Heterogeneous Effects of Economic Integration Agreements

By Scott L. Baier (Clemson University), Jeffrey H. Bergstrand (University of Notre Dame), and Matthew W. Clance (University of Pretoria)

It is now widely accepted that economic integration agreements (EIAs) and other trade-policy liberalizations contribute to nations’ economic growth and development. EIAs have proliferated among North-North (N-N), North-South (N-S), and South-South (S-S) country-pairs. While such agreements inevitably alter distributions of income within countries, for the most part EIAs are believed to raise economic welfare. A major recent advance in the international trade literature — in the wake of and building upon theoretical developments associated with firm heterogeneity and export fixed costs — is the development of the “new quantitative trade models.”[1] These models provide calculations of general equilibrium trade and welfare effects of trade liberalizations using exogenous (variable-cost) “trade elasticities” estimated from structural gravity equations combined with aggregate bilateral trade data. Moreover, estimates of welfare effects of EIAs can be computed once one has partial treatment effects from a properly specified gravity equation with EIA dummy variables and an exogenous trade-elasticity (parameter) value.[2]

However, an important unresolved and hardly explored issue is whether — and by what factors — trade elasticities with respect to trade-policy changes vary across time and space, that is, are sensitive to “particular settings”; this is particularly important in contrasting trade elasticities for N-N, N-S, and S-S EIAs. In a recent study, we address three particular questions related to this issue.[3] First, how are trade elasticities — fixed-cost-trade-policy trade elasticities as well as variable-cost ones — theoretically related to levels of fixed and variable trade-cost variables, which vary dramatically between N-N, N-S, and S-S pairs? Second, is there convincing empirical evidence supporting these theoretical interactions? Third, how important quantitatively is the heterogeneity in partial equilibrium trade impacts in determining the general equilibrium welfare impacts of trade-policy liberalizations?

To address these questions, we provided three contributions. First, we extended a standard Melitz model of trade to show theoretically how extensive-margin, intensive-margin, and trade elasticities are endogenous to the levels of theoretical bilateral variable and fixed, policy and non-policy trade costs — even with CES preferences and with an untruncated Pareto productivity distribution.[4] Among several theoretical results, we note three. While the intensive-margin elasticity of tariff rates is sensitive only to the relative levels of variable policy and non-policy trade costs, the extensive-margin elasticity is sensitive also to the relative importance of bilateral endogenous export fixed costs (via network effects) in total bilateral export fixed costs. While the intensive-margin elasticity of policy export fixed costs is zero, the extensive-margin elasticity of policy export fixed costs is sensitive to the relative importance of bilateral endogenous export fixed costs in total bilateral export fixed costs as well as the relative importance of exogenous policy export fixed costs to exogenous non-policy export fixed costs. The theoretical comparative statics provide numerous predictions about how proxies for (time-invariant exogenous) natural variable trade costs and policy and non-policy export fixed costs influence the expected partial effects of EIAs on intensive margins, extensive margins, and bilateral trade.

Second, we evaluated empirically our theoretical hypotheses. We provided empirical evidence confirming our theory and demonstrated the heterogeneity of EIAs’ trade effects depending upon country-pairs’ geographic, cultural, institutional, and development characteristics. Extending earlier work, this is the first study to show evidence that extensive-margin, intensive-margin, and trade-flow EIA elasticities are indeed sensitive to levels of (observable) bilateral variable and fixed, policy and non-policy trade costs in a manner consistent with theoretical comparative statics.[5] Trade elasticities with respect to trade-policy changes do vary across “particular settings.” Geographic, cultural, institutional, and development country-pair characteristics all significantly influence the extensive margin elasticity, whereas primarily geographic variables (distance and adjacency) influence the intensive margin elasticity, consistent with our theory.

Finally, our framework allows us to put to ex ante use the partial effects of EIAs. By explaining the heterogeneity of EIAs’ effects according to theoretically-motivated factors, one can use the heterogeneous partial (treatment) effects for ex ante predictions and we demonstrate empirically that the partial effect of an EIA tends to be much larger for a pair of developing economies. Moreover, in the context of the new quantitative trade models, we demonstrate empirically using two approaches how sensitive quantitatively general equilibrium welfare effects of EIA liberalizations are to the bilaterally heterogeneous (partial) trade elasticities. In one approach, we calculate the general equilibrium welfare effects for importers of 1,358 bilateral EIA liberalizations among N-N, N-S, and S-S country-pairs. Consistent with theory, we show that 98-99 percent of the variation in these 1,358 welfare changes can be explained by the variation in two statistics: the estimated pair-specific bilateral EIA partial (treatment) effect and the share of the importer’s national expenditures on exports from the EIA partner. In the other approach, we show that the probability of two countries having an EIA — which in the context of a theoretical model is related to the net welfare gain from such EIA — is highly correlated with the heterogeneous EIA coefficients and the trade shares.[6] Our results suggest that a 10 percent lower average per capita income of a country-pair is associated with a 60 percent higher partial (trade) effect of an EIA. We close our study by demonstrating the relevance of our findings to the current trade-policy debate, analyzing the partial effect of “Brexit” from the European Union (EU), as well the potential effects of two EU members that are developing economies exiting the EU.

References

Arkolakis, C., A. Costinot, A. Rodriguez-Clare, (2012); “New Trade Models, Same Old Gains?American Economic Review, 102 (1), 94-130.

Baier, S., and J. Bergstrand, (2004); “Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements.Journal of International Economics, 64 (1), 29-63.

Baier, S., J. Bergstrand, and M. Clance, (2018); “Heterogeneous Effects of Economic Integration Agreements.Journal of Development Economics, 135, 587-608.

Baier, S., J. Bergstrand, and M. Feng, (2014); “Economic Integration Agreements and the Margins of International Trade.Journal of International Economics, 93 (2), 339-350.

Costinot, A., and A. Rodriguez-Clare, (2014); “Trade Theory with Numbers.” In Handbook of International Economics, Volume 4, edited by G. Gopinath, E. Helpman, and K. Rogoff. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam.

Head, K., and T. Mayer, (2014); “Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, and Cookbook.” In Handbook of International Economics, Volume 4, edited by G. Gopinath, E. Helpman, and K. Rogoff. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam.

Melitz, M., and S. Redding, (2015); “New Trade Models, New Welfare Implications,” American Economic Review, 105 (3), 1105-1146.

Novy, D., (2013); “International Trade without CES: Estimating Translog Gravity,” Journal of International Economics, 89 (2), 271-282.

Endnotes

[1] See Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), Head and Mayer (2014), and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014).

[2] See Head and Mayer (2014).

[3] See Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance (2018).

[4] Novy (2013) generated endogenous trade elasticities by assuming transcendental logarithmic preferences and Melitz and Redding (2015) generated endogenous trade elasticities by assuming a truncated Pareto productivity distribution.

[5] See Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and Head and Mayer (2014) for earlier work.

[6] See Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for underpinnings on this methodology.

Community-Based Action to Fight Corruption

By Avinash Dixit (Princeton University)

How should a country fight corruption? Most people would answer that the government should make and enforce strong laws against it. But further thinking should show that this approach won’t get far. The politicians who make laws, and the officials who enforce them, all stand to benefit from the prevailing corrupt system. One cannot expect them to go against their strong self-interest. They will make weak laws with loopholes; their enforcement will be lax and itself riddled with corruption. At a minimum, formal legal avenues must be supplemented by participatory and organized efforts of the losers – citizens. Participatory because mere voting is not enough; even if a corrupt government is voted out, the new one will act with the implicit motto: “It is now our turn to eat”. Organized because any one citizen or firm is helpless when a politician or official demands a bribe, but collectively they have a lot of power. The question is how to harness it effectively.

This is a prisoners’ dilemma for consumers and businesses. If no one else is giving bribes, you improve your chances by bribery; if everyone else is complicit in bribery, you will only hurt yourself if you refrain. So bribery is the dominant strategy for all. But when everyone chooses it, in the aggregate they merely cancel one another’s actions and transfer money to politicians and officials. Social scientists have observed and theorized about numerous ways to resolve prisoners’ dilemmas using bottom-up, self-enforcing strategies. We can deploy this knowledge and experience to devise community-based action against corruption.

We know that successful collective action to resolve prisoners’ dilemmas requires: (1) a group with stable ongoing relationships, (2) common knowledge of what constitutes cooperation and cheating, (3) common knowledge of the sanctions to be imposed on cheaters, (4) good detection of cheating, (5) good communication of incidents of cheating to all participants, (6) incentives for members to take their designated action to punish a cheater.[1]

A business community can establish a “no bribery” norm and enforce it using the sanction that anyone found violating it would be ostracized by the others, which would cut him/her off from all the interactions – contracts, supply chains, finance and so on – that any business needs to function in today’s economies.

Let us see how this meets the desiderata listed above.[2]

(1) The community should have some organized structure such as a Chamber of Commerce, which a business is required to join in order to benefit from networking and trade relations, or be on a list qualified to bid for government business.

(2) Members must pledge not to attempt bribery to win any government contracts or licenses or to influence the decisions of regulators, legislators, and courts.

(3) Any member found violating the norm is subject to ostracism by others. This means cutting off business contacts, but can also include social ostracism if the Chamber has a social branch where the families of businesspeople meet. No one wants their spouses and children excluded from social activities of friends, so this threat can be very effective. But experience shows that sanctions should be graduated, not drastic ones triggered by small infractions; therefore violations especially by new and small members should be met first with warnings, and escalate to full ostracism only if they persist.

(4) The Chamber should have a good gossip network, and contacts with media and officials, that enable it to sniff out corruption, and a tribunal that can investigate suspicions or allegations of corruption. This can be supplemented by a more formal research unit that gives ratings to firms for their clean or corrupt behavior, similar to the Michelin star ratings for restaurants. It is extremely important to avoid false accusations, under severe penalties against anyone found making them. It is also important that the tribunal is not perceived as an insiders’ club that serves to exclude newcomers. A broad outside representation of respected senior retired businesspeople, public figures, media personnel, and academics should oversee the working of the tribunal.

(5) The name and picture of anyone convicted of violating the norms should be publicized widely, as done by the famous New York Diamond Merchants’ Club.[3]

(6) A system like the Honor Codes against cheating that exist in some universities, where refusing to report a violation is itself a violation requiring similar sanction, can create an incentive to take part in the ostracism of a convicted briber. But more than that: If A is ostracized by everyone and invites B to deal with him, B knows that A has nothing worse to fear by cheating in their interaction, and therefore that he must give up a bigger share of the available joint profit or rent to A to keep him honest. In other words, it is more costly to deal with a convicted briber than with someone who has a clean record.

The prisoners’ dilemma view of corruption can be supplemented by a coordination game.[4] Societies have two kinds of equilibria, one where everyone is corrupt and that is just an accepted state of affairs, and another with a clean culture where corruption is shameful and rare. How to shift from a corrupt to a clean equilibrium? Try harnessing the idealism of youth. Everywhere the young, especially the best educated and most enterprising, want their country to be modern and corruption-free. Other things reasonably equal, they prefer to work for, and buy from, firms with good governance and ethical behavior. A movement that channels these preferences into action can create an environment in which such clean firms attract the best talent, are favored by consumers, and therefore are more profitable; this builds momentum for more and more firms to eschew corruption. Indeed, such an organization is having some success in Sicily to fight the Mafia’s extortion; bureaucrats should be easier to counter.[5]

I am not claiming that such organizations or movements will successfully eliminate corruption everywhere, or quickly, or completely. But corruption is such an obstacle to development that even a little success is worth having. Nothing else has worked at all well. Waiting for a 100% effective solution only ensures getting 0% progress.[6]

Suggestions for further reading

Transparency International, (2016); The Benefits of Anti-Corruption and Corporate Transparency.  Working Paper #01/2016.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015); The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge University Press.

Basu, K., and T. Cordella (eds). (2018); Institutions, Governance, and the Control of Corruption, Palgrave Macmillan.

References

Bernstein, L., (1992); “Opting out of the legal system: Extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry.Journal of Legal Studies, 21(1), 115–57.

Dixit, A., (2004); Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press.

Dixit, A., (2017); “Fighting corruption by altering the equilibrium in an assurance game.” working paper, November 2017, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/wrkps.html

Dixit, A., (2018); “Anti-Corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory.” Published in K. Basu and T. Cordella, (eds.) Institutions, Governance, and the Control of Corruption, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 15-49.

Dixit, A. and R. Mankar (2018); “New ideas for fighting corruption in India,” LiveMint, April 23, 2018, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/mxVdMVeQUBEfoJWmY0scRL/New-ideas-for-fighting-corruption-in-India.html .

Dugatkin, L., (1999); Cheating Monkeys and Citizen Bees: The Nature of Cooperation in Animals and Humans, Harvard University Press, 1999

Greif, A., (2006); Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press.

Jacobson, P., (2014); “Addiopizzo: The Grassroots Campaign Making Life Hell for the Sicilian Mafia,” Newsweek, September 17, 2014.

Ostrom, E., (2015); Governing the Commons: Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Canto Classics reissue.

Superti, C., (2009); “Addiopizzo: Can a Label Defeat the Mafia?” Journal of International Policy Solutions, 11, Spring 2009 3-11.

Endnotes

[1] This list derives from studies and meta-analyses of many prisoners’ dilemmas of collective action: common resource pool problems (most notably Ostrom 2015), contract enforcement (for example Greif 2006, and Dixit 2004), and socio-biology (for example Dugatkin, 1999), to cite just a few.

[2] For more detailed arguments see Dixit (2018).

[3] See Bernstein (1992).

[4] A model with supporting evidence is in Dixit (2017).

[5] See Superti (2009) and Jacobson (2014).

[6] An OpEd offers a starter attempt to implement these ideas in India: Dixit and Mankar (2018).

 

 

Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and Applications

By Eric Alston (University of Colorado Boulder), Lee Alston (Indiana University Bloomington), Bernardo Mueller (University of Brasilia), and Tomas Nonnenmacher (Allegheny College, Pennsylvania)

Today, the notion that “institutions matter” is broadly accepted.  Scholars have generated a rich literature on the causes and effects of institutions spanning from the micro to the macro level. The pioneering work of Buchanan, Coase, North, Ostrom, Williamson, and many others is the fertile soil in which the literature in Institutional and Organizational Analysis (IOA) has taken root and blossomed. There is a wealth of institutional scholarship that now spans disciplines, decades, and continents. Our 2018 book with Cambridge University Press, Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and Applications, expands on many of the major contributions in this area, organized within a framework that explains both the effects and determinants of institutions and norms.

Our book is centered on the insight that institutions and norms are fundamental determinants of economic and political development. Institutions are rules that recognized authorities create, and choose whether or not to enforce. Norms are long-standing patterns of behavior, shared by a subset of people in a society or organization. Institutions and norms play a role in all organizations, including governments, firms, churches, universities, gangs, and even families. In our book, we (1) present a set of concepts—for example, institutions, norms, property rights, and transaction costs—used in IOA that link institutions and norms to economic performance; (2) use the same set of concepts to better understand political organizations and performance; and (3) build a framework based on those concepts for understanding divergent developmental trajectories of nations around the world. In Parts I and II, we define the concepts needed to understand how economic activity is organized and how institutions and norms shape economic and political outcomes. In Part III, we add the comparatively recent work on beliefs and leadership to better understand the fundamental question of why there has not been convergence in economic and political performance across countries. In the following paragraphs, we summarize the three parts of our book in greater detail, which is intended as a useful reference for advanced students and scholars alike.

In Part I of the book, we link institutions to property rights, transaction costs, and economic performance. In Chapter 1, we examine how institutions and norms shape property rights. Property is a social construct; that is, property rights define our ability to use different aspects of an asset. In Chapter 2, we define transaction costs as the costs of “transfer, capture, and protection” of property rights. Transaction costs are a key determinant of organizational and contractual choice. In Chapter 3, we analyze how different types of transaction costs shape the structure of contracts and organizations. The price mechanism and hierarchies can be thought of as endpoints on a spectrum of contractual choices, and we provide a theoretical justification for and examples of different intermediary forms.

In Part II, we explain the determinants of institutions taking as fixed the basic constitutional rules and current economic performance. In the four chapters, we analyze the process through which groups and individuals lobby and government supplies laws and regulations. In Chapter 4, we address the role and impact of interest groups on government policy. Every policy is potentially redistributive, so firms and individuals organize to influence redistribution in their favor. In Chapter 5, we assess the roles of the legislature and the executive as the organizations in charge of creating and implementing legislation. In Chapter 6, we address the role of the bureaucracy and its impacts on the content, quality, and effectiveness of the outcomes of laws. In Chapter 7, we analyze how institutions can influence the structure and output of the judiciary. We also examine the impact that judiciaries have on institutions and norms.

Simple economics suggest that countries should have converged in terms of economic and political development. Moreover, scholars in the IOA have spilled a lot of ink in showing the socially beneficial institutions that accompany development. But despite an increasingly well-known institutional template, countries have not converged in terms of economic and political development and, in many cases, have outright declined. A number of explanations to this puzzle have emerged: (1) it is not in the interest of those in power to have economic and political development; (2) poorer countries have not converged because the volatility of their growth rates means such economies are as likely to shrink as grow; and (3) a change in fundamental core beliefs about how institutions affect outcomes is required to break out of the status quo. In Part III, we discuss the role of core beliefs and leadership in bringing about changes to constitutional-level institutions. Though we do not directly analyze culture or ideas as a determinant, we recognize their importance as background conditions that determine which belief changes take place. We stress leadership for its coordinative function within a dominant network that is negotiating how to respond to either an existing shock or a foreseeable crisis that could be attenuated or avoided, provided sufficient institutional change occurs.

Further, we identify fruitful avenues for research within each of our referential frames of institutional and organizational analysis, from the economic to the political to the constitutional. Our text provides useful background for the future areas of research we suggest by laying out many of the foundational contributions of the emerging discipline. It is our hope that the text will serve as a resource in helping to define the still emerging field of IOA. Our book is relevant for advanced undergraduates, as well as a valuable reference for graduate students and scholars. The analysis of the emergence and evolution of complex rule sets has proven to be one of the most illuminating areas of economic study over the course of the past century, and we accordingly describe how much more we think the field has to contribute.

Export Competitiveness of Developing Countries and US Trade Policy

By Shushanik Hakobyan[1] (International Monetary Fund)

With rising US trade protectionism against its major trading partners, the Generalized System of Preferences or GSP, a long-running scheme of tariff exemptions meant to aid exporters in developing countries, may get less attention. While GSP imports account for about one percent of total US imports, they account for about ten percent of all imports from GSP beneficiaries with considerable heterogeneity across countries.[2] Since the early 1970s, the GSP has given a boost to these exporters by granting their products duty-free access to the US market thereby aiding the efforts to expand their industrial and exporting capacity. But as with any policy, the devil is in the details. Despite the benefits, uptake has been low due to a number of reasons, including a low margin of preference granted by GSP, uncertainty about the permanence of the GSP program, and the statutory caps on benefits designed to prevent “abuse” by successful exporters.[3] My research focuses on the latter and explores whether these caps are well-targeted and serve their designated purpose.[4]

One of the features of the US GSP, the so-called Competitive Needs Limits, or CNLs, act as caps on benefits by excluding exporters exceeding CNL thresholds. There are two criteria to identify country-product pairs that have exceeded CNLs: (1) imports exceeding a certain value threshold in a calendar year, set at $180 million in 2017, and increasing by $5 million every year; (2) import share of a country in a given product exceeding the percentage threshold set at 50 percent. Meeting either criteria triggers an automatic exclusion of a country-product pair from GSP in the following year. The range of imports that exceed these thresholds varies greatly in terms of value. For example, the eligibility of Indian exporters of gold necklaces and neck chains was revoked in 2008, following their exports reaching $266 million in the previous calendar year (the value threshold in 2007 was set at $130 million). Likewise, the Argentine exporters of green olives lost their GSP eligibility in 2008 after accounting for 66 percent of total imports of green olives into the US in 2007. It is worth noting that Argentina had not exported green olives in the previous five years prior to 2007.

There are three ways to avoid losing the GSP benefits due to the CNL. First, if total US imports of a given product are trivial, at most $23.5 million in 2017 (set to increase by $0.5 million every year), a de minimis waiver could be applicable. Second, the percentage threshold may be waived if a directly competitive product was not produced in the US on January 1, 1995 (504(d) waiver). Lastly, country-product pairs exceeding the value or percentage CNL may petition for a more “permanent” CNL waiver.

To evaluate the impact of these caps on exporters, I examine the universe of all country-product pairs that have been excluded for more than two years from GSP over the period of 1997-2010. There have been 202 country-product pairs that met the CNL criteria in this period and were excluded from the GSP, accounting for $7 billion in imports (in the pre-exclusion year) or about 31 percent of US imports claiming GSP on average over this period. I estimate country-product level regressions of the value and share of imports on a set of binary variables indicating the first, second and third year of exclusion.

I find that the CNL exclusions are associated with a continuous decline in exports and import shares for up to three years after the exclusion, leading to a 75 percent drop by the third year of exclusion relative to the pre-exclusion average. Similarly, import shares drop by 42 percentage points from an average of 63 percent prior to the exclusion. This drop is predominantly driven by exporters who meet the percentage threshold with lower valued exports. These results are robust to employing volume data instead of values. Furthermore, the effect is larger for products facing higher MFN tariff rates. By the third year of exclusion, the value of imports and import shares of exporters eligible for a de minimis waiver drop by 50 and 75 percent, respectively, relative to pre-exclusion averages. In contrast, the impact of CNLs on the largest country-product pairs that exceeded the value threshold is negligible.

A related question of interest is the potential impact of CNLs on imports from other GSP beneficiary countries. If CNL-affected countries are unable to continue exporting to the US, who fills the void — other GSP countries or non-GSP countries? I find that import shares rise considerably more for non-GSP countries. By the third year of exclusion, the share of imports from other GSP eligible countries increases by 7 percentage points from a pre-exclusion average of 7 percent, whereas the share of imports from non-GSP countries rises by 29 percentage points (pre-exclusion average share is 25 percent).

Arguably, CNLs do not serve their intended purpose of identifying exporters who no longer need the preferential market access and allowing other GSP beneficiary countries benefit more from the program. Instead, CNLs tend to target small exporters, forcing them to stop exporting to the U.S. altogether, and mostly benefit non-GSP exporters.

These findings call for tweaks to the design of the program. Two simple changes can be made to boost the utilization of the program. First, since percentage CNL fails to identify successful exporters, a more holistic approach that takes into account both the value of imports and market share is needed to accurately detect such exporters. Second, the analysis of exports over a longer period (instead of the statutory one year) could go in hand with the previous suggestion by capturing the export dynamics of given products. These simple changes would ensure a lasting market access for the countries whom the GSP scheme is intended to help.

References

Blanchard, E., and S. Hakobyan, (2015); “The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences in Principle and Practice,” The World Economy 38(3).

Hakobyan, S., (2015); “Accounting for Underutilization of Trade Preference Programs: U.S. Generalized System of Preferences,” Canadian Journal of Economics 48(2), 2015.

Hakobyan, S., (2017a); “Export Competitiveness of Developing Countries and U.S. Trade Policy,” The World Economy 40(7).

Hakobyan, S., (2017b); “GSP Expiration and Declining Exports from Developing Countries,” Working Paper, 2017.

Ornelas, E., (2016); “Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries,” in Handbook of Commercial Policy, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (eds.), Vol. 1B, Amsterdam, North-Holland: Elsevier.

Endnotes

[1] The views expressed in this column are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, its management, or its member country governments.

[2] See Ornelas (2016) for a general introduction to GSP, an aspect of special and differential treatment for developing countries under the World Trade Organization.

[3] See Blanchard and Hakobyan (2015), Hakobyan (2015, 2017b).

[4] See Hakobyan (2017a).

Summary of the 5th InsTED Workshop at Syracuse University

We would like to thank The Department of Economics and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, for hosting and sponsoring the 5th InsTED Workshop.  We are also grateful for sponsorship and organizational support from the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, as well as sponsorship from the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC) and the University of Exeter Business School.  The workshop took place at the Maxwell School from May 15th-16th 2018.  Special thanks go to Kristy Buzard and Devashish Mitra as joint chairs of the local organizing committee, and Juanita Horan for her extremely helpful interactions with everyone.

The program comprised of 18 papers ranging over four broad topics at the intersection of institutions, trade and economic development.  The first was global value chains, focusing on how they are determined at the firm level, and what their implications are for economic outcomes, especially in the developing world.  The second topic examined ongoing concerns about the implications of trade integration for income distribution, with emphasis on a developing country perspective.   The third concerned the interaction between trade integration or other institutional reform and resource allocation.  The fourth was on institutional constraints on international trade policy, including a look at the implications of restrictions imposed by the World Trade Organization.  There now follows a summary of all the papers presented at the workshop, organized under these four topic headings.  A bibliography, together with links to papers where available, is provided at the end.  Please note that for brevity the summary mentions presenters’ names but not those of their co-authors.  This information is contained in the bibliography.

Global Value Chains: Their Determinants and Implications

The spread of global value chains (GVCs) over the last thirty years or so has been a key new feature of the current wave of globalization, and important for the integration of developing countries into the world economy.  At the broadest level, the spread of GVCs has been facilitated by innovations in information and communication technology, the deepening of trade liberalization and ongoing reduction in transport costs, and political developments principally involving the fall of the iron curtain.  But in this globally more integrated environment, there is growing appreciation that firm-level decisions play a critical role in the determination of how global value chains actually form.  The outcome of these decisions has been characterized in terms of GVCs forming either as ‘spiders’, where a central ‘body’ imports inputs for assembly from various ‘legs’ that originate in different countries, or where a product is assembled sequentially along the length of a ‘snake’.  Such trade in intermediate inputs now accounts for 70% of global trade, spanning not just developed but developing countries as well.

The keynote address by Pol Antràs discussed his research project to model how firm-level extensive margin sourcing decisions are made, that give rise to the formation of GVCs.  His motivation of the need for a new model was that the canonical Melitz model renders firm export decisions tractable by assuming constant (exogenous) marginal costs, while firm import decisions are made specifically to lower marginal costs which are therefore endogenous.  The interdependence in a firm’s extensive margin import decisions complicates the firm’s problem considerably.  In the case of a spider, this involves a combinatorial problem with 2J possible choices, where J denotes the number of possible source countries.  In the case of a snake, the problem is similarly complex.

Antràs presented two papers, which provide tractable ways to model firm decisions in the cases of spiders and snakes respectively in ways that can be estimated structurally in the data.  In the case of spiders, the modelling approach is to apply an iterative algorithm that exploits complementarities in the decision of a firm to import from particular markets, and uses lattice theory to reduce the dimensionality of the firm’s optimal sourcing strategy problem.  The results show that while the ‘China shock’ resulted in an overall decline in domestic sourcing by US firms, the most productive firms actually increased domestic sourcing due to the cost savings derived through sourcing from China.  In the case of snakes, where the value chain is sequential, Antràs showed that the lead firm’s problem becomes one of solving the least cost path through a sequence of suppliers.  By applying a different algorithm the paper shows that, other things equal, it is optimal to locate relatively downstream stages of production in relatively central locations.  He then discussed counterfactual exercises that illustrate how changes in trade barriers affect the extent to which various countries participate in domestic, regional or global value chains, and traces the real income consequences of these changes.  Using this approach, substantial income gains are shown to arise from the increased participation of low-income countries in GVCs.

A key question motivating the literature on the extensive margins of trade is whether better firm performance gives rise to exporting or, conversely, exporting improves firm performance.  A particular form of this question is as follows: if offered the opportunity to export through a marketing arrangement in a developed country, can firms in developing countries upgrade the quality of the goods they produce and export, thereby increasing their incomes?  Rocco Macchiavello presented a paper on the case of the Nespresso sustainable quality program in Colombia.  The dataset constructed for the paper matches detailed administrative data on the universe of Colombian Coffee farmers with transaction-level data along three stages in the coffee chain, from the export gate to the farm gate.  Machiavello and his collaborators find that the program induced farmers to upgrade their coffee plantations, expand their farms as well as production, increase the quality of the coffee produced, and the loyalty of their marketing arrangement.  Most notably, a price premium of approximately 5-8% is fully transmitted along the supply chain, from the export gate to the farm gate, thereby bringing significant income gains to farmers in the developing world.  This paper therefore adds to the evidence supporting the view that gaining the opportunity to export can indeed enhance firm performance.

While GVCs can potentially increase incomes by creating cost advantages and quality improvements, there is widespread concern that cost advantages may be gained through lax environmental and labor regulation in countries where suppliers are located.  Sebastian Krautheim presented a paper studying this issue both theoretically and empirically.  In the model of his paper, a Northern firm can save costs by outsourcing to a Southern supplier that uses a cost-saving but unethical technology.  Contracts are incomplete, so that a firm has limited control over unethical technology choices of suppliers along the value chain.  The technology is a credence characteristic, in that consumers care about it but cannot know what it is.  However, the model features a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can reveal the technology being used.  Using the unethical technology creates an incentive to increase scale, but this also increases the probability of being detected by the NGO.  The paper provides empirical support for the model’s prediction that a high cost advantage of ‘unethical’ production in an industry and a low regulatory stringency in the supplier’s country favor international outsourcing as opposed to vertical FDI.

Trade Integration and Income Distribution

There has long been a concern that deeper trade integration causes an increase in inequality.  This is the focus of the famous Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, which arises directly from the classic Hecksher-Ohlin model and in a wider set of settings as well.  It predicts that if, compared to the South, skilled labor is relatively abundant in the North while unskilled labor is relatively scarce, then deeper trade integration will drive an increase in inequality in the North and a decrease in the South.  Previous academic debates tended to focus on the rise in inequality in the North, and the extent to which trade integration with the South was ‘to blame’.

In her keynote address, Nina Pavcnik presented her literature review that assesses the current state of evidence on how international trade shapes inequality and poverty.  Her review focuses mainly on developing countries, reflecting the fact that there is now more evidence in that context, but her discussion drew parallels to the empirical evidence on developed countries as well.  Her review also discusses perceptions about international trade in over 40 countries at different levels of development, including perceptions on trade’s overall benefits for the economy, trade’s effect on the livelihood of workers through wages and jobs, and trade’s contribution to inequality.  In framing the review, she noted that while most studies of developed countries focus on import shocks, studies of developing countries present evidence on export shocks as well to provide a more nuanced picture.

One insight that emerges from Pavcnik’s review is that losers from trade liberalization tend to be geographically concentrated and persistent over time because the costs are large.  Another insight is that worker-firm affiliation matters for how individuals are affected by trade liberalization.  Better performing firms tend to be better equipped to respond to the opportunities arising from trade liberalization.  Declines in industry employment from import competition are concentrated in less productive firms and workers.    A third insight is that one cannot ignore the effects of the informal sector in developing countries.  In some cases, international trade supports economic development by promoting the transfer of labor from inefficient informal firms to more efficient formal firms.  In others, especially where labor markets are poorly functioning or government support for those displaced from employment by trade is absent, the informal sector can serve as a coping mechanism for trade shocks.  Pavcnik noted that these outcomes are in some cases at significant variance to the predictions derived from the classic H-O model, especially because it does not have a role for firms.  The main policy recommendation to come out of her review was that governments must support workers and not jobs, because it is inevitable that the gains from trade are realized through the destruction of jobs, and the costs to workers are substantial.

The program featured two papers that studied the effects of trade policy in India.  The paper presented by Beyza Ural Marchand studies the distributional implications, with a particular focus on the poor, by asking: ‘what would be the distributional effects of eliminating the current protectionist structure?’  Thus her focus is on the welfare implications of a move from current trade policies to free trade.  The welfare effects are estimated through household expenditure and earnings effects of liberalization. The results indicate that Indian trade policy is pro-poor through the earnings channel, as its elimination leads to higher welfare losses for poorer households. But it is pro-rich through the expenditure channel, as its elimination leads to higher welfare gains for poorer households.  On balance, surprisingly, Marchand finds that Indian trade policy is regressive overall.

The paper presented by Ariel Weinberger investigates the liberalization episode in India during the 1990’s, which has been characterized by large and unexpected changes in trade and foreign investment policies.  Contrary to what might have been expected, given the secular decline in labor shares since the 1980s, his paper finds that trade reforms mostly raised the labor-to-capital relative factor shares in India. A reduction in capital tariffs and liberalization of FDI raise the share of income paid to labor relative to capital. His results reveal access to foreign capital as a new mechanism through which openness affects factor shares: imported capital augments technical change and potentially reduces rental rates, both of which raise the relative labor share.  Weinberger and his collaborator attribute the observed overall decline in the labor share to domestic deregulation policies and credit expansion.

Richard Chisik reversed the direction of enquiry relative to the papers above.  Rather than look at the effects of trade on inequality, his paper considers the effect of inequality on trade.  The prior literature notes that a foreign transfer may generate a ‘Dutch disease’ type effect in the recipient country: a transfer brings about a real exchange rate appreciation via an increase in wages that can reduce the size of the manufacturing sector.  This may reduce manufacturing exports or even eliminate a comparative advantage in manufacturing altogether.  In this literature, remittances have been considered isomorphic to foreign aid in causing the Dutch disease. Chisik’s paper questions this apparent similarity.  His paper argues that, whereas aid generates a Dutch disease effect, remittances can lead to growth of manufacturing.  The reason is that (ironically) aid tends to go to wealthier individuals who spend the money on non-traded services, which does appreciate the real exchange rate and shrinks the manufacturing sector, while remittances tend to go to poorer individuals who spend on manufactures which tends to increase the size of that sector.  The differing effects on the relative size of the manufacturing sector have, in turn, different bearings on comparative advantage.  The paper presents econometric results supportive of their model.

Rather than focus directly on trade and inequality, Ben Zissimos looked at how the inequality created by international trade can threaten the survival of dictatorships, especially in the face of world price shocks.  In his paper, the survival of dictatorships is taken to be a bad thing because they tend to support extractive economic institutions that fail to promote economic development.  The theory developed in the paper predicts that, in food exporting dictatorships, a world food price spike can provoke the threat of revolution.  Dictatorships are predicted to respond by making transfers using export taxes, hence defusing the threat of revolution and forestalling democratization.  The prior literature on institutions and development has tended to focus on the use of domestic redistributive taxation for the purposes of defusing the threat of revolution.  But the paper presented by Zissimos draws on evidence to suggest that dictatorships do not install domestic redistributive capacity for fear that it will be used to tax away their wealth.  Trade taxes, which are available to dictators, are used instead for this purpose.  Hence the paper proposes a new motive for the use of trade policy.  It also provides econometric results supportive of the predictions of the model.

Trade and Resource Reallocation Effects of Trade Integration and Institutional Reform

As tariffs have been reduced through multilateral trade rounds and the formation of free trade agreements, attention has shifted to other measures such as product standards, intellectual property protection, and infrastructure in an effort to facilitate integration where appropriate.

The paper presented by Walter Steingress quantifies the heterogeneous trade effects of harmonizing standards on product entry and exit as well as export sales.  Using a novel and comprehensive database on cross-country standard equivalences, the paper identifies standard harmonization events.  To track harmonization events, the paper presents a new correspondence table between the International Classification for Standards (ICS) and Harmonized System (HS) codes.  The results Steingress reported show that, on average, standard harmonization leads to a 0.5% increase in export sales. This effect is driven by an increase in the intensive margin, a decrease in prices and an increase in the quantities sold.  The paper argues that these results are compatible with a theoretical framework where standard harmonization leads to higher fixed costs as companies have to adapt to the new standards, but simultaneously reduced variable costs, thus increasing overall trade flows.

In her paper, Magdalene Silberberger broaches the impact of trade liberalization on health, safety and environmental (HSE) standards.  She and her collaborator ask whether tariff liberalization causes ‘regulatory chill’, meaning that countries are reluctant to implement HSE standards, or instead causes a race to the top as governments seek to use standards as non-tariff barriers to trade.  Her paper analyzes annual country-by-industry data on notifications of changes in sanitary and phytosanitary standards by WTO members. The results suggest that the impact of increased trade pressure depends on whether domestic producers are likely to gain or lose from a change in standards. Regulatory chill is the dominant response in most countries, but countries in which producers can adapt to standards relatively cheaply appear to race to the top.  Consequently, that paper concludes that tariff liberalization is associated with a divergence in standards across countries.

Shifting the focus from standards to patents, Tom Zylkin explored the effects of cross-border patents on international trade.  His paper highlights an ambiguity as to what one might expect here.  On the one hand, a firm might file a patent in another country because it wants to protect a good that it plans to export there.  On the other hand, the reason for filing a patent in another country might be that the firm wants to produce a good there instead of exporting it.  So, he argued, cross-border patents could be complements or substitutes to trade.  Using a highly disaggregated database of all patents filed in and out of developed and developing countries, his paper provides the first systematic analysis of how bilateral trade responds to bilateral filings.  It reports results suggesting large roles for geographic as well as industry-level heterogeneity, suggestive of competing motivations for cross-border patenting.  Patents promote bilateral exports—and negate bilateral imports—in high-demand elasticity industries, but can have the opposite effect in industries where the products are primarily used as intermediate inputs and/or between countries that are not far apart geographically.

The final two papers in this section consider the effects on economic performance of fundamental changes to the domestic economic and political environment.  Mingzhi (Jimmy) Xu‘s paper studies the aggregate and distributional impacts of China’s high-speed railway (HSR) network.  China’s HSR is a passenger rail network that covers 29 of the country’s 33 provincial-level administrative divisions and exceeds 25,000 km/16,000 miles in total length, accounting for about two-thirds of the world’s high-speed rail tracks in commercial service.  Xu argued that HSR connection generates productivity gains by improving firm-to-firm matching efficiency and leading firms to search more efficiently for suppliers.  His paper first provides reduced-form evidence that access to HSR in China significantly promotes exports at the prefecture level.  It then constructs and calibrates a quantitative spatial equilibrium model to perform counterfactuals, taking into account trade, migration, and outsourcing. The quantitative exercise reveals that the construction of HSR between 2007 and 2015 increased China’s overall welfare by 0.46%, but was also associated with an increase in national inequality. In addition, the paper finds that gains from HSR are larger when labor migration costs are higher, implying that the HSR project is well suited to a country like China, which features high internal migration barriers.

Ama Baafra Abeberese’s paper considers the implications of democratic reform for firm productivity, and in particular the impact of President Suharto’s unexpected resignation from the Presidency of Indonesia in 1998, after more than three decades in the post.  The basic idea underpinning the paper is that politicians can create high entry barriers for firms in order to collect rents from those that do enter.  Arguably, since this concentrates the gains from economic activity, democratically elected politicians will be less able to create such barriers without being displaced from office, and so the environment under democracy should be more competitive.  However, the effect on firm productivity is ambiguous since a more competitive environment may make it more difficult for firms to become established.  Baafra’s paper uses the fact that, in Indonesia, local mayors’ terms were asynchronous.  This asynchronicity of terms means that the paper can identify variation in the productivity of firms operating under mayors appointed by Pres. Suharto versus mayors who were democratically elected after Suharto stepped down.  The main result Baafra presented was that democratization did in fact boost productivity, and more so in industries that were shown to be politically connected to the Suharto regime and hence presumably more sheltered when he was in office.

Institutional Constraints on Trade Policy

While it might be collectively rational for countries to adopt free trade, it is often individually rational for a government to adopt some degree of trade protection.  This observation has been used to provide motivation for why governments sign up to institutional measures that constrain their abilities to set trade policy unilaterally, often in the form of a trade agreement.  This way of thinking forms the basis for the literatures on the purpose of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now absorbed into the Articles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the purpose of preferential trade agreements.

David DeRemer opened the discussion of these issues at the workshop with a paper that provides a new framework for thinking about international trade agreements in modern trade environments such as those involving offshoring, and rent seeking by foreign governments.  These are environments that extend beyond those which standard models of trade agreements are set up to consider.  His presentation started out by taking a stance on what distinguishes modern trade negotiation environments from the earlier era.  The new framework he developed focuses on how trade agreements help countries to escape from prisoner’s dilemmas in which each government disregards the effects of local price, as opposed to world price, changes on trading partners.  He argued that, typically, these local prices matter because they affect foreigners’ producer surplus or value-added.

His paper considers trade agreements that achieve the stable end-point of reciprocal negotiations, meaning a situation where neither government can gain from policy changes that affect net export value equally.  The paper shows this end point is Pareto efficient for governments, so it is a suitable prediction for the trade negotiation outcome.  This stable and efficient outcome for modern trade environments yields new predictions that are consistent with empirical evidence.  For example, more politically organized exporters with large supply elasticities compel governments to undertake greater reductions in cooperative import tariffs from trade negotiations.  In this setting, governments jointly pursue gains for exporters to the extent that they would assess losses for domestic firms from import competition to be outweighing gains for consumers.

Woan Foong Wong’s paper focused specifically on the main WTO rules that govern free trade agreement (FTA) formation.  Her paper is based on a three country ‘competing exporters model’, where any two countries compete to export a given product to the third country.  An FTA can then be formed between two countries, leaving the third one out, or all three countries can adopt global free trade, with the outcome being endogenously determined.  FTA formation under Article 24 of the GATT/WTO requires that external tariffs not be raised, and all internal tariffs be removed.  Wong’s paper examines the implications of the requirement to remove internal tariffs by comparing the outcome when this requirement is adhered to with when it is relaxed.  She showed that requiring FTAs to eliminate internal tariffs makes the non-member better off although it simultaneously reduces the likelihood of achieving global free trade by encouraging free-riding on its part.  The reason is that setting lower internal tariffs creates an incentive for members to set lower external tariffs, since they compete more aggressively for the third market, which benefits the non-member.  This problem is avoided by customs union members who, unlike FTA members, coordinate their external tariff.  Therefore, surprisingly, in the case of FTA formation removing the ‘free internal trade requirement’ increases the parameter space where global free trade is a stable outcome.

Other papers at the workshop undertook econometric work to explore the implications of trade agreement formation.  The paper presented by Kishore Gawande undertook the first econometric test of the commitment-based theory of trade agreements.  The idea of this theory is that import-competing sectors where industry interest groups know they can lobby the government for protection will end up with tariffs set above efficient levels and over-investment in capital.  But if governments realize that they cannot receive sufficient compensation for such long-run distortions, they may choose to sign a trade agreement and thus tie their hands to efficient trade policy, thereby shutting down lobbying altogether.  Gawande’s presentation reported econometric results testing this theory against industry-level and firm-level data, and found supportive evidence for the model in the data.

Yifan Zhang‘s paper investigates the impacts of trade liberalization on household behavior and other outcomes in urban China resulting from that country’s entry to the WTO in 2001.  The identification strategy employed in the paper exploits regional variation in the exposure to the resulting tariff cuts.  The paper finds that workers in regions initially specialized in industries facing larger tariff cuts experienced relative declines in wages. Households responded to these income shocks in several ways. First, household members were found to work more, especially if they moved into the non-tradable sector. Second, young adults were more likely to live longer in the parental household, and so average household size increased. Third, households tended to save less. These changes in bahavior were interpreted as being motivated by attempts by households to buffer themselves against the negative wage shocks induced by trade liberalization.

There is a long-held view in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection (TP) measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties are substitutes. However, David J. Kuenzel argued in his presentation that there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping, safeguard and countervailing duties. Based on recent theoretical advances, his paper argues that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing TP measures is instead the difference between WTO bound and applied tariffs, or ‘tariff overhang’ as it is often known. Lower tariff overhangs constrain countries’ abilities to raise their MFN applied rates without legal repercussions, independent of past tariff changes. Using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 WTO member countries during the period 1996-2014, Kuenzel finds strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and TP activity. This result implies that tariff overhangs and TP measures are substitutes.  Based on this finding, he argues that this indicates the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative TP instruments.

Bibliography of Papers Presented with Links Where Available (Presenters’ Names Shown in Bold)

Abeberese, A.B., P. Barnwal, R. Chaurey, and P. Mukherjee “Firms Under Dictatorship and Democracy: Evidence from Indonesia’s Democratic Transition.”

Aisbett, E., and M. Silberberger “Tariff Liberalisation and Protective Product Standards.”

Antràs, P., T.C. Fort and F. Tintelnot, “The Margins of Global Courcing: Theory and Evidence from US Firms.

Antràs, P., and A. de Gortari, “On the Geography of Global Value Chains.

Abeberese, A.B., P. Barnwal, R. Chaurey, and P. Mukherjee, “Firms under Dictatorship and Democracy: Evidence from Indonesia’s Democratic Transition.”

Baccini, L., H. Cheng, K. Gawande, and H. Jo, “The Political Economy of Trade Agreements: A Test of a Theory.”

Behzadan, N., and R. ChisikThe Paradox of Transfers: Distribution and the Dutch
Disease.”

Brunel, C., and T. ZylkinDo Cross-Border Patents Promote Trade?

Dai, M., W. Huang, and Y. Zhang,How Do Households Adjust to Trade Liberalization? Evidence from China’s WTO Accession.

DeRemer, D.R., “The Principle of Reciprocity in the 21st Century: New Predictions for Trade Agreement Outcomes.

Gawande, K., and B. Zissimos,How Dictators Forestall Democratization Using International Trade Policy.”

Herkenhoff, P., and S. Krautheim, The International Organization of Production in the Regulatory Void.

Kuenzel, D.J., WTO Tariff Commitments and Temporary Protection: Complements or Substitutes?

Leblebicioglu, A., and A. Weinberger, “Openness and Factor Shares: Is Globalization Always Bad for Labor?”

Machiavello, R., and M. Florensa, “Improving Export Quality and What Else? Nespresso in Colombia.”

Marchand, B.U.,Inequality and Trade Policy: Pro-Poor Bias of India’s Contemporary Trade Restrictions.”

Pavcnik, N., “The Impact of Trade on Inequality in Developing Countries.”

Saggi, K., W.F. Wong, and H.M. Yildiz, “Preferential Trade Agreements and Rules of the Multilateral Trading System.”

Schmidt, J., and W. Steingress, “No Double Standards: Quantifying the Impact of the Standard Harmonization on Trade.”

Xu, M., “Riding on the New Silk Road: Quantifying the Welfare Gain from High-Speed Railways.”

Firm Productivity Differences from Factor Markets: New Evidence from China

By Wenya Cheng (University of Glasgow) and John Morrow (Birkbeck, University of London)

Although firms may face radically different production conditions, this dimension of firm heterogeneity is often overlooked. A number of studies document large and persistent differences in productivity across both countries and firms.[1] However, these differences remain largely ‘some sort of measure of our ignorance’. It’s therefore worth inquiring to what extent the supply characteristics of regional input markets help explain such systematic productivity dispersion across firms, differences which remain a ‘black box’.[2] It would be surprising if disparate factor markets result in similar outcomes, when clearly the prices and quality of inputs available vary considerably, as when markets are thin, incomplete, distorted or highly heterogeneous: in short, in most developing country markets. Recent work has indicated imperfect factor mobility has sizable economic effects and that developing country distortions are large.[3] Our recent work models firm adaptation to such variation in a general equilibrium framework which microfounds these distortions and heterogeneity.[4] The structural equations of the model are simple to estimate and the estimation results quantify the importance of local factor markets for firm input use, productivity and welfare.

To better understand the environments that firms operate in, we model regional inputs markets with differing distributions of worker types, wages and regional input quality. Firms can hire different types of labor (e.g. education groups or occupations) and within each type, worker quality varies and incurs search costs. As the ease of finding higher quality workers increases with their regional supply, firm hiring depends on the joint distribution of worker types and wages. Our estimates indeed confirm that contrary to standard models with perfectly competitive labor markets, firm hiring responds to not only wages, but also the availability of worker types. Since each firm’s optimal workforce varies by industry and region, the comparative advantage of regions varies with its labor market characteristics. Since industries also differ in factor intensity, local capital and materials costs also influence the comparative advantage of a region. As the model also explicitly models entry, firms locate in proportion to the cost advantages available.

To quantify real world supply conditions, we use the model to derive estimating equations which fix: 1) hiring by wage and worker type distributions, 2) substitution into non-labor inputs and 3) firm location in response to local factor markets. The estimation strategy combines manufacturing and population census data for China in the mid-2000s, a setting which exhibits substantial local variation (see Figures 1, 2 a,b).

Figure 1 Chinese Prefectures Average Monthly Income of Employees (2005)

Figure 2 (a) % of Labor Force with less than or equal to Junior High School

Figure 2 (b) % of Labor Force with greater than or equal to Junior College

By revealing how firm demand for skills varies with local conditions, the model quantifies the unit costs for labor across China. The estimates based on within-firm hiring patterns imply interquartile differences in effective labor costs across prefectures which range from 30 to 80 percent (see Figure 3). Taking into account industry level production estimates of capital, labor and materials expenditure shares, these labor cost differences imply productivity differences of 3 to 12 percent. This helps explain the productivity difference ‘black box’ by reducing the variance of productivity residuals in every industry compared to a production function using counts of worker types or the wage bill. Extending this approach we also find that capital and materials frictions combined explain a similar range of productivity differences.

Figure 3: Geographic Dispersion of Unit Labor Costs: General Machines

The model has welfare implications for microeconomic changes in labor markets that shift regional comparative advantage and thereby the distribution of industry activity in general equilibrium. For instance, if the highly heterogenous distribution of workers and wages is due to regional frictions (e.g. the hukou system in China) then homogenizing worker distributions and wages across labor markets helps capture what the removal of these frictions might imply. In theory, this homogenization could lead to gains from variety being more evenly sourced across regions but could also lessen regional comparative advantages and gains from specialization. Ultimately these competing forces must be resolved quantitatively. Using Input-Output and population data, the model implies that homogenizing across factor markets would, on net, increase real incomes by 1.33 percent.

The importance of local factor markets for understanding firm behavior suggests new dimensions for policy analysis. For instance, regions with labor markets which generate lower unit labor costs for an industry attract higher levels industry activity. As unit labor costs depend on the distribution of wages and worker types that represent substitution options, this yields a deeper view of how educational policy or flows of different worker types impact firms. For this reason, work evaluating wage determination could be enriched by taking this approach. Taken as a whole, the results show that policy changes which influence the composition of regional labor markets will likely have sizeable effects on firm productivity and location. Finally, the substantial differences within industry suggest that at the regional level, inherent comparative advantages exist which policymakers might leverage.

In fact, relatively little is known about the dynamic relationships between labor markets and firm behavior, and this paper provides both a general equilibrium theory and structural estimation strategy to evaluate these linkages.[5] Having seen that cost and productivity differences inherent in local factor markets are potentially large, our approach could be of use in evaluating trade offs between regional policies or ongoing trends across regions. Further work could leverage or extend the approach of combining firm, census and geographic data to better understand the role of local factor markets on firm behavior.

References

Cheng, W. and J. Morrow, (2018); “Firm Productivity Differences from Factor Markets.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 66(1): 126–171.

Hsieh, C. T. and P. J. Klenow, (2009); “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4): 1403–1448.

Melitz, M.J. and S.J. Redding, (2014); “Heterogeneous Firms and Trade.” Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 4: 1–54.

Ottaviano, G., and G. Peri, (2013) “New Frontiers of Immigration Research: Cities and Firms.” Journal of Regional Science, 53(1): 1–7.

Syverson, C., (2011); “What Determines Productivity?Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2): 326–365.

Topalova, P., (2010); “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on Poverty from India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(4): 1–41.

Endnotes

[1] See Syverson (2011).

[2] See Melitz and Redding (2014).

[3] See Topalova (2010) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).

[4] See Cheng and Morrow (2018).

[5] See Ottaviano and Peri (2013).

Trade Liberalization and Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Urban India

By Reshad N Ahsan (University of Melbourne) and Arpita Chatterjee (University of New South Wales)

Economic globalization is currently under threat from a populist political backlash.  A common narrative is that this backlash is partly a result of a trade-induced increase in inequality.[1]  In our recent research, we show that the same mechanism that causes greater trade-induced inequality – a higher relative demand for skill – also allows an increasing number of Indian sons from underprivileged backgrounds to enter better occupations than their father.[2]  This suggests that, when thinking about the effects of trade on labour-market opportunities for the poor, we must keep in mind international trade’s ability to provide a pathway for children from underprivileged backgrounds to move up the occupational ladder.

Once regarded as one of Asia’s least open economies, India experienced a rapid increase in trade following its trade reforms in 1991.  These reforms led to a decrease in India’s average manufacturing tariffs from 149 percent in 1988 to 45 percent in 1998. This dramatic trade reform occurred in a country where occupations are highly persistent across generations.  This is vividly illustrated in Figure 1 below, where we show that conditional on having a father who is at the bottom decile of the fathers’ occupational distribution in 1999 there is a 57 percent chance that a son in 1999 is also in the bottom decile of the sons’ occupational distribution.  We also observe high levels of persistence at the other end of the occupational distribution.  In particular, we find that, conditional on having a father who is at the top decile of the fathers’ occupational distribution in 1999 there is a 39 percent chance that a son in 1999 is also in the top decile of the sons’ occupational distribution.

Figure 1: The occupational deciles of sons who have fathers in the bottom decile of the fathers’ occupational distribution.

To identify the impact of trade on occupational mobility, we use nationally representative household surveys collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO).  These data are for the year 1999 and allow us to categorize individuals in our sample in to 335 three-digit occupations.  With these data in hand, we examine whether, all else equal, a son residing in an urban district with greater exposure to trade liberalization is more likely to be in an occupation that is higher ranked than that of his father.[3]  We define a district’s exposure to trade liberalization as the change in the weighted average tariffs of all manufacturing industries located in that district between 1987 and 1998.  A key advantage of our context is the fact that India’s trade reforms were enacted under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and provides us with exogenous variation in tariffs in the post-reform period.[4]

Our analysis shows that greater exposure to trade liberalization allows an increasing number of sons from underprivileged backgrounds in India to enter better occupations than their father.  This result is both statistically significant and economically meaningful.  It suggests that differential exposure to trade explains 46 percent of the difference in upward occupational mobility between a district at the 25th percentile of upward mobility when compared to a district at the 75th percentile.

What explains this effect?  We show that sons residing in more liberalized districts in 1999 are more likely to be employed in skill-intensive industries. This is consistent with the idea that trade induces an increase in the relative share of skilled occupations.[5] While this effect goes hand-in-hand with a rise in the gap in skilled and unskilled wages, it also creates exactly the type of occupations that underprivileged sons need to move up the occupational ladder.  Interestingly, we also find evidence of spillover effects where manufacturing tariff liberalization leads to greater intergenerational occupational mobility amongst sons working in non-manufacturing industries.  We show that this result can be partly explained by the rising demand for skill in downstream manufacturing industries spilling over in to upstream non-manufacturing industries.

An alternate explanation for our results is that trade liberalization improved occupational mobility via its impact on educational mobility.  This means that households that invest more in their son’s education as a result of trade are the ones that experience greater upward intergenerational occupational mobility.  However, our results do not support this conjecture.  Interestingly, in a second new result, we show that greater investment in education only facilitates greater intergenerational occupational mobility in areas where we expect to see the largest increases in the employment share of high-skill occupations.  These results suggest that education can act as a harbinger of social mobility only if there is a sufficient increase in the demand for skill.

Our results offer a more nuanced perspective on the prevailing narrative that trade leads to adverse labour-market outcomes for underprivileged individuals. While trade may increase the skill premium, it also has longer-term effects that facilitate upward intergenerational mobility. For developing countries in particular, these longer-term effects of trade on occupational mobility have the potential to significantly improve the lives of underprivileged individuals.

References

Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., and Prantl, S., 2009. “Online Supplement to The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity.The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1): 20–32.

Ahsan, R.N., and Chatterjee, A., 2017. “Trade Liberalization and Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Urban India.Journal of International Economics, 109(1): 138-152.

Rodrik, D., 2017. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” NBER Working Paper Number 23559.

Topalova, P., 2010. “Factor Immobility and Regional Impacts of Trade Liberalization: Evidence on Poverty from India.American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(4), 1–41.

Endnotes

[1] See Rodrik (2017).

[2] See Ahsan and Chatterjee (2017).

[3] We rank occupations by calculating the average education of individuals in that occupation in 1987, which is prior to the trade reform of 1991.  Thus, we do not allow this ranking to change over time. Our results are robust to ranking occupations based on average wages instead.

[4] See Topalova (2010).

[5] We develop this idea more formally in an appendix to our paper. Following Aghion et al. (2009), we show that the threat of foreign entry encourages domestic firms that are relatively close to the technology frontier to increase their innovation effort, thereby leading to an increase in the share of high-skill occupations.

Growth, Import Dependence, and War

By Roberto Bonfatti (University of Nottingham) and Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke  (University of Oxford)

World trade has increased tremendously in recent decades, driven by the rise of China and other emerging economies. The reliance of world trade on choke points (such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea) creates the need for someone to guarantee the freedom of navigation. Traditionally, this role has been upheld by the naval hegemon of the day: Britain during the 19th century’s Pax Britannica, and the United States today. While the naval hegemon may in fact be providing a global public good by behaving in this manner, its activities may not always reassure everyone, especially if strategic tensions are gradually building up between itself and rising powers such as China.

Rising tension between the US and China is often analyzed in the context of the broader challenge that the rise of China poses to US military hegemony. Political scientists have long cautioned against the risks posed by shifts in relative power. In fact, in the eyes of some theorists, such shifts are the main reason why war can occur. Robert Powell shows, in the context of a two-country world, that if one of the two countries is catching up militarily on the other, it may be impossible to dissuade the established power from launching a pre-emptive war against the rising power.[1]

This is because from the perspective of the established power, not going to war carries a future cost: in the future, the rising power, having become more powerful, will be better able to impose its will on the established hegemon when it comes to disputes between the two. The follower has an incentive to forestall a pre-emptive war by the leader, by promising the leader a sufficiently big slice of the pie in the future. Since it cannot pre-commit to this, and has an incentive to use its greater power in the future to secure a greater share of the pie, the leader may choose to launch a pre-emptive war in order to lock in a higher share of the spoils while it still has the chance.

Applied to the case of industrial catching up, this model seems to have clear implications. Military power goes hand in hand with growth and industrial development; thus, an established industrial leader should be the one to consider launching a pre-emptive war against a catching-up, late industrializing, follower.

In our recent work, we show that, if international trade is taken into account, the implications of the model can be quite different.[2] Central to our analysis are the assumptions that the follower needs to import increasing amounts of raw materials from the rest of the world, as it undergoes structural change, and that the leader may be able to blockade the follower’s trade.

An industrial leader may well be losing out to a catching-up follower in terms of potential military power; however, this does not necessarily imply that it is actually becoming militarily weaker over time. Industrial catching up is a double-edged sword for the follower: while it makes its military apparatus potentially more powerful, rapid growth and structural change also makes it more dependent on imported raw materials. If the leader has the capacity to blockade these imports in case of war, the follower may actually become militarily weaker, rather than stronger, over time. In this case, it may be the follower who launches a pre-emptive war on the leader, and not the other way around.

By generalizing the model in this manner, we open up a rich menu of theoretical possibilities. For example, the follower may decide to attack resource-rich peripheral areas in an attempt to become more self-sufficient, or entirely self-sufficient, in raw materials. It may do so instead of, or prior to, launching an attack on the leader. The follower may even attack the resource-rich region in circumstances when it knows that this will provoke an attack upon it by the leader, when otherwise the two countries would not have gone to war.

We argue that our model can shed light on why it was Japan who attacked the United States in 1941, and not the other way around.[3] This was unambiguously a case of an industrial follower catching up on the leader. And yet Japan was also becoming rapidly more dependent on imported raw materials. Japan’s invasions of resource-rich Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia were attempts to break free from this pattern of increased dependence: they correspond to attacks on the resource-rich region in our model, prior to an eventual attack on the leader.

Like Japan, late 19th and early 20th century Germany had been rapidly catching up on the Britain and the United States. However, Germany had also become more dependent on imports of food and raw materials. While we do not argue that this strategic dependence explains the origins of either world war in Europe, Avner Offer has argued that it was a key factor explaining the Anglo-German naval rivalry which preceded World War I.[4] After World War I, Hitler was obsessed with German dependence on imports of food and strategic raw materials. The importance of securing the resources needed to fight his wars is a constant theme of Adam Tooze’s classic book on the Nazi economy.[5] One obvious solution was to attack Eastern Europe, which corresponded to the resource-rich peripheral region in our model, even though attacking Poland risked war with the UK and France. And in the long run, conquering Russia was seen as the only way to achieve complete self-sufficiency in raw materials.

Such theoretical and historical considerations suggest that it is Chinese vulnerability, rather than American, that we should be worried about. As long as the United States retains control over maritime choke points, it may be China, rather than the United States, that fears becoming more vulnerable over time. In that context, Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, while potentially dangerous, may not be so surprising.

References

Barnhart, M.A. (1987). Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. Cornell University Press.

Bonfatti, R. and K.H. O’Rourke (forthcoming). “Growth, Import Dependence and War.” Economic Journal. An earlier version is available as CEPR Discussion Paper 10073.

Offer, A. (1989). The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation. Clarendon Press.

Powell, R. (2006). “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization, vol. 60(1), pp. 169-203.

Tooze, A. (2006). The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, Allen Lane.

Endnotes

[1] See Powell (2006).

[2] See Bonfatti and O’Rourke (forthcoming).

[3] See Barnhart (1987).

[4] See Offer (1989).

[5] See Tooze (2006).

Foreign Investment Boosts Sophistication of Domestic Manufacturing: New Evidence from Turkey

By Beata Javorcik (University of Oxford), Alessia Lo Turco, (Marche Polytechnic University), Daniela Maggioni (University of Catania)

Recently, there has been a renewal of interest in industrial policy across the world. Advanced economies promise to use industrial policy to revive their declining manufacturing, while emerging markets hope that industrial policies will help them upgrade their production structure and in this way stimulate economic growth. Yet, little is known about the micro determinants of product upgrading.

The existing research suggests that inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) can foster host countries’ production upgrading, where upgrading is measured in terms of the unit values of exports (Harding and Javorcik,  2012).[1]

In our recent work, we move away from unit values – a highly imperfect proxy for product quality –  and examine the link between FDI and product upgrading, as captured by complexity of new products introduced by domestic firms.[2] We focus on manufacturing firms in Turkey, a country that has experienced a spectacular surge in FDI inflows during the 2000s and dramatically increased the sophistication of its productive structure in the last decades.[3]

Anecdotal evidence

Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign affiliates stimulate product upgrading among their suppliers. For example, Indesit Company, an Italian white good producer – recently acquired by Whirlpool – has produced refrigerators in Turkey since the 1990s. In 2012, Indesit built a new plant to produce washing machines. To become a supplier of this new plant, a local company purchased new presses and automated its production process. This allowed it to start producing a new and more sophisticated product, a washing machine flange, and to increase efficiency and production volumes. The flange is a very complex product as it needs to be produced with no aesthetic defects by an 800-1,000 tonne metal presses. It also needs to withstand the stress of between 1,000 and 1,400 revolutions per minute while remaining within a certain range of vibration and noisiness. Indesit has shared essential tacit knowledge, information processes, instructions and control procedures with the local company, thus stimulating and supporting the supplier’s complexity upgrading.

Inspired by the anecdotal evidence, our study examines the link between the presence of foreign affiliates and production upgrading by Turkish firms located in the same region and active in the input-supplying industries.

Measuring product complexity

To capture product complexity we use a measure proposed by César Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann, who relate the concept of product complexity to the extent and exclusivity of capabilities needed to produce a given product.[4] It is easiest to explain this measure using a Lego analogy. Think of a country as a bucket of Lego pieces with each piece representing the capabilities available there. The set of products (i.e., Lego models) a country can produce depends on the diversity and exclusiveness of the Lego pieces in the bucket. A Lego bucket that contains pieces that can only be used to build a toy bicycle probably does not contain the pieces to create a toy car. However, a Lego bucket that contains pieces that can build a toy car may also have the necessary pieces needed to build a toy bicycle.  While two Lego buckets may be capable of building the same number of models, these may be completely different sets of models. Thus, determining the complexity of an economy by looking at the products it produces amounts to determining the diversity and exclusivity of the pieces in a Lego bucket by simply looking at the Lego models it can build.

Our findings

Our analysis suggests that the presence of foreign affiliates does not affect the propensity of Turkish firms to innovate. However, the presence of foreign affiliates is positively correlated with the complexity level of products newly introduced by Turkish firms active in the supplying industries and located in the same region.

The estimated effect is economically meaningful. A 10 percentage point increase in foreign presence implies moving about half of the way from the production of pot scourers to producing stainless sinks. An increase of about 17 percentage points in FDI in the relevant sectors would be necessary in order to move from the production of stainless sinks to the production of the washing machine flanges.

Conclusion  

Our findings matter for policy. Dani Rodrik argues that enhancing an economy’s productive capabilities over an increasing range of manufactured goods can be considered an integral part of economic development.[5] As foreign affiliates facilitate the upgrading of the host country’s productive capabilities, our results, then, imply that FDI inflows can act as an important stimulus for economic growth. Thus, there is room for investment promotion activities, a policy that is quite effective in developing countries.[6] In contrast to many other industrial policies, investment promotion is relatively inexpensive and causes few distortions. Therefore, there is little downside when the government gets it wrong.

References

Harding, T. and Javorcik, B.S. (2011). ‘Roll out the red carpet and they will come: investment promotion and FDI inflows’, Economic Journal, vol. 121(557), pp. 1445–1476.

Harding, T. and Javorcik, B.S. (2012). ‘Foreign direct investment and export upgrading’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 94(4), pp. 964–980.

Hidalgo, C.A. and Hausmann, R.(2009). ‘The building blocks of economic complexity’, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., vol. 106, pp. 10570–10575.

Javorcik, B.S., Lo Turco, A., Maggioni, D. ‘New and Improved: Does FDI Boost Production Complexity in Host Countries?‘ Economic Journal, forthcoming.

Rodrik, D. (2006). ‘Industrial development: stylized facts and policies’, Kennedy School of Government.

Endnotes

[1] See Harding and Javorcik (2012).

[2] Javorcik, Lo Turco and Maggioni (forthcoming).

[3] See Hidalgo (2009).

[4] See Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009)

[5] See Rodrik (2006)

[6] Harding and Javorcik (2011)

Trade and Growth with Heterogeneous Firms and Asymmetric Countries

By Takumi Naito (Vanderbilt University and Waseda University)

Trade liberalization encourages more productive firms to start exporting, while it forces more unproductive firms to exit from their domestic markets. The increase in the average productivity because of tougher selection contributes to higher welfare of countries. This idea, captured by the Melitz model of heterogeneous firms, has now become one of the standard principles of international economics.[1] However, the implications of liberalization-induced selection for countries’ growth was not explored until Richard Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (henceforth BRN) set up a two-country R&D-based endogenous growth model that embodies this underlying feature.[2] In the BRN model, trade liberalization has mixed effects on long-run growth: on the one hand, it allows knowledge to flow across borders more freely through trade in goods, which is good for growth; on the other hand, it makes it more difficult for a potential entrant to survive, which is bad for growth. The total growth effect of liberalization depends on the specification of R&D technologies.

Since BRN, many researchers have developed models of trade and growth with heterogeneous firms based on a common assumption: symmetric countries.[3] This is clearly unrealistic in the context of developing and developed countries: they are totally different in terms of endowments, preferences, and technologies. Not only that, the assumption also prevents us from studying the effects of policy shocks that are necessarily asymmetric across countries such as unilateral trade liberalization, regional trade agreements, and so on. To enlarge the scope of heterogeneous firm models of trade and growth for policy analysis, we have to extend them to allow for asymmetric countries.

In spite of the demand, there has been no successful attempt to deal with asymmetric countries in heterogeneous firms and endogenous growth settings. The problem is to evaluate an entrant’s future profits possibly growing at different rates across markets and over time, which makes it almost impossible for us to determine the entrant’s entry decision. How can we resolve the technical difficulty?

In a recent research project, which so far consists of two papers, I have provided two possible solutions to resolve this difficulty.  In the first paper, the solution I provide involves giving up the assumption that firms have an infinite horizon.[4] In my framework, each firm’s product life ends in each period, and they have to pay the initial and market entry costs every time they reenter their markets. By embedding the static Melitz framework in a two-country AK model (i.e., an endogenous growth model with constant returns to capital), I show that unilateral trade liberalization increases the numbers and revenue shares of exported varieties and the growth rates of all countries for all periods, and welfare of all countries, compared with the old balanced growth path (BGP), where all variables grow at constant rates. Intuitively, a country’s import liberalization directly encourages exports and domestic selection in the partner country, while it indirectly promotes exports and domestic selection in the liberalizing country through the decreased relative rental rate clearing its trade deficit.[5] More domestic selection implies the higher return to, and hence the growth rate of, capital. The greatest advantage of the model is the ability to describe the transitional dynamics caused by policy changes, distinguishing between the short- and long-run effects.

In the second paper of this project, the solution I provide involves giving up transitional dynamics in order to focus on a BGP in an asymmetric BRN model where firms do have infinite horizons.[6] Then we can still determine the relative number of varieties from the balanced growth condition, and also the relative wage from the balanced trade condition. It turns out that unilateral trade liberalization has similar selection effects to the first paper described above, and the symmetric BRN model: a country’s import liberalization encourages exports and domestic selection in both the partner and liberalizing countries. As a result, even unilateral trade liberalization can speed up global growth if it sufficiently facilitates international knowledge spillovers.

With the two solutions in hand, we are no longer restricted by the assumption of symmetric countries in endogenous growth models with heterogeneous firms. Our models are so flexible that they can be extended to study the effects of trade policies, domestic policies, or combinations thereof. For example, for governments of developing countries who depend heavily on import tariffs as a revenue source, it has been a serious concern how to design a domestic tax structure which recovers the revenue lost from trade liberalization. It will be interesting to see how such tariff and tax reform affects growth and welfare of developing and developed countries in a Melitz world. It should also be noted that the above two-country models can be extended to more than two countries, although the analysis will be much harder. This allows us to examine the effects of a regional trade agreement on member and nonmember countries. It is hoped that the papers will trigger applications of asymmetric heterogeneous firm models of trade and growth to more relevant policy issues.

References

Baldwin, R. E., and F. Robert-Nicoud (2008) “Trade and growth with heterogeneous firms,” Journal of International Economics 74(1), 21-34

Demidova, S., and A. Rodríguez-Clare (2013) “The simple analytics of the Melitz model in a small economy,” Journal of International Economics 90(2), 266-272

Felbermayr, G., B. Jung, and M. Larch (2013) “Optimal tariffs, retaliation, and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model,” Journal of International Economics 89(1), 13-25

Gustafsson, P., and P. Segerstrom (2010) “Trade liberalization and productivity growth,” Review of International Economics 18(2), 207-228

Melitz, M. J. (2003) “The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity,” Econometrica 71(6), 1695-725

Naito, T. (2017a) “An asymmetric Melitz model of trade and growth,” Economics Letters 158, 80-83

Naito, T. (2017b) “Growth and welfare effects of unilateral trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms and asymmetric countries,” Journal of International Economics 109, 167-173

Sampson, T. (2016) “Dynamic selection: an idea flows theory of entry, trade, and growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(1), 315-380

Endnotes

[1] Melitz (2003).

[2] Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008)

[3] See, for example, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) and Sampson (2016).

[4] Naito (2017a)

[5] The reallocation mechanism induced by unilateral trade liberalization described here is the same as that in the static asymmetric Melitz models of Felbermayr et al. (2013) and Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), except that they consider labor as the only factor.

[6] Naito (2017b)