Ever since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, there has been a growing sense that the GATT, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that has superseded it, favours the interests of developed countries.  In response to this, a line of research has developed to investigate possible reforms to the world trading system (the set of rules that forms the basis of the GATT/WTO) so that it better represents the interests of developing countries as well.

Bagwell K., Mavroidis, P. and R. Staiger (2007); “Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO.” Journal of International Economics, 73(2), 309-332. [Working paper version]

Bronckers M. and N. Van Den Broek (2005); “Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement.” Journal of International Economic Law, 8, 101-126.

Limão N. and K. Saggi (2008); “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements.” Journal of International Economics 76(1), 48-60. [Working paper version]

Limão N. and K. Saggi (2013); “Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements.” 63: 10-27. [Working paper version]

Schott J. (2009); “America, Europe, and the New Trade Order.” Business and Politics, 11(3), 1-22.

Srinivasan T. N. (1999); “Developing Countries in the World Trading System: From GATT, 1947, to the Third Ministerial Meeting of WTO.” The World Economy, 22 (8), 1047 – 1064. [Working paper version]

Zissimos B. (2009); “Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter.” Journal of International Economics, 78(2), 276-286. [Working paper version]

The stated mission of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that preceded it is ‘to open trade for the benefit of all’.  Rose (2004) questions whether the GATT/WTO is actually accomplishing its mission by showing that, surprisingly, member countries’ trade patterns are little different from those of non-members.  The subsequent debate has focused on differences in trade patterns of developed versus developing country members, arguing that while the GATT failed to promote trade among developing countries, it was successful at promoting trade between countries that are developed. This in turn raises the question of whether the WTO should promote trade among developed and developing countries alike, or whether equity implications of the MFN rule imply that developing countries should be exempted.

Bagwell K. and R. Staiger, (2011); “Can the Doha Round be a Development Round? Setting a Place at the Table” NBER Working Paper No. 17650.

Kennett M., S. J. Evenett and J. Gage , (2005); “Evaluating WTO accessions: legal and economic perspectives.” Geneva: Ideas Centre.

Lawrence R. (2003) Crimes and Punishments? Retaliation under the WTO. Institute of International Economics, Washington, D.C. [Earlier version]

Ludema R. & A. M. Mayda (2009) “Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?” Journal of International Economics, 77(2), 137-150. [Earlier version]

Rose A. K., (2004); “Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?” American Economic Review, 94(1): 98-114. [Earlier version]

Rose A. K., (2004): “Response to Subramanian and Wei.”

Rose A. K. (2007); “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply.” American Economic Review, 97(5): 2019-2025. [Earlier version]

Saggi K. and F. Sengul , (2009); “On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world.“ Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(1): 267-299. [Earlier Version]

Subramanian A. and S.-J. Wei, (2007); “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly.”  Journal of International Economics, 72(1): 151-175. [Earlier version]

Tomz M., J.Goldstein and D. Rivers, (2007); “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment.”  American Economic Review, 97(5): 2005–18. [Earlier version]