature of our options, we recommend that direct threats to the nation be differentiated from crises that pose threats to our national values. Thus, we propose the current Tier 1 threat should be split into two different threats, one to be kept in Tier 1 and one to be moved to Tier 2.

Tier 1: Conflicts in which Britain would be de jure implicated from their outset: attacks on us or our allies by foreign powers, imminent issues of international security, large threats to international stability.

Tier 2: Conflicts in which our involvement would be a matter of real choice, however difficult that choice might be: humanitarian crises, combatting arms proliferation, foreign internal peacekeeping efforts. These decisions should be directed both by a commitment to the values in which our country believes and a realistic assessment of their potential economic and international impact and, indeed, of our available military resources.

Our proposed change to the tier system would, we hope, reflect the real limits on the finite nature of our economic and military resources, the allocation of which is a fundamental purpose of the NSS.

Britain’s role in the world

We believe that the NSS is based upon an underlying assumption – that Britain should exercise an influential global role. This assumption appears to be entrenched in the attitude and policy making of the British Government.

It has therefore been expressed as a concern in our inquiry group that such an important assumption remains unchallenged; while it is clear that in the short-term Britain will exercise an influential global role, in the long-term it would be beneficial for Britain to institute a regular debate seeking to define Britain’s expected role in global affairs.

While we do not dispute the notion of Britain playing a global role at this time, it is our contention that Britain must not take decisions based on an assumption that such a global role is there by default. Instead, the British Government should take active, open, and public measures to regularly define exactly what our role in the world should be.

Yours faithfully,

Thomas Charlton

Stephane Chui

Alastair Cole

Conrad Deverell

Ryan Hopkins

Matthew Morley

Kiah Shabka

Thomas Owen

Charles Tolley

Nick White

Reflections of an Intern: My experience in SSI, by Lara Salzer-Levi

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Having spent two months interning at the Strategy and Security Institute (SSI) of the University of Exeter (UoE), saying that I have learnt a lot would be an immense understatement. During my time there, I had the unique opportunity to work alongside Dr Danny Steed, Lecturer in Strategy and Defence, who, having recently arrived to Exeter himself was more than enthusiastic to have me on board and give me the opportunity to get a lot more involved than I originally expected.

But before revealing the inner workings of the department, a quick word about SSI for those who don’t know what it is. The Strategy and Security Institute is a brand new department, set to change the University of Exeter’s student perceptions of strategy and security in today’s world, in effect applying theory to practice. With the ever changing balance in today’s political arena, I would argue that it is a perfect time to have a department which, through simulations and innovative teaching methods available for students of all divisions and age groups, effectively applies the political theory learnt throughout one’s degree to strategy in real life situations.  Come September 2013, the Institute will be fully operational with a Master’s course in Strategy and frequent simulations for those wishing to test their abilities to strategize.

Upon arrival to SSI for my first day as an Intern, I was more than intimidated knowing that the Institute I was about to involve myself with was home to people having experience in unique fields, with CVs that would intimidate even the most well-read PhD and with a profound military presence throughout the Institute. So as a second year student with no real work experience in politics as such, I was determined not to be overwhelmed. To my great surprise the atmosphere in the Institute was relaxed and welcoming, but having talked to Dr Steed before my arrival, I knew that beyond my initial impressions, my time there would involve a lot of challenging work, thinking outside the box, and hair pulling dilemmas.

And so, I was introduced to the ideas behind the simulations I would be helping Dr Steed in bringing to life and with the help of a big map we started brainstorming and plotting. I was trusted enough to be given the opportunity to get heavily involved in planning one such simulation based in Libya. The students participating were split into three teams and spread across three different locations throughout the University (immersing the participants in the way conferences are held during real life crises) and for the first time since starting my degree, I was able to apply what I had spent so much time learning in a classroom to a life-like situation. A situation which, were it to actually occur would be a tough challenge even for senior politicians and civil servants. Despite the simulation only lasting an afternoon, the preparation of it took much longer. Months longer.  What started as a dot on a map became an identification of a reoccurring crisis, which then became the involvement of third parties and finally, the creation of documents, podcasts and media packages to support the simulation before it was presented to the students. Planning the simulation not only challenged the knowledge I had already learnt in my studies but was also very fulfilling in watching our ideas match the development of events on the news, and the stress on the students faces as they argued over the best solution.  Having carried out three simulations already this year, and having hosted a multitude of high ranking officials to talk to the students, SSI has already made a prominent name for itself among the student body at Exeter.

But what an average student does not hear about however, are the perks of the job. I had the unique and incredibly eye opening opportunity of attending closed seminars with people including Jon Day, the Chairman of the JIC; a working lunch with former Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth; and an academic trip to the Royal Marines Commando Training Centre Lympstone. This as well as the treat of meeting individuals such as Dr Stephanie Blair, Andrew Rathmell, Major General Jerry Thomas, Professor Mike Clarke and Robert Fox.

However, it has to be said that without the presence of the SSI’s “driving force” none of the high-tech, lifelike and challenging activities I and other students at the University have participated in, would be as successful as I (as a student at the University) deem them to be.  Firstly, the Director of SSI, General Sir Paul Newton, is a man whose reputation and experience precedes him.  Katherine Felstead and Roo Haywood-Smith are the women who comprise the administrative driving force behind the immaculate executions of SSI appointments. Professor Paul Cornish, a man I did not get to see much yet found his work throughout all key areas of SSI, and Dr Steed, my supervisor and ‘problem solver’ in SSI, have been working towards setting up the new Master’s programme, the MA in Applied Security Strategy.  Along with recently joined Dr Catarina Thomson and Dr Sergio Catignani, the four of them will be leading modules on the Masters course come September.

My final two weeks with SSI consisted of my assisting in the smooth running of the SSI’s Grand Challenges dilemma. The Grand Challenges programme is newly established for first year students, following the completion of the student’s third academic term and exams. The university offers first year students to choose between a range of twelve day long dilemmas including the SSI dilemma  titled ‘Resetting the UK’s National Security Strategy’ which is currently due for re-assessment in 2015. The students were tasked with exploring what the UK currently deems a Tier 1 threat, and discussing whether, with the pending re-assessment of the document, the classification of some of the current Tier 1 threats should be altered. The students proved to be very hard working and fervent on the issue at hand, along with providing full engagement with Sir Paul Newton’s invited guest speakers, asking them very difficult and high quality questions, the answers of which they later considered when addressing issues within the dilemma. As a result, with the help of the supporting members of staff lead by Dr Steed, the students wrote a letter – which has already been sent to the Prime Minister – explaining the student’s desire to alter certain Tier 1 threats and terminology within the document in accordance to, for example, the development of technology i.e. the emergence and awareness of expanded cyber security threats since the document was written.

On a more personal note, my involvement in Grand Challenges was more on the administrative side, making sure the programme ran on time and aiding the Institute in any way I could, however, upon being invited to participate in certain activities throughout the two weeks, I can honestly say that even though I am not a first year student, I was impressed with the level of the discussion on behalf of the students, along with the quality of the talks and level of input the guest speakers provided.

Overall, I feel privileged in saying that I have had a wonderful experience working in SSI and as Dr Steed would rightly say, it is a department that makes the impossible, possible. There was never of moment of lull within the office, and the small pieces of knowledge and tricks I have picked up along the way are both priceless and incomparable. So, I would like to say a big thank you to everyone in SSI for welcoming me and giving me such a fantastic opportunity. I shall definitely be attending all further programmes and simulations the Institute organises; a great experience for those of you who have not yet had the opportunity to attend one.

Participating in Grand Challenges, A Student’s Perspective II, by Kiah Shabka

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Following our exams in June, Exeter University ran a project called Grand Challenges. After two weeks of lounging about on Exmouth beach, I felt that it was time to do something a little more productive so I signed up to be part of the project. The inquiry group I took part in looked into Re-setting the UK National Security Strategy, focusing primarily on issues classified as Tier One threats: terrorism, interstate conflict and cyber security. In this post, I hope to provide an insight into the work we did during Grand Challenges by discussing some of the activities we undertook and the outputs we produced.

 

The first activity we took part in focused on interstate conflict and, being ever-present in the news, we were asked to look at Syria through an activity called Red Teaming. At the start of the session I thought that I knew my feelings towards Syria, however Sir Paul wanted us to do a deeper analysis of the situation and introduced us to a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). Through the SWOT analysis, we began to look at the situation in a completely different way and it became clear to me that my previous views on Syria were far too simplistic for such a complex scenario. We were split into groups and together formulated a plan of action which we then presented back to the other groups. Luckily my group were broadly in agreement over how we should prioritise the issues that we had identified during the SWOT analysis, and we quickly decided that intervention was simply not an option. Even humanitarian intervention carried far greater risk than reward. As this was a Red Team activity, each presentation was followed by a harsh critique from other groups, and surprisingly each team had decided on a different plan on action. This really demonstrated to me that there was no right answer and that if you put an idea forward, you really had to be willing to defend it tooth and nail among both peers and experts.

 

One of our key outputs was an open letter to the Prime Minister in which we critiqued the UK’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in terms of its approach to terrorism, interstate war and cyber security. This was an interesting task because, unlike the Red Team activity, we were forced to agree on how the next NSS (to be published in 2015) should be improved. We began by discussing terrorism which turned out to be relatively simple as we all agreed that the main flaw in that section of the NSS was the focus on ‘Islamic terrorism’. By solely focusing on Islamic terrorism, we felt that the NSS ran the risk of exacerbating the isolation often felt by vulnerable societal groups, which can actually contribute rather than prevent home-grown terrorism and radicalisation.

 

When we moved on to interstate conflict, however, the task became significantly harder. Whilst we all recognised that the wording of the NSS was vague, there was a fifty-fifty split in our group as to whether this was good or bad. Our solution to the group divide was simply to sit in a room for forty minutes and thrash out our dispute and, after a heated debate, we concluded that clarification was necessary for the sake of any future NSS. We proposed that the threat should be divided in two, with one to remain in Tier One and the other to be lowered to Tier Two status. Remaining in Tier One should be situations in which the UK is de jure implicated from the start, and demoted to Tier Two would be situations where Britain is not obliged to intervene, regardless of the amount of pressure being put on us. I really enjoyed being able to argue my views with fellow students and felt that it was incredibly refreshing to be able to decide amongst ourselves which direction we should be taking in our letter.

 

Finally we discussed the approach taken in the NSS to cyber warfare. Once again we were all in agreement that the document, and subsequent actions based on this document, showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of cyber security. Currently over sixty per cent of the cyber budget is sent to GCHQ and we felt that this completely overlooks the personal level of cyber security. Over eighty per cent of UK households have internet access, with this number rising significantly every year; in a world where your personal device can be hacked and used in a DDoS attack against a business or even one’s own government, all without your knowledge, we should be ensuring that citizens have the knowledge necessary to protect themselves from attack. We decided that investment in education should be the key message of the NSS; computer programming should be taught in every school just as other languages are, and we should be aiming to make British citizens the most secure users of cyberspace, whilst producing world-class programmers to protect our national interest.

 

The letter to the Prime Minister was one of the most exciting outputs we created because it has the potential to generate tangible impact. We have now received confirmation that our letter to the Prime Minister has been received, read, and will be passed onto the team who will create the 2015 NSS. I am very much looking forward to its publication as it will be interesting to see whether our critique has actually been listened to and acted upon.

 

In addition to the letter to the Prime Minister, we created a series of podcasts on the topics previously discussed. I was interviewed by one of the lecturers working with us, Dr Danny Steed, about my opinions on cyber warfare and why I thought it was so important to national security. It was a great experience to be able to openly discuss cyber security, a topic I find very interesting, and these podcasts should be available on the SSI website shortly.  The final outputs we produced were two presentations: one pitching our group’s findings to the media and the other presenting them to the other Grand Challenges groups. A team member and I created and presented the second presentation, summarising our task and findings. As well as the three key threats, we also discussed Britain’s role in the world and how our legislation in response to the aforementioned threats reflect where we see ourselves on the world stage. Personally I found this task very enjoyable and interesting and I hope that the people watching felt equally as interested.

 

Grand Challenges proved to be an incredibly interesting and informative two weeks and I can honestly say that the experience has sparked new interests and made me rethink future career paths. I would like to thank everyone involved in Grand Challenges and, in particular, those who helped create and run the programme. Sir Paul Newton, Dr Danny Steed, Ryan Patterson and Atienza Saldaña – thank you.

Participating in Grand Challenges: A Student’s Perspective, by Ryan Hopkins

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Encouraging a student out of bed for a 9am start, the week after exams have finished and for one of those dreaded “extra-curricular” activities, is by no means an easy task. Yet when the morning of June 3rd arrived, and the University of Exeter’s Grand Challenges (GC) programme kicked off, there I was, (mostly) bright-eyed and eager to go.

 

Some months earlier I had decided the join the GC inquiry group run by the University’s new Strategy and Security Institute, entitled “Re-setting the UK National Security Agenda”. SSI had grabbed our attention early – inviting us all to attend a lecture by the former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), Sir John Scarlett. This was quickly followed by an intimate, closed seminar with the current head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Mr. Jon Day. The SSI had thrown two huge actors in the world of strategy and security at us, and promised more of the same to come during the GC programme. This, I deemed, was worth getting out of bed for on June 3rd.

 

At the core of our inquiry group was an investigation into a document imaginatively entitled the UK National Security Strategy (NSS). This, as one can probably guess, set out the main national security threats faced by the UK, and the Coalition Government’s proposed responses to them. It was to be the purpose of our group – under the guidance of SSI’s Director, Sir Paul Newton, and Lecturer of Strategy and Defence, Dr Danny Steed – to examine this document, in order to assess whether or not we deemed the threats presented in it to be realistic dangers to the UK, to examine the Government’s understanding of these threats, and to judge whether or not the proposed responses and classifications were fit for purpose. Essentially, we were tasked with the question, “Is the NSS up to scratch, or does it need to be re-set?” By the end of the programme, we were expected to have written an open letter to the Prime Minister, recorded podcasts, and have presented to our peers participating in other GC groups, with our findings and recommendations for the next NSS – due to be published in 2015.

 

In order to allow us to do this, the SSI facilitated a huge range of external speakers – all more than living up to the exceptionally high standard that had been set previously by Sir John Scarlett and Jon Day. The idea was to expose us students to a broad selection of experts in the field of strategy and security policy, in order to allow us to see how strategy was applied in the real-world, away from academic debate and examination, which, in turn, would aid us in our quest to assess the utility of the NSS. I must confess, however, that in some sessions I simply forgot the purpose of the inquiry group, as I became caught up by some fascinating talks. Each of the “real people” (always a novelty, within a university) presented to us held captivating jobs and could speak of incredible experiences, all of which they were willing to share with a small inquiry group of around 15 people.

 

A particular highlight for me from the GC speaker set was a visit by the former Director of the National Security Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mr. William Nye. Mr. Nye also currently holds the position of Principle Private Secretary to HRH The Prince of Wales, so commands much respect. This session in particular stands out for me, because after giving a short talk on the NSS (which he was responsible for commissioning), Mr. Nye sat down in amongst the students, and took questions. Somewhat controversially, given his position as a lifelong expert in the field of UK National Security, I found myself disagreeing with some of what Mr. Nye had said. In most academic circumstances, disagreeing with the expert doesn’t really get you very far – it’s often a case of fair enough if you disagree, but please be quiet and just get on with it. Not so on this occasion. Mr. Nye gave me the chance to thrash out my own argument – contrary to his. He responded and asked for my opinion in return, he corrected me when some of my points were incorrect, and he gave me the chance to debate back.  Deliberating real UK National Security Policy, with a real National Security expert, gave me an insight that no lecture or conventional seminar could ever have provided. By placing students into small, closed sessions with practitioners who were willing to engage in debate and discussion, the SSI and GC programme went beyond the realms of traditional university learning, and in turn, allowed us to hone and perfect our own views and arguments.

 

And it is this aspect, fundamentally, that gave the inaugural Grand Challenges that added extra; that engaged students, that kept us coming back day after day for the two week programme, and which, if continued, will allow GC to grow and expand in future years. The Strategy and Security Institute realized and embraced this, and went above and beyond in providing activities and speakers far-removed from traditional academia. I have focused primarily on the range of speakers that were hosted, but of course, the SSI’s inquiry group went beyond that, and pushed the boundaries of teaching methods by engaging us in activities that were far-removed from the humdrum of the average lecture theatre. It was this combination of expertise, stimulating debate, and engaging activity that gave the SSI the edge in facilitating this programme. And from a student’s point of view, well, it was worth getting out of bed for.

 

On behalf of all of the students who took part in the “Re-setting the UK National Security Agenda” inquiry group, may I extend the warmest thanks and congratulations to Sir Paul, Danny, Ryan, and Atienza, for hosting a truly engaging, innovative, and successful programme.

 

Paul Cornish – Recent Conferences and Events

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Professor Paul Cornish spoke on ‘Professional Military Education in a Strategic Age’ at a conference sponsored by NATO and the UK Defence Academy at Wilton Park in May 2013. Later in May Professor Cornish spoke on ‘The Idea of a National Security Strategy’ at a conference in honour of Professor Colin Gray at the University of Reading.

Following the death of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich on Wednesday 22 May Professor Cornish published a short article on The Conversation UK; an independent, online source of news and opinion drawn from the academic and policy research community.

Professor Cornish’s article can be found on The Conversation’s website:

http://theconversation.com/the-duty-of-care-that-should-keep-our-armed-forces-safe-but-didnt-14645

 

 

Danny Steed – Gearing up for Grand Challenges

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The University of Exeter’s Grand Challenges programme is almost upon us with its launch on June 3rd and the inquiry group that SSI will be heading, “Resetting the UK National Security Agenda”, promises to deliver an exciting experience for the 40 students taking part and ourselves.

Grand Challenges is an eleven-day programme designed to provide junior undergraduate students from a diverse disciplinary background with a broader learning experience than that which they typically receive during the course of the academic year. When Sir Paul Newton and myself were asked to deliver one of the inquiry groups as part of the Human Security versus Power Politics dilemma, we hungrily took the chance.

Sir Paul and I agreed that Grand Challenges presented not only an exciting opportunity to Exeter students, but also an opportunity for us to showcase our philosophy of teaching that we intend to take into our taught courses launching here at Exeter in October 2013. Here in SSI we seek to enthuse a highly interactive, collaborative learning environment that never leaves our students as passive and inactive in a classroom. We seek instead to foster an atmosphere of peer engagement, as well as exposure to our large network of highly experienced practitioners so that students will constantly benefit not only from academic expertise, but also face-to-face access with practitioners.

During our Grand Challenges inquiry our students will receive no less than seven external speakers across eleven days, ranging from the Department of International Development, the Royal Marines, active defence correspondents, the Director of the Royal United Services Institute, a former Secretary of State for Defence, and the former Director of the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. By facilitating maximum engagement between students and practitioners, SSI hopes to bring the subject of strategy to life by exposing our students to the reality of how decisions are made and how strategy is done in the practitioner’s world. Or as we here in SSI say, Applied Strategy.

This exposure will build on the experience that many of these students have already had in the past month of meeting both Sir John Scarlett, the former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), and Jon Day, the current Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Amy Walker, Department of Law and one of our group’s students, said of John Scarlett’s visit: ‘I was in awe of John Scarlett and felt extremely privileged to be in his company hearing about his experiences within MI6…He was very thorough in his lecture and provided a fantastic Q&A session…Well done SSI for another fantastic and memorable event!’

Throughout the inquiry students from a range of disciplinary backgrounds will be exposed to the thinking behind the UK National Security Strategy, as well as conduct a broad range of activities designed to engage group interaction and critical thinking. All of this is intended to assess the suitability of the current National Security Strategy of the UK with these questions guiding them throughout: is the UK NSS up to scratch? Or does it need to be reset in 2015? They will focus on what the British Government has declared as representing “Tier One” threats to national security; cyber attacks, terrorism, and inter-state war.

Our activities include a student workshop, where teams dedicated to cyber, terrorism, and inter-state war, will be “Red Teamed” by their own peers in a dedicated Red Team. A Red Team session will be conducted by all on a current crisis of global significance to identify possible scenarios, as well as participating in joint activities with other inquiry groups. These will include looking at the role of the media in contemporary warfare, and a joint debate with the Nuclear Wars inquiry group into the question of whether or not the UK should renew the Trident nuclear deterrent.

Our students will not only reach a point where they can confidently answer the questions motivating our inquiry, they will also produce a series of outputs that we in SSI intend to make available for public access. Those outputs will consist of a series of podcasts that will serve to formally launch the SSI podcast series, and an open letter to Prime Minister David Cameron, expressing the inquiry group’s view on his government’s National Security Strategy.

By the end of the inquiry, students taking part in our activities will have received a wealth of expertise, both academically and from practitioners, on the subject of British National Security Strategy. Further to this though, these students will have experienced a different way of teaching, one that encourages maximum exposure to practitioners, fosters an atmosphere of peer engagement and critical analysis in the classroom, and generates tangible outputs. These students will develop the skills and the confidence to makes reasoned arguments and develop ways of communicating their thoughts to an audience beyond the University of Exeter.