Asymmetric Shocks in Trade Distances

The correlation between trade and income has been extensively documented in empirical research.  But the ‘endogeneity issue’ of whether trade increases income or income increases trade has not received a definite answer.  The first attempts to solve the endogeneity issue involved the use of geographical instruments.  A natural choice of instrument is the geographical distance from one country to other countries, since distance provides considerable information about trade volumes.  For example, New Zealand is far from most other countries and the amount it trades is reduced when compared to Belgium, which is close to many of the world’s richest countries.  But the concern with this approach is that distance may be acting through channels other than trade.  For example, countries close to the equator may be further from the world’s richest countries, but this happens to coincide with the fact that they have weak institutions, which may be the real cause for reduced trade volumes.

An alternative approach, which still relies on geography as an instrument for trade, is to observe natural experiments that generate asymmetric shocks in trade distances. One type of experiment focuses on the effects of trade disruption associated with wars or natural disasters.  The Six Day War fought between Israel and Egypt, which resulted in the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975, is an example of such a natural experiment.  Because the Suez Canal provides the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe, its closure implied that in some cases the transport of goods through the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope would take almost double the nautical miles.  This variation in shipping distance allows for the analysis of the impact of pure transportation costs on trade and the effect of trade on output.  Another experiment, that explores the effects of unexpected variation in trade distances in a similar manner, focuses on air transportation.  It uses the two months disruption in flights caused by the eruption of a volcano in Iceland in 2010, allowing for the direct analysis of goods flows to European destinations, and an indirect analysis of non-European destinations via network effects.  Not only do both of these experiments enable the evaluation of the effect of trade to be free from confounding factors, like the movement of people.  They also create the opportunity for research in economic development, patterns of production specialization across countries, and the ability of supply chains to react to these shocks.

A second type of natural experiment is the change in transportation technology over time.  One striking example is the reduction of the costs of air freight between 1955 and 2004, which fell by a factor of ten, leading to a substantial shift toward air freight around the globe.  Similar effects have been found for the development of ‘containerization’ in shipping.  Both of these innovations can be interpreted in terms of a change in the physical distance between countries over time that may be used to identify the effect of trade on income.  One of the main findings of the work on air freight is that, in general, trade has a significant positive effect on income.  However, a different technological shock indicates a more nuanced story.  Going back to the first wave of globalization at the end of 19th century and beginning of the 20th century, the invention of the steamship removed the dependence of transport on wind.  This produced an asymmetric change in shipping times across countries because some shipping routes benefited more from trade winds than others.  After this change, the research found that the income per capita gap between poor and rich countries increased even more.  One explanation is that a reduction in relative trade costs together with increasing returns in manufactures causes a process of industrial agglomeration that is beneficial for countries that specialize in manufacturing but might actually harm countries that specialize in agriculture which is characterized by constant returns to scale.  Since this suggests that a reduction in trade costs across countries does not automatically generate large positive effects on economic development, more research is necessary to understand the mechanisms through which trade may lead to positive effects on income.

Bernhofen, Daniel M. & El-Sahli, Zouheir & Kneller, Richard, 2016. “Estimating the Effects of the Container Revolution on World Trade.” Journal of International Economics, 98: 36-50. [working paper].

Besedes, Tibor, Antu Mushid (2017) “Experimenting with Ash: The Trade-Effects of Airspace Closures in the Aftermath of Eyjafjallajökull,” Working Paper.

Frankel, Jeffrey and David Romer (1999) “Does Trade Cause Growth? American Economic Review, 89 (3): 379-99.

Freyer, James (2009) “Trade and Income: Exploiting Time Series in Geography.” NBER Working Paper 14910.

Freyer, James (2009) “Distance, Trade, and Income: The 1967 to 1975 Closing of the Suez Canal as a Natural ExperimentNBER Working Paper 15557.

Gerritse, Michiel (2017) “Does Trade Cause Unfortunate Specialization in Developing Economies? Evidence from Countries South of the Suez Canal,” Working Paper.

Pascali, Luigi (forthcoming) “The Wind of Change: Maritime Techonology, Trade, and Economic Development,” American Economic Review. [working paper]

Rodriguez, Francisco. and Dani Rodrik (2000) “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptics Guide to the Cross-national Evidence“. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 15, 261-338.

Trade Liberalization, Heterogenous Firms and Growth

In static trade models with no market imperfections, the aggregate income and welfare of a small country grow when it opens to trade.  In endogenous growth models, trade liberalization boosts the growth effect generated by non-diminishing returns to factors of production, or learning-by-doing, or knowledge spillovers, or other forms of endogenous technological change.  Although important insights into the relationship between trade and growth can be derived from these models, the mechanism through which this process takes place is still not well-understood.  One promising perspective is offered by new trade models that focus on how the production choices made by heterogeneous firms affect growth.

The first set of models in the literature on growth with trade and heterogeneous firms is underpinned by the Melitz model.  Growth is driven by endogenous technology diffusion and trade is one of the components influencing firms’ technology choices.  In one study for example, given changes in trade costs, firms have to decide whether to upgrade their technology, taking into account the fixed costs of upgrading.  In another study, firms have to choose between process innovation (raising productivity) and product innovation (increasing variety).  In both approaches, static gains from trade are offset by a reallocation of labor from the production of goods to activities centred on market entry and product adoption.  Even though there is a loss in varieties produced and consumed, reductions in trade costs increase the rate of technology adoption and economic growth.

A second branch of the literature includes models that build on a Ricardian framework to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the creation and diffusion of ideas.  This setting highlights the role of intermediate goods in the growth process in an environment with many asymmetric countries.  The setting also makes it possible to separate gains from trade into static and dynamic components.  The static component is based on the gains from specialization, underpinned by comparative advantage, whereas the dynamic component is derived from the gains through the flow of ideas.  This dynamic component of gains from trade is found to play an important role in explaining growth miracles in countries such as South Korea.  This result brings about a significant advance in our understanding of the relationship between trade openness and growth.  However, other growth channels are still open to investigation.  For example, in both branches of literature identified above, foreign direct investment was not part of the analyses but it clearly plays a role in knowledge transfer.

Alvarez, Fernando and Robert E. Lucas (2007) “General equilibrium analysis of the Eaton-Kortum model of international trade,Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6): 1726-1768. [working paper]

Atkeson, Adrew and Ariel T. Burstein (2010) “Innovation, Firm Dynamics, and International Trade, ” Journal of Political Economy, 118 (3): 433–484. [working paper]

Coe, David and Elhanan Helpman (1995) “International R&D Spillovers, ” European Economic Review, 39 (5): 859-887. [working paper]

Buera, Paco and Erza Oberfield (2015) “Global Diffusion of Ideas,” Working Paper.

Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (1999) “International Technology Diffusion: Theory and Measurement,” International Economic Review, 40 (3): 537-570.

Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum (2001) “Technology, trade, and growth: A Unified Framework,” European Economic Review, 45 (4-6): 742-755. [working paper]

Perla, Jesse, Christopher Tonetti and Michael Waugh (2015) “Equilibrium Technology Diffusion, Trade, and Growth, ” Working Paper.

Sampson, Thomas (2016) “Dynamic Selection: An Idea Flows Theory of Entry, Trade, and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (1): 315-380.

Search and Matching, Contracting, and the Division of Gains from Trade

A well-known prediction in the “new” trade theory is that markups fall with trade liberalization.  The reason is that, because larger firms and/or more concentrated industries enjoy more market power, their prices are more responsive to an increase in foreign competition.  There are efficiency gains and consumers benefit from cheaper domestically produced and imported goods.  However, micro-econometric studies have revealed situations where this prediction fails in practice.  For example, one study on India’s trade liberalization shows that changes in marginal costs do not reflect perfectly changes in prices due to variable markups (i.e., there is incomplete pass-through).  Moreover, the most likely beneficiaries of trade liberalization are not consumers, but instead domestic Indian firms who enjoy lower production costs while simultaneously raise markups.  This type of non-standard outcome has given rise to a literature that evaluates, theoretically and empirically, the distribution of gains from trade liberalization among consumers, importers, exporters, and traders (aka intermediaries) as well as the implications for overall welfare.

One branch of the literature, by building on a search and matching approach, aims to quantify the gains from trade while allowing buyers and sellers to be heterogeneous.  One study on Colombia’s footwear industry suggests that the outcome from trade liberalization is more likely to be positive for welfare.  This is explained by the entry of Chinese firms into the Colombian market, combined with a reduction in search costs of Colombian traders acting as importers after liberalization.  In contrast, a different study shows that there is a loss of aggregate welfare in a country where the exporters’ bargaining power is small with respect to traders.  This setting is typical of developing countries with farmers as exporters negotiating with traders from developed countries. The intuition is that there is a trade externality underlying the search friction in goods markets that not only affects the division of surplus between farmers and traders, but also the entry of foreign traders into the market.  This, in turn, affects trading prospects of farmers who are not matched to a trader.  The loss of welfare occurs because farmers and traders only bargain after they find a match and their negotiations fail to internalize this externality.

Another branch of the literature uses a contracting approach to explore the idea that trade liberalization may induce firms to replace trade barriers with contracts that preclude consumers reaping the gains yielded by market integration.  The root of this issue is in the successive markups by exporters and traders that might emerge from an imperfectly competitive market structure (double marginalization).  In addition, if products are differentiated, competing traders impose a business-stealing effect on each other, which lowers their profits.  Exporters can overcome the inefficiency related to the double marginalization by offering bilateral contracts that specify fixed payments and quantities.  If the contract offered is also joint with the competing traders the business-stealing effect can be mitigated.  However the outcome may be detrimental to consumers: higher profits with restricted sales imply higher consumer prices.  Another study on Colombia finds that after the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement was signed and American exporters started to enjoy duty-free access to the Colombian market, product prices rose, lower quantities were shipped and the number of trader partners in Colombia was reduced.  But because contracting corrects for such inefficiencies the resulting effect on aggregate welfare is unclear.

As micro data become available, researchers will be able to evaluate the distributional implications of contracting and search-and-matching more accurately.  These will have the potential to make valuable contributions towards the determination of trade policies that lead to greater aggregate welfare.

 

Antràs, Pol and Arnaud Costinot (2011) “Intermediated Trade,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126: 1319-1374.

Bernard, Andrew B. and Swati Dhingra (2015) “Contracting and the Division of Gains from Trade“, Working Paper.

De Loecker, Jan, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Amit K. Khandelwal and Nina Pavcnik (2016) “Prices, Markups, and Trade ReformEconometrica, 84 (2): 445-510. [working paper]

Eaton, Jonathan, David Jinkins, James Tybout and Daniel Yi Xu (2016) “Two-sided Search in International Markets,” Working Paper.

Raff, Horts and Nicholas Schmitt (2005): “Endogenous vertical restraints in international trade,” European Economic Review, 49 (7): 1877–1889 [working paper]

Rauch, James (1999) “Networks versus Markets in International Trade,” Journal of International Economics, 48: 7-35.

Tybout, James R. (2003): “Plant-and firm-level evidence on “new” trade theories,” In: E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan (eds) Handbook of International Trade, Blackwell Publishing, Malden.

 

Distributional Consequences of Changes in Relative Prices of Tradeables

Trade policies, price shocks, and changes in exchange rates have a distributional impact whenever they affect the relative price of goods that are consumed at different intensities by high and low-income households. Low-income households consume relatively more tradeables (such as food), while high-income households consume relatively more non-tradeables (such as personal services).  If trade policy, for example, causes an increase on the price of food, a low-income household is likely to suffer a greater negative impact than a high-income household.

To understand the impact on welfare of changes in relative prices through the expenditure channel a common modelling approach is based on non-homothetic preferences. These provide the theoretical background for the construction of models that can be used in structural estimation of the cost of living. For the estimation part, a growing body of work in international trade adopts the Almost-Ideal Demand System (AIDS), although other forms of demand estimation are also being used.  The increasing availability of detailed microdata facilitates the evaluation of changes in welfare of households at different income levels, in particular the welfare effects associated with prices changes of different types of product as well as different qualities within a product category.

The general conclusion of this research is that the nature of the shock determines the variation in the welfare effects across groups at different income levels.  Trade liberalization or the entry of large retailers in the domestic market have in some cases been beneficial to low-income households. On the other hand a large exchange rate devaluation has been found not to be beneficial.  The formation of MERCOSUR, a customs union in Latin America was found to be beneficial to the poor in Argentina but the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement was found to hurt the poor in Mexico.

 

Atkin, David, Benjamin Faber, and Marco Gonzalez-Navarro (2016) “Retail Globalization and Household Welfare: Evidence from Mexico”, Working Paper.

Cravino, Javier and Andrei A. Levchenko (2015) “The Distributional Consequences of Large Devaluations“, Working Paper.

Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1980) “An almost ideal demand system“, American Economic Review, 70 (3): 312–326.

Deaton, Angus. and John Muellbauer (1980) Economics and consumer behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Faber, Benjamin (2014) “Trade Liberalization, the Price of Quality, and Inequality: Evidence from Mexican Store Prices“, Working Paper.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Gene M. Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman (2011) “Income Distribution, Product Quality, and International Trade.” Journal of Political Economy, 119(4): 721-65.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo D, and Amit K Khandelwal (2016) “Measuring the unequal gains from trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (3):1113-80. [Working paper version]

Porto, Guido G. (2006) “Using survey data to assess the distributional effects of trade policy,” Journal of International Economics, 70 (1): 140–60. [Working paper version]

The trade-off between tax revenues and trade liberalization

Standard theory predicts that, in the long term, trade liberalization leads to an increase in allocative efficiency and hence an increase of fiscal revenues.  This prediction is based on the idea that overall economic surplus determines the size of the tax base and an improvement in allocative efficiency increases surplus.  Given this attractive feature of trade liberalization, especially from a fiscal standpoint, it is puzzling that developing countries remain relatively protectionist.  A new branch of the literature has begun to shed light on this issue.

The empirical evidence shows that trade taxes in low-to-middle income countries, and particularly low-income countries (LICs), account for a significant share of their fiscal revenue.  For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa trade taxes account for an average of about one quarter of all government revenues and in the developing countries of Asia and the Pacific they account for around 15 percent.  In contrast, high-income countries depend more on domestic income taxes and for many of them the share of revenues from trade taxes is very small.  It is argued that developing countries’ dependence on revenues from trade taxes might itself account for their failure to liberalize further.  The problem appears to be that many developing countries do not have the domestic fiscal capacity to increase domestic taxation.  That is, the machinery of domestic tax collection does not exist within the country.  If within a country different social groups with conflicting interests cannot agree on investing in fiscal capacity, then domestic taxation fails to develop and the country remains reliant on trade taxation.

Consistent with this perspective, the empirical evidence shows that after trade liberalization episodes, developing countries typically take a long time to replace trade tax revenue losses with domestic tax revenue gains.  A significant number of LICs never manage to replace the revenues that were lost to trade liberalization. A political economy approach has been developed to understand this paradox. Research shows that the governments of powerful countries sometimes succeed in influencing the trade policies of their less powerful developing country trade partners. This could lead them to decrease taxes on trade ‘too early’ from a fiscal perspective, i.e. before they are in a position to increase revenues from domestic sources of taxation.

One line of research suggests that structural changes associated with the process of development of the domestic economy could in turn facilitate trade liberalization, rather than the reverse prediction of standard theory.  Through structural change the cost of monitoring and enforcing income taxes decreases, the domestic tax base expands and allows the government to rely less on (inefficient) trade taxes, which could in principle lead to more liberalization in the future.

Antràs, Pol  and Gerard Padró i Miquel (2011) “Foreign Influence and Welfare,” Journal of International Economics, 84: 135–148.

Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2011) Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton University Press.

Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2014) “Why do developing countries tax so little?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(4): 99-120.

Baunsgaard, Thomas and Michael Keen (2010) “Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization,” Journal of Public Economics, 94(9-10): 563 – 577 [working paper]

Cagé, Julia and Lucie Gadenne (2014) “Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006“, Working Paper

Dixit, Avinash (1985) “Tax policy in open economies,” in Handbook of Public Economics, ed. by A. J. Auerbach, and M. Feldstein, vol. 1 of Handbook of Public Economics, chap. 6, pp. 313–374. Elsevier.

Riezman, Raymond, and Joel B. Slemrod (1987): “Tariffs and Collection Costs,” Review of World Economics, 23(2): 209–287.

International Trade, Redistribution and Institutional Change

In international trade theory, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem demonstrates how changes in relative goods prices affect the returns to factors of production.  The theorem predicts that a rise in the relative price of a good will lead to an increase in the real return of the factors used intensively in its production.  The resulting redistribution of domestic income has important political economy implications. Social groups who benefit from the redistribution through an increase in their own income may gain enough de facto political power to demand changes in institutions in order to preserve their gains.  The question of whether or not these institutional changes bring about increased political participation and/or long term economic growth is at the center of an intense intellectual debate.

One aspect of the debate focuses on how the expansion of international trade in medieval Europe led to major institutional reforms that were fundamental to the rise of Western Europe.  It is argued that these reforms were mainly led by commercial interests outside the royal circle and their demands supported long term economic growth.  These reforms included the expansion of property rights protections, constraints on the power of monarchs, the creation of a legal system, and the emergence of business corporations.  Another aspect of the debate emphasizes that eventually commercial interests may promote worse economic outcomes.  The reason is that once these interests achieve enough political power and become part of the establishment, they are able to manipulate economic policy and build institutions that exclude the rest of society from political participation and the gains from trade. As a result society becomes politically closed, unequal and stratified.

The intellectual challenge that emerges from this debate is to identify a critical juncture where growth promoting institutions are transformed into rent extracting ones.  Recent research has begun to try to do this.

 

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2005) “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review, 95 (3): 546–579.

Dippel, Christian, Avner Greif and Daniel Trefler (2015) “The Rents from Trade and Coercive Institutions: Removing the Sugar Coating,” NBER Working Paper 20958.

Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff, (1997) “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Harber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 260–304.

Gerchunoff, Pablo and Lucas Llach (2009) “Equality or Growth: A 20th Century Argentine Dilemma,” Revista de Historia Economica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 37(3):397-426.

Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast (1994) ‘‘Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,’’ Journal of Political Economy, 102: 745–776.

Puga, Diego and Daniel Trefler (2014) “International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice’s Response to Globalization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (2): 753–821.

Zissimos, Ben (2015); “Food Price Shocks, Income, and Democratization,” World Bank Economic Review: Proceedings of the 2014 Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, “The Role of Theory in Development Economics, 29 (1): S145-S154. [Working Paper version]

Non-homothetic Preferences in Models of International Trade

In international trade models, the assumption of homothetic preferences ensures that income elasticities of demand are equal to one, allowing the analysis to focus on the supply side.  Over the years, many important insights have been facilitated by this assumption.  These include the idea that differing factor proportions can motivate trade, as well as more recent discoveries about firm behavior in an international trade setting.  However the assumption of homothetic preferences has been questioned from an empirical standpoint.  In particular, we do not observe an income elasticity of demand equal to one in the data.  When preferences are assumed to be non-homothetic instead, so that aggregate demand varies with aggregate income as well as the income distribution, the focus of the analysis shifts to the demand side.

The Linder hypothesis is perhaps the best known argument featuring a central role for the demand side in the determination of trade patterns.  Consumers earning similar incomes consume similar baskets of goods, which in turn drives specialization in production and hence exporting to countries where incomes are similar.  Underpinning this specialization, the higher the average national income level, the higher the average quality of goods produced and consumed.  This leads countries at a given income level to specialize and trade amongst themselves at a corresponding level of product quality.

Linder proposed this as a competing hypothesis to the idea that trade is driven by relative factor proportions as in the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, which was the dominant hypothesis explaining international trade at the time.  His motivation was that the majority of world trade occurred between similar rich countries, which the H-O model had difficulty explaining.  This was also the motivation behind the development of the increasing-returns-based trade literature.  In certain respects, it was also the motivation behind the more recent ‘Ricardian revival’, which shows that variations in technology play a significant role in explaining world trade patterns.  A new empirical literature is emerging to assess the role of non-homothetic preferences.  The findings so far suggest that demand-side factors may be at least as important as those on the supply side in explaining world trade patterns.

 

Caron, Justin, Thibault Fally, and James R. Markusen (2014) “International trade puzzles: a solution linking production and preferences.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3): 1501-52. [Working paper version]

Choi, Yo Chul, David Hummels, and Chong Xiang. “Explaining Import Quality: the Role of the Income Distribution.” Journal of International Economics 77 (2009): 265-76. [Working paper version]

Deaton, Angus and John Muellbauer (1980) Economics and Consumer Behavior.  Cambridge University Press.

Dingel, Jonathan (2015) “The Determinants of Quality Specialization.” Working Paper.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Gene M. Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman (2011) “Income Distribution, Product Quality, and International Trade.” Journal of Political Economy, 119(4): 721-65.

Fajgelbaum, Pablo D, and Amit K Khandelwal (2016) “Measuring the unequal gains from trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, advance online publication, doi: 10.1093/qje/qjw013. [Working paper version]

Fieler, Ana Cecilia (2011) “Nonhomotheticity and Bilateral Trade: Evidence and a Quantitative ExplanationEconometrica, 79(4): 1069-1101.

Hallak, Juan Carlos (2010) “A Product-Quality View of the Linder Hypothesis.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(3): 453–66.

Linder, S. B. (1961) An Essay on Trade and Transformation. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Markusen, James R (2013) “Putting per-capita income back into trade theory.” Journal of International Economics 90(2): 255–65.

McCalman, Phillip (2016) “International Trade, Income Distribution and Welfare.Working Paper.

Mitra, Devashish and Vitor Trindade (2005) “Inequality and Trade.” Canandian Journal of Economics, 38(4): 1253-71. [Working paper version]

 

 

Granularity and International Trade

A large literature has developed over the last twenty years or so to understand the role of firm heterogeneity in a country’s exporting behavior.  A key feature of the models in this literature is that they typically assume each firm has measure zero in its industry.  This assumption is useful because it removes strategic interaction between firms and so helps makes tractable the complexities of firm heterogeneity.  An implication of this assumption is that no single firm can affect industry aggregates.  And so the productivity realizations of a single firm or small group of firms cannot affect a country’s aggregate exports.

New research argues that useful insights are gained by relaxing the measure zero assumption, allowing individual firms to be at the center of the analysis.  The reason is that in reality firms, especially the largest ones, can play a pivotal role in business cycle and aggregate trade fluctuations; aggregate welfare; or even on a country’s comparative advantage.  When firms are allowed to be “granular” or large relative to the markets in which they operate, idiosyncratic shocks to individual (large) firms, such as reductions in trade costs and productivity changes across countries, will not average out, and instead lead to movements in the aggregates.  This has already been shown empirically for French and American data.

This new line of research may be particularly useful in studying international trade and economic development.  In developing countries, there is a greater prevalence of industrial policy that promotes exporting by particular firms within sectors.  At the same time, regulatory regimes are often opaque and unpredictable, and credit markets or commercial policies favor large firms.  In this setting, granularity in firms may help to explain why developing economies tend to be fundamentally more volatile than developed economies.   However, there is currently little empirical evidence on the role of individual firms and firm-to-firm linkages in aggregate fluctuations in developing countries.

 

Atkeson, A. and A. Burstein (2008): “Pricing to Market, Trade Costs and International Relative Prices,” American Economic Review, 98(5), 1998–2031. [Working Paper Version]

Bernard, A. B., J. B. Jensen, S. J. Redding, and P. K. Schott (2015) “Global Firms,” Working Paper.

di Giovanni, J. and A. Levchenko (2009) “International Trade and Aggregate Fluctuations in Granular Economies,” Working Paper.

Di Giovanni, J., A. Levchenko, and I. Méjean (2014): “Firms, Destinations, and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica, 82(4): 1303–1340. [Working Paper Version]

Eaton, J., S. Kortum, and S. Sotelo (2012): “International Trade: Linking the Micro and the Macro,” NBER Working Paper, 17864.

Gabaix, X. (2011) “The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica, 79: 733-772.

Gaubert, C. and O. Itskhoki (2015) “Granular Comparative Advantage,” Working Paper.

Hottman, C., S. Redding, and D. Weinstein (2015) “Quantifying the Sources of Firm Heterogeneity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. [Working Paper Version]

Melitz, M. J. (2003) “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6): 1695–1725.

Learning Externalities and International Trade

It has long been recognized that the dynamic effects of trade, such as the learning externalities that drive technological change, are likely to dwarf the static gains.  According to the oral tradition in economics, the literature tended to focus on the static gains because the dynamic effects were poorly understood and supposedly impossible to measure.  Yet recent work conducting natural and field experiments has found large effects from learning externalities associated with international trade, potentially shattering the received wisdom that this type of effect cannot be measured.

Perhaps the oldest and best known learning externality of trade is associated with the infant industry argument for protection.  A developing country’s transformation curve shifts over time partly due to the learning-by-doing effect of “experience” in raising manufacturing productivity.  As a result the manufacturing sector is too small under laissez faire.  There is an efficiency gain to protecting or subsidising the manufacturing sector because the additional manufacturing output contributes to social benefit by enhancing future productivity.  Two challenges arise with identifying empirically the effects of infant industry protection.  First, even if the industry becomes competitive after receiving protection it is difficult to know whether it would have become competitive anyway.  Second, in the case of a policy intervention, it is not possible to disentangle the effect of the market imperfection from the effect of the policy intervention itself.  A recent paper by Réka Juhász has addressed both issues by treating the protective effect on the French cotton industry of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) as a natural experiment.  Exogenous within-country variation in the effectiveness of the naval blockade makes it possible to address the first challenge identified above.  The fact that the protection does not arise as the result of a policy addresses the second.  The results show that areas that received a larger trade cost shock during the Napoleonic Wars increased production capacity in mechanised cotton spinning to a larger extent than areas which received a smaller shock.  This research suggests that economically significant learning effects can arise from protection.  Future research could usefully ask how to obtain these effects without falling into the usual traps that accompany protective interventions.

“Learning from exporting” is perhaps the newest type of learning externality to be identified in the literature on international trade and appears to have emerged from policy circles.  Early attempts to identify this effect found little evidence of it, finding instead that more productive firms tended to select into exporting and not the other way around.  But recent research by David Atkin, Amit Khandelwal and Adam Osman based on a randomised trial conducted in Egypt offers compelling evidence to the contrary.  The trial randomly assigns access to international markets across a sample of firms, making it possible to causally identify the impact of exporting on profits and productivity.  Treatment firms report 15-25 percent higher profits and exhibit large improvements in quality alongside reductions in output per hour relative to control firms.  These important results give rise to a new research agenda to understand the apparent conflict between the failure of early attempts to find learning externalities and the success of these new results.  A related question that could usefully be explored in future research concerns the extent to which these results vary with the quality of domestic institutions such as the rule of law and enforcement of property rights.

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Clerides, S.K., S. Lach and J.R. Tybout, (1998); “Is Learning by Exporting Important? Microdynamic Evidence from Columbia, Mexico and Morocco.Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 903-947.

De Loecker, J., (2007); “Do Export Generate Higher Productivity? Evidence from Slovenia.”  Journal of International Economics, 73: 609-644. [Working paper version]

Head, K. (1994); “Infant Industry Protection in the Steel Rail Industry.Journal of International Economics, 37(3), 141-165.

Irwin, D.A., (2000); “Did Late-Nineteenth-Century US Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry.The Journal of Economic History, 60(2): 335-360. [Working paper version]

Juhasz, R., (2014); “Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade.” CEP Discussion Paper no. 1322.

Keller, W., (2004); “International Technology Diffusion.Journal of Economic Literature, 43: 752-782. [Working paper version]

Rhee, Y., B. Ross-Larson and G. Pursell (1984); Korea’s Competitive Edge: Managing the Entry into World Markets. Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, Baltimore, MD.

Contracting Institutions and International Trade

The quality of contracting institutions is among the most important determinants of the relationship between buyers and sellers engaged in international trade.  Contractual frictions are magnified in international trade by the fact that if one of the parties reneges on a written contract the dispute has to be resolved in local courts (as opposed to international courts) even though the parties are residents of different countries.  This imbalance causes the risk for opportunistic behavior in an international transaction to be greater than in a domestic one and helps to explain why international trade flows are generally significantly lower than domestic trade flows.  Moreover, the fact that contracting institutions are generally worse in developing countries than they are in developed ones means that potential gains from trade are being lost, as is technology transfer from developed to developing countries.   At the same time, recent research has shown that variation in the quality of contracting institutions is actually a source of comparative advantage, which in turn determines trade patterns.

While problems with formal contract enforcement in developing countries tend to exacerbate opportunistic behavior, in some settings informal mechanisms have been put in place to try to improve enforcement.  Informal mechanisms require either repeated interaction leading to reputation and trust or other side constraints to try to improve enforcement.  This is particularly important in the trade of perishable goods where the short life of a product makes it impractical to write and enforce a contract on a supplier’s reliability.  Other mechanisms rely on the financing terms used in the transactions.  An exporter can require the importer to pay for goods before they are shipped, can allow the importer to pay after the goods have arrived at their destination, or can use some form of bank intermediation such as a letter of credit.  The chosen financing terms depend on the countries’ institutional settings of the parties participating in the transaction.  Transactions are more likely to require cash in advance or a letter of credit when the importer is located in a country with weak contractual enforcement.  As an importer develops a relationship with the exporter, transactions are less likely to occur on terms that require prepayment.

The theoretical literature has developed a variety of models that capture institutional features such as enforcement problems, insurance considerations or uncertainty over the parties’ commitment to the relationship.  More recently the availability of microdata has allowed researchers to test the predictions of these models and discover which features are the most relevant for international trade.  Some results suggest that exporters tend to sell larger volumes to countries with good contracting institutions than to countries with weak institutions; experience built via repeated interaction helps exporters to select reliable importers; and banks are more effective than the exporter in pursuing financial claims against importers.

 

Araujo Luis, Giordano Mion and Emanuel Ornelas (2015) “Institutions and Export Dynamic ” Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.

Antràs, Pol, and Fritz C Foley (Forthcoming) “Poultry in Motion: A Study of International Trade Finance PracticesJournal of Political Economy. [Working paper version]

Greif, Avner (2005) “Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting  Exchange” In: Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. C. Menard and M. M. Shirley. New York: Springer

Levchenko, Andrei A. (2007) “Institutional quality and international trade.” The Review of Economic Studies74(3): 791-819. [Working paper version]

Macchiavello, Rocco, and Ameet Morjaria (2015) “The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports.” American Economic Review, 105(9): 2911-45. [Working paper version]

Nunn, Nathan (2007) “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of Trade.Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2), pp. 569-600.

Rodrik, Dani (2000) “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(1): 177-186

Williamson, Oliver (1985) “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting.”  The Free Press.