CALL FOR PAPERS VI Annual Conference of the Trade, Integration, and Growth Network (TIGN) Los Angeles, USA, May 15-16, 2015

The VI Annual Conference of the Trade, Integration and Growth Network (TIGN) will be held in Los Angeles, USA, on May 15-16, 2015. This conference is sponsored by the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the CAF-Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), and UCLA and is organized by UCLA. The TIGN conference is a unique event that brings together top researchers and policymakers to discuss recent theoretical and empirical advances in trade and integration and growth broadly defined. For additional information on this conference and to register and submit a paper please click here:

European Commission: Call for expressions of interest

The following fields are covered by this call for expressions of interest:

1. Economic analysis of trade and investment arrangements/agreements (unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, sectoral etc.) covering the EU and partner countries, including inter alia the use of modelling techniques, econometrics and literature reviews (Excluding Sustainability Impact Assessments, Ex-post Evaluations and studies supporting impact assessments prepared for Commission initiatives which are expected to have significant direct economic, social or environmental impacts).

2. Economic analysis of trade restrictive measures taken by partner countries e.g. in the context of the Trade Barriers Regulation or disputes discussed at the World Trade Organisation.

3. Economic analysis, including literature reviews, of any other specific trade policy topic.

4. Development of trade policy modelling and trade data analytical tools. For example, building extensions of existing models, creating user-friendly modelling modules and providing analytical means to assess and analyse large volumes of trade related data such as firm level trade data and product level trade data.

5. Trade policy related surveys.

6. Peer review (blind) of tasks carried out under the points above (primarily points 1-3) safeguarding standards of the work undertaken commensurate with the level of technical requirements for publications in peer reviewed journals (A vendor may be included in one or several of the sub-lists above, but must not review his/her own work. Collusion with vendors on the other sub-lists is prohibited. Any potential conflict of interest should be signalled to the Commission before the review commences).

Expressions of interest should be submitted in one of the official languages of the European Union by electronic means at the following address:
The list will become operational on 1 May 2015. Inclusion on the list entails no obligation on the part of the contracting authority concerning the conclusion of contracts.

For full details, see

Global Economic Governance Programme

Department for International Development (DFID), GB

The Department for International Development (DFID) invites tenders for its global economic governance programme. This provides support to South African partner organisations for research on a range of issues linked to global economic governance. The scope of the programme is currently being defined, and is likely to include research, dialogues and outreach on issues including:

•global trade policy to support an open international trading system;

•the conditions for regional economic growth in Africa;

•improving domestic revenue mobilisation to support development;

•ensuring global financial regulation supports development in low income countries and international action to help protect countries against financial and other shocks.

It is essential that this programme is based on a partnership with an institution or institutions best placed to supply international level expertise in this field and with excellent existing relationships with relevant stakeholders.

Ref: 6691.

  • Closing date 13 Feb 15
  • Deadline information Tenders due by 2pm.
  • Date added 06 Jan 15

Indexed with these disciplines

Poverty; Development Studies; International Economics; Local Government & Services; Politics & Economics of Africa; Economic Development; International Trade; African Studies; Government & Governance Studies; Financial Regulation

Click here for original funding call


Political Economy of Agricultural Policy

The 2008 world food price spikes lead to conflict between the World Bank and food exporters.  Motivated by the prospect of food shortages, food exporting countries responded to the food price spikes by restricting their exports just at the time when countries already experiencing a shortage were looking to the world market for relief.  In a bid to further encourage exports, food importing countries in some cases even responded by implicitly subsidising imports.  These interventions amplified the price spikes and harmed consumers in the intervening countries and beyond.  Seeing export restrictions as the root of the problem, the World Bank asked the countries concerned to desist from such practices.  But with violence erupting on the streets, some governments felt that their hands were tied to the export restrictive measures.  There is an active debate in the literature seeking to understand the policy responses that accompanied and exacerbated the food price spikes.

Over the longer term, supply side policies have depressed farmers’ incentives for some time.  The governments of many developing countries have taxed agriculture at significantly higher rates than other sectors or have taxed agriculture indirectly by overvaluing their currencies to pursue import-substitution industrialization strategies.  These policies clearly introduce price distortions.  It is an open questions as to whether these policies have a negative impact on growth and the income distribution.  If government interventions do have adverse effects, the question is why they are so prevalent in developing countries.  The political economy literature offers two main explanations.  One is that policymakers protect consumers in order to indirectly protect their positions in power.  The other is that governments are captured by vested interests in industry.

Anderson, Kym, Gordon Rausser, and Johan Swinnen (2013) “Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets.Journal of Economic Literature, 51(2): 423-77. [Working paper version]

Findlay, Ronald, and Kevin H. O’Rourke (2007) “Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium.” Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Hillman, Arye L (1982) “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives.American Economic Review,72 (5): 1180–87.

Krueger, Anne O., Maurice Schiff, and Alberto Valdes (1991) “The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy“, Volume 1: Latin America; Volume 2: Asia; and Volume 3: Africa and the Mediterranean. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Martin, Will and Kym Anderson (2011) “Export Restrictions and Price Insulation During Commodity Price BoomsAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 94 (2): 422-427. [Working paper version]

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl (2006) “From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective” Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

Swinnen, Johan F. M. (1994) “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76 (1): 1–14

World Bank (2007) “World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development” Washington, DC :World Bank.