Welcome new member

We would like to welcome the following new member of the InsTED network.

Prof. Avinash Dixit (Princeton University).  Prof Dixit’s research interests have included microeconomic theory, game theory, international trade, industrial organization, growth and development theories, public economics, political economy, and the new institutional economics.

Second Winter School on the Analytics and Policy Design of Migration

Course Announcement

January 7-11, 2015, Doha, Qatar

Submission Deadline: October 15, 2014

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q) is pleased to announce that the Second Winter School on the Analytics and Policy Design of Migration will be held in Doha, Qatar, on January 7-11, 2015.

The School will be led by Oded Stark, Distinguished Research Scholar at GU-Q, Professor at the Universities of Klagenfurt, Bonn, Tuebingen, Vienna, and Warsaw.

SCHOOL DESCRIPTION: The main purpose of the School is to induce the participants to think rigorously, creatively, and in non-conventional ways on various approaches to the modeling of migration choices and consequences, and to demonstrate to the participants how such a thinking process could enrich the spectrum of informed migration policies. Participants will be exposed to the art of economic modeling in general, and to the workings of applied microeconomic theory in particular. Following the School, the participants are expected to be more at ease with deciphering theoretical research on migration, and at engaging in such research themselves.

QUALIFICATIONS: School participants should be holders of Ph.D. in Economics earned during 2010-2014, or Economics Ph.D. students in advanced stages of their dissertation work.

FURTHER DETAILS: The cost of participation in the School, including return air travel via a direct route, accommodation, and meals, will be covered by the School. The School will be held in the new campus of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Participants will be expected to arrive on Tuesday, January 6, 2015, and to depart on Monday, January 12, 2015.

APPLICATION PROCEDURE: Applicants are asked to submit, in a pdf format, their C.V. along with a sample article or a chapter in their Ph.D. dissertation to Dr. Ewa Kepinska, Coordinator of the Winter School, e-mail: . The application deadline is October 15, 2014. Responses to the applications will be provided by October 31, 2014.

Additional information is at: http://qatar.sfs.georgetown.edu/academics/migrationpolicy

Welcome new members

We would like to welcome the following new members of the InsTED network.

Dr. Zohal Hessami (University of Konstanz)  Her research interests are in Political Economy, Economic & Fiscal Policy, Public Finance & Public Governance, and Applied Econometrics. 

Dr. Thushyanthan Baskaran (University of Gottingen) His research interests are in Public Economics, Political Economics, and Development Economics.

CALL FOR PAPERS: Workshop on Firm Dynamics, Trade and Development

December 10-11, 2014
Montevideo, Uruguay

The Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU), in cooperation with the Research Institute for Development, Growth and Economics (RIDGE), is pleased to announce a call for papers for the Workshop on Firm Dynamics, Trade and Development, which will be held onDecember 10-11, 2014, in Montevideo, Uruguay, organizers Joseph Stiglitz (Columbia), Omar Licandro (Barcelona GSE) and Adolfo Sarmiento (BCU).
This Workshop will count with the presence of the following invited speakers: Professor Sam Kortum from Yale University and Professor Peter Schott from Yale University.
The policy round table discussion will be led by Dr. Christian Volpe from IADB.
Ariel Burstein, UCLA
Lorenzo Caliendo, Yale University
Hugo Hopenhayn, UCLA
Nestor Gandelman, Universidad ORT (Montevideo)
Deadline for paper submission: September 30, 2014
Notification of paper acceptance: October 15, 2014
The Workshop organizers invite authors to submit original, theoretical and empirical papers on the general topic of firm dynamics, trade and development.
Papers for the Workshop must be submitted by September 30, 2014. To submit a paper, please email a PDF file to  or 
The cover page should include: the title of the paper, institutional affiliation, including address, phone and email of each author, and an abstract with the appropriate JEL classification.
Authors of papers accepted for presentation at the Workshop will be notified by October 15, 2014.

Organizers will make hotel reservations and cover accommodation costs (up to two nights) to speakers (though participants from central banks and other official institutions are expected to cover their own expenses). Limited resources are available to cover travel expenses.

Should you have any questions, please contact  or
This Workshop will develop within the framework of the First RIDGE December Forum,December 8 – 12, 2014, jointly with the following workshops:
Financial Stability and Regulatory Responses, December 8-9
Financial Crises, December 9-10
Productivity Growth, Resource Misallocation and Development. 11-12
The RIDGE December Forum aims to favor the spread of high quality research in economics by associating top researchers working on the frontier of knowledge to local and regional researchers and policymakers.
Participants to the Workshop on Firm Dynamics, Trade and Development are welcome to attend the other workshops.

Trade and Unemployment

Most of the public debate concerning the liberalization of international trade revolves around the effect of trade on the levels of employment.  Proponents of trade liberalization argue that higher demand for domestic products from abroad would increase employment.  Opponents worry that competition with imported products, in driving domestic producers out of business, would lead to job losses overall.  For scholars, however, the complexity of countries’ economies and the functioning of their labor markets suggest that both views are at least incomplete.In the academic literature on this issue, models of unemployment incorporate labor market frictions into the market clearing mechanism, so that unemployment arises endogenously as an equilibrium outcome.

In the early literature, labor market frictions were restricted to minimum wages, rigid wages or union activity.  The more recent literature incorporates search frictions, efficiency wages, fair wages, implicit contracts, insider/outsider models of labor markets, among others.  In these models, because the allocation of resources determines employment across sectors, policies that affect the allocation of resources can have an impact on the levels of employment.  If international trade affects the allocation of resources, then employment is also affected by trade.There is now a growing body of research that emphasizes the decisions of individual firms and workers in understanding the causes and consequences of aggregate trade on employment.  This emergent theoretical literature is a response to empirical studies using micro data, which reveal a number of features of worker and producer behaviors that were not well explained by pre-existing theories of international trade.  In particular, these models introduce search and matching frictions into a (Melitz type) model of firm heterogeneity to analyze employment as well as the income distribution.  With firm heterogeneity it can be shown that, for example, more productive firms pay higher wages while exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity, so that the opening of trade enhances wage inequality but can either raise or reduce unemployment.

Agell, Jonas and Per Lundborg (1995), “Fair Wages in the Open Economy“, Economica, 62: 335-351.

Bombardini, M.; G. Gallipoli and G. Pupato (2012) ”Skill Dispersion and Trade Flows”, American Economic Review, 102(5): 2327-2348.

Botero, Juan C., Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), “The Regulation of Labor“, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 1339-1382. [Working paper version]

Brecher, Richard A. (1974) “Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of International TradeThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(1):98-116.

Cacciatore, M. (2014) “International trade and macroeconomic dynamics with labor market frictions”, Journal of International Economics, 93(1):17-30.

Copeland, B. R. (1989) “Efficiency Wages in a Ricardian Model of International Trade”, Journal of International Economics, 27(3):221–244.

Dao, M. C. (2013) “Foreign Labor Costs and Domestic Employment: What are the Spillovers?Journal of International Economics, 89(1): 154-171.

Davidson, C. and S. J. Matusz (2012) “A Model of Globalization and Firm-Worker Matching: How Good is Good Enough?International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 5-15.

Davidson, C., M. Lawrence and S. Matusz (1999), “Trade and Search Generated Unemployment“, Journal of International Economics, 48: 271-299.

Davidson, C. (1990) “Introduction.” In: Recent Developments in the Theory of Involuntary Unemployment Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 1-5.

Davis, D. R. and J. Harrigan (2011) “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade LiberalizationJournal of International Economics, 84(1): 26-36. [Working paper version]

Fadinger, H. and K. Mayr (2014) “Skill-Biased Technological Change, Unemployment, and Brain Drain” Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(2): 397-431. [Working paper version]

Felbermayr, G. J.; M. Larch and W. Lechthaler, (2013) “Unemployment in an Interdependent World”, American Economic JournalEconomic Policy, 5(1): 262-301. [Working paper version]

Felbermayr, G. J.; M. Larch and W. Lechthaler (2012) “Endogenous Labor Market Institutions in an Open Economy”, International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 30-45.

Hasan, R.; D. Mitra, and P. Ranjan (2012) “Trade Liberalization and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence from IndiaJournal of Development Economics, 97(2): 269-280.

Helpman, E,; O. Itskhoki, Oleg and S. Redding (2010) “Inequality And Unemployment In A Global EconomyEconometrica, 78(4): 1239-1283 [Working paper version]

Helpman, E. and O. Itskhoki (2010) “Labor Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment”. Review of Economic Studies, 77(3): 1100-1137 [Working paper version]

Kreickemeier, U. and D. Nelson (2006), “Fair Wages, Unemployment and Technological Change in a Global Economy,” Journal of International Economics, 70: 451—469.

Melitz, M. and Alejandro Cuñat (2012) “Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and the Pattern of Comparative Advantage”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 10: 225-254.

Matusz, S. J. (1986) “Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and International Trade”, The Economic Journal, 96(382): 307-322.

Paz, L. S. (2014) “The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Informal Labor Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of the Brazilian Case”, Journal of International Economics 92(2): 330-348. [Working paper version]

de Pinto, M. and J. Michaelis (2014) “International Trade and Unemployment-the Worker-selection Effect”, Review of International Economics 22(2): 226-252.

Ranjan, P. (2013) “Offshoring, Unemployment, and Wages: The Role of Labor Market InstitutionsJournal of International Economics, 89(1): 172-186. [Working paper version]

Ranjan, P. (2012) “Trade Liberalization, Unemployment, and Inequality with Endogenous Job Destruction” International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 16-29.

Seker, M. (2012) “Rigidities in Employment Protection and ExportingWorld Development, 40(2): 238-250. [Working paper version]

Tang, H. (2012) “Labor Market Institutions, Firm-Specific Skills, and Trade PatternsJournal of International Economics, 87(2): 337-351. [Working paper version]

Venice Summer Institute 2015: The World Trade Organization and Economic Development

Time: Jul 20, 2015 9 AM – Jul 21, 2015 2 PM

Address: San Servolo, Venice, Italy

The original intention behind the ‘Doha Round’ of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was to promote the integration of developing countries into the world trading system. The collapse of the round in 2008 led to pessimism over whether the pursuit of such a ‘development-based’ agenda is even possible. And yet a number of scholars have continued to explore the scope for progress to be made at the WTO on development-related issues. The aim of this workshop is to bring together people working on this topic to interact on the progress that has been made in the various areas being explored.

Scientific organiser(s): Dr. Benjamin Zissimos

Call for papers


CESifo Office

Phone: +49(0)89/9224-1410
Fax: +49(0)89/9224-1409
Email: office@cesifo.de

Excellence Award in Global Economic Affairs 2015

Economists until the age of 35 (born 1979 or later) are invited to apply for this award by submitting up to three published or unpublished papers in the field of global economic affairs, and specifically pertaining to the following areas:

      • International Trade and FDI
      • Knowledge Creation and Growth
      • Poverty Reduction, Equity and Development
      • Environmental Policy
      • Reforming the Welfare Society
      • Labour Market Policy
      • Monetary Policy
      • Financial Markets and Macroeconomic Activity
      • Behavioural Economics

Submission of a paper does not preclude publication in the standard outlets. Submitted papers may include coauthored papers.

The aim of the Excellence Award is to build a community of the brightest young researchers in the area of global economic affairs.

Submitted papers will be evaluated by a jury. The top contestants will be granted the “Excellence Award in Global Economic Affairs” at a prize-giving ceremony at the Kiel Institute. In addition, they will receive a Research Fellowship at the Kiel Institute, entitling them to a research visit to the Institute, all expenses paid. Research Fellows will receive research support, access to the Institute’s Virtual Research Communities and the opportunity to participate in the Institute’s research projects and events.

There are four named Research Fellowships: the “Horst Siebert Fellowship”, the “Porsche Fellowship”, the “Landeshauptstadt Kiel Fellowship” and the “Birke Hospitality Fellowship”. Further information is provided on the Excellence Award website. Staff members of the Kiel Institute and of the sponsoring organizations are not eligible for the fellowship.

Papers should be submitted as email attachment to  together with a CV that includes the birth date. The submission deadline is Oct. 31, 2014.

Institute for New Economic Thinking Announces 6th Grant Round

The Institute for New Economic Thinking aims to foster open discourse and to advance new thinking on economic issues and theory. The Institute’s notion of new economic thinking is deliberately open and non-dogmatic. Our hope is to support research that transforms our understanding of major economic problems and improves analysis of policy.

In this grant round, in addition to our call for research, we seek to fund projects that promise to advance the way economics is taught in and out of formal courses in economics. Preference will be given to projects promising lasting improvements in course materials and pedagogy that could potentially be widely adopted, rather than seminars or courses offered on a one-off basis dependent on continued outside funding. These proposals will be segmented and considered separately from the other applications.

In our sixth round of grants, we plan to fund proposals of up to $250,000. The deadline for the first stage of applications is October 20, 2014. For guidance on how to prepare an application for either type of grant, see our Grants FAQ. Note that efficient use of resources is a factor in the evaluation process.

Click here for full funding call.

The 2nd InsTED Workshop


We would like to thank the Department of Economics at the University of Oregon for sponsoring the Second InsTED Workshop.  The workshop was held at the Inn at the 5th, Eugene, Oregon, from August 12th-14th 2014.  Special thanks go to Chris Ellis as chair of the local organizing committee and Jodie Rogers for her tireless efforts and attention to detail in the organization of this event.

The program comprised of 22 papers that ranged over three broad topics at the intersection of institutions, trade and economic development.  One topic was the implications of international institutions, especially the World Trade Organisation (WTO), for efficiency, equity, and technological innovation especially in developing countries.  The second concerned how domestic institutions, both economic and political, affect economic performance.  The third was on international trade and commercial policy, especially that involving developing countries.  There now follows a summary of all the papers presented at the workshop, organised under these topic headings.  A bibliography, together with links to papers where available, is provided at the end.

Efficiency, Equity and Technological Innovation under International Trade and the WTO

Although the InsTED network embraces topics at the intersection of institutions, trade and economic development, there is a certain intrinsic appeal to topics at the union of these three areas.  And the papers presented on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) were certainly very appealing in this regard.  The keynote address, presented by Kamal Saggi, together with a companion paper presented by Rick Bond, were on innovation and imitation under compulsory licensing as governed by the WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement.  Compulsory licensing was included in the TRIPS agreement to enable developing country governments to obtain a newly innovated good by issuing a license for its production, say to a domestic producer, if a foreign patent holder was making this difficult.  The keynote address paper presented by Kamal showed that if the South is obligated to offer patent protection under TRIPS then compulsory licensing tends to occur in equilibrium and can even make both the developing country and the patent holder better off.  This happens when, under compulsory licensing, the developing country obtains a lower quality but cheaper imitation of the good in question while the patent holder obtains higher profits from restricting world supply of its higher quality patented good.  The paper presented by Rick explores the feature that total surplus may increase or decrease at the deadline when compulsory licensing is allowed, and shows that welfare of the South only increases if total surplus increases.

The remaining papers in this area concerned the effects of international institutional arrangements on international trade flows and hence welfare.  Mostafa Beshkar’s paper asks what the optimal remedy is for the breach of a trade agreement under the WTO.  His paper examines the choice between a ‘property rule’ that releases a party from the agreement only if the other party agrees, and a ‘liability rule’ whereby a party can release itself unilaterally.  He shows that surprisingly the property rule leads to excessive retaliation, because the parties effectively negotiate their own sanctions, and hence is less efficient than the liability rule where retaliation is more limited.  Kristy Buzard, in her paper, endogenizes the effort exerted by lobbies to obtain greater protection, and shows that consequently a trade agreement can be used to discourage lobbying by tying the hands of policymakers.  On the other hand, an escape clause can give rise to greater lobbying effort than a more rigid trade agreement because the government’s hands are not completely tied.

Shifting the focus to preferential trade agreements, Tom Zylkin aims to be the first to examine empirically the asymmetric gains across countries within a given free trade agreement.  Focusing on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and allowing for no-tariff and tariff barriers, he shows through a detailed investigation of trade liberalization effects across industries that Mexico gains more from NAFTA than both Canada and the US.  Exploring a different type of preferential trade arrangement under the WTO, Shushanik Hakobyan estimates the effects of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) expiration on exports from developing countries to the US.  Under GSP, developed countries such as the US are allowed to grant preferential access to exports from developing countries without requiring reciprocated access to corresponding developing country markets.  Shushanik shows that, when US GSP expired in 2011 without any certainty over its renewal, exports from developing countries to the US declined by 3 percent on average, with exports on textiles and clothing declining by a sizable 9 percent.  The paper presented by Nick Sly examined the effect of a different type of international institution on trade flows.  With his collaborators, he examines the effect of bilateral tax treaties on offshoring.  They show that the effect of bilateral tax treaties is quite different across countries, since this lowers the cost of offshoring for within-firm transactions which themselves tend to vary across industries.  They use this variation to show that offshoring has a positive aggregate effect on US employment but that the impact varies substantially across industries.

The Effects of Domestic Private, Public and Political Institutions on Economic Performance

The keynote address by Avinash Dixit focused on contests fought using agents, setting forth a general framework that can be used to consider institutions in private, public and political domains.  The tension brought to light was on the divergent interests between those wishing to engage in a contest and the agents frequently employed to compete.  Examples include political parties that use local party machines who are biased away from the median voter and towards the party faithful; and governments that may engage in war using mercenaries to protect would-be citizen soldiers.  A key insight that arises from within this framework is that bonuses for success would be required, where possible, to correct for the inefficiencies in outcome that would otherwise arise from the divergence of interests.

What prompts an economy to move away from subsistence agriculture and towards modern methods of production?  This question was addressed from an institutional perspective in papers presented by John Morrow and Ben Zissimos.  Michael Carter and John ask what gives rise to a viable producer class within society and hence to broad based inclusive growth.  They show that while inclusive growth depends on public good provision, public good provision itself depends upon a relatively equitable initial distribution of resources across society.  Wealth conditions not only the set of voters in favor of public goods, but the strength of their preferences through campaign contributions.  For both these reasons, shared or inclusive growth policies are more likely when the initial wealth distribution is more equal.  Ben and Isleide Zissimos focus on the incentives of a ruling elite to put in place institutions that support technology adoption.  Conventional wisdom holds that a ruling elite would always have an incentive to support technology adoption because they get to tax the surplus that is generated as a result.  The surprising insight from this paper is that ruling elite interests in undermining technology adoption in order to keep wages low, for the purposes of maximizing elite profits, tend to dominate their incentive to generate greater surplus through taxation.  The paper presented by Tony Cookson was on the classic issue of institutions that enforce private contacts.  He compares economic activity on American Indian reservations that differ by whether contracts are enforced by state courts or tribal courts.  His main finding is that state courts, which are argued to be better understood by investors, give rise to greater employment and investment in industries where sunk costs are significant.

The efficiency implications of public institutions were explored in papers presented by Dan Berkowitz and Lorenzo Rotunno.  Dan and his collaborators explored the question of whether state ownership of enterprises can promote economic efficiency, or whether their role is more to maintain social stability, against the backdrop of China’s dazzling growth over the last thirty years or so.  They conclude that, relative to private firms, the profitability of Chinese state owned enterprises has increased over time.  But this has been based on the monopoly positions that state owned enterprises enjoy in the domestic market, coupled with favorable access to credit; they find no evidence of productivity gains relative to private firms.  The paper presented by Lorenzo, written with Alen Mulabdic, explores the role of public procurement as a mechanism for pork barrel politics.  They find that in countries where political parties are more fractionalized there is a greater tendency to use government procurement for pork barrelling purposes.

The implications of explicitly political institutions received significant attention at the workshop, being the subject of papers presented by Chris Ellis, Tom Groll, Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Petros Sekeris.  Chris looked at dynamic dissolutions and unifications of states, through the process of civil wars and invasions.  He follows an existing literature in arguing that the incentives to provide public goods drives the structure of states, but shows that by introducing dynamic considerations we can reverse many of the results that had previously be derived on state formation.  It is the responsiveness of public good location to the number of countries in future periods that enables the results established in a static setting to be flipped.  The paper presented by Petros was also on the causes of civil war.  He and his collaborators show that a weak dictator may let his country plunge into civil war to increase his personal rents, weakening the opposition in the process.  The presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups.  The paper presented by Tom Groll, with Chris as a co-author, examined dynamic commercial lobbying.  Rather than focusing, as much of the prior literature has done, purely on policies in exchange for financial contributions, they consider lobbyists who are for-profit organizations that have no inherent policy bias and interact repeatedly with policy makers.  Within this setting, they show that a policymaker obtains an outcome that represents a contract with the lobbyist involving a mix of financial contributions and information on policy proposals.  The paper presented by Pierre-Guillaume, written jointly with Khalid Sekkat, studies the impact of democratic and autocratic transitions on governance outcomes.  It finds that democratic transitions are on average followed by an improvement in governance after six years.  Intriguingly, there also appears to be some evidence of an improvement in governance in anticipation of a democratic transition.  On the other hand, the evidence of a deterioration of governance after autocratic transitions is suggestive but limited.

International Trade and Commercial Policy, Possibly Involving Developing Countries

While the development of ‘new trade theory’ and ‘new new trade theory’ was prompted by the predominance since the 1970s of North-North trade flows, Paul Krugman in his Nobel Prize winning address in 2008 noted the rise once again of North-South trade.  So it was exciting to see that Ahmed Lashkaripour has developed a framework, the subject of his presentation, that simultaneously accounts for North-North and North-South trade.  In it, North specializes in high mark-up industries with a relatively high incentive to export, while lower mark-ups on goods produced by the South generate lower exporting incentives.  But surprisingly, Southern countries gain more from opening up to trade because of the relatively large gains from being able to import significantly higher quality products from the North.  Relatedly, Kathryn Marshall presented a paper written jointly with Eric Fisher, that tests the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Paradigm in a world with cheap foreign labor.  Measuring factors services rather than quantities, their paper shows no statistically significant evidence of missing trade.  Using a comprehensive firm-level panel dataset of Danish exports, the paper presented by Anca Cristea finds robust evidence for profit shifting by multinational corporations (MNC) through transfer pricing. The triple difference estimation method that she and her collaborators employ corrects for a downward bias found in previous studies. The bias results from MNCs adjusting their arm’s length prices to obscure the extent of their transfer price manipulations.  They show that, after acquiring an affiliate in a country with a corporate tax rate lower than in the home country, Danish multinationals reduce the unit values of their exports there between 5.7 to 9.1 percent on average, which translates into a loss in tax income equal to 3.24 percent of Danish MNCs’ tax returns in 2006 alone.

Turning to commercial policy, Simone Moriconi and his co-authors investigate empirically the interaction of commodity tax competition and product market regulation, finding that these policies are strategic complements.  What is the intuition?  Deregulation, where regulation is assumed to be inefficiently high to begin with, cuts the time to start a new business, which in turn facilitates a reduction in taxation on each business.  Last but certainly not least, Claire Brunel examines the Porter Hypothesis that environmental policy both protects the environment and stimulates domestic economic activity.  Whether or not this hypothesis holds will depend, crucially, on whether new environmental technology is developed at home and exported or whether it is imported from abroad.  She finds that an increase in the stringency of environmental policy does bring about an increase in environmental innovation, but there is only a very small increase in domestic patents filed.  The reason is that much of the innovation for the countries in her sample is imported.


Bibliography of Papers Presented with Links Where Available (Presenters’ Names Shown in Bold)

Daniel Berkowitz, Hong Ma, and Shuichiro Nishioka “Recasting the Iron Rice Bowl: The Evolution of China’s State Owned Enterprises”

Mostafa Beshkar “Political Commitment versus Flexibility in Trade Agreements”

Eric Bondand Kamal Saggi “International Price Negotiations under the Threat of Compulsory Licensing

Eric Bond and Kamal Saggi Compulsory Licensing and Patent Protection: A North-South Perspective

Michael R. Carter and John Morrow The Political Economy of Inclusive Rural Growth

Claire Brunel Green Innovation and Green Imports: Links between Environmental Policies, Innovation and Trade

Kristy Buzard Endogenous Politics and the Design of Trade Agreements

J. Anthony CooksonEconomic Consequences of Judicial Institutions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Anca D. Cristea and Daniel X. Nguyen “Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Foreign Firm Ownerships

Giacomo De Luca, Petros G. Sekeris, and Juan F. Vargas “Beyond Divide and Rule: Weak Dictators, Natural Resources and Civil Conflict

Avinash Dixit Contests Fought Using Agents: A Framework with Applications to Elections and Wars
This was a general talk referencing several papers, hence the link is not to one specific paper.

Christopher J. Ellis “Dynamic Dissolutions and Unifications”

Eric Fischerand Kathryn G. MarshallTesting the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Paradigm in a World with Cheap Foreign Labor

Thomas Groll, andChristopher J. Ellis “Dynamic Commercial Lobbying

Shushanik Hakobyan GSP Expiration and Declining Exports from Developing Countries

Brian Kovak, Lindsay Oldenski, and Nicholas SlyIncomplete Contract and the Labor Market Effects of Offshoring

Ahmad Lashkaripour Markups, International Specialization, and the Gains from Trade

Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat “A Time to Throw Stones, A Time to Reap: How long does it take for democratic reforms to improve institutional outcomes?

Simone Moriconi, Pierre M. Picard, and Skerdilajda Zanaj “Commodity Taxation and Regulatory Competition”

Alen Mulabdic, and Lorenzo Rotunno “Home Bias in the Public Sector and the Role of Institutions”

Ben Zissimos, and Isleide Zissimos “Comparative Advantage, Technology Adoption and Political Risk”

Thomas Zylkin “Not all FTAs have the same Advantages”