Tag Archives: Middle East

RAF Officer Graduates from Chief of the Defence Staff’s Scholarship

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20150414-Exeter Graduation Photograph copy

An RAF Officer selected as the first Chief of the Defence Staff’s Scholar has graduated with distinction from the University of Exeter. Wing Commander Mal Craghill was selected as the CDS Scholar from a group of MOD personnel undertaking the inaugural MA Applied Security and Strategy (MStrat) at Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, where he had been awarded a place through the Chief of the Air Staff’s Fellowship scheme. Besides the MOD students the MStrat cohort of 28 included recent Bachelor’s graduates as well as mid-career professionals from diverse backgrounds, nationalities and career streams.

Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute, led last year by Professor Paul Cornish and Lt Gen (Ret’d) Sir Paul Newton, offers the MStrat as a unique and innovative approach to the study of strategy in the contemporary security environment. Alongside a core programme of lectures and seminars, students undertake crisis management simulations, field trips and conferences as well as presenting their own policy frameworks for the UK’s engagement with real world challenges. In the latter case Wg Cdr Craghill led a group investigating the UK’s approach towards Iran, culminating in a presentation to Whitehall policy-makers at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

The MStrat, taught by dedicated faculty as well as a wide array of internationally renowned academics and practitioners, pushes students well beyond traditional academic boundaries and sees them producing blog posts, op-ed articles and think pieces, policy briefs, options papers and evidence submissions to Parliamentary Select Committees as well as more traditional essays and literature reviews. Topics range widely, covering areas such as the role of the private sector in delivering national strategy, scrutiny of intelligence and security agencies, and drawing lessons from historical case studies. The final MStrat deliverable is a dissertation on a strategy or security related topic; Wg Cdr Craghill’s research took an inter-disciplinary approach to remodelling conflict prevention in fragile states, applying lessons from crime prevention to suggest a revised approach to the UK’s strategy for intervening in the developing world. He is now putting the MStrat into action in the MOD’s strategic headquarters, formulating policy and plans in the Defence Engagement Strategy team.

Photo: Wg Cdr Craghill graduating from the University of Exeter’s inaugural MA Applied Security and Strategy.

Syria: “Boots on the Ground” After All? By Tobias Borck

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We will have “no boots on the ground” in Syria – that is the great mantra governments in Washington and London are repeating at almost every possible occasion. Even when American and British military action against Syria was imminent in September 2013 so as to punish Bashar al-Assad’s regime for the use of chemical weapons, Barack Obama and David Cameron made clear that putting “boots on the ground” was not up for discussion.

Just last week, in his speech at West Point, Obama felt compelled to tell the world again that he had “made a decision that we should not put American troops” into Syria and that he believed “that is the right decision.” Nobody disagrees, not even the Syrian opposition. They may be demanding more anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, they may even welcome Western air support, but they certainly don’t want American or British soldiers to take on the Assad regime on their behalf.

But there may come a time when all this insistence of “no boots on the ground” no longer matters. There may come a time when Obama and Cameron (or their successors) send their uniformed men and women into Syria after all – or at least vote in the UN Security Council that other nations should send theirs. When these “boots”, wherever they may come from, are placed “on the ground” in Syria, it will not be to fight Assad. That remains – and will most likely remain – out of the question. Instead, it will be to keep the peace, to stabilise Syria and to make sure that a political settlement can be implemented.

The war in Syria will end with a political solution, no side can win a military victory. Obama and Cameron repeat that fact almost more frequently than their “no boots” mantra. In fact, there is wide-spread agreement within the international community that a political settlement is the only way to end the nightmare of the Syrian people.

Let us cast our minds forward and imagine a scenario where such a political settlement has actually been reached. The regime and the opposition sign a document, the newspapers print pictures of handshakes. But what next? Syria is in ruins. Aleppo, Homs, Damascus’ suburbs – everything has been reduced to rubble after years of barrel bombs, shelling and gunfire. Millions of Syrians are displaced, everyone has experienced monumental loss and is irrevocably scarred for life, physically or mentally. And there are inevitably some groups, probably the radical Islamists, that are not done yet, that want to keep killing and destroying.

This future Syria will need serious state-building and some kind of peacekeeping force to provide the necessary security. America and Britain will not have to shoulder this task alone; that is the responsibility of the UN – Russia, the EU, the Arab League, perhaps even Iran will need to help. But it may not be enough to deploy a few thousand Blue Helmet troops from India, Nepal, Indonesia or Spain as in the UN’s ongoing peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. This is not to disparage the quality of these troops or their achievements. But if groups like al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, al-Nusra, or the even more extreme Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) linger on, American and British soldiers may have to step up.

American and British militaries are the only ones with the necessary training, equipment and experience to battle an opponent like ISIS. They did it successfully during the surge in Iraq in 2007-08 when they fought al-Qaeda, ISIS’s predecessor, into a corner. The Iraqi case should also be a warning. Since American and British troops have left Iraq, radical Islamists have experienced their own little surge. ISIS currently controls parts of Fallujah and Ramadi and suicide bombers terrorise the people of Baghdad. The Iraqi military, although trained by America and Britain and outfitted with Apache helicopters, drones and hellfire missiles, has made little progress against the extremists.

There will be “no boots on the ground” – this mantra will hold true as long as the war rages in Syria. But when the agony of the Syrian people finally ends and a political solution to the conflict is reached, it may become untenable. A UN peacekeeping mission may be needed to help rebuild the country and American and British soldiers may have to do the heavy lifting, to once again take up the battle with radical Islamists. We should be ready.

Weapons for peace? The West needs to convince Assad that he cannot win, by Tobias Borck

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The war in Syria has to end in a political solution. This is one of the very few things that most members of the international community agree on. In his recent speech at West Point, US President Barack Obama made clear that that “no military solution that can eliminate the terrible suffering any time soon.”[i] The Russian Foreign Ministry agrees the lack of any progress on a political settlement of the war only “results in more deaths and suffering in Syria every day.”[ii] The Speaker of Iran’s parliament, Ali Lrijani, emphasises the need for “negotiations and dialogue,”[iii] and UK Foreign Secretary William Hague thinks that all sides need to “reach an inclusive political settlement that takes into account the needs and aspirations of all Syria’s communities.”[iv]

 

A political solution to the war in Syria is of course not a new idea. Neither is the apparent consensus within the international community that it is the only viable option to end the bloodshed. Peace initiatives, talks, and talks of talks are a constant by-product of the war. Nevertheless, it took almost three years just to get representatives from the regime and the opposition to sit down together in the same room at the UN in Geneva. For a few days in January and February 2014 there was a small glimmer of hope. It was quickly extinguished, though, and Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s chairman of the negotiations, apologised to the Syrian people that the talks hadn’t “helped them very much.”[v]

 

In the months since the Geneva conference virtually no progress has been made to find a political settlement. Instead around 200 Syrians die every day, adding to the war’s death toll that has already exceeded 150,000.[vi]

 

There are of course several reasons for why a political solution to the conflict remains elusive. The opposition is famously fragmented and al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamists act as powerful spoilers. Perhaps the most crucial reason, however, is that Bashar al-Assad still thinks that he can win the war. This year, his forces have made some territorial gains, and although a total military victory is nigh on impossible, so is a total defeat. This is why the Geneva talks failed and why no new negotiations have happened. A political solution requires compromises and the Assad regime simply doesn’t see the need to make any at the moment.

 

If the USA, Russia, the UK, Iran or the rest of the international community are serious about their commitment to a political solution, they will have to convince Assad that there is no alternative to negotiations, that he cannot win the war. There are two options of how this can be done: through diplomatic or military pressure.

 

Russia and Iran hold the key to the diplomatic option. They have the greatest sway over the Assad regime. Without their financial, military and political support, Assad would be in serious trouble. However, this support in the absence of any concessions by the regime in the political process suggests that Russia and Iran are ultimately unwilling to use their leverage over Assad.

 

The only meaningful concession the regime has made since the beginning of the conflict was the deal to give up its chemical weapons, and Russia played a decisive role in this. But it is also important to remember that the deal was only reached after Obama’s infamous ‘red line’ had been crossed with the chemical weapons attack in August 2013. Russian pressure on Assad may have been important, but American missiles pointing at Syria surely helped as well.

 

“When you fear for your life, then you are going to trade,”[vii] says Alistair Burt, a former UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. To make Assad fear for his life and to bring him to the negotiating table, it may therefore be necessary to renew the military pressure on his regime by stepping up support for the opposition forces.

 

It is a sad reality that political solutions to end wars often only become possible through temporary escalation. The example of the war in Bosnia Herzegovina demonstrates this. Here, a brutal war raged for three years. All initiatives for a political settlement failed. Then, in 1995, NATO support enabled a Croat-Bosnian alliance to make significant advances against the Bosnian Serbs. However, NATO did not allow a total Croat-Bosnian victory. This would only have resulted in more ethnic cleansing, this time with the Bosnian Serbs as the main victims. Instead all sides were brought together to negotiate and the Dayton Agreement was reached.

 

The objective of empowering opposition forces in Syria should therefore not be to defeat the Assad regime, but merely to convince him that he cannot win the war. A western military involvement of the same scale as NATO’s Bosnia operation is currently unthinkable in Syria. There is no political will to launch missile strikes, an air campaign, much less a full-scale invasion. However, the USA and its European allies can certainly provide the armed opposition with the military equipment and training it needs to tackle the regime’s tanks and airplanes. In his West Point speech Obama suggested that operations in this direction are already underway.

 

So far, the Obama administration has been extremely cautious in its military support for the opposition, mainly out of fear that American weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists. This risk is of course difficult to eliminate, but it should also not be overstated. One of the main reasons why groups such as al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have become so influential in Syria is their military effectiveness, not their extremist ideologies. Increasing the military capability of more moderate groups could therefore also limit the influence of the radical Islamist.

 

The war in Syria has to end in a political solution. Ultimately it of course appears counter-intuitive to feed additional weapons into a war that has already killed so many people. American weapons in the hands of opposition forces will inevitably be used to kill more. But as long as Russian and Iranian influence, for whatever reasons, is not enough to convince Assad to make concessions, it may be the only way to create the conditions for meaningful negotiations.


[i] BBC (2014) “Obama West Point Speech in Full with Analysis.” BBC Online, 29 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-27606537 [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[ii] Voice of Russia (2014) “Russia Urges Setting of Date for New Round of Syria Talks in Geneva.” Voice of Russia, 15 May. http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_05_15/Russia-urges-to-set-date-for-new-round-of-Syria-talks-in-Geneva-0341/ [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[iii] Press TV (2014) “Iran Backs Political Solution to Syria: Larijani.” Press TV, 5 May. http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/05/05/361455/iran-backs-political-solution-to-syria/ [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[iv] Hague, W. (2014) “Foreign Secretary William Hague to the Montreux Peace Talks on Syria.” Gov.com, 22 January. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-to-geneva-conference-on-syria [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[v] Maigua, P. (2014) “Syrian Peace Talks Adjourned Indefinitely.” United Nations Radio, 15 February. http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/02/syrian-peace-talks-adjourned-indefinitely/#.U2J5dl6CTwI [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[vi] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe?fref=ts [Accessed 31 May 2014].

[vii] Burt, A. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

What Will Shock the World? Waiting for Syria’s Srebrenica by Tobias Borck

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The bombing of the Ain Jalout school in Aleppo, on 30 April 2014, encapsulates the horror of the war in Syria. The air strike, carried out by the Syrian military, killed more than 20 people, half of them children. That day, the school was hosting an exhibition of drawings and paintings, in which the students had depicted their dreams – most of them featured the war, death and destruction.[1]

James Bays, reporting for Al-Jazeera, said that the attack on the Ain Jalout school “should shock the world.”[2] But will the shock be big enough to change the attitude of the international community, or rather, the strategies of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council? Valerie Amos, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, expressed her outrage calling the bombing of the school, and other attacks targeting civilians, “a flagrant violation of the basic tenants of war.”[3] Ultimately, however, the attack is unlikely to change anything.

Syria’s war has entered its fourth year. The killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians have become a daily occurrence, causing unspeakable human suffering. James Clapper, United States Director of National Intelligence, has recently called the humanitarian situation in Syria “an apocalyptic disaster.” Since the beginning of the war in March 2011, more than 150,000 people have been killed,[4] among them more than 11,000 children.[5] 2.7 million Syrians have fled the country;[6] a further 6.5 million were forced to leave their homes but remain in Syria.[7]

We Are Waiting

The strategy of the western P5 members towards Syria, led by the USA, appears to be based on waiting and monitoring the situation. But what is it that Barack Obama’s government is waiting for?

Despite recent territorial gains for Bashar al-Assad’s forces, a military victory for any side in the conflict is unlikely. The Geneva peace talks, chaired by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, ended without significant results in February 2014. Back then, Brahimi called on all parties involved to decide whether “they want this process to take place or not.”[8] In the absence of any tangible further developments since, the answer seems to be: no. Brahimi himself is expected to resign in the coming months, particularly if presidential elections in Syria planned for June are going ahead. President Bashar al-Assad has recently confirmed his stand for reelection and it is widely believed he will win.[9]

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council Resolution 2139[10] from February 2014, continues to be violated with impunity by all sides in the conflict. The resolution demanded an end to all attacks against civilians, and unrestricted access for humanitarian agencies within the countries. While the resolution is legally binding under International Law, it does not stipulate any consequences for noncompliance or measures for its enforcement. Any advances towards a more robust resolution continue to be blocked by Russia.[11]

To improve their own position and to convince Assad that there can be no military solution to the conflict, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the opposition’s leadership in exile, continues to lobby western governments to provide opposition forces with much needed military equipment. In an interview with Exeter students, Walid Saffour, the SNC’s UK ambassador, expressed his belief that the Free Syrian Army (FSA) could make significant progress on the ground “if we have got adequate arms to stop two things: the tanks and the aircraft.”[12]

Next week, Ahmad Jarba, the SNC’s president will visit Washington, not least in an attempt to convince the US government to arm the FSA with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Whether he will succeed, however, is uncertain. Apart from some limited shipments of weapons, the Obama administration has thus far been extremely cautious in providing military equipment to opposition forces. The main reason for this reluctance is the fear that American weapons could fall into the hands of radical Islamists.[13]

What Are We Waiting For?

What, then could change US policy towards Syria? A review of some of the US-led military interventions and wars in past decades, suggests that changes in US strategy are often influenced by specific events. With regard to the US interventions in Lebanon (1982), Bosnia Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011), it is possible to identify crucial turning points for US strategy. With the exception of the war in Afghanistan, which was a direct response to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, these events were not in themselves the sufficient or sole reason for respective US governments to launch interventions. They did not occur in a vacuum, but rather in a continuum of conflicts within the individual countries or – in the case of 9/11 – within the context of global developments. They were the last straws that broke the proverbial camel’s back and convinced the US presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama that military action, or at least military support for one side in the conflict, was unavoidable.

In 1982, Ronald Reagan’s decision to send almost 2,000 US Marines to Lebanon came days after the Sabra and Shatila massacre in September. At this point, Lebanon’s civil war had already devastated the country for seven years. In August, a contingent of US marines had briefly deployed to Lebanon as part of a multinational force to supervise the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation from the country. They left on 10 September. A week later, between 16-18 September, a Christian militia – with, at the very least, the quiet acceptance of the occupying Israeli army – killed between 700 and 3,000 Palestinian refugees. The images of the massacre’s aftermath went around the world and promoted Reagan’s formation of a new multinational force tasked with supporting the Lebanese government. The intervention was ultimately unsuccessful and ended in the horrific terror attack on the US Marines’ barracks in October 1983. The war continued until 1990.[14]

In Bosnia Herzegovina, the US-led NATO interventions only occurred after the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. The war had begun in 1992 and had already cost tens of thousands of deaths. A UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), with limited US participation, was deployed in 1992, but only had a mandate to protect certain areas, not to use force to stop the fighting. UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness was exposed when Bosnian Serb forces overran the Muslim town of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and killed more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslims. Days after the massacre, NATO agreed to take a tougher stand to defend other safe areas and in August launched a decisive campaign to end the war.[15]

In Kosovo, two widely publicised massacres by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanians in Prekaz and Racak played a critical role in the prelude to NATO’s US-led military intervention. After the Prekaz massacre, in which 53 Albanians were killed on 5 March 1998, the USA intensified its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Two days after the attack, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright announced that “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.’’[16] Nine months later, after 45 Albanians were killed in the Racak massacre on 15 January 1999, the USA and its European allies decided that diplomacy alone was no longer enough. In March, NATO’s military intervention began.[17]

The US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not preceded by massacres in those countries, but by the terror attacks in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. These attacks were decidedly more instrumental in the US government’s decision to launch military operations than any of the events outlined above, especially in the case of Afghanistan. However, both Afghanistan and Iraq were on the USA’s foreign policy agenda long before 2001. In 1998, the Clinton administration authorised missile strikes against suspected bases of Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan.[18] In Iraq, the USA played the leading role in maintaining no-fly zones over both the north and the south of the country throughout the 1990s. Regime change in Iraq was certainly identified as a US objective before 9/11, especially among the neoconservative establishment. Yet, it took 9/11 to create the momentum to launch a military campaign.[19]

Finally, NATO’s intervention in Libya is a rare example of where the threat of a massacre was sufficient for the USA and its allies to launch military intervention. In March 2011, Gaddafi’s forces were advancing on Benghazi, the origin of popular protests against the regime and the stronghold for the armed rebellion. Obama later explained his decision to support NATO’s intervention: “I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”[20]

These six events – the atrocities in Sabra and Shatila, Srebrenica, and Prekaz and Recak, the attacks of 9/11, and the potential massacre in Benghazi – were unique in themselves and specific to their respective contexts. There is no particular threshold, no definitive number of casualties that forces US presidents to opt for military intervention. However, these events are united in the fact that they represented significant turning points for US strategy. It is important to note that these events did not necessarily lead to international consensus in favour of military intervention – the Kosovo intervention happened despite vehement Russian opposition.[21] Although Russia may have more of an invested interest in Syria than it did in Kosovo, this suggests that deadlock in the UN Security Council is not an insurmountable obstacle to military intervention.

The Waiting Continues

In Syria a turning point was almost reached in August 2013, when between 300-1,400 civilians were killed in a chemical weapons attack. For a few days US missile strikes against Syria seemed likely. However, diplomacy prevailed and the Assad regime agreed to the US-Russia brokered deal to give up its chemical weapons stockpiles.[22] Six months later, the international Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has removed the bulk of Syria’s declared chemical weapons arsenal.[23] The killing, however, continues unabated and with horrific consistency. In the week culminating in the Ain Jalout school bombing on 30 April 2014, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) had counted daily death tolls of 206, 270, 210, 265, 288, 223 and 284.[24] These figures are far from unusual for the war in Syria. The data published on the SOHR’s Facebook page shows very similar numbers for the past months, even years.

Alistair Burt, former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, suggests that this consistency is no accident. “We think Assad has learned perfectly well from his father that killing 20,000 people in Hama as in 1982 would not now be the right thing to do,” he said in an interview with Exeter students.[25] However, the death of 200-300 people a day appears to be a level that governments in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London are prepared to sustain. The decisive turning point, Syria’s Sabra and Shatila or Srebrenica has not yet occurred. For the moment, “four, five thousand, six thousand people a month appears to be a figure that the world is prepared to stand,” says Burt.

In the absence of a turning point event in Syria, a terror attack originating in the country but carried out in one of Syria’s neighbours or even in Europe or the USA could potentially lead to a policy change by western governments. The proliferation of radical Islamist forces and groups linked to Al-Qaeda in Syria is well documented.[26] Thus far, these groups have concentrated on terrorising Syrian civilians. A day before the Ain Jalout school bombing, two car bombs by Al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra killed more than 50 civilians and injured hundreds in an area of Homs controlled by the Assad regime.[27]

However, it is far from certain that Al-Nusra, and other radical organisations active in Syria will continue to limit their operations to the battlefield within Syria. Matthew Olson, Director of the US National Counterterrorism Center told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2014 that “Syria has become the preeminent location for independent or Al-Qaeda-aligned groups to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom we assess may seek to conduct external attacks.”[28]

It is clear that the current policy of the Obama administration and its allies in Europe is not leading to any meaningful changes in Syria. Chemical weapons may have been largely removed from the conflict, but the killing, maiming and displacement of ordinary Syrians continues at a horrifically consistent level. US and European strategy appears to be reduced to waiting, either for one side of the conflict to achieve an unlikely military victory, or for an atrocity that will make further inaction simply impossible.


[1] BBC (2014) “Syria Crisis: ‘Children Killed in Aleppo School Strike.” BBC Online, 30 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27227791 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[2] Al-Jazeera (2014) “Aleppo School Bombing Condemned by UN.” Al-Jazeera Online, 1 May. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/aleppo-school-bombing-condemned-un-2014516372113604.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[3] Ibid.

[4] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) “More than 150,000 Martyred and Killed Since the Start of the Revolution.” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Arabic website, 1 April. http://www.syriahr.com/index.php?option=com_news&nid=17296&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.U2J3A16CTwJ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[5] Salama, H., and Daragan, H. (2013) “Stolen Futures: The Hidden Toll of Child Casualties in Syria.” Oxford Research Group, 24 November. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/stolen_futures [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[6] UNHRC (2014) “Syria Regional Refugee Response.” UNHRC, last updated 14 April. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[7] USAID (2014) Syria – Complex Emergency: Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2014, April 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/syria_ce_fs12_04-10-2014.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[8] Maigua, P. (2014) “Syrian Peace Talks Adjourned Indefinitely.” United Nations Radio, 15 February. http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2014/02/syrian-peace-talks-adjourned-indefinitely/#.U2J5dl6CTwI [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[9] Charbonneau, L. (2014) “Search is on for Successor to Syria Peace Mediator Brahimi.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-brahimi-idUSBREA3T10A20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[10] United Nations Security Council (2014) “Full Text: UN Security Council Resolution 2139.” UN Watch, 22 February. http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2014/02/22/full-text-un-security-council-resolution-2139/ [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[11] Nichols, M. (2014) “UN Aid Chief Suggests Stronger Action Needed on Syria.” Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-syria-crisis-aid-un-idUSBREA3T10B20140430 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[12] Saffour, W. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

[13] Pecquet, J. (2014) “Syrian Opposition Looks to Congress for Military Boost.” Al-Monitor, 25 April. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/04/syria-opposition-congress-military-boost.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[14] Azrael, J. R., and Payin, E. A. (1996) US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force. Santa Monica: RAND. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/CF129.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[15] Daalder, I. H. (1998) “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended.” Brookings, December. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[16] Erlanger, S. (1998) “Albright Warns Serbs on Kosovo Violence.” The New York Times, 8 March. http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/08/world/albright-warns-serbs-on-kosovo-violence.html [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[17] BBC (2000) “Behind the Kosovo Crisis.” BBC Online, 12 March. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/674056.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[18] BBC (2014) “Afghanistan Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 8 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[19] BBC (2014) “Iraq Profile: Timeline.” BBC Online, last updated 1 May. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[20] Cooper, H. (2011) “Obama Cites Limits of US Role in Libya.” The New York Times, 28 March. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html?pagewanted=1&hp [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[21] BBC (1998) “Why Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo.” BBC Online, 13 October. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/111585.stm [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[22] BBC (2014) “Q&A: Syria Chemical Weapons Disarmament Deal.” BBC Online, last updated 30 January. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23876085 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[23] BBC (2014) “Bulk of Syria’s Chemical Weapons ‘Removed’, Says Sigrid Kaag.” BBC Online, 27 April. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27179365 [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[24] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (2014) Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Facebook. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/syriahroe?fref=ts [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[25] Burt, A. (2014) Interview. London, 4 March.

[26] Jones, S. G. (2013) “Syria’s Growing Jihad.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (4), pp. 53-72. Available at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-94b0/survival–global-politics-and-strategy-august-september-2013-0b78/55-4-07-jones–seth-abcd [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[27] Human Rights Watch (2014) “Syria: Car Bombs, Mortars Hit Residential Areas.” Human Rights Watch, 1 May. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/01/syria-car-bombs-mortars-hit-residential-areas [Accessed 4 May 2014].

[28] Olson, M. G. (2014) “Extremism and Sectarianism in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.” Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 6 March. Available at: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030614AM_Testimony%20-%20Matthew%20Olsen.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2014].

Mstrat student submit evidence to Parliament on Iran

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The UK Parliament Commons Select Committee launched on 2 December 2013 its inquiry on “UK Policy Towards Iran”. Falling in line with the focus of one of the Mstrat student inquiry groups as part of the Crisis Watch module, two of our students submitted evidence to this inquiry in January.

The evidence submitted by Mal Craghill and Nicholas Wood can be found at the following url: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/inquiries1/parliament-2010/iran-2014/?type=Written#pnlPublicationFilter

Evidence was also submitted by an Exeter PhD candidate, Morgane Colleau, who is supervised by SSI’s Director of Research, Professor Gareth Stansfield. Her evidence can also be found in the link above.

Rouhani’s new Iran: carefully navigating Iran’s near neighbours, by Thomas Owen – Crisis Watch: Iran

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The first day of 2014 saw snow fall in the Iranian capital Tehran, an apt

reflection of the cold reception that greeted news of the historic agreement

reached in Geneva on November 24th. As president Hassan Rouhani

celebrated his first one hundred days in office, a hundred days that were

perhaps more productive than that of US president Barak Obama’s, he still

faces an uphill struggle to convince his near neighbours that both he, and

Iran, are not to be feared.

This deal has brought about sudden turn of events that has seen the status

quo in the Middle East suddenly shift far faster than many leaders would

have liked, and while the developed world celebrated an apparent thawing in

diplomatic relations with Iran, the temperature that has settled over Tehran is

similar to the coolness Iran’s neighbours are treating them with.

Saudi Arabia and Israeli, two of the most unlikely bedfellows have

nevertheless crawled under the blanket of security, providing them, no

doubt, with the warming reassurance of alliance and mutual interest in

keeping an ascendent Iran in check. Rightly this has shivers running down

the spine of many in Washington, London, Brussels and Tehran, particularly

considering Israel is the region’s sole nuclear power and Saudi Arabia, it has

been rumoured, has had secret dealings with Pakistan that involve funding

Pakistan’s nuclear programme in exchange for rapid access to nuclear

weapons. If these rumours prove true, it could make Iran and Rouhani think

long and hard about their current dismissal of a nuclear weapons programme.

With this unease generated by Israel and Saudi Arabia, the war in Syria is

most certainly an unwanted distraction, with Iran heavily involved in

supporting and financing the Assad regime and various factions operating

within Syria’s borders such as Hezbollah. This support of groups identified

by the West as terrorist organisations is still a big stumbling block on the road

to reconciliation, particularly with countries like Israel.

The news isn’t all bad, as it was Oman, one of Britain’s strongest allies in

the Middle East, who originally brokered the first tentative meetings between

Iran and the USA. The Gulf States’ cooperation is high on the list of priorities

for Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, as he said on his

Facebook Page that “Iran’s ties with the Persian Gulf littoral states will get

better day by day, and we will try to have these relations upgraded to the

highest level.” For their part the Gulf States are nervous of an ascendent Iran.

The US’s attempt at reconciliation, combined with its desire to be self

sufficient in its ability to access oil and natural gas put the Gulf States in a

tricky situation. Turki bin Faisal al Saud, member of the Saudi royal family

and former head of Saudi intelligence has warned that US-Iran relations

should galvanise the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

(GCC) to form a “unit” that does more than cooperation on economic matters

and the price of oil. This sentiment was echoed by the Saudi deputy Foreign

Minister, Nizar Madani, who said “the Gulf states should no longer work

independently from one another to guarantee their security.” The GCC does

welcome a nuclear deal, as it diminished the threat of an Israeli-US military

strike on Iran. Being excluded from the negations however, was not

welcomed.

The real reason for the GCC’s unease, says Omar al Hassan, director of

the Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, is the potential for Iran to use its new

found peace with the West to forge a place as a Middle Eastern superpower

that would use its influence in Syria and Iraq to try to control the region. Al

Hassan reckons this is where the GCC should come together to counter any

power grabs Iran may have planned.

In all, the deal brokered on 24th of November will have a positive impact

on the regional dynamics of the Gulf. The GCC feel let down by America for

not intervening in Syria, and will likely grow closer as time goes on. Iran can

use this closeness to its advantage, by extending trade deals (which will be

limited given US and UN sanctions) to both the GCC, and to its existing

allies such as China and Russia. Syria will play a huge role in deciding the

balance of power in the region, and if the US continues to bring Iran in as a

powerful ally in the war against al-Qaeda and Sunni extremism, then Iran

could have the upper hand in securing influence in the future of Syria. The

relationship between Iran and her neighbours is complex, with mistrust

stretching back to the days of the Shah and Iran’s previous attempts at

becoming a regional superpower. As Spring comes to Iran and the snow

melts, it is likely that the thaw will continue in the relationship Iran has with

both its neighbours and the outside world.

The interim agreement: regional considerations, by Rafael Serrano – Crisis Watch: Iran

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Beyond the issues surrounding the Iranian nuclear development program there is a larger struggle for regional power and influence. This struggle has pit traditional Gulf powers, led by Saudi Arabia, the Israelis, and the Iranians in a regional race for influence and leverage against one another. The divisions between these regional powers are influenced by deep political, cultural, and religious divisions. While the majority of the headlines and commentary have focused on the threats exchanged between the Israelis and Iranians, the Gulf States have also been actively and aggressively engaged in countering Iran at every opportunity. The recent international negotiations regarding Iran’s proposed nuclear weapons program have had a profound effect on the dynamic between the rivals with significant implications going forward.

There is an ongoing proxy war between the regional powers that could have serious impact of the possible success of any nuclear negotiations between Iran and major foreign powers. Understanding the significance of the proposed international deal to stem the Iranian nuclear weapons program requires an appreciation of the strategic environment. There is a broader and more complex strategic environment from within which the actions and counteractions regarding the Iranian nuclear development program are continuing to develop of which the nuclear issue is just one feature. This environment has a complex network of regional stakeholders and is significantly influenced by deep historical, cultural and religious dimensions. It is within landscape and through the prism of the regional geopolitical dynamic that the impact of any negotiations or actions must be analyzed.

The Saudis and Gulf States

The divisions between the Saudi and the Iranian regimes have the deepest and most complex origins and narratives in the region. These divisions have manifested themselves in a series of ongoing bloody sectarian battles throughout the region including in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. These proxy wars have been fought by patchwork network of extremist organizations and Islamist militants to counteract one another. Whereas, the Saudis have also previously been able to rely on their interest more succinctly aligning with those of the US, they have perceived this to increasingly not be the case. The Saudi’s have been increasingly critical of western positions, especially those of the US, on Syria and Iran. This has led to increased sectarian proxy wars carried out by sub-state and non-state actors leading to assassination attempts, bombings, and arming sectarian militias.

The Saudi’s were further rebuffed when their demands for a seat at P5+1 nuclear negotiation were rebuffed. The apparent Saudi loss of strategic ground in the power politics of the region has led to the creation of a new alliance with the Israelis. While the Saudis had previously expressed support for Israeli direct action against Iran, these sentiments were always shared with the US as the intermediary. However, this new alliance may be a move to ensure Saudi interests are promoted without a reliance on direct US involvement, especially as they pertain to Iran.

The Israelis

The Israelis have been very clear regarding their positions on political and security matters throughout the region, especially regarding the Iranian nuclear program. They have long reiterated their unwillingness to have any nuclear capacity in Iran and reserved their right to strike if necessary. As with the Saudis, the Israelis have also been publicly opposed to the ongoing negotiations with Iran and are increasingly critical of western involvement, or lack thereof, in the region. The Israeli stance has been challenged directly with Iranian demands for disarmament of all regional powers in negotiations which may explain the new Saudi-Israeli alliance.

The emergence of an alliance, even if just against Iran, could have serious implications for the region. As international negotiations with Iran have progressed the Israeli government has found itself increasingly on the outside. This Israeli security dilemma has been coupled with the increasing instability on its borders in Lebanon and Syria. Additionally, Israel has had to navigate a good but changing relationship with Turkey which has recently adopted a more hard-line stance on regional issues.

The Turkish

In recent years the geopolitical dynamic has been further complicated by the reemergence of Turkey as an active participant in the regional security and political affairs of the Middle East. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire provides Turkey with a powerful legitimizing narrative to support greater regional involvement. Turkey has launched into regional affairs with noticeably differing objectives which have put them at odds with Saudi and other Gulf States. In fact, the Turks have taken a far more aggressive and strategic approach to relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. However

In the past year the Turkish government has taken actions in direct opposition to the interests of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The Turkish government expelled Saudi intelligence officials from Turkey and allegedly reported a number of Israeli intelligence assets in Turkey to Iranian officials, resulting in a significant loss to both countries. Moreover, Turkey has openly opposed Saudi positions in Egypt and Syria increasing tensions the two countries. These actions are in addition to Turkey’s more aggressive approaches towards Palestinian territories in Israel. Turkey’s relationship with Iran has been mixed but far better than that of Saudi and Israel. The significance of Turkey’s newfound position was best captured in the inclusion of President Erdogan in President Obama’s top five international leader friends; a list which excluded both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah.

The Strategic Implications

The international community has thus far largely failed to fully appreciate the complexities and nuances of the geopolitical dynamic in the region in negotiating the Iranian nuclear deal. The struggle for regional power and influence in the Middle East is an inescapable reality that has direct bearing over the ongoing nuclear negotiations. As such, there are several possible reactions to the P5+1 negotiation that western powers would be wise to monitor. First, if proxy warfare is allowed to escalate, groups like the Al Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Syria could increase the threat of international terrorist in the region. Additionally, any unilateral actions on the part of Israel could potentially plunge the region in a far larger conflict.

In attempting to find a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue foreign powers should be wary of the implications to regional power balance. This is especially true since geopolitics in the region between the primary actors is often seen as a zero sum game. Moreover, while the reemergence of Turkey as a prominent geopolitical entity can possibly provide much needed balance, western powers should appreciate that all the regional powers will ultimately act according to its own strategic interests. In such a complex environment there is as much potential for negative outcomes as positive.

The interim agreement: unresolved issues, by Nick Wood – Crisis Watch: Iran

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Whilst the interim agreement that was reached on the 24th November between the P5+1 and Iran saw embraces and smiles from the negotiating teams, the hard work is only just beginning. The 9th December saw negotiations commence once again in an attempt to agree upon the technical details not discussed in the 24th November agreement. The talks are taking place at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna, a suitable location considering the key role the organisation will play in monitoring Iran’s compliance when the final agreement is implemented – possibly as early as January.

 

An agreement between Iranian nuclear officials and the IAEA on the 11th November saw Iran allow the UN nuclear watchdog access to both the Gachin uranium mine and the heavy water facility at Arak. The latter had been a particular sticking point after Iran refused to adhere to a UN Security Council Resolution demanding cessation of work related to heavy water projects in 2006, with Iran maintaining that it was under no legal obligation to halt activity. The one-day visit to the facility by a two-member IAEA team on 8th December signalled the first inspection since 2011. Whilst the Geneva interim agreement stated that Iran would make no further advances in its activities at the Arak reactor, Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif announced to Iran’s Press TV, just five days after the agreement had been reached, that although ‘capacity at the Arak site is not going to increase…construction will continue there.’ It is varying interpretations of what the interim does and does not allow that must be clarified in the current technical negotiations. Claims, for example, that the nuclear agreement includes loopholes that could allow for the production of specific nuclear-related components off-site, suggest that certain aspects of the deal still need to be clarified.

 

Another controversial aspect of the Geneva interim agreement is the lack of reference made to the Parchin military complex. A report released by the IAEA in November 2011 announced that it had received information from member states that suggested Iran constructed a large explosives containment chamber in 2000 and had been carrying out subsequent testing, possibly associated with nuclear materials – a charge that Iran denies. Whilst the IAEA’s visits in 2005 uncovered nothing of relevance, the UN watchdog maintained that Iran had yet to ‘explain the rationale behind these activities.’ Though Iran has argued in the past that the military sensitivity of the complex means that detailed inspections are not appropriate, there are hopes amongst U.S officials that further negotiations might break the impasse that Parchin has historically presented and allow a deal to be struck that could eventually permit future access.

 

Perhaps a more pressing issue concerns the practicalities of the IAEA’s expansion of monitoring in order to observe Iranian compliance with a final deal. The organisation’s Director-General Yukiya Amano announced on Thursday 28th November that the monitoring of the Iranian deal would have ‘implications for funding and staffing’ that would require an increased budget. Around 10% of the IAEA’s annual inspections budget of €121m is already used to monitor the Iranian nuclear program. The interim agreement and its subsequent technical additions will vastly increase the IAEA’s workload, requiring extra support, funding and time.

 

The 24th November interim agreement was certainly a breakthrough for both Iran and the P5+1. Putting the words to paper took much time and effort, but their implementation will require even more determination. The technical negotiations must clarify what exactly constitutes compliance if questions over facilities such as Parchin or loopholes over Arak are to be effectively addressed. The P5+1, Iran and the IAEA all have a difficult time ahead of them – the success of any deal will be measured ‘in months and years, not minutes.’

The path to an interim nuclear deal – by Mal Craghill, Crisis Watch: Iran

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In the early hours of Sunday 24th November the foreign ministers of Iran and the “P5+1” group – China, France, Germany, Russia, UK and USA – agreed an interim Joint Plan of Action on solving the long crisis of Iran’s nuclear programme. The talks, led by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, had been significantly aided by secret Omani-brokered talks between Iran and the USA since Hassan Rouhani’s surprise election as President of Iran in June, as well as talks between Iran and the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which had been taking place separately from the P5+1 talks. An earlier set of Geneva talks, which had seemed likely to result in a breakthrough, had broken up with no agreement on 9th November after France allegedly held out for a tougher interim settlement, much to the delight of the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Just two days later Iran reached agreement with the IAEA over access to the Arak nuclear reactor and the Gachin uranium mine, and on the same day the UK and Iran announced that they would be re-opening diplomatic relations – suspended after the British Embassy in Tehran was attacked in 2011 – with the exchange of non-resident charges d’affaires. On 17th November France’s President Hollande arrived in Israel for a previously scheduled visit and announced that France would continue to hold out against the easing of sanctions on Iran until it was convinced Iran was not pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. It was against this backdrop – and the bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on 19th November – that the Geneva talks re-convened. With expectations lowered following the previous round of talks, the talks were at “official” rather than ministerial level, and whilst they were underway Binyamin Netanyahu engaged in a frantic round of visits trying to forestall an agreement, including visiting Russian President Putin in Moscow on 20th November and meeting with John Kerry in Israel on 22nd November. This proved fruitless for Netanyahu, with good progress evident in Geneva as the P5+1 foreign ministers converged on Geneva on Saturday. Despite a long wrangle over the details of one or two points, a deal was eventually struck in the early hours of 24th November, with all sides claiming victory for their negotiating standpoints. But as the dust settles from Geneva, what does the agreement mean for Iran’s prospects over the next 6-12 months, and for the UK’s engagement with Iran? A series of blog posts from the Iran Crisis Watch group will investigate prospects for Iran over the coming months.

 

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The Prospects for Trade 

The Joint Plan of Action allowed for a limited easing of sanctions against Iran which may aid Iran’s ailing economy in limited ways. It puts a hold on efforts to further reduce Iran’s crude oil sales – which have dropped from around 2.5m barrels per day to 1m barrels per day – and allows Iran’s crude oil customers to maintain their current levels of supply. Sanctions on the automotive sector, petrochemicals and precious metal exports are suspended, and a channel is opened for humanitarian aid which will include food and agricultural products as well as medical and pharmaceutical supplies. The effect on trading partners has been surprisingly rapid, although the temporary nature of the current deal has led many to approach potential trade deals with caution.

 

One immediate beneficiary is likely to be India. Given its fragile relations with Pakistan, India has been involved in work to build a deep water port at Chabahar in Iran, which it views as an essential route for Indian trade into Iran and Central Asia. Illustrating the region’s difficult geopolitical situation, Chabahar would be in direct competition for international trade with the Chinese-financed Gwadar port, just 44 miles away in Pakistan. Iran has announced its intention to establish a free trade zone around the port, probably to attract lost trade back to the country; the port of Bandar Abbas is reportedly handling almost half of the trade now that it was two years ago. The announcement of the free trade zone already seems to be creating interest, with several Gulf States keen to invest. Japan also seems keen to rekindle trade with Iran, with talks having taken place in Tehran recently.

 

A number of opportunities arise for European trade with Iran, which will be highly beneficial for many stagnant European economies; EU exports to Iran are down 45% (3.4Bn euros) in the first 9 months of 2013 compared with the same period in 2011. France will be keen to re-kindle Peugeot and Renault’s previous exports to the Iranian automotive sector, although it remains to be seen whether their reported intransigence in Geneva will be held against them. Iran has also begun reaching out to oil companies that it would like to see re-entering the market, going as far as naming the companies it wants to do business with – including two from the USA, and Britain’s BP. Italian company Eni has been the first to show signs of interest, with its CEO meeting with Iran’s oil minister at the annual OPEC meeting in Vienna on 4th December. This sector is likely to be slow to develop, given the uncertainty over a long-term settlement and the poor terms under which Iran dealt with foreign oil companies in the past. An Austrian trade delegation visited Tehran in early December, reportedly focusing on infrastructure and manufacturing opportunities. Pakistan is also using the recent international developments to reinvigorate a stalled project to construct a gas pipeline from Iran into central Asia, despite opposition from the USA. Although Iran is keen to progress this project, their recent cancellation of finance for the Pakistan side of the pipeline reflects Rouhani’s pragmatism, showing a desire to fix Iran’s ailing economy structurally as well as through increased international trade.

 

Two UK companies stand to benefit immediately, thanks to the humanitarian sanctions relief. GlaxoSmithKlein and AstraZeneca have both maintained trade with Iran during the recent sanctions (reportedly $32.2m and $14m annually, respectively), and they can expect an immediate increase in sales of medicine and medical equipment. Beyond that there are no immediate reports of UK companies seeking new trade in Iran, but over the next 6 months – as work on a permanent agreement with Iran progresses – more interest is likely to be shown. According to the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, opportunities are likely to lie in telecommunications and IT, joint manufacturing ventures (particularly in vehicle manufacturing), water and waste water projects and banking sector reform. The re-opening of diplomatic relations bodes well for potential future trade deals; Ajay Sharma, the UK charge d’affaires has already visited Tehran, and a reciprocal visit by his counterpart to London has just taken place. William Hague has made it clear that this will be a step-by-step process, rooted in demonstrable trust being developed, but the early signs are promising.

 

There are likely to be some negative aspects to the recent deal as well. With many GCC States believing, at least privately, that steps towards normalisation of Iran’s relations with the outside world will upset the balance of power in the region, it is possible that they will seek to scale down trade with members of the P5+1 group in retaliation. However, a more unexpected result may be to kill off some arms trades in the region. It already seems likely that the UAE will either postpone or cancel a potential Eurofighter Typhoon buy from the UK, citing fears over destabilising the region militarily and with one eye on seeking increased trade with Iran themselves. Oman even went as far as standing in opposition to the other 5 GCC members recently when they called for deepening the partnership into a military alliance. Oman has a strong trading history with Iran, and does not want to harm future relations by joining a potentially threatening regional alliance. For the UK, the real trade benefits will come with the agreement of a permanent settlement to Iran’s nuclear programme, and may necessitate a change of approach to the region, treating the Arab GCC states as individuals rather than as a homogenous bloc.

Participating in Grand Challenges, A Student’s Perspective II, by Kiah Shabka

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Following our exams in June, Exeter University ran a project called Grand Challenges. After two weeks of lounging about on Exmouth beach, I felt that it was time to do something a little more productive so I signed up to be part of the project. The inquiry group I took part in looked into Re-setting the UK National Security Strategy, focusing primarily on issues classified as Tier One threats: terrorism, interstate conflict and cyber security. In this post, I hope to provide an insight into the work we did during Grand Challenges by discussing some of the activities we undertook and the outputs we produced.

 

The first activity we took part in focused on interstate conflict and, being ever-present in the news, we were asked to look at Syria through an activity called Red Teaming. At the start of the session I thought that I knew my feelings towards Syria, however Sir Paul wanted us to do a deeper analysis of the situation and introduced us to a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). Through the SWOT analysis, we began to look at the situation in a completely different way and it became clear to me that my previous views on Syria were far too simplistic for such a complex scenario. We were split into groups and together formulated a plan of action which we then presented back to the other groups. Luckily my group were broadly in agreement over how we should prioritise the issues that we had identified during the SWOT analysis, and we quickly decided that intervention was simply not an option. Even humanitarian intervention carried far greater risk than reward. As this was a Red Team activity, each presentation was followed by a harsh critique from other groups, and surprisingly each team had decided on a different plan on action. This really demonstrated to me that there was no right answer and that if you put an idea forward, you really had to be willing to defend it tooth and nail among both peers and experts.

 

One of our key outputs was an open letter to the Prime Minister in which we critiqued the UK’s National Security Strategy (NSS) in terms of its approach to terrorism, interstate war and cyber security. This was an interesting task because, unlike the Red Team activity, we were forced to agree on how the next NSS (to be published in 2015) should be improved. We began by discussing terrorism which turned out to be relatively simple as we all agreed that the main flaw in that section of the NSS was the focus on ‘Islamic terrorism’. By solely focusing on Islamic terrorism, we felt that the NSS ran the risk of exacerbating the isolation often felt by vulnerable societal groups, which can actually contribute rather than prevent home-grown terrorism and radicalisation.

 

When we moved on to interstate conflict, however, the task became significantly harder. Whilst we all recognised that the wording of the NSS was vague, there was a fifty-fifty split in our group as to whether this was good or bad. Our solution to the group divide was simply to sit in a room for forty minutes and thrash out our dispute and, after a heated debate, we concluded that clarification was necessary for the sake of any future NSS. We proposed that the threat should be divided in two, with one to remain in Tier One and the other to be lowered to Tier Two status. Remaining in Tier One should be situations in which the UK is de jure implicated from the start, and demoted to Tier Two would be situations where Britain is not obliged to intervene, regardless of the amount of pressure being put on us. I really enjoyed being able to argue my views with fellow students and felt that it was incredibly refreshing to be able to decide amongst ourselves which direction we should be taking in our letter.

 

Finally we discussed the approach taken in the NSS to cyber warfare. Once again we were all in agreement that the document, and subsequent actions based on this document, showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of cyber security. Currently over sixty per cent of the cyber budget is sent to GCHQ and we felt that this completely overlooks the personal level of cyber security. Over eighty per cent of UK households have internet access, with this number rising significantly every year; in a world where your personal device can be hacked and used in a DDoS attack against a business or even one’s own government, all without your knowledge, we should be ensuring that citizens have the knowledge necessary to protect themselves from attack. We decided that investment in education should be the key message of the NSS; computer programming should be taught in every school just as other languages are, and we should be aiming to make British citizens the most secure users of cyberspace, whilst producing world-class programmers to protect our national interest.

 

The letter to the Prime Minister was one of the most exciting outputs we created because it has the potential to generate tangible impact. We have now received confirmation that our letter to the Prime Minister has been received, read, and will be passed onto the team who will create the 2015 NSS. I am very much looking forward to its publication as it will be interesting to see whether our critique has actually been listened to and acted upon.

 

In addition to the letter to the Prime Minister, we created a series of podcasts on the topics previously discussed. I was interviewed by one of the lecturers working with us, Dr Danny Steed, about my opinions on cyber warfare and why I thought it was so important to national security. It was a great experience to be able to openly discuss cyber security, a topic I find very interesting, and these podcasts should be available on the SSI website shortly.  The final outputs we produced were two presentations: one pitching our group’s findings to the media and the other presenting them to the other Grand Challenges groups. A team member and I created and presented the second presentation, summarising our task and findings. As well as the three key threats, we also discussed Britain’s role in the world and how our legislation in response to the aforementioned threats reflect where we see ourselves on the world stage. Personally I found this task very enjoyable and interesting and I hope that the people watching felt equally as interested.

 

Grand Challenges proved to be an incredibly interesting and informative two weeks and I can honestly say that the experience has sparked new interests and made me rethink future career paths. I would like to thank everyone involved in Grand Challenges and, in particular, those who helped create and run the programme. Sir Paul Newton, Dr Danny Steed, Ryan Patterson and Atienza Saldaña – thank you.