Global Inequality, Investment, and Trade Frictions in Capital Goods

Since 1950 the global Gini coefficient for between-country income inequality has stood at about 55, reflecting a twenty five-fold difference in wealth between the richest and poorest countries. A well-known stylized fact underpinning this feature of the world economy is that the real investment rate of wealthy countries such as Norway and the United States is roughly two to three times that of poor countries such as Mali and Kenya.  Based on this evidence, the literature seeking to understand international inequality has attributed a key role to differences in physical capital intensity.

The early literature attributes low capital intensity to low savings rates, combined with limited international capital mobility.  Low savings rates have been attributed in turn to poor institutions, and policies that result in high effective tax rates on capital income such as high explicit tax rates, high discount rates, and high dependency ratios.  Alternatively, low-saving traps have been attributed to subsistence consumption needs.  This line of reasoning formed the intellectual foundations for the lending work of institutions such as the World Bank.

A more recent strand of the literature assigns a central role to factors that directly determine the cost of capital.  From this perspective, poor countries have low real investment rates because they tax capital goods, erect or endure barriers to trade in capital goods, or grant monopoly rights to domestic capital goods producers.  Recent contributions to this literature have been organized around an Eaton Kortum (EK) model wherein capital can grow both through domestic and imported capital formation.  Within this framework, trade frictions have been identified as quantitatively important in understanding why standards of living and measured total factor productivity between the richest and poorest countries differ by so much.

Carroll, C.D., B.-K. Rhee, and C. Rhee (1994); “Are here Cultural Effects on Saving? Some Cross-Sectional Evidence.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3): 685–99.

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Easterly, W., and S. Rebelo. 1993. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3): 417–58.

Eaton, J., and S. Kortum, (2001); “Trade in Capital Goods.European Economic Review 45:1195–1235. [Working paper version]

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Hsieh, C.-T. and P.J. Klenow, (2007); “Relative Prices and Relative Prosperity.American Economic Review 97 (3):562–585. [Working paper version]

Rodriguez, Francisco and Dani Rodrik. 2001. “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, NBER Chapters. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 261–325.

Waugh, M.E., (2010); “International Trade and Income Differences.American Economic Review 100 (5):2093–2124.

Economic Development through Export Promotion

If economic development is essentially about an economy’s transition from agricultural to industrial production, then the attainment of a comparative advantage in industrial products is widely regarded to be the hallmark of successful development.  Against this backdrop, governments aiming to promote development often seek to do so partly through the promotion of industrial exports.  In light of this, a literature has developed in economics recently to understand whether and under what circumstances policy to promote exports has been successful.

This recent literature focuses on two different types of market imperfection that could motivate government intervention to promote exports.  The first involves hysteresis in exporting.  This is driven by firm heterogeneity in productivity and a sunk cost to foreign market entry, whereby the return to becoming an exporter today includes the option value of continuing to exporting in future without incurring start-up costs.  The second type of market imperfection involves a cost of self-discovery both of new products and of new markets based on learning about the specific products in which a country has a comparative advantage.  In both cases an across-the-board policy to promote exports is found to address the market imperfection: export subsidy and a real exchange rate depreciation respectively.  The main policy conclusion is that an appropriate government policy can help to circumvent the externalities that firms face and hence promote industrial development.  But to be successful these policies must allow the market, as opposed to the government, to determine which firms and products prevail.  While these policy conclusions are promising for economic development in and of themselves, they risk imposing mercantilist or begger-thy-neighbour externalities of their own on other countries.  Indeed, such are the risks associated with export subsidies that there is an initiative at the WTO to phase them out altogether.  Therefore, future research could usefully evaluate whether and how policies can address domestic market imperfections associated with underdevelopment without imposing adverse effects on other nations.

Bernard, A.B., J. Eaton, J.B. Jensen and S. Kortum, (2003); “Plants and Productivity in International Trade.American Economic Review, 93(4): 1268-1290. [Working paper version]

Das, S., M.J. Roberts and J.R. Tybout (2007); “Market Entry Costs, Producer Heterogeneity, and Export Dynamics.” Econometrica, 75(3): 837-873. [Working paper version]

Dixit, A., (1989); “Hysteresis, Import Penetration, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(2): 205-228.

Fernandes, A., and H. Tang, (2014); “Learning to Export from Neighbors.Journal of International Economics, 94(1): 67-84. [Working paper version]

Freund, C., and M.D. Pierola, (2012); “Export Surges.Journal of Development Economics 97: 387-395.

Hausmann, R., and D. Rodrik, (2003); “Economic Development as Self Discovery.Journal of Development Economics, 72(2): 603-633. [Working paper version]

Trade Liberalization and Inequality

The distributional implications of trade liberalization have long been of central interest to economists.  That may be why the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is probably trade theory’s best known result.  For those new to trade it demonstrates that, as a result of an increase in the relative price of a good, factors used intensively in its production enjoy a real increase in their return whereas those not used intensively suffer a real decline.  Since the 1980s, trade liberalization between the developed world and developing Asia and Latin America, coupled with an increase in inequality in the developed world over the same timeframe, have revived interest in the role that trade plays in driving inequality.

The first wave of the literature focused on developed countries and the increase in inequality between high-skilled and low skilled labor.  Such an increase is in line with the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem if there is trade liberalization and developed countries are relatively well endowed with high skilled labor.  The consensus was that, while trade liberalization was partially responsible for the increase in inequality, technological change played a greater role.  Some argued that trade liberalization was itself responsible for labor-saving technological change, providing a greater indirect role for trade liberalization in driving inequality.

The second wave switched focus to developing countries.  Here the results have been less clear-cut.  First, there has been an increase in inequality which runs counter to the prediction of the Stolpher-Samuelson Theorem if the developing world is abundant in low-skilled labor.  Moreover labor market regulations are reckoned to be more stringent in the developing than the developed world, limiting labor mobility between sectors which violates a central assumption in the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.  There appears to be some evidence that trade liberalization and technological change may have had opposite effects on inequality, with the positive technological change effects being dominant.  The consensus appears to be that, although skilled-biased technological change may have played a greater role in increasing the skill premium, technological change was itself an endogenous response to more openness so that globalization was indirectly responsible for the increase in the skill premium. Following the current trend in economics, the way forward seems to lie in more detailed models and datasets that facilitate careful examinations of the precise impulses that hit workers and how they responded.

Dix-Carneiro, R., (2014); “Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Dynamics.Econometrica, 82(3): 825-885. [Working paper version]

Feenstra, R.C. and G.H. Hanson, (2003); “Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages.” Published in Handbook of International Trade, vol. 1, ed. E. K. Choi and J. Harrigan. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 146–85.

Goldberg, P.K., and N. Pavcnik (2007); “Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries.Journal of Economic Literature 45: 39-82. [Working paper version]

Harrison, A.E., and G.H. Hanson, (1999); “Who Gains from Trade Reform? Some Remaining Puzzles.” Journal of Development Economics, 59(1): 125–54.

Krugman, P.R., (2000); “Technology, Trade and Factor Prices.” Journal of International Economics, 50(1): 51-71.

Leamer, E.E., (2000);“What’s the use of factor contents?Journal of International Economics, 50(1): 17-49.

McCaig, B., (2011); “Exporting Out of Poverty: Provincial Poverty in Vietnam and US Market Access.” Journal of International Economics, 85(1): 102-113. [Working paper version]

Pavcnik, N., (2003); “What Explains Skill Upgrading in Less Developed Countries?Journal of Development Economics, 71(2): 311–28. [Working paper version]

Porto G.G., (2006); “Using Survey Data to Assess the Distributional Effects of Trade Policy.” Journal of International Economics, 70(1): 140–60. [Working paper version]

Robertson, Raymond. 2004. “Relative Prices and Wage Inequality: Evidence from Mexico.” Journal of International Economics, 64(2): 387–409. [Working paper version]

Wood, A., (1995); “How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(3): 57–80.

The Interaction between Economic Institutions and International Trade

The main focus of the recent literature on the economics of institutions has been on the role of institutions that define and enforce contracts and property rights in enhancing economic performance. A key finding of this literature is that countries with better rule of law and more private property rights protection have on average grown faster, where faster growth is associated with better allocative efficiency.  Yet a criticism of this literature is that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in institutions as well as in outcomes associated with a given institutional metric.

The literature on the interaction between economic institutions and international trade provides some insight into how such heterogeneity can arise. It does so by arguing that poor institutions can be a source of rent for some groups while institutions can also be a source of comparative advantage.  Consequently, the welfare consequences arising from the interaction between economic institutions and international trade are shown to be ambiguous.  For example, recent research shows that if (Ricardian) productivity is greater by a sufficiently large margin in the sector where the country has a comparative advantage, then comparative advantage is assured and opening to trade increases rent seeking, thereby reducing efficiency. But if productivity differences between countries are small then under trade they compete for the sector by improving institutional quality, and so trade liberalization increases efficiency.

Acemoglu, D., and J.A. Robinson, (2006); “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy., Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.

Costinot, A., (2009); “On the Origins of Comparative Advantage.” Journal of International Economics, 77: 255-264. [Working paper version]

Dal Bó, E. and P. Dal Bó (2011); “Workers, Warriors and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(4): 646–677. [Working paper version]

Engerman, S.L., and K.L. Sokoloff, (1997); “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States.” Published in S. Harber (ed) How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford University Press, Stanford. [Working paper version]

Garfinkel, M.R., S. Skaperdas, and C. Syropoulos, (2008); “Globalization and Domestic Conflict.” Journal of International Economics, 76(2): 296-308. [Working paper version]

Levchenko, A., (2007); “Institutional Quality and International Trade.” Review of Economic Studies, 74:3 (July 2007), 791-819. [Working paper version]

Levchenko, A.A., (2013); “International Trade and Institutional Change.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29(5): 1145-1181. [Working paper version]

Nunn, N., (2007); “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2): 569-600.

Trade and Unemployment

Most of the public debate concerning the liberalization of international trade revolves around the effect of trade on the levels of employment.  Proponents of trade liberalization argue that higher demand for domestic products from abroad would increase employment.  Opponents worry that competition with imported products, in driving domestic producers out of business, would lead to job losses overall.  For scholars, however, the complexity of countries’ economies and the functioning of their labor markets suggest that both views are at least incomplete.In the academic literature on this issue, models of unemployment incorporate labor market frictions into the market clearing mechanism, so that unemployment arises endogenously as an equilibrium outcome.

In the early literature, labor market frictions were restricted to minimum wages, rigid wages or union activity.  The more recent literature incorporates search frictions, efficiency wages, fair wages, implicit contracts, insider/outsider models of labor markets, among others.  In these models, because the allocation of resources determines employment across sectors, policies that affect the allocation of resources can have an impact on the levels of employment.  If international trade affects the allocation of resources, then employment is also affected by trade.There is now a growing body of research that emphasizes the decisions of individual firms and workers in understanding the causes and consequences of aggregate trade on employment.  This emergent theoretical literature is a response to empirical studies using micro data, which reveal a number of features of worker and producer behaviors that were not well explained by pre-existing theories of international trade.  In particular, these models introduce search and matching frictions into a (Melitz type) model of firm heterogeneity to analyze employment as well as the income distribution.  With firm heterogeneity it can be shown that, for example, more productive firms pay higher wages while exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity, so that the opening of trade enhances wage inequality but can either raise or reduce unemployment.

Agell, Jonas and Per Lundborg (1995), “Fair Wages in the Open Economy“, Economica, 62: 335-351.

Bombardini, M.; G. Gallipoli and G. Pupato (2012) ”Skill Dispersion and Trade Flows”, American Economic Review, 102(5): 2327-2348.

Botero, Juan C., Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), “The Regulation of Labor“, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 1339-1382. [Working paper version]

Brecher, Richard A. (1974) “Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of International TradeThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88(1):98-116.

Cacciatore, M. (2014) “International trade and macroeconomic dynamics with labor market frictions”, Journal of International Economics, 93(1):17-30.

Copeland, B. R. (1989) “Efficiency Wages in a Ricardian Model of International Trade”, Journal of International Economics, 27(3):221–244.

Dao, M. C. (2013) “Foreign Labor Costs and Domestic Employment: What are the Spillovers?Journal of International Economics, 89(1): 154-171.

Davidson, C. and S. J. Matusz (2012) “A Model of Globalization and Firm-Worker Matching: How Good is Good Enough?International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 5-15.

Davidson, C., M. Lawrence and S. Matusz (1999), “Trade and Search Generated Unemployment“, Journal of International Economics, 48: 271-299.

Davidson, C. (1990) “Introduction.” In: Recent Developments in the Theory of Involuntary Unemployment Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 1-5.

Davis, D. R. and J. Harrigan (2011) “Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, and Trade LiberalizationJournal of International Economics, 84(1): 26-36. [Working paper version]

Fadinger, H. and K. Mayr (2014) “Skill-Biased Technological Change, Unemployment, and Brain Drain” Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(2): 397-431. [Working paper version]

Felbermayr, G. J.; M. Larch and W. Lechthaler, (2013) “Unemployment in an Interdependent World”, American Economic JournalEconomic Policy, 5(1): 262-301. [Working paper version]

Felbermayr, G. J.; M. Larch and W. Lechthaler (2012) “Endogenous Labor Market Institutions in an Open Economy”, International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 30-45.

Hasan, R.; D. Mitra, and P. Ranjan (2012) “Trade Liberalization and Unemployment: Theory and Evidence from IndiaJournal of Development Economics, 97(2): 269-280.

Helpman, E,; O. Itskhoki, Oleg and S. Redding (2010) “Inequality And Unemployment In A Global EconomyEconometrica, 78(4): 1239-1283 [Working paper version]

Helpman, E. and O. Itskhoki (2010) “Labor Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment”. Review of Economic Studies, 77(3): 1100-1137 [Working paper version]

Kreickemeier, U. and D. Nelson (2006), “Fair Wages, Unemployment and Technological Change in a Global Economy,” Journal of International Economics, 70: 451—469.

Melitz, M. and Alejandro Cuñat (2012) “Volatility, Labor Market Flexibility, and the Pattern of Comparative Advantage”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 10: 225-254.

Matusz, S. J. (1986) “Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and International Trade”, The Economic Journal, 96(382): 307-322.

Paz, L. S. (2014) “The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Informal Labor Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Evaluation of the Brazilian Case”, Journal of International Economics 92(2): 330-348. [Working paper version]

de Pinto, M. and J. Michaelis (2014) “International Trade and Unemployment-the Worker-selection Effect”, Review of International Economics 22(2): 226-252.

Ranjan, P. (2013) “Offshoring, Unemployment, and Wages: The Role of Labor Market InstitutionsJournal of International Economics, 89(1): 172-186. [Working paper version]

Ranjan, P. (2012) “Trade Liberalization, Unemployment, and Inequality with Endogenous Job Destruction” International Review of Economics & Finance, 23(SI): 16-29.

Seker, M. (2012) “Rigidities in Employment Protection and ExportingWorld Development, 40(2): 238-250. [Working paper version]

Tang, H. (2012) “Labor Market Institutions, Firm-Specific Skills, and Trade PatternsJournal of International Economics, 87(2): 337-351. [Working paper version]

The ‘Institutions Hypothesis’ and International Trade

According to Douglas North’s ‘Institutions Hypothesis’, powerful groups within a society will manipulate their nation’s economic institutions in their own interests if they are not bound by appropriate constraints, with potentially deleterious effects on economic development. The main focus is on institutions that specify and enforce contracts and property rights to reduce transactions costs. Existing powerful groups block the enforcement of property rights, and with it investment in new technology, in order to protect their economic rents. Societies are able to make technological advances only if they can defeat such groups. The literature on the interaction between economic institutions and international trade shows that poor institutions can be a source of rent for some groups while institutions can also be a source of comparative advantage in trade. Consequently, the welfare consequences of institutional comparative advantage are often ambiguous. Another branch of the literature focuses instead on the interaction between international trade and political institutions, for example studying the effects of constraints imposed by democratic institutions on the executive branch of government. Trade and growth are found to expand far more in countries where the executive cannot use their power to monopolize the gains from trade.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2005); “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth.” American Economic Review, 95(3): 546-579. [Working paper version]

Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson (2000); “Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development.” American Economic Review, 90(2): 126-130. [Working paper version]

Besley, T.J., K.B. Burchardi, and M. Ghatak (2012); “Incentives and the De Soto Effect.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 237–282. [Working paper version]

Costinot, A., (2009); “On the Origins of Comparative Advantage.” Journal of International Economics, 77(2): 255-264. [Working paper version]

Do, Q.-T. and A. Levchenko (2009); “Trade, Inequality, and the Political Economy of Institutions.” Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4): 1489-1520. [Working paper version]

Gancia, G. and Zilibotti, F. (2009); “Technological Change and the Wealth of Nations” Annual Review of Economics, 1: 93-120. [Working paper version]

Garfinkel, M., S. Skaperdas and C. Syropoulos, (2008); “Globalization and Domestic Conflict.” Journal of International Economics, 76(2): 296-308. [Working paper version]

Krusell, P. and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (1996); “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth.” Review of Economic Studies, 63(2): 301-329. [Working paper version]

Levchenko, A., (2007); “Institutional Quality and International Trade.” Review of Economic Studies, 74(3): 791-819. [Working paper version]

Levchenko, A., (2013); “International Trade and Institutional Change.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29(5): 1145-1181. [Working paper version]

North (1991); “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97-112.

Nunn, N., (2007); “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2): 569-600. [Working paper version]

R.G. Raghuram and L. Zingales (2000); “The Tyranny of Inequality.” Journal of Public Economics 76(3): 521–558. [Working paper version]

The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicine

The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement is an undertaking by members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to respect each others’ property rights.  At its inception, its main purpose was to protect the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of Northern firms, who have historically tended to be the main innovators, in Southern markets where imitation was prevalent.  It was granted as a quid pro quo for easier entry of Southern products into Northern markets.  Two main issues have arisen as a result of the introduction of TRIPS.  One concerns the effect on Southern industrial development, and whether this is made more difficult in the face of more stringent intellectual property protection.  The other is the effect on Southern consumers, particularly with regard to their access to medicine.  In both cases, the policy interactions can be quite intricate.  For example, even with the TRIPS agreement in place, Northern governments still have control over whether exhaustion of IPR protection is national or international, essentially governing whether Northern retailers can sell goods on in other markets that they have bought at home.  Under an amendment to the TRIPS agreement, Southern governments can license products to local producers on a compulsory basis.  And firms can decide which markets they serve.  The interaction of these policies and entry decisions has a critical bearing on the welfare implications.

Bond R. and K. Saggi, (2012); “Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products.” Vanderbilt University typescript.

Branstetter L., R. Fisman and F. Foley, (2006); “Do stronger intellectual property rights increase international technology transfer? Empirical evidence from U.S. firm-level data.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1): 321–349. [Earlier version]

Branstetter L., R. Fisman, F. Foley and K. Saggi, (2011); “Does intellectual property rights reform spur industrial development?” Journal of International Economics, 83(1): 27–36. [Earlier version]

Chaudhuri, S., P .Goldberg and P. Jia, (2006); “Estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals: a case study of quinolones in India.” American Economic Review, 96(5): 1477–514. [Earlier version]

Goldberg P.K., (2010); “Intellectual property rights protection in developing countries: the case of pharmaceuticals.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 326-353. [Earlier version]

Grossman G.M. and E. Lai, (2008); “Parallel imports and price controls.” Rand Journal of Economics, 39(2): 378–402. [Earlier version]

Ivus, O., (2010); “Do stronger patent rights raise high-tech exports to the developing world? ” Journal of International Economics, 81(1): 38–47. [Earlier version]

Javorcik B., (2004); The composition of foreign direct investment and protection of intellectual property rights in transition economiesEuropean Economic Review, 48(1):39–62. [Earlier version]

Richardson M., (2002); “An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports.” Journal of International Economics, 56(1): 233–245.

Saggi, K., (2013); “Market power in the global economy: The exhaustion and protection of intellectual property.” The Economic Journal, 123 (567): 131–161. [Earlier version]

Valletti T.M., (2006); “Differential pricing, parallel trade, and the incentive to invest.” Journal of International Economics, 70(1): 314–24.

Valletti T.M. and S. Szymanski, (2006); “Parallel trade, international exhaustion and intellectual property rights: a welfare analysis.” Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(4): 499–526. [Earlier version]

Enforcement Institutions and Economic Development

Markets rest on institutions that ensure individuals can commit to keep their contractual obligations. The literature has focused both on formal contract-enforcing institutions, where contracts can be enforced by a third party such as a court of law, and informal institutions where the parties enforce an informal contract themselves. Self-enforcing agreements are particularly important in international trade because the jurisdictions of courts of law often do not extend beyond national borders, particularly at a relatively early stage of economic development. One branch of the literature explores whether liberal political institutions such as limited government and the rule of law, which are necessary for a well functioning court system, lead to the expansion of markets or vice versa. A particular focus of attention in this literature is the endogenous emergence of market supporting institutions in the early history of international trade. This is an important question to the extent that development failure is caused by an absence of this type of institution. A second branch of the literature looks at what types of institutions are required to support the supply of high quality goods and services. The concern here rests on recognition that developing countries often lack well functioning formal contract-enforcement institutions. The question becomes one of whether informal institutions such as social networks that do exist in developing countries can support the delivery of high quality (or efficient) outcomes in the absence of formal institutions. While intuition might suggest that formal and informal institutions serve as substitutes, a key insight from this literature is that formal and informal institutions can in fact complement one another.

Battigalli, P. and G. Maggi, (2002); “Rigidity, Discretion, and the Cost of Writing Contracts.” American Economic Review, 92: 798–817. [Earlier version]

Battigalli, P. and G. Maggi, (2008); “Costly Contracting in a Long-Term RelationshipRAND Journal of Economics, 39(2): 352–377. [Earlier version]

Besley, T.J, M. Ghatak, and K. Burchardi (2012) “Incentives and the de Soto EffectQuarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1): 237-282.

Dhillon, A. and J. Rigolini (2011); “Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions.Journal of Public Economics, 95: 79-87.

Dixit, A. (2003); “On Modes of Economic Governance.” Econometrica, 71(2): 449-481. [Earlier version]

Grief, A. (1993); “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.American Economic Review, 83(3): 525-548.

Greif, A. (2004); “Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange.” Published in C. Menary and M.M. Shirley (eds) Handbook for New Institutional Economics, Norwell, MA, Kluwer Academic Publications, 727-786.

Greif, A., P. Milgrom and B.R Weingast (1994); “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild.Journal of Political Economy, 102(4): 745-776.

MacLeod, B. (2007); “Reputations, Relationships and Contract Enforcement.Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3): 597-630. [Earlier version]

Milgrom, P., D.C. North, B.R. Weingast, (1990); “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics, 1: 1-23.

How Applicable is An Economic Theory of the GATT to Developing Countries?

According to “An Economic Theory of the GATT” by Bagwell and Staiger (1999), the main purpose of a trade agreement is to escape from a terms-of-trade driven prisoner’s dilemma. This is where all countries have a collective incentive to liberalise trade but an individual incentive to adopt protectionist measures such as tariffs. Recent econometric evidence suggests that even relatively small countries set tariffs to leverage their power on world markets, broadening the applicability of the theory. Subsequent developments of the theory argue that in an uncertain world it is efficient to write a trade agreement as an incomplete contract that does not specify the exact levels of tariffs but instead imposes tariff ceilings that allow a degree of flexibility. Recent research uncovers an intriguing empirical regularity. On average small countries, which tend to be developing nations, set their applied tariff rates further below their tariff bindings than large countries, which tend to be developed, do. The explanation proposed is that larger countries, having more power on world markets than small countries do, have a greater incentive to behave opportunistically by raising their tariffs and hence must be bound more tightly by any agreement that is reached.

Bagwell K. and R. Staiger, (1999); “An Economic Theory of GATT.American Economic Review 89 (1), 215-248. [Working paper version]

Bagwell K. and R. Staiger, (2011); “What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence From The World Trade Organization.American Economic Review, 101(4): 1238-73. [Working paper version]

Beshkar M. (2010); “Optimal Remedies in International Trade Agreements.” European Economic Review 54(3), 455-466.

Beshkar M. and E. Bond, (2013); “Cap and Escape in Trade Agreements.” University of New Hampshire and Vanderbilt University typescript. [Working paper version]

Beshkar M., E. Bond and Y.-W. Rho, (2012); “Tariff Binding and Overhang: Theory and Evidence.” University of New Hampshire and Vanderbilt University typescript. [Working paper version]

Broda C., N. Limão and D. Weinstein, (2008); “Optimal Tariffs and Market Power: The Evidence.American Economic Review 98(5), 2032-2065. [Working paper version]

Horn H., G. Maggi, and R. Staiger (2010); “Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts.American Economic Review, 100(1), 394-419. [Working paper version]

Syropoulos C., (2002); “Optimal Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters.The Review of Economic Studies, 69 (3): 707-727.

The TRIPS Agreement and Industrial Development

The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement is an undertaking by members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to respect each others’ property rights.  At its inception, its main purpose was to protect the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of Northern firms, who have historically tended to be the main innovators, in Southern markets where imitation was prevalent.  In the Uruguay Round where the WTO was formed, the terms of TRIPS were agreed to as a quid pro quo for easier entry of Southern products into Northern markets.  One of the main concerns that has arisen as a result of TRIPS is the effect on Southern industrial development of tighter intellectual property protection, since imitation by firms in the South that is widely seen as a precursor to innovation has been curtailed by TRIPS. On the other hand, TRIPS proponents argue that stronger IPRs world-wide will not only increase incentives for innovation but also foster industrial development in developing countries by encouraging multinationals to move production there. A key point established in this literature is that the effects of increased IPR protection in the South on the Northern rate of innovation depend critically on whether production shifts to the South via imitation of Northern firms or via North–South FDI. Recent research has produced a unified framework in which Northern innovation, Southern imitation and the North–South flow of FDI respond endogenously to changes in the degree of Southern IPR protection available to Northern firms, wherein the South’s share of the global basket of goods can actually increase with a strengthening of Southern IPR protection. Econometric testing finds some supportive evidence in the data.

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Goldberg P.K., (2010); “Intellectual property rights protection in developing countries: the case of pharmaceuticals.Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3): 326-353. [Working paper version]

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