Welcome new members

We would like to welcome the following new members of the InsTED network.

Prof. Hamid Beladi (University of Texas at San Antonio) His research interests are the economics of migration of skilled and unskilled labor, international trade in technology, global outsourcing and bi-sourcing, exchange rate pass-through, and fraudulent financial practices.

Prof. Rafael Dix-Carneiro (Duke University) His research fields are  international trade and labor economics.

Prof. Kishore Gawande (University of Texas at Austin) His research fields are econometrics, economic development, global sourcing, international business, and public policy.

Prof. John Gilbert (Utah State University) His research fields are international trade theory and policy, applied general equilibrium modeling, and development economics.

Prof. Peter Sandholt Jensen (University of Southern Denmark) His research interests are economic development, economic history, democratization, and public finance.

Dr. Ryan Monarch (Federal Reserve Board) His research interests are international trade, industrial organization, and the Chinese economy. 

Prof. Jayjit Roy (Appalachian State University) His primary research interest is in international trade.

Prof. Heiwai Tang (Johns Hopkins University) His research interests span a wide range of theoretical and empirical topics in international trade.

Contracting Institutions and International Trade

The quality of contracting institutions is among the most important determinants of the relationship between buyers and sellers engaged in international trade.  Contractual frictions are magnified in international trade by the fact that if one of the parties reneges on a written contract the dispute has to be resolved in local courts (as opposed to international courts) even though the parties are residents of different countries.  This imbalance causes the risk for opportunistic behavior in an international transaction to be greater than in a domestic one and helps to explain why international trade flows are generally significantly lower than domestic trade flows.  Moreover, the fact that contracting institutions are generally worse in developing countries than they are in developed ones means that potential gains from trade are being lost, as is technology transfer from developed to developing countries.   At the same time, recent research has shown that variation in the quality of contracting institutions is actually a source of comparative advantage, which in turn determines trade patterns.

While problems with formal contract enforcement in developing countries tend to exacerbate opportunistic behavior, in some settings informal mechanisms have been put in place to try to improve enforcement.  Informal mechanisms require either repeated interaction leading to reputation and trust or other side constraints to try to improve enforcement.  This is particularly important in the trade of perishable goods where the short life of a product makes it impractical to write and enforce a contract on a supplier’s reliability.  Other mechanisms rely on the financing terms used in the transactions.  An exporter can require the importer to pay for goods before they are shipped, can allow the importer to pay after the goods have arrived at their destination, or can use some form of bank intermediation such as a letter of credit.  The chosen financing terms depend on the countries’ institutional settings of the parties participating in the transaction.  Transactions are more likely to require cash in advance or a letter of credit when the importer is located in a country with weak contractual enforcement.  As an importer develops a relationship with the exporter, transactions are less likely to occur on terms that require prepayment.

The theoretical literature has developed a variety of models that capture institutional features such as enforcement problems, insurance considerations or uncertainty over the parties’ commitment to the relationship.  More recently the availability of microdata has allowed researchers to test the predictions of these models and discover which features are the most relevant for international trade.  Some results suggest that exporters tend to sell larger volumes to countries with good contracting institutions than to countries with weak institutions; experience built via repeated interaction helps exporters to select reliable importers; and banks are more effective than the exporter in pursuing financial claims against importers.

 

Araujo Luis, Giordano Mion and Emanuel Ornelas (2015) “Institutions and Export Dynamic ” Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.

Antràs, Pol, and Fritz C Foley (Forthcoming) “Poultry in Motion: A Study of International Trade Finance PracticesJournal of Political Economy. [Working paper version]

Greif, Avner (2005) “Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting  Exchange” In: Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. C. Menard and M. M. Shirley. New York: Springer

Levchenko, Andrei A. (2007) “Institutional quality and international trade.” The Review of Economic Studies74(3): 791-819. [Working paper version]

Macchiavello, Rocco, and Ameet Morjaria (2015) “The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports.” American Economic Review, 105(9): 2911-45. [Working paper version]

Nunn, Nathan (2007) “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade.Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2), pp. 569-600.

Rodrik, Dani (2000) “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1): 177-186

Williamson, Oliver (1985) “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting.”  The Free Press.

The Age of Sustainable Development

” Jeffrey D. Sachs is one of the world’s most perceptive and original analysts of global development. In this major new work he presents a compelling and practical framework for how global citizens can use a holistic way forward to address the seemingly intractable worldwide problems of persistent extreme poverty, environmental degradation, and political-economic injustice: sustainable development.

Sachs offers readers, students, activists, environmentalists, and policy makers the tools, metrics, and practical pathways they need to achieve Sustainable Development Goals. Far more than a rhetorical exercise, this book is designed to inform, inspire, and spur action. Based on Sachs’s twelve years as director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, his thirteen years advising the United Nations secretary-general on the Millennium Development Goals, and his recent presentation of these ideas in a popular online course, The Age of Sustainable Development is a landmark publication and clarion call for all who care about our planet and global justice.” [Publisher’s book website]

Author’s book website

Reviews / Comments

Book review by  Matthew E. Kahn in Journal of Economic Literature, 53(3), September 2015.

Book review by Richard N. Cooper in Foreign Affairs, September 2015.

Book review by James H. Brown in BioScience, August 2015.

Book review by Pavithra Rao in The Africa Report, June 2015.

Book review by Fred Pearce in New Scientist, March 2015.

Book review by Japhy Wilson in Human Geography, 8(2), 2015.

Global Inequality, Investment, and Trade Frictions in Capital Goods

Since 1950 the global Gini coefficient for between-country income inequality has stood at about 55, reflecting a twenty five-fold difference in wealth between the richest and poorest countries. A well-known stylized fact underpinning this feature of the world economy is that the real investment rate of wealthy countries such as Norway and the United States is roughly two to three times that of poor countries such as Mali and Kenya.  Based on this evidence, the literature seeking to understand international inequality has attributed a key role to differences in physical capital intensity.

The early literature attributes low capital intensity to low savings rates, combined with limited international capital mobility.  Low savings rates have been attributed in turn to poor institutions, and policies that result in high effective tax rates on capital income such as high explicit tax rates, high discount rates, and high dependency ratios.  Alternatively, low-saving traps have been attributed to subsistence consumption needs.  This line of reasoning formed the intellectual foundations for the lending work of institutions such as the World Bank.

A more recent strand of the literature assigns a central role to factors that directly determine the cost of capital.  From this perspective, poor countries have low real investment rates because they tax capital goods, erect or endure barriers to trade in capital goods, or grant monopoly rights to domestic capital goods producers.  Recent contributions to this literature have been organized around an Eaton Kortum (EK) model wherein capital can grow both through domestic and imported capital formation.  Within this framework, trade frictions have been identified as quantitatively important in understanding why standards of living and measured total factor productivity between the richest and poorest countries differ by so much.

Carroll, C.D., B.-K. Rhee, and C. Rhee (1994); “Are here Cultural Effects on Saving? Some Cross-Sectional Evidence.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3): 685–99.

Caselli, F., and J. Feyrer, (2007); “The Marginal Product of Capital.Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2): 535–568. [Working paper version]

Easterly, W., and S. Rebelo. 1993. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3): 417–58.

Eaton, J., and S. Kortum, (2001); “Trade in Capital Goods.European Economic Review 45:1195–1235. [Working paper version]

Higgins, M., and J.G. Williamson, (1997); “Age Structure Dynamics in Asia and Dependence on Foreign Capital.Population and Development Review, 23(2): 261–93.

Hsieh, C.-T., (2001); “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence: Comment.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, NBER Chapters. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 325–330.

Hsieh, C.-T. and P.J. Klenow, (2007); “Relative Prices and Relative Prosperity.American Economic Review 97 (3):562–585. [Working paper version]

Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik. 2001. “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, NBER Chapters. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 261–325.

Waugh, M.E., (2010); “International Trade and Income Differences.American Economic Review 100 (5):2093–2124.

Economic Development through Export Promotion

If economic development is essentially about an economy’s transition from agricultural to industrial production, then the attainment of a comparative advantage in industrial products is widely regarded to be the hallmark of successful development.  Against this backdrop, governments aiming to promote development often seek to do so partly through the promotion of industrial exports.  In light of this, a literature has developed in economics recently to understand whether and under what circumstances policy to promote exports has been successful.

This recent literature focuses on two different types of market imperfection that could motivate government intervention to promote exports.  The first involves hysteresis in exporting.  This is driven by firm heterogeneity in productivity and a sunk cost to foreign market entry, whereby the return to becoming an exporter today includes the option value of continuing to exporting in future without incurring start-up costs.  The second type of market imperfection involves a cost of self-discovery both of new products and of new markets based on learning about the specific products in which a country has a comparative advantage.  In both cases an across-the-board policy to promote exports is found to address the market imperfection: export subsidy and a real exchange rate depreciation respectively.  The main policy conclusion is that an appropriate government policy can help to circumvent the externalities that firms face and hence promote industrial development.  But to be successful these policies must allow the market, as opposed to the government, to determine which firms and products prevail.  While these policy conclusions are promising for economic development in and of themselves, they risk imposing mercantilist or begger-thy-neighbour externalities of their own on other countries.  Indeed, such are the risks associated with export subsidies that there is an initiative at the WTO to phase them out altogether.  Therefore, future research could usefully evaluate whether and how policies can address domestic market imperfections associated with underdevelopment without imposing adverse effects on other nations.

Bernard, A.B., J. Eaton, J.B. Jensen and S. Kortum, (2003); “Plants and Productivity in International Trade.American Economic Review, 93(4): 1268-1290. [Working paper version]

Das, S., M.J. Roberts and J.R. Tybout (2007); “Market Entry Costs, Producer Heterogeneity, and Export Dynamics.” Econometrica, 75(3): 837-873. [Working paper version]

Dixit, A., (1989); “Hysteresis, Import Penetration, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2): 205-228.

Fernandes, A., and H. Tang, (2014); “Learning to Export from Neighbors.Journal of International Economics, 94(1): 67-84. [Working paper version]

Freund, C., and M.D. Pierola, (2012); “Export Surges.Journal of Development Economics 97: 387-395.

Hausmann, R., and D. Rodrik, (2003); “Economic Development as Self Discovery.Journal of Development Economics, 72(2): 603-633. [Working paper version]

New Working Papers – July 2015

The following working papers have recently been added to our working papers page.

Anesi, Vincent and Giovanni Facchini (2014) “Coercive Trade Policy

Baland, Jean-Marie,  Rohini Somanathan and Zaki Wahhaj (2014) “Group Lending and Endogenous Social Sanctions

Basu, Kaushik and Avinash Dixit (2014) “Too Small to Regulate

Besedes, Tibor (2014) “The Effects of European Integration on the Stability of International Trade: A Duration Perspective

Brown, James R., J.Anthony Cookson and Rawley Heimer (2015) “Law and Finance Matter: Lessons from Externally Imposed Courts

Camarero, Mariam, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. and Cecilio Tamarit (2013) “Trade Openness and Income: A Tale of Two Regions

Cookson, J. Anthony (2014) “Economic Consequences of Judicial Institutions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Eberhardt, Markus, Zheng Wang and Zhihong Yu (2015) “From One to Many Central Plans: Drug Advertising Inspections and Intra-National Protectionism in China

Lopes da Fonseca, M. and T. Baskaran (2015) “Re-evaluating the economic costs of conflicts

Martinez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada, Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. and Kai Rehwald (2014) “Is aid for trade effective? A Quantile Regression Approach

Institutions, Firm Growth, and Economic Development

The macroeconomic institutions literature has demonstrated the importance of institutions in promoting economic development and growth.  Economists are now digging deeper to understand the microfoundations of this growth at the level of individual firms.  A feature of developing economies is that fledgling firms find it more difficult to grow than their counterparts in developed countries and remain small throughout their lives.  Seeking to explain this feature, a popular hypothesis is that small firms find it difficult to grow because capital markets do not function efficiently and so firms are credit constrained.  But if this were true then small developing country firms should exhibit high productivity at the margin.  Recent detailed econometric work at the firm level has found that firm level productivity in developing countries is in fact quite low.

A new literature proposes that firms in developing countries are unproductive due to poor management, an idea first introduced by Penrose (1959) but only tested recently through the emergence of appropriate data.  This new literature argues that firms in developing countries remain small because, in the presence of weak contract enforcement institutions, it is difficult for them to incentivize managers appropriately.  As a result managerial decisions are restricted to the families who own the firms, limiting the potential for firm growth.  A striking predictor of firm size in developing countries is the number of male members in the family that owns the firm.  Although progress has been made recently in understanding the importance of institutions for managerial effectiveness, many questions remain open.  For example, what is the external validity of the findings for management effectiveness in the sectors where this research has been undertaken?  What are the links to established theories of management?  Can field experiments be used to discover the most effective management practices?

Akcigit, Ufuk, Harun Alp, and Michael Peters (2014) “Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries”, Working Paper.

Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic (2005) “Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?”, Journal of Finance, 60: 137-177. [Working paper version]

Bloom, Nicholas., and John Van Reenen (2007): “Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (4): 1351-1408 [Working paper version]

Bloom, Nicholas., and John Van Reenen  (2010): “Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms and Countries?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1): 203–224.

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes , Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, (1997) “Legal Determinants of External Finance”, Journal of Finance 52: 1131- 1150.

Laeven Luc and Christopher Woodruff (2007) “The Quality of the Legal System, Firm Ownership, and Firm Size”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(4): 601-614. [Working paper version]

Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Benjamin A. Olken (2014) “The Missing ‘Missing Middle’”,  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3): 89–108.

Penrose, Edith T. (1959) Theory of the Growth of Firms. J. Wiley & Sons, New York

Welcome new members

We would like to welcome the following new members of the InsTED network.

Prof.Lee J. Alston (Indiana University) His research interests have focused on the important roles of institutions, beliefs, and contracts in shaping economic and political outcomes in multiple domains.

Prof.Tibor Besedes (Georgia Institute of Technology ) His research interests include international trade and experimental/behavioral economics.

Prof. Amrita Ray Chaudhuri (University of Winnipeg) Her research interests are industrial organization, environmental economics, and international trade.

Pramila Crivelli (University of Geneva) Her research interests are international trade, development economics, and applied econometrics.

Dr.Fariha Kamal (U.S. Bureau of the Census) Her research interests are international trade and investment, economic geography, and development.

Prof.Volodymyr Lugovsyy (Indiana University) His research interests are international trade, applied microeconomics, and experimental economics.

Dr.Assaf Zimring (University of Michigan) His research interests are international economics, and economics of innovation.

International
Economics
, Economics of Innovation

Kiel Institute Advanced Studies in International Economic Policy Research

Advanced Studies Program 2015/16 the Kiel Institute will again offer several one-week and two-week courses from  August 1, 2015 – May 31, 2016 with outstanding teachers:

Macroeconomics in Open Economies

Cedric Tille (Geneva)

Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

Tommaso Monacelli (Bocconi)

Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice

Lawrence Christiano (Northwestern)

International Trade: Gravity and Geography

Gianmarco Ottaviano (LSE)

Firms in International Trade

Kalina Manova (Stanford)

Globalisation and Labour

David Dorn (Zurich)

International Migration

Hillel Rapoport  (Bar-Ilan)

Economic Growth

Oded Galor (Brown University)

 Economic Development

Rohini Pande (Harvard)

Detailed course outlines are available at Kiel Institute’s website.

Welcome new members

We would like to welcome the following new members of the InsTED network.

Prof. Jean-Marie Baland (University of Namur) His main research interest is in development economics.

Prof. Giovanni Facchini (University of Nottingham) His recent research focuses on the processes through which immigration policies are shaped.

Prof. Saumitra Jha (Stanford Graduate School of Business) His primary research interests are comparative politics, development economics, economic history, and political economy.