VHOST is deprecated. Use the boolean constant SUBDOMAIN_INSTALL in wp-config.php to enable a subdomain configuration. Use is_subdomain_install() to check whether a subdomain configuration is enabled. in /var/www/html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 5497
We would like to welcome the following new member of the InsTED network.
Dr.Ana Fernandes (University of Exeter). Her research interests include work on how firms and workers are affected by globalisation. Her recent research examines global production relationships and firms’ decisions over whether to outsource to or integrate with foreign assembly plants in developing countries.
There is increasing interest in how natural resources influence political stability. Under a dictatorial regime, political stability is determined by the ability of a ruling group to stay in power. If political power is the route to personal riches by the appropriation of natural resource income, remaining in power is that much more attractive. As well as facilitating personal enrichment, a dictator can use part of the income from natural resources to suppress opposition through various mechanisms. These include direct repression and undermining the formation of rival groups (“divide and rule”). In democracies, incumbent politicians can use natural resources to finance popular projects in order to increase their chances of remaining in power via reelection.
On the other hand, natural resources can also be a source of political instability. They create an incentive for the opposition to take over power, yielding access to natural resource rents. Another possibility is for the opposition to seize a natural resource and use it to fund rebel activity. In both cases the survival of the political incumbent is less likely in the presence of natural resources. These sources of instability tend to be pervasive in non-democratic regimes.
Acemoglu, D., J.A. Robinson, and T. Verdier (2004); “Kleptocracy And Divide And Rule: A Theory of Personal Rule”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2-3): 162-192. [Working paper version]
Alexeev, M., and R. Conrad (2009); “The Elusive Curse of Oil” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3): 586-598.
Andersen, J. J., and S. Aslaksen (2013); “Oil and Political Survival.” Journal of Development Economics, 100(1): 89-106. [Working paper version]
Arezki, R., and T. Gylfason, (2013); “Resource rents, democracy and corruption: evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa” Journal of African Economies, ejs036. [Working paper version]
Bhattacharyya, S., and R. Hodler, (2010); “Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption” European Economic Review, 54 (4): 608-621. [Working paper version]
Bjorvatn, K., and M. R. Farzanegan, (2014); “Resource Rents, Power, and Political Stability” CESIFO Working Paper No. 4727.
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler, (2004); “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford Economic Papers, 56: 563-95. [Working paper version]
Frankel, J. A., (2010); “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey”, NBER Working Paper No.15836. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gallego, M., and P. Pitchik, (2004); “An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover.” Journal of Public Economics, 88 (12): 2361-2382.
Lipset, S.M., (1960); Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Anchor Books, New York.
Mahdavy, H., (1970); “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development.” Published in in M. A. Cook, (ed.); Rentier States: The Case of Iran, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 428-67.
Robinson, J.A., and R. Torvik, (2005); “White Elephants.” Journal of Public Economics, 89 (2-3): 197-210. [Working paper version]
Robinson, J.A., and R. Torvik, (2008); “Endogenous Presidentialism.” NBER Working Paper No. 14603, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Robinson, J.A., R. Torvik and T. Verdier, (2006); “Political Foundations of the Resource Curse.” Journal of Development Economics, 79 (2): 447-468.
Sachs, J.D., and A. M. Warner, (1995); “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” NBER Working Paper No. 5398. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
The Kiel Institute will continue its successful Advanced Studies in International Economic Policy Research with a new program starting in August 2015:
Macroeconomics in Open Economies – Cedric Tille (Geneva)
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy – Tommaso Monacelli
(Bocconi)
Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice – Lawrence Christiano
(Northwestern)
International Trade: Gravity and Geography – Gianmarco Ottaviano
(LSE)
Firms in International Trade – Kalina Manova ( Stanford)
Globalisation and Labour – David Dorn ( Zurich)
International Migration – Hillel Rapoport (Bar-Ilan)
Economic Growth – Oded Galor ( Brown University)
Economic Development – Rohini Pande ( Harvard)
The 10 month program addresses in particular M.A. graduates who are interested in a career at international organisations, ministries and central banks, financial corporations, research institutes and development institutions, or who wish to improve their chances of admission to PhD programs at renowned universities.
The program is also relevant for economists with some years of professional experience who would like to keep up with recent academic developments in the field, and for PhD candidates who are enrolled at universities without an own PhD program (or who would like to attend the above courses as a complement to their local PhD program). Participation in selected courses of the program is possible.
Detailed information on the program is provided on the Kiel Institute´s website
DFID wishes to commission a series of Rapid Evidence Assessments (REAs) that will provide an up to date, impartial, rigorous and accessible synthesis of evidence on a set of questions under the theme of Economic Development. Bidders are invited to respond to questions on the following topics:
The full set of questions are available in the
REAs will be carried out to a short timeframe, and will include the following aspects: a structured literature search, a quality appraisal of the literature, and a synthesis of the evidence.
Interested parties are invited to submit tenders by 2pm UK time on Friday 28 November 2014.
Click here for original call