International Trade and Conflict

The availability of natural resources can directly affect the prospects of growth of a nation and their geographic distribution is uneven across and within countries. On one hand this can create opportunities for international trade between resource scarce and resource rich countries or, at the national level, generate revenues to be invested in development projects. On the other hand natural resources can feed international conflicts that can escalate to costly wars. Moreover, in countries where property rights are weakly enforced disputes over their control can lead to prolonged civil wars.

Acemoglu D., M. Golosov, A. Tsyvinski, and P. Yared, (2012); “A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (1): 283-331. [earlier version]

Anderson J. E. and D. Marcouiller, (2005); “Anarchy and Autarky: Endogenous Predation as a Barrier to Trade.” International Economic Review, 46 (1): 189–213. [earlier version]

Findlay R. and  K. H. O’Rourke, (2007); Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium. Princeton University Press, New Jersey

Garfinkel M. R., S. Skaperdas and C. Syropoulos (2008); “Globalization and Domestic Conflict.” Journal of International Economics, 76(2): 296-308. [earlier version]

Garfinkel M. R., S. Skaperdas and C. Syropoulos (2009); “International Trade and Transnational Insecurity: How Comparative Advantage and Power are Jointly Determined.” Working Paper.

Powell R., (1993); “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy.” American Political Science Review, 87: 115–132.

Syropoulos C. and T. Zylkin (2013); “The Problem of Peace: A Story of Corruption, Destruction and Rebellion.” Working Paper.

From Dictatorship to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation

There is considerable debate over whether and how political institutions affect economic performance and vice versa. Does the form of government, democracy or dictatorship, have an important bearing on economic growth and efficiency, and how does growth affect the consolidation of democracy? Under what circumstances is democracy a spur for greater equality, and does inequality spur revolution? An apparently important aspect of this debate is how international influences through trade, the actions of international institutions, and political events in foreign countries, affect political regime change, say from dictatorship to democracy, and political consolidation on peaceful government after civil war or revolution.

Acemoglu D. and J. A. Robinson, (2001); “A Theory of Political Transitions.” American Economic Review, 91(4): 938-963. [earlier version]

Aidt T. and P. S. Jensen, (2012); “Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938.” Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1102, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

Aidt T., F. Albornoz and M. Gassebner (2012); “The Golden Hello and Political Transitions.” CESifo Working Paper Series 3957, , CESifo Group Munich.

Ellis C. J. and J. Fender (2011); “Information Cascades and Revolutionary Regime Transition.” Economic Journal 121(551): 763792.

Ornelas E. and X. Liu, (2012); “Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy.” Working Paper, London School of Economics.

The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off

“How can developing countries grow their economies? Most answers to this question center on what the rich world should or shouldn’t do for the poor world. In The Quest for Prosperity, Justin Yifu Lin–the first non-Westerner to be chief economist of the World Bank–focuses on what developing nations can do to help themselves…” [Publisher’s book website]
Reviews / Comments
Book review by Monika Kerekes in Journal of Economics, 109(1), May 2013.

Book review by Xuan Nguyen in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 22(2), April 2013

Book review by Ashley Aarons in Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED), April 2013

Book review by Richard N. Cooper in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013.

Pragmatic search for path to prosperity by Martin Wolf in Financial Times, October 2012.

Book review by Howard Davies in Times Higher Education, October 2012.

What do IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes Achieve?

Among the stated aims of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.  And yet there is considerable debate over how successful it has been at accomplishing these objectives.  One view is that it manages a considerable degree of success in institutional environments where growth is extremely difficult to establish.  Another is that the IMF prioritises the interests of creditor nations at the expense of the poor in donor countries.  Recently, evidence has emerged that IMF programmes may even contribute to the eruption of violence in debtor nations as people protest against the austerity measures that structural adjustment programmes entail.

Barro R. J. and J.W. Lee, (2005); “IMF-Programs: Who Is Chosen and What are the Effects? Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7): 1245-1269. [Earlier version]

Bird G. and D. Rowlands, (2001); “IMF Lending: How is it Affected by Economic, Political, and Institutional Factors?The Journal of Policy Reform 4 (3), 243-270.

Bird G. and D. Rowlands, (2002); “The Pattern of IMF Lending: An Analysis of Prediction Failures.Journal of Policy Reform, 5(3), 173-186.

Boughton J. (2001); Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989. International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C..

Conway P., (1994); “IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact.Journal of Development Economics, 45(2), 365-391.

Dreher A. and N.M. Jensen, (2007); “Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions.The Journal of Law and Economics, 50(1): 105-124. [Earlier version]

Easterly W., (2005); “What did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth with Repeated IMF and World Bank Adjustment Loans.Journal of Development Economics, 76(1): 1-22. [Earlier version]

Guimond M. F., (2007); “Structural Adjustment and Peacebuilding.” International Development Research Centre, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, 2005-2006. [Earlier version]

Hartzell C.A., M. Hoddie, and M. Bauer, (2010); “Economic Liberalization via IMF Structural Adjustment: Sowing the Seeds of Civil War?” International Organization, 64(2): 339-356.

Stiglitz J., (2002); Globalization and Its Discontents, Penguin Books, London, UK.

Stroup C. and B. Zissimos, (2013); “Social Unrest in the Wake of IMF Structural Adjustment Programs.”  CESifo Working Paper NO. 4211.

Walton J. and D. Seddon, (1994); Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment. Blacwell, Cambridge Mass., US.

The TRIPS Agreement and Industrial Development

The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement is an undertaking by members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to respect each others’ property rights.  At its inception, its main purpose was to protect the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of Northern firms, who have historically tended to be the main innovators, in Southern markets where imitation was prevalent.  In the Uruguay Round where the WTO was formed, the terms of TRIPS were agreed to as a quid pro quo for easier entry of Southern products into Northern markets.  One of the main concerns that has arisen as a result of TRIPS is the effect on Southern industrial development of tighter intellectual property protection, since imitation by firms in the South that is widely seen as a precursor to innovation has been curtailed by TRIPS. On the other hand, TRIPS proponents argue that stronger IPRs world-wide will not only increase incentives for innovation but also foster industrial development in developing countries by encouraging multinationals to move production there. A key point established in this literature is that the effects of increased IPR protection in the South on the Northern rate of innovation depend critically on whether production shifts to the South via imitation of Northern firms or via North–South FDI. Recent research has produced a unified framework in which Northern innovation, Southern imitation and the North–South flow of FDI respond endogenously to changes in the degree of Southern IPR protection available to Northern firms, wherein the South’s share of the global basket of goods can actually increase with a strengthening of Southern IPR protection. Econometric testing finds some supportive evidence in the data.

Branstetter L., R. Fisman and F. Foley, (2006); “Do stronger intellectual property rights increase international technology transfer? Empirical evidence from U.S. firm-level data.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1): 321–349. [Working paper version]

Branstetter L., R. Fisman, F. Foley and K. Saggi, (2011); “Does intellectual property rights reform spur industrial development?Journal of International Economics, 83(1): 27–36. [Working paper version]

Branstetter L., and K. Saggi, (2011); “Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development.” Economic Journal, 121(555): 1161–1191. [Working paper version]

Chaudhuri, S., P .Goldberg and P. Jia, (2006); “Estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals: a case study of quinolones in India.” American Economic Review, 96(5): 1477–514. [Working paper version]

Chen, Y. and T. Puttitanun, (2005); “Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries.” Journal of Development Economics, 78(2): 474–93.

Goldberg P.K., (2010); “Intellectual property rights protection in developing countries: the case of pharmaceuticals.Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 326-353. [Working paper version]

Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, (1991a); Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge: MIT press.

Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, (1991b); “Endogenous product cycles.Economic Journal, vol. 101(3): 1214–29.[Working paper version]

Grossman, G.M. and E. Lai (2004); “International Protection of Intellectual Property.American Economic Review, 94 (5): 1635-53.[Working paper version]

Helpman, E., (1993); “Innovation, imitation, and intellectual property rights.Econometrica, 61(6): 1247–80.[Working paper version]

Ivus, O., (2010); “Do stronger patent rights raise high-tech exports to the developing world? ” Journal of International Economics, 81(1): 38–47. [Working paper version]

Javorcik B., (2004); The composition of foreign direct investment and protection of intellectual property rights in transition economies, European Economic Review, 48(1):39–62. [Working paper version]

Lai, E., (1998); “International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation.” Journal of Development Economics, 55(1): 133–53.[Working paper version]

The Globalization Paradox Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist

“For a century, economists have driven forward the cause of globalization in financial institutions, labour markets, and trade. Yet there have been consistent warning signs that a global economy and free trade might not always be advantageous. Where are the pressure points? What could be done about them?…” [Publisher’s Book Website]

Author’s Book Presentation, August 2012.

Author’s Book Presentation, May 2011.

Author’s Lecture, December 2011.

Reviews / Comments 

Book Review by Kate Saffin in LSE Review of Books, August 2012.

Book Review by Shahid Yusuf in The Development Economics, 50(4), December 2012.

The Lessons From Rodrik’s Globalization Paradox by Antoaneta Dimitrova in Eurosearch, December 2011.

Book Review by Simon Lester in World Trade Review, 10, June 2011.

Book Review by Duncan Green in From Poverty to Power, OXFAM Blog, June 2011.

Book Review by William R. Cline in Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2011.

Book Review by Steven Pearlstein in The Washington Post, March 2011.

Book Review by Matthew Yglesias in Think Progressive, March 2011.

Book Review by  Richard N. Cooper in Foreign Affairs, February 2011.

Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations

“Meet the economic gangster. He’s the United Nations diplomat who double-parks his Mercedes on New York City streets at rush hour because the cops can’t touch him–he has diplomatic immunity. He’s the Chinese smuggler who dodges tariffs by magically transforming frozen chickens into frozen turkeys. The dictator, the warlord, the unscrupulous bureaucrat who bilks the developing world of billions in aid. The calculating crook who views stealing and murder as just another part of his business strategy. And, in the wrong set of circumstances, he might just be you…” [Publisher’s Website]

Interview by Edward Miguel, Octomber 2008.

Interview by Raymond Fisman, Nov 2008.

Reviews / Comments

Book Review by Dean Yang in Journal of Economic Literature, 49(3), September 2011.

Book Review by Charles Crawford in British Politics and Policy at LSE Blog, March 2011.

Book Review by Tarcisius Mukuka in Development in Practice, 19(6), July 2009.

Book Reviewby Raghav Gaiha in Development and Change, 40(3), May 2009.

Book Review by David A. Savage in Economic Analysis & Policy, 39(1), MARCH 2009.

Book Reviewby Susanne Karstedt in Times Higher Education, February 2009.

Book Review by Steven Poole in The Guardian, November 2008.


Reforming the World Trading System to Better Integrate Developing Countries

Ever since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, there has been a growing sense that the GATT, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that has superseded it, favours the interests of developed countries.  In response to this, a line of research has developed to investigate possible reforms to the world trading system (the set of rules that forms the basis of the GATT/WTO) so that it better represents the interests of developing countries as well.

Bagwell K., Mavroidis, P. and R. Staiger (2007); “Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO.Journal of International Economics, 73(2), 309-332. [Working paper version]

Bronckers M. and N. Van Den Broek (2005); “Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement.Journal of International Economic Law, 8, 101-126.

Limão N. and K. Saggi (2008); “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements.Journal of International Economics 76(1), 48-60. [Working paper version]

Limão N. and K. Saggi (2013); “Size Inequality, Coordination Externalities and International Trade Agreements.” 63: 10-27. [Working paper version]

Schott J. (2009); “America, Europe, and the New Trade Order.Business and Politics, 11(3), 1-22.

Srinivasan T. N. (1999); “Developing Countries in the World Trading System: From GATT, 1947, to the Third Ministerial Meeting of WTO.The World Economy, 22 (8), 1047 – 1064. [Working paper version]

Zissimos B. (2009); “Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter.” Journal of International Economics, 78(2), 276-286. [Working paper version]

One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth

“In One Economics, Many Recipes, leading economist Dani Rodrik argues that neither globalizers nor antiglobalizers have got it right. While economic globalization can be a boon for countries that are trying to dig out of poverty, success usually requires following policies that are tailored to local economic and political realities rather than obeying the dictates of the international globalization establishment. A definitive statement of Rodrik’s original and influential perspective on economic growth and globalization, One Economics, Many Recipes shows how successful countries craft their own unique strategies–and what other countries can learn from them…” [Publisher ‘s Book Website]

Author’s Interview, IMF, November 2007.

Reviews / Comments

Book review by Mukti Upadhyay in Journal of International and Global Studies, 1(2), April 2010.

Book review by Andrés Rodríguez-Clare in Journal of International Economics, 77(1), February 2009. [Earlier version]

Book review by Jonathan Temple in The Economic Journal 119(535), February 2009.

Book Review by Robert C. Feenstra in The Economic Journal, 119(535), February 2009.

Book review by Declan Trott in Agenda, 15(1), November 2008.

Book review by Robert E. Baldwin, World Trade Review, 7(3), July 2008.

Book review by Christian Kellermann, Rezensionen/Book Reviews, April 2008.

Book review by Richard N. Cooper in Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008.

A Crooked Timber Seminar on Dani Rodrik’s Book edited by Henry Farrell, 2007.

Book review by Piaw Na in Piaw’s Blog, December 2007.

A discussion of Dani Rodrik’s book by Gregory Sanders, November 2007.

Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters

“Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.” So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird’s-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith’s pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters–places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes…” [Publisher’s Book Webpage]

Authors’ Book website

Reviews / Comments

Book review by Moses K. Kihiko in Progress in Development Studies, 13(2), April 2013.

Book review by Tuuli Ylinen in Journal of International Development, 25(3), April 2013.

Book review by Bentley MacLeod in Journal of Economic Literature, 51(1), March 2013. [Earlier version]

Book Review by Colin Jennings in European Journal of Political Economy, 29, March 2013.

Book Review by Claudia Williamson in Public Choice, 153 (1/2), October 2012.

Book Review by Daniel W. Bromley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November 2011.

Talk notes for LSE Book Launch by Robert H. Wade, November 2011.

“Building an effective state” by The Enlightened Economist, October 2011.